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• Kieran McKenna

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General Semiotics Notes

Contents 1

2

3

4

Semiotics

1

1.1

Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.2

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

1.3

Formulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

1.4

Notable semioticians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

1.5

Current applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1.6

Branches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

1.6.1

Pictorial semiotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1.6.2

Semiotics and globalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1.7

Main institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

1.8

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

1.9

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

1.10 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

Sign (semiotics)

14

2.1

Dyadic signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

2.2

Triadic signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

2.2.1

Classes of triadic signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2.3

20th century theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

2.4

Postmodern theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

2.5

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2.6

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2.7

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

Code (semiotics)

20

3.1

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

3.2

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3.3

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

Connotation (semiotics)

22

4.1

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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4.2

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

4.3

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

i

ii 5

6

7

8

9

CONTENTS Denotation (semiotics)

24

5.1

Discussion

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

5.2

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

5.3

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

Content word

26

6.1

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

6.2

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

Modality (semiotics)

27

7.1

Discussion of sign-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

7.2

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

7.3

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

Representation (arts)

29

8.1

Defining representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8.2

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8.3

Contemporary ideas about representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8.4

Peirce and representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8.4.1

Semiotics and logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

8.4.2

Using signs and objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8.5

Saussure and representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8.6

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8.7

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

8.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

8.9

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

Salience (language)

37

9.1

Semiotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

9.1.1

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Communication studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

9.2.1

Axioms of salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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9.2.2

Policy making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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9.3

Public opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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9.4

Marketing stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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9.5

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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9.5.1

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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9.2

9.6

10 Semiosis

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10.1 Introduction to theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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10.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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10.3 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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CONTENTS

iii

10.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Semiosphere

42 43

11.1 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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11.2 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12 Semiotic elements and classes of signs

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12.1 Semiotic elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12.1.1 Sign relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12.1.2 Sign, object, interpretant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12.2 Classes of signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12.2.1 I. Qualisign, sinsign, legisign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12.2.2 II. Icon, index, symbol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12.2.3 III. Rheme, dicisign, argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12.2.4 The three sign typologies together: ten classes of sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12.3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

12.4 References and further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12.5 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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13 Umwelt

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13.1 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

13.2 Critics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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13.3 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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13.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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13.5 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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13.6 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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14 Value (semiotics)

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14.1 Saussure’s Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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14.2 Definitions

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14.2.1 Saussure

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14.2.2 Barthes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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14.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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14.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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14.5 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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14.5.1 Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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14.5.2 Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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14.5.3 Content license . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 1

Semiotics Semiotics (also called semiotic studies; not to be con- that is, with all the psychological, biological, and sociofused with the Saussurean tradition called semiology logical phenomena that occur in the functioning of signs. which is a part of semiotics) is the study of meaningmaking, the study of sign processes and meaningful communication.[1] This includes the study of signs and 1.1 Terminology sign processes (semiosis), indication, designation, likeness, analogy, metaphor, symbolism, signification, and The term derives from the Greek σημειωτικός communication. sēmeiōtikos, “observant of signs”,[4] (from σημεῖον Semiotics is closely related to the field of linguistics, sēmeion, “a sign, a mark”,[5] ) and it was first used in which, for its part, studies the structure and meaning of English by Henry Stubbes[6] (spelt semeiotics) in a very language more specifically. The semiotic tradition ex- precise sense to denote the branch of medical science plores the study of signs and symbols as a significant part relating to the interpretation of signs.[7][8] John Locke of communications. As different from linguistics, how- used the term sem(e)iotike in book four, chapter 21 of An ever, semiotics also studies non-linguistic sign systems. Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690).[9][10] Semiotics may be divided into three branches: Here he explains how science may be divided into three parts: • Semantics: relation between signs and the things to which they refer; their signified denotata, or All that can fall within the compass of meaning human understanding, being either, first, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation: or, secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness: or, thirdly, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated; I think science may be divided properly into these three sorts. — Locke, 1823/1963, p. 174

• Syntactics: relations among or between signs in formal structures • Pragmatics: relation between signs and sign-using agents or interpreters

Semiotics is frequently seen as having important anthropological dimensions; for example, the late Italian semiotician and novelist Umberto Eco proposed that every cultural phenomenon may be studied as communication.[2] Some semioticians focus on the logical dimensions of the science, however. They examine areas belonging also to the life sciences—such as how organisms make predictions about, and adapt to, their semiotic Locke then elaborates on the nature of this third category, niche in the world (see semiosis). In general, semiotic naming it Σημειωτική (Semeiotike) and explaining it as theories take signs or sign systems as their object of study: “the doctrine of signs” in the following terms: the communication of information in living organisms is covered in biosemiotics (including zoosemiotics). Nor is there any thing to be relied upon in Syntactics is the branch of semiotics that deals with the Physick,[11] but an exact knowledge of medicinal physiology (founded on observation, not formal properties of signs and symbols.[3] More precisely, syntactics deals with the “rules that govern how words are principles), semiotics, method of curing, and combined to form phrases and sentences”. Charles Mortried (not excogitated,[12] not commanding) ris adds that semantics deals with the relation of signs to medicines. their designata and the objects that they may or do denote; — Locke, 1823/1963, 4.21.4, p. 175 and, pragmatics deals with the biotic aspects of semiosis, 1

2 In the nineteenth century, Charles Sanders Peirce defined what he termed “semiotic” (which he sometimes spelled as “semeiotic”) as the “quasi-necessary, or formal doctrine of signs”, which abstracts “what must be the characters of all signs used by... an intelligence capable of learning by experience”,[13] and which is philosophical logic pursued in terms of signs and sign processes.[14][15] The Peirce scholar and editor Max H. Fisch[16] claimed in 1978[17] that “semeiotic” was Peirce’s own preferred rendering of Locke’s σημιωτική.

CHAPTER 1. SEMIOTICS

1.2 History

The importance of signs and signification has been recognized throughout much of the history of philosophy, and in psychology as well. Plato and Aristotle both explored the relationship between signs and the world, and Augustine considered the nature of the sign within a conventional system. These theories have had a lasting effect in Western philosophy, especially through scholastic philosophy. (More recently, Umberto Eco, in Charles W. Morris followed Peirce in using the term his Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, has argued “semiotic” and in extending the discipline beyond human that semiotic theories are implicit in the work of most, perhaps all, major thinkers.) communication to animal learning and use of signals. Ferdinand de Saussure, however, founded his semiotics, The general study of signs that began in Latin with Augustine culminated in Latin with the 1632 Tractatus de Signis which he called semiology, in the social sciences: of John Poinsot, and then began anew in late modernity with the attempt in 1867 by Charles Sanders Peirce to It is... possible to conceive of a science draw up a “new list of categories”. Peirce aimed to base which studies the role of signs as part of social his new list directly upon experience precisely as constilife. It would form part of social psychology, tuted by action of signs, in contrast with the list of Arisand hence of general psychology. We shall totle’s categories which aimed to articulate within expericall it semiology (from the Greek semeîon, ence the dimension of being that is independent of expe'sign'). It would investigate the nature of signs rience and knowable as such, through human understandand the laws governing them. Since it does ing. not yet exist, one cannot say for certain that it The estimative powers of animals interpret the environwill exist. But it has a right to exist, a place ment as sensed to form a “meaningful world” of objects, ready for it in advance. Linguistics is only but the objects of this world (or “Umwelt”, in Jakob von one branch of this general science. The laws Uexküll’s term,[19] ) consist exclusively of objects related which semiology will discover will be laws to the animal as desirable (+), undesirable (–), or “safe to applicable in linguistics, and linguistics will ignore” (0). thus be assigned to a clearly defined place in the field of human knowledge. In contrast to this, human understanding adds to the — Cited in Chandler’s “Semiotics for Beginanimal “Umwelt” a relation of self-identity within obners”, Introduction. jects which transforms objects experienced into things as well as +, –, 0 objects.[20] Thus, the generically animal objective world as “Umwelt”, becomes a speciesWhile the Saussurean semiotic is dyadic (sign/syntax, sig- specifically human objective world or “Lebenswelt” (lifenal/semantics), the Peircean semiotic is triadic (sign, ob- world), wherein linguistic communication, rooted in the ject, interpretant), being conceived as philosophical logic biologically underdetermined “Innenwelt” (inner-world) studied in terms of signs that are not always linguistic or of humans, makes possible the further dimension of culartificial. The Peircean semiotic addresses not only the tural organization within the otherwise merely social orexternal communication mechanism, as per Saussure, but ganization of non-human animals whose powers of obthe internal representation machine, investigating not just servation may deal only with directly sensible instances sign processes, or modes of inference, but the whole in- of objectivity. This further point, that human culture dequiry process in general. Peircean semiotics further sub- pends upon language understood first of all not as comdivides each of the three triadic elements into three sub- munication, but as the biologically underdetermined astypes. For example, signs can be icons, indices, and sym- pect or feature of the human animal’s “Innenwelt”, was originally clearly identified by Thomas A. Sebeok.[21] Sebols. beok also played the central role in bringing Peirce’s Yuri Lotman introduced Eastern Europe to semiotics work to the center of the semiotic stage in the twentiand adopted Locke’s coinage as the name to subtitle eth century,[22] first with his expansion of the human use (Σημειωτική) his founding at the University of Tartu in of signs (“anthroposemiosis”) to include also the generiEstonia in 1964 of the first semiotics journal, Sign Systems cally animal sign-usage (“zoösemiosis”),[23] then with his Studies. further expansion of semiosis (based initially on the work Thomas Sebeok assimilated “semiology” to “semiotics” of Martin Krampen,[24] but taking advantage of Peirce’s as a part to a whole,[18] and was involved in choosing the point that an interpretant, as the third item within a sign name Semiotica for the first international journal devoted relation, “need not be mental”[25] ) to include the vegetative world (“phytosemiosis”). to the study of signs.

1.3. FORMULATIONS One of Peirce’s distinctions was that of distinguishing an interpretant from an interpreter. Peirce’s “interpretant” notion opened the way to understanding an action of signs beyond the realm of animal life (study of “phytosemiosis” + “zoösemiosis” + “anthroposemiosis” = biosemiotics), which was his first advance beyond Latin Age semiotics. Other early theorists in the field of semiotics include Charles W. Morris.[26] Max Black argued that the work of Bertrand Russell was seminal in the field.[27]

3 is a necessary overlap between semiotics and communication. Indeed, many of the concepts are shared, although in each field the emphasis is different. In Messages and Meanings: An Introduction to Semiotics, Marcel Danesi (1994) suggested that semioticians’ priorities were to study signification first, and communication second. A more extreme view is offered by Jean-Jacques Nattiez (1987; trans. 1990: 16), who, as a musicologist, considered the theoretical study of communication irrelevant to his application of semiotics.

Semiotics differs from linguistics in that it generalizes the definition of a sign to encompass signs in any medium or sensory modality. Thus it broadens the range of sign systems and sign relations, and extends the definition of language in what amounts to its widest analogical or metaphorical sense. Peirce’s definition of the term “semiotic” as the study of necessary features of signs also has the effect of distinguishing the discipline from linguistics as the study of contingent features that the world’s languages happen to have acquired in the course of their evolutions. From a subjective standpoint, perhaps more difficult is the distinction between semiotics and the philosophy of language. In a sense, the difference lies between separate traditions rather than subjects. Different authors have called themselves “philosopher of language” or “semiotician”. This difference does not match the separation between analytic and continental philosophy. On a closer look, there may be found some differences reColor-coding hot- and cold-water faucets (taps) is common in garding subjects. Philosophy of language pays more atmany cultures but, as this example shows, the coding may be ren- tention to natural languages or to languages in general, dered meaningless because of context. The two faucets (taps) while semiotics is deeply concerned with non-linguistic probably were sold as a coded set, but the code is unusable (and signification. Philosophy of language also bears connecignored), as there is a single water supply. tions to linguistics, while semiotics might appear closer to some of the humanities (including literary theory) and Semioticians classify signs or sign systems in relation to to cultural anthropology. the way they are transmitted (see modality). This process of carrying meaning depends on the use of codes that Semiosis or semeiosis is the process that forms meaning may be the individual sounds or letters that humans use from any organism’s apprehension of the world through to form words, the body movements they make to show signs. Scholars who have talked about semiosis in their attitude or emotion, or even something as general as the sub-theories of semiotics include C. S. Peirce, John clothes they wear. To coin a word to refer to a thing (see Deely, and Umberto Eco. Cognitive semiotics is comlexical words), the community must agree on a simple bining methods and theories developed in the disciplines meaning (a denotative meaning) within their language, of cognitive methods and theories developed in semiotics but that word can transmit that meaning only within the and the humanities, with providing new information into language’s grammatical structures and codes (see syntax human signification and its manifestation in cultural pracand semantics). Codes also represent the values of the tices. The research on cognitive semiotics brings together culture, and are able to add new shades of connotation to semiotics from linguistics, cognitive science, and related disciplines on a common meta-theoretical platform of every aspect of life. concepts, methods, and shared data. To explain the relationship between semiotics and communication studies, communication is defined as the Cognitive semiotics may also be seen as the study of process of transferring data and-or meaning from a source meaning-making by employing and integrating methods to a receiver. Hence, communication theorists construct and theories developed in the cognitive sciences. This models based on codes, media, and contexts to explain involves conceptual and textual analysis as well as experthe biology, psychology, and mechanics involved. Both imental investigations. Cognitive semiotics initially was disciplines recognize that the technical process cannot developed at the Center for Semiotics at Aarhus Univerbe separated from the fact that the receiver must decode sity (Denmark), with an important connection with the the data, i.e., be able to distinguish the data as salient, Center of Functionally Integrated Neuroscience (CFIN) and make meaning out of it. This implies that there at Aarhus Hospital. Amongst the prominent cognitive

1.3 Formulations

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semioticians are Per Aage Brandt, Svend Østergaard, Peer Bundgård, Frederik Stjernfelt, Mikkel Wallentin, Kristian Tylén, Riccardo Fusaroli, and Jordan Zlatev. Zlatev later in co-operation with Göran Sonesson established CCS (Center for Cognitive Semiotics) at Lund University, Sweden.

1.4 Notable semioticians • Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), a noted logician who founded philosophical pragmatism, defined semiosis as an irreducibly triadic process wherein something, as an object, logically determines or influences something as a sign to determine or influence something as an interpretation or interpretant, itself a sign, thus leading to further interpretants.[28] Semiosis is logically structured to perpetuate itself. The object may be quality, fact, rule, or even fictional (Hamlet), and may be “immediate” to the sign, the object as represented in the sign, or “dynamic”, the object as it really is, on which the immediate object is founded. The interpretant may be “immediate” to the sign, all that the sign immediately expresses, such as a word’s usual meaning; or “dynamic”, such as a state of agitation; or “final” or “normal”, the ultimate ramifications of the sign about its object, to which inquiry taken far enough would be destined and with which any interpretant, at most, may coincide.[29] His semiotic[30] covered not only artificial, linguistic, and symbolic signs, but also semblances such as kindred sensible qualities, and indices such as reactions. He came c. 1903[31] to classify any sign by three interdependent trichotomies, intersecting to form ten (rather than 27) classes of sign.[32] Signs also enter into various kinds of meaningful combinations; Peirce covered both semantic and syntactical issues in his speculative grammar. He regarded formal semiotic as logic per se and part of philosophy; as also encompassing study of arguments (hypothetical, deductive, and inductive) and inquiry’s methods including pragmatism; and as allied to, but distinct from logic’s pure mathematics. In addition to pragmatism, Peirce provided a definition of the term “sign” as: “A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea.” Peirce called the sign a representamen, in order to bring out

the fact that a sign is something that “represents” something else in order to suggest it (that is, “represent” it) in some way.[33] For a summary of Peirce’s contributions to semiotics, see Liszka (1996) or Atkin (2006). • Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), the “father” of modern linguistics, proposed a dualistic notion of signs, relating the signifier as the form of the word or phrase uttered, to the signified as the mental concept. According to Saussure, the sign is completely arbitrary—i.e., there is no necessary connection between the sign and its meaning. This sets him apart from previous philosophers, such as Plato or the scholastics, who thought that there must be some connection between a signifier and the object it signifies. In his Course in General Linguistics, Saussure credits the American linguist William Dwight Whitney (1827–1894) with insisting on the arbitrary nature of the sign. Saussure’s insistence on the arbitrariness of the sign also has influenced later philosophers and theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, and Jean Baudrillard. Ferdinand de Saussure coined the term sémiologie while teaching his landmark “Course on General Linguistics” at the University of Geneva from 1906 to 1911. Saussure posited that no word is inherently meaningful. Rather a word is only a “signifier”, i.e., the representation of something, and it must be combined in the brain with the “signified”, or the thing itself, in order to form a meaning-imbued “sign”. Saussure believed that dismantling signs was a real science, for in doing so we come to an empirical understanding of how humans synthesize physical stimuli into words and other abstract concepts. • Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) studied the sign processes in animals. He used the German word for “environment”, umwelt, to describe the individual’s subjective world, and he invented the concept of functional circle (funktionskreis) as a general model of sign processes. In his Theory of Meaning (Bedeutungslehre, 1940), he described the semiotic approach to biology, thus establishing the field that now is called biosemiotics. • Valentin Voloshinov (1895–1936) was a SovietRussian linguist, whose work has been influential in the field of literary theory and Marxist theory of ideology. Written in the late 1920s in the USSR, Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (tr.: Marksizm i Filosofiya Yazyka) developed a counter-Saussurean linguistics, which situated language use in social process rather than in an entirely decontexualized Saussurean langue. • Louis Hjelmslev (1899–1965) developed a formalist approach to Saussure’s structuralist theories. His

1.4. NOTABLE SEMIOTICIANS

5

best known work is Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, which was expanded in Résumé of the Theory of Language, a formal development of glossematics, his scientific calculus of language. • Charles W. Morris (1901–1979). In his 1938 Foundations of the Theory of Signs, he defined semiotics as grouping the triad syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Syntax studies the interrelation of the signs, without regard to meaning. Semantics studies the relation between the signs and the objects to which they apply. Pragmatics studies the relation between the sign system and its human (or animal) user. Unlike his mentor George Herbert Mead, Morris was a behaviorist and sympathetic to the Vienna Signaling and communication between the Astatotilapia burtoni Circle positivism of his colleague, Rudolf Carnap. Morris was accused by John Dewey of misreading Peirce.[34] of the issues addressed by philosophy of mind and coining the term zoosemiotics. Sebeok insisted that • Thure von Uexküll (1908–2004), the “father” of all communication was made possible by the relamodern psychosomatic medicine, developed a ditionship between an organism and the environment agnostic method based on semiotic and biosemiotic in which it lives. He also posed the equation beanalyses. tween semiosis (the activity of interpreting signs) and life—a view that the Copenhagen-Tartu biosemiotic • Roland Barthes (1915–1980) was a French literary school has further developed. theorist and semiotician. He often would critique pieces of cultural material to expose how bourgeois • Yuri Lotman (1922–1993) was the founding memsociety used them to impose its values upon othber of the Tartu (or Tartu-Moscow) Semiotic ers. For instance, the portrayal of wine drinking in School. He developed a semiotic approach to the French society as a robust and healthy habit would study of culture—semiotics of culture—and estabbe a bourgeois ideal perception contradicted by cerlished a communication model for the study of text tain realities (i.e. that wine can be unhealthy and semiotics. He also introduced the concept of the inebriating). He found semiotics useful in conductsemiosphere. Among his Moscow colleagues were ing these critiques. Barthes explained that these Vladimir Toporov, Vyacheslav Ivanov and Boris Usbourgeois cultural myths were second-order signs, pensky. or connotations. A picture of a full, dark bottle is a sign, a signifier relating to a signified: a fermented, • Christian Metz (1931–1993) pioneered the applicaalcoholic beverage—wine. However, the bourgeois tion of Saussurean semiotics to film theory, applying take this signified and apply their own emphasis to it, syntagmatic analysis to scenes of films and groundmaking “wine” a new signifier, this time relating to ing film semiotics in greater context. a new signified: the idea of healthy, robust, relaxing wine. Motivations for such manipulations vary from • Umberto Eco (1932–2016) made a wider audience a desire to sell products to a simple desire to mainaware of semiotics by various publications, most notain the status quo. These insights brought Barthes tably A Theory of Semiotics and his novel, The Name very much in line with similar Marxist theory. of the Rose, which includes (second to its plot) applied semiotic operations. His most important contributions to the field bear on interpretation, ency• Algirdas Julien Greimas (1917–1992) developed a clopedia, and model reader. He also has criticized structural version of semiotics named, “generative in several works (A theory of semiotics, La struttura semiotics”, trying to shift the focus of discipline assente, Le signe, La production de signes) the “iconfrom signs to systems of signification. His theories ism” or “iconic signs” (taken from Peirce’s most fadevelop the ideas of Saussure, Hjelmslev, Claude mous triadic relation, based on indexes, icons, and Lévi-Strauss, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. symbols), to which he purposes four modes of sign • Thomas A. Sebeok (1920–2001), a student of production: recognition, ostension, replica, and inCharles W. Morris, was a prolific and wide-ranging vention. American semiotician. Although he insisted that an• Eliseo Verón (1935–2014) developed his “Social imals are not capable of language, he expanded the Discourse Theory” inspired in the Peircian conceppurview of semiotics to include non-human signaltion of “Semiosis”. ing and communication systems, thus raising some

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• The Mu Group (Groupe µ) (founded 1967) devel- The major semiotic book series “Semiotics, Communicaoped a structural version of rhetorics, and the visual tion, Cognition”, published by De Gruyter Mouton (sesemiotics. ries editors Paul Cobley and Kalevi Kull) replaces the former “Approaches to Semiotics” (more than 120 volumes) and “Approaches to Applied Semiotics” (series editor Thomas A. Sebeok). Since 1980 the Semiotic Soci1.5 Current applications ety of America has produced an annual conference series: Semiotics: The Proceedings of the Semiotic Society of America.

1.6 Branches Semiotics has sprouted subfields including, but not limited to, the following: • Biosemiotics: the study of semiotic processes at all levels of biology, or a semiotic study of living systems (e.g., Copenhagen–Tartu School). • Semiotic anthropology. Chart semiotics of social networking

Applications of semiotics include: • It represents a methodology for the analysis of “texts” regardless of the medium in which it is presented. For these purposes, “text” is any message preserved in a form whose existence is independent of both sender and receiver; • It may improve ergonomic design in situations where it is important to ensure that human beings are able to interact more effectively with their environments, whether it be on a large scale, as in architecture, or on a small scale, such as the configuration of instrumentation for human use. In some countries, its role is limited to literary criticism and an appreciation of audio and visual media, but this narrow focus may inhibit a more general study of the social and political forces shaping how different media are used and their dynamic status within modern culture. Issues of technological determinism in the choice of media and the design of communication strategies assume new importance in this age of mass media. Publication of research is both in dedicated journals such as Sign Systems Studies, established by Yuri Lotman and published by Tartu University Press; Semiotica, founded by Thomas A. Sebeok and published by Mouton de Gruyter; Zeitschrift für Semiotik; European Journal of Semiotics; Versus (founded and directed by Umberto Eco), et al.; The American Journal of Semiotics; and as articles accepted in periodicals of other disciplines, especially journals oriented toward philosophy and cultural criticism.

• Cognitive semiotics: the study of meaning-making by employing and integrating methods and theories developed in the cognitive sciences. This involves conceptual and textual analysis as well as experimental investigations. Cognitive semiotics initially was developed at the Center for Semiotics at Aarhus University (Denmark), with an important connection with the Center of Functionally Integrated Neuroscience (CFIN) at Aarhus Hospital. Amongst the prominent cognitive semioticians are Per Aage Brandt, Svend Østergaard, Peer Bundgård, Frederik Stjernfelt, Mikkel Wallentin, Kristian Tylén, Riccardo Fusaroli, and Jordan Zlatev. Zlatev later in co-operation with Göran Sonesson established the Center for Cognitive Semiotics (CCS) at Lund University, Sweden. • Computational semiotics: attempts to engineer the process of semiosis, in the study of and design for human-computer interaction or to mimic aspects of human cognition through artificial intelligence and knowledge representation. See also cybercognition. • Cultural and literary semiotics: examines the literary world, the visual media, the mass media, and advertising in the work of writers such as Roland Barthes, Marcel Danesi, and Yuri Lotman (e.g., Tartu–Moscow Semiotic School). • Cybersemiotics: built on two already-generated interdisciplinary approaches: cybernetics and systems theory including information theory and science, and Peircean semiotics including phenomenology and pragmatic aspects of linguistics, attempts to make the two interdisciplinary paradigms—both going beyond mechanistic and pure constructivistic ideas—complement each other in a common framework. Søren Brier.[35]

1.6. BRANCHES • Design semiotics or product semiotics: the study of the use of signs in the design of physical products; introduced by Martin Krampen, a o, and in a practitioner-oriented version by Rune Monö while teaching industrial design at the Institute of Design, Umeå University, Sweden. • •

•

•

•

7

1.6.1 Pictorial semiotics

Pictorial semiotics[37] is intimately connected to art history and theory. It goes beyond them both in at least one fundamental way, however. While art history has limited its visual analysis to a small number of pictures that qualify as “works of art”, pictorial semiotics focuses Ethnosemiotics is a disciplinary perspective which on the properties of pictures in a general sense, and on links semiotics concepts to ethnographic methods. how the artistic conventions of images can be interpreted Film semiotics: the study of the various codes and through pictorial codes. Pictorial codes are the way in signs of film and how they are understood; see which viewers of pictorial representations seem automatically to decipher the artistic conventions of images by Christian Metz. being unconsciously familiar with them.[38] Gregorian chant semiology is a current avenue of palaeographical research in Gregorian chant which According to Göran Sonesson, a Swedish semiotician, pictures can be analyzed by three models: (a) the naris revising the Solesmes school of interpretation. rative model, which concentrates on the relationship beLaw and semiotics: one of the more accomplished tween pictures and time in a chronological manner as in a publications in this field is the International Journal comic strip; (b) the rhetoric model, which compares picfor the Semiotics of Law, published by International tures with different devices as in a metaphor; and (c) the Association for the Semiotics of Law. laokoon (or laocoon) model, which considers the limits Marketing semiotics, or commercial semiotics is an and constraints of pictorial expressions by comparing texthat utilize time with visual mediums that application of semiotic methods and semiotic think- tual mediums[39] utilize space. ing in the analysis and development of advertising

and brand communications in cultural context. Key The break from traditional art history and theory—as well figures include Virginia Valentine, Malcolm Evans, as from other major streams of semiotic analysis—leaves Greg Rowland, Georgios Rossolatos. open a wide variety of possibilities for pictorial semiotics. • Music semiology: “There are strong arguments that Some influences have been drawn from phenomenologimusic inhabits a semiological realm which, on both cal analysis, cognitive psychology, structuralist, and cogontogenetic and phylogenetic levels, has develop- nitivist linguistics, and visual anthropology and sociology. mental priority over verbal language.” (Middleton 1990, p. 172) See Nattiez (1976, 1987, 1989), Ste1.6.2 Semiotics and globalization fani (1973, 1986), Baroni (1983), and Semiotica (66: 1–3 (1987)). Studies have shown that semiotics may be used to make or break a brand. Culture codes strongly influence whether • Semiotics of music videos. a population likes or dislikes a brand’s marketing, es• Organisational semiotics: the study of semiotic pecially internationally. If the company is unaware of processes in organizations (with strong ties to a culture’s codes, it runs the risk of failing in its marcomputational semiotics and human-computer in- keting. Globalization has caused the development of a teraction). global consumer culture where products have similar as• Social semiotics: expands the interpretable semiotic sociations, whether positive or negative, across numerous [40] landscape to include all cultural codes, such as in markets. slang, fashion, and advertising (See Roland Barthes, Mistranslations may lead to instances of "Engrish" or Michael Halliday, Bob Hodge, and Christian Metz). "Chinglish", terms for unintentionally humorous crosscultural slogans intended to be understood in English. This may be caused by a sign that, in Peirce’s terms, mistakenly indexes or symbolizes something in one culture, that it does not in another.[41] In other words, it creates a connotation that is culturally-bound, and that violates • Theatre semiotics: extends or adapts semiotics on- some culture code. Theorists who have studied humor stage; key theoricians include Keir Elam. (such as Schopenhauer) suggest that contradiction or incongruity creates absurdity and therefore, humor.[42] Vi• Urban semiotics olating a culture code creates this construct of ridiculous• Visual semiotics: analyses visual signs; prominent ness for the culture that owns the code. Intentional humodern founders to this branch are Groupe µ and mor also may fail cross-culturally because jokes are not Göran Sonesson (see also visual rhetoric). on code for the receiving culture.[43] • Structuralism and post-structuralism in the work of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Louis Hjelmslev, Roman Jakobson, Jacques Lacan, Claude LéviStrauss, Roland Barthes, etc.

• Semiotics of photography.[36]

A good example of branding according to cultural code

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is Disney’s international theme park business. Disney fits 1.9 References well with Japan's cultural code because the Japanese value “cuteness”, politeness, and gift giving as part of their cul- Notes ture code; Tokyo Disneyland sells the most souvenirs of any Disney theme park. In contrast, Disneyland Paris [1] “The science of communication studied through the interfailed when it launched as Euro Disney because the compretation of signs and symbols as they operate in various pany did not research the codes underlying European culfields, esp. language”, Oxford English Dictionary (2003) ture. Its storybook retelling of European folktales was taken as elitist and insulting, and the strict appearance [2] Caesar, Michael (1999). Umberto Eco: Philosophy, Semiotics, and the Work of Fiction. Wiley-Blackwell. p. standards that it had for employees resulted in discrim55. ISBN 978-0-7456-0850-1. ination lawsuits in France. Disney souvenirs were perceived as cheap trinkets. The park was a financial failure [3] The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Lanbecause its code violated the expectations of European guage: Syntactics culture in ways that were offensive.[44] On the other hand, some researchers have suggested that it is possible to successfully pass a sign perceived as a cultural icon, such as the Coca-Cola or McDonald’s logos, from one culture to another. This may be accomplished if the sign is migrated from a more economically-developed to a less developed culture.[44] The intentional association of a product with another culture has been called Foreign Consumer Culture Positioning (FCCP). Products also may be marketed using global trends or culture codes, for example, saving time in a busy world; but even these may be fine-tuned for specific cultures.[40] Research also found that, as airline industry brandings grow and become more international, their logos become more symbolic and less iconic. The iconicity and symbolism of a sign depends on the cultural convention and, are on that ground in relation with each other. If the cultural convention has greater influence on the sign, the signs get more symbolic value.[45]

1.7 Main institutions A world organisation of semioticians—the International Association for Semiotic Studies, with its journal Semiotica—was established in 1969. The larger research centers together with extensive teaching program include the semiotics departments at the University of Tartu, Aarhus University, and Bologna University.

1.8 See also • Outline of semiotics • Index of semiotics articles • Semiotic elements and classes of signs • Medical sign • Ethnosemiotics • Language-game (philosophy) • Private language argument

[4] σημειωτικός, Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, on Perseus [5] σημεῖον, Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A GreekEnglish Lexicon, on Perseus [6] Stubbe, H.,The Plus Ultra reduced to a Non Plus ... (London, England, 1670), page 75: "... nor is there any thing to be relied upon in Physick, but an exact knowledge of medicinal phisiology (founded on observation, not principles), semeiotics, method of curing, and tried (not excogitated, not commanding) medicines ....” [7] “The branch of medical science relating to the interpretation of symptoms”, Oxford English Dictionary (1989) [8] For the Greeks, “signs” occurred in the world of nature, “symbols” in the world of culture. Not until Augustine of Hippo would a thematic proposal for uniting the two under the notion of “sign” (signum) as transcending the nature-culture divide and identifying symbols as no more than a species (or sub-species) of signum be formally proposed. See the monograph study on this question, Le teorie del segno nell’antichità classica by Giovanni Manetti (Milan: Bompiani, 1987); trans. by Christine Richardson as Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993). Classic also is the article by Luigi Romeo, “The Derivation of ‘Semiotics’ through the History of the Discipline”, in Semiosis 6, Heft 2 (1977), 37–49. See also Andrew LaVelle’s discussion of Romeo on Peirce-l at . [9] Locke used the Greek word σημιωτική [sic] in the 4th ed. of 1700 (p. 437) of his Essay concerning Human Understanding. He notably writes both (a) "σημιωτικὴ" and (b) "Σημιωτική"—when term (a) is followed by any kind of punctuation mark, it takes the form (b); see Ancient Greek accent. The 1689/1690 first edition of Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding, in the concluding “Division of the Sciences” chapter, Locke introduces, in §4, "σημιωτική" as his proposed name synonymous with "the Doctrine of Signs" for the development of the future study of the ubiquitous role of signs within human awareness. In the 1689-1690 original edition, the “Division of the Sciences” chapter was Chapter XX. In the 4th ed. of 1700, a new Chapter XIX “Of Enthusiasm” is inserted into Book IV, after which the Chapter XX of the 1st ed. becomes Chapter XXI for all subsequent editions. — see in John Deely, Why Semiotics? (Ottawa: Legas, 2004), 71–88, esp. 77–80 for the editions of Locke’s

1.9. REFERENCES

9

Essay from 1689 through 1716. It is an important fact that Locke’s proposal for the development of semiotics, with three passing exceptions as “asides” in the writings of Berkeley, Leibniz, and Condillac, “is met with a resounding silence that lasts as long as modernity itself. Even Locke’s devoted late modern editor, Alexander Campbell Fraser, dismisses out of hand ‘this crude and superficial scheme of Locke’" (see “Locke’s modest proposal subversive of the way of ideas, its reception, and its bearing on the resolution of an ancient and a modern controversy in logic” in Chap. 14 of Deely’s Four Ages of Understanding, pp. 591–606). In the 1975 Oxford University Press critical edition, prepared and introduced by Peter Harold Nidditch, Nidditch tells us, in his “Foreword”, p. vii, that he presents us with “a complete, critically established, and unmodernized text that aims at being historically faithful to Locke’s final intentions"; p. xxv tells us further that “the present text is based on the original fourth edition of the Essay", and that “readings in the other early authorized editions are adopted, in appropriate form, where necessary, and recorded otherwise in the textual notes”. The term "σημιωτική" appears in that 1700 4th edition, the last published (but not the last prepared) within Locke’s lifetime, with exactly the spelling and final accent found in the 1689/1690 1st edition. Yet if we turn to (the final) chapter XXI of the 1975 Oxford edition, we find on p. 720 not "σημιωτικὴ" but rather do we find substituted the "σημειωτικὴ" spelling (and with final accent reversed). (Note that in Modern Greek and in some systems for pronouncing classical Greek, "σημιωτική" and "σημειωτική" are pronounced the same.)

[15] Peircean semiotic is triadic (sign, object, interpretant), as opposed to the dyadic Saussurian tradition (signifier, signified), and is conceived of as philosophical logic studied in terms of signs that are not always linguistic or artificial, and sign processes, modes of inference, and the inquiry process in general, with emphases not only on symbols but also on signs that are semblances (“icons”) and signs that are signs by being factually connected (“indices”) to their objects.

[10] Prior to Locke, the notion of “sign” as transcending the nature/culture divide was introduced by Augustine of Hippo—see John Deely, Augustine & Poinsot: The Protosemiotic Development (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2009) for full details of Augustine’s originality on this point—a specialized study was firmly established. Himself a man of medicine, Locke was familiar with this “semeiotics” as naming a specialized branch within medical science. In his personal library were two editions of Scapula’s 1579 abridgement of Henricus Stephanus’ Thesaurus Graecae Linguae, which listed σημειωτική as the name for “diagnostics”, the branch of medicine concerned with interpreting symptoms of disease ("symptomatology"). Indeed the English physician and scholar Henry Stubbes had transliterated this term of specialized science into English precisely as “semeiotic” in his 1670 work, The Plus Ultra Reduced to a Non Plus (p. 75).

[20] Cf. Martin Heidegger (1927), in the 1962 trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Being and Time (New York, NY: Harper & Row), p. 487: “The distinction between the being of existing Dasein and the Being of entities, such as Reality, which do not have the character of Dasein...is nothing with which philosophy may tranquilize itself. It has long been known that ancient ontology works with ‘Thing-concepts’ and that there is a danger of ‘reifying consciousness’. But what does this ‘reifying’ signify? Where does it arise? Why does Being get ‘conceived’ ‘proximally’ in terms of the present-at-hand and not in terms of the ready-to-hand, which indeed lies closer to us? Why does reifying always keep coming back to exercise its dominion?" This is the question that the Umwelt/Lebenswelt distinction as here drawn answers to.

[16] Max Fisch compiled Peirce-related bibliographical supplements in 1952, 1964, 1966, 1974; was consulting editor on the 1977 microfilm of Peirce’s published works and on the Comprehensive Bibliography associated with it; was among the main editors of the first five volumes (published 1981–1993) Writings of Charles S. Peirce; and wrote a number of published articles on Peirce, many collected in 1986 in Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, Ketner and Kloesel, eds., Indiana University Press: catalog page, Bloomington, IN, 480 pages. See Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography. [17] Fisch, Max H. (1978), “Peirce’s General Theory of Signs” in Sight, Sound, and Sense, ed. T. A. Sebeok. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 31–70. [18] The whole anthology, Frontiers in Semiotics, was devoted to the documentation of this pars pro toto move of Sebeok. [19] See “Umwelt”, Semiotica 134–1/4 (2001), 125–135; Special Issue on “Jakob von Uexküll: A paradigm for biology and semiotics” Guest-Edited by Kalevi Kull.

[13] Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 2, paragraph 227.

[21] Thomas A. Sebeok, “The Evolution of Communication and the Origin of Language”, lecture in the 1984 June 1– 3 International Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies 1984 Colloquium on “Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Communication Systems”, published under the title “Communication, Language, and Speech. Evolutionary Considerations”, in Sebeok’s I Think I Am A Verb. More Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs (New York: Plenum Press, 1986), pp. 10–16. For subsequent context, see the “Afterword” to the volume of Sebeok’s Semiotic Prologues, ed. John Deely and Marcel Danesi (Ottawa, Canada: Legas, 2012), pp. 365–383; version online at .

[14] Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Logic, Considered as Semeiotic”, Manuscript L75, transcription at Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway, and, in particular, its “On the Definition of Logic” (Memoir 12), transcription at Arisbe.

[22] Detailed demonstration of Sebeok’s role of the global emergence of semiotics is recorded in at least three recent volumes. (1) Semiotics Seen Synchronically. The View from 2010 (Ottawa: Legas, 2010). (2) Semiotics

[11] A now-obsolete term for the art or profession of curing disease with (herbal) medicines or (chemical) drugs; especially purgatives or cathartics. Also, it specifically refers to the treatment of humans. [12] That is, “thought out”, “contrived”, or “devised” (Oxford English Dictionary).

10

CHAPTER 1. SEMIOTICS

Continues To Astonish. Thomas A. Sebeok and the Doctrine of Signs (Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter, 2011)—a 526page assemblage of essays, vignettes, letters, pictures attesting to the depth and extent of Sebeok’s promotion of semiotic understanding around the world, including his involvement with Juri Lotman and the Tartu University graduate program in semiotics (currently directed by P. Torop, M. Lotman and K. Kull). (3) Sebeok’s Semiotic Prologues (Ottawa: Legas, 2012)—a volume which gathers together in Part I all the “prologues” (i.e., introductions, prefaces, forewords, etc.) that Sebeok wrote for other peoples’ books, then in Part 2 all the “prologues” that other people wrote for Sebeok. [23] See Thomas A. Sebeok, “Communication in Animals and Men”, review article covering three books: Martin Lindauer, Communication among Social Bees (Harvard Books in Biology, No. 2; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961, pp. ix + 143); Winthrop N. Kellogg, Porpoises and Sonar (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. xiv + 177); and John C. Lilly, Man and Dolphin (Garden City, New York: Doubleday), in Language 39 (1963), 448–466.

[31] Peirce, Collected Papers v. 2, paragraphs 243–263, written c. 1903. [32] He worked on but did not perfect a finer-grained system of ten trichotomies, to be combined into 66 (Tn₊₁) classes of sign. That raised for Peirce 59,049 classificatory questions (59,049 = 310 , or 3 to the 10th power). See p. 482 in “Excerpts from Letters to Lady Welby”, Essential Peirce v. 2. [33] Ryan, Michael (2011). [http://www.credoreference.com. pitt.idm.oclc.org/entry/wileylitcul/semiotics> The Encyclopedia of Literary and Cultural Theory]. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-1-4051-8312-3. [34] Dewey, John, (1946, February 14), “Peirce’s Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and Meaning”. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 43, n. 4, pp. 85–95. [35] Brier, Søren (2008). Cybersemiotics: Why Information Is Not Enough!. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-0-8020-9220-5. [36] Semiotics of Photography

[24] Martin Krampen, “Phytosemiotics”, Semiotica, 36.3/4 (1981), 187–209.

[37] “Pictorial Semiotics”. Oxford Index. Oxford University Press, n.d. Web.

[25] Peirce c. 1907: Excerpt from “Pragmatism (Editor [3])", published under the title “A Survey of Pragmaticism” in The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. 5, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 5.473. See also the part of Peirce’s letter of to Lady Welby dated 23 December 1908, in Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between C. S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby, ed. Charles S. Hardwick with the assistance of James Cook (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 73–86. And “Semiosis: The Subject Matter of Semiotic Inquiry”, Chap. 3 of Basics of Semiotics by John Deely (5th ed.: Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University Press, 2009), 26–50, esp. 31 & 38– 41).

[38] “Pictorial Codes”. Oxford Index. Oxford University Press, n.d. Web.

[26] 1971, orig. 1938, Writings on the general theory of signs, Mouton, The Hague, The Netherlands [27] 1944, Black M. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 5. [28] For Peirce’s definitions of signs and semiosis, see under "Sign" and "Semiosis, semeiosy" in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms; and "76 definitions of sign by C. S. Peirce" collected by Robert Marty. Peirce’s "What Is a Sign" (MS 404 of 1894, Essential Peirce v. 2, pp. 4–10) provides intuitive help. [29] See Peirce, excerpt from a letter to William James, March 14, 1909, Collected Papers v. 8, paragraph 314. Also see under relevant entries in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms. On coincidence of actual opinion with final opinion, see MS 218, transcription at Arisbe, and appearing in Writings of Charles S. Peirce v. 3, p. 79. [30] He spelt it “semiotic” and “semeiotic”. See under "Semeiotic [etc.] in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms.

[39] Sonesson, Göran (1988). “Methods and Models in Pictorial Semiotics": 2–98. [40] Alden, Dana; Jan-Benedict Steenkamp & Rajeev Batra. (1999). “Brand Positioning Through Advertising in Asia, North America, and Europe: The Role of Global Consumer Culture”, Journal of Marketing 63 (1), 75–87. [41] Chandler, Daniel. (2001/2007). Semiotics: The Basics. London: Routledge [42] Spotts, H. Weinberger M. & Parsons A. (1997). “Assessing the use and impact of humor on advertising effectiveness: A contingency approach”, Journal of Advertising, 26 (3), 17–32 [43] Beeman, William. (1981). “Why do they laugh? An interactional approach to humor in traditional Iranian improvisatory theater: Performance and its effects”. Journal of American Folklore, 94 (374), 506–526. [44] Brannen, M. (2004). When Mickey Loses Face: Recontextualization, Semantic Fit, and the Semiotics of Foreignness, Academy of Management Review, 29 (4), 593– 616 [45] Thurlow, C. & Aiello, G. (2007). “National pride, global capital: a social semiotic analysis of transnational visual branding in the airline industry”, Visual Communication, 6(3), 305–344

Bibliography • Atkin, Albert. (2006). "Peirce’s Theory of Signs", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

1.9. REFERENCES

11

• Barthes, Roland. ([1957] 1987). Mythologies. New York: Hill & Wang.

• Eagleton, Terry. (1983). Literary Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

• Barthes, Roland ([1964] 1967). Elements of Semiology. (Translated by Annette Lavers & Colin Smith). London: Jonathan Cape.

• Eco, Umberto. (1976). A Theory of Semiotics. London: Macmillan.

• Chandler, Daniel. (2001/2007). Semiotics: The Basics. London: Routledge.

• Eco, Umberto. (1986) Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

• Clarke, D. S. (1987). Principles of Semiotic. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

• Eco, Umberto. (2000) Kant and the Platypus. New York, Harcourt Brace & Company.

• Clarke, D. S. (2003). Kluwer.

Dordrecht:

• Eco, Umberto. (1976) A Theory of Semiotics. Indiana, Indiana University Press.

• Culler, Jonathan (1975). Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

• Emmeche, Claus; Kull, Kalevi (eds.) (2011) Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. London: Imperial College Press. pdf

• Danesi, Marcel & Perron, Paul. (1999). Analyzing Cultures: An Introduction and Handbook. Bloomington: Indiana UP.

• Foucault, Michel. (1970). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: Tavistock.

• Danesi, Marcel. (1994). Messages and Meanings: An Introduction to Semiotics. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press.

• Greimas, Algirdas. (1987). On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory. (Translated by Paul J Perron & Frank H Collins). London: Frances Pinter.

Sign Levels.

• Danesi, Marcel. (2002). Understanding Media Semiotics. London: Arnold; New York: Oxford UP. • Danesi, Marcel. (2007). The Quest for Meaning: A Guide to Semiotic Theory and Practice. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. • Deely, John. (2005 [1990]). Basics of Semiotics. 4th ed. Tartu: Tartu University Press. • Deely, John. (2000), The Red Book: The Beginning of Postmodern Times or: Charles Sanders Peirce and the Recovery of Signum. Eprint PDF (578 KiB).

• Herlihy, David. 1988–present. “2nd year class of semiotics”. CIT. • Hjelmslev, Louis (1961). Prolegomena to a Theory of Language. (Translated by Francis J. Whitfield). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. • Hodge, Robert & Kress, Gunther. (1988). Social Semiotics. Ithaca: Cornell UP. • Lacan, Jacques. (1977) Écrits: A Selection. (Translated by Alan Sheridan). New York: Norton.

• Deely, John. (2000), The Green Book: The Impact of Semiotics on Philosophy. Eprint PDF (571 KiB).

• Lidov, David (1999) Elements of Semiotics. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

• Deely, John. (2001). Four Ages of Understanding. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

• Liszka, J. J. (1996) A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of C.S. Peirce. Indiana University Press.

• Deely, John. (2003), “On the Word Semiotics, Formation and Origins”, Semiotica 146.1/4, 1–50.

• Locke, John, The Works of John Locke, A New Edition, Corrected, In Ten Volumes, Vol.III, T. Tegg, (London), 1823. (facsimile reprint by Scientia, (Aalen), 1963.)

• Deely, John. (2003). The Impact on Philosophy of Semiotics. South Bend: St. Augustine Press. • Deely, John. (2004), "'Σημειον' to 'Sign' by Way of 'Signum': On the Interplay of Translation and Interpretation in the Establishment of Semiotics”, Semiotica 148–1/4, 187–227. • Deely, John. (2006), “On 'Semiotics’ as Naming the Doctrine of Signs”, Semiotica 158.1/4 (2006), 1–33. • Derrida, Jacques (1981). Positions. (Translated by Alan Bass). London: Athlone Press.

• Lotman, Yuri M. (1990). Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture. (Translated by Ann Shukman). London: I.B. Tauris. • Morris, Charles W. (1971). Writings on the general theory of signs. The Hague: Mouton. • Menchik, D., and X. Tian. (2008) “Putting Social Context into Text: The Semiotics of Email Interaction.” The American Journal of Sociology. 114:2 pp. 332–70.

12 • Peirce, Charles S. (1934). Collected papers: Volume V. Pragmatism and pragmaticism. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.

CHAPTER 1. SEMIOTICS • The Semiotics of the Web • Tartu Semiotics Department

• Hard Semiotics by Robert Marty • Petrilli, S. (2009). Semiotics as semioethics in the era of global communication. Semiotica, 173(1–4), 343–347, 353–354, 359. doi: Peircean focus 10.1515/SEMI.2009.015 • Ponzio, Augusto & S. Petrilli (2007) Semiotics Today. From Global Semiotics to Semioethics, a Dialogic Response. New York, Ottawa, Toronto: Legas. 84 pp. ISBN 978-1-894508-98-8 • Romeo, Luigi (1977), “The Derivation of 'Semiotics’ through the History of the Discipline”, Semiosis, v. 6 pp. 37–50. • Sebeok, T.A. (1976), Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN.

• Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway • Minute Semeiotic, English, Portuguese • Peirce’s Theory of Semiosis: Toward a Logic of Mutual Affection—free online course • Semiotics according to Robert Marty, with 76 definitions of the sign by C. S. Peirce • The Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms

• Sebeok, Thomas A. (Editor) (1977). A Perfusion of Journals, book series—associations, centers Signs. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. • Signs and Meaning: 5 Questions, edited by Peer Bundgaard and Frederik Stjernfelt, 2009 (Automatic Press / VIP). (Includes interviews with 29 leading semioticians of the world.) • Short, T.L. (2007), Peirce’s Theory of Signs, Cambridge University Press.

• American Journal of Semiotics, Joseph Brent, Editor, & John Deely, Managing Editor—from the Semiotic Society of America. • Applied Semiotics / Sémiotique appliquée(AS/SA), Peter G. Marteinson & Pascal G. Michelucci, Editors.

• Stubbe, Henry (Henry Stubbes), The Plus Ultra reduced to a Non Plus: Or, A Specimen of some Animadversions upon the Plus Ultra of Mr. Glanvill, wherein sundry Errors of some Virtuosi are discovered, the Credit of the Aristotelians in part Readvanced; and Enquiries made...., (London), 1670.

• Approaches to Applied Semiotics (2000–2009 book series), Thomas Sebeok et al., Editors.

• Uexküll, Thure von (1982). Semiotics and medicine. Semiotica 38-3/4:205-215

• Biosemiotics, Marcello Barbieri, Editor-in-Chief— from the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies.

• Williamson, Judith. (1978). Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising. London: Boyars. • Zlatev, Jordan. (2009). “The Semiotic Hierarchy: Life, Consciousness, Signs and Language, Cognitive Semiotics”. Sweden: Scania.

1.10 External links • Applied Semiotics / Sémiotique appliquée • Communicology: The link between semiotics and phenomenological manifestations • Language and the Origin of Semiosis • Semiotics for Beginners • Signo—www.signosemio.com—Presents semiotic theories and theories closely related to semiotics

• Approaches to Semiotics (1969–97 book series), Thomas A. Sebeok, Alain Rey, Roland Posner, et al., Editors.

• Center for Semiotics, Aarhus University, Denmark. • Cognitive Semiotics, Per Aage Brandt & Todd Oakley, Editors-in-Chief. • Cybernetics and Human Knowing, Søren Brier, Chief Editor. • International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems (IJSSS), Angelo Loula & João Queiroz, Editors. • Open Semiotics Resource Center. Journals, lecture courses, etc. • The Public Journal of Semiotics, Paul Bouissac, Editor in Chief; Alan Cienki, Associate Editor; René Jorna, Winfried Nöth. • S.E.E.D. Journal (Semiotics, Evolution, Energy, and Development) (2001–7), Edwina Taborsky, Editor—from SEE.

1.10. EXTERNAL LINKS • The Semiotic Review of Books, Gary Genosko, General Editor; Paul Bouissac, Founding Editor. • Semiotica, Marcel Danesi, Chief Editor—from the International Association for Semiotic Studies. • Semiotiche, Gian Paolo Caprettini, Managing Director; Andrea Valle & Miriam Visalli, Editors. Some articles in English. Home site seems gone from Web, old url no longer good, and Wayback Machine cannot retrieve. • Semiotics, Communication and Cognition (book series), Paul Cobley & Kalevi Kull, Editors. • SemiotiX New Series: A Global Information Bulletin, Paul Bouissac et al. • Sign Systems Studies, Kalevi Kull, Kati Lindstrom, Mihhail Lotman, Timo Maran, Silvi Salupere, Peeter Torop, Editors—from the Dept. of Semiotics, U. of Tartu, Estonia. • Signs and Society, Richard J. Parmentier, Editor. • Signs: International Journal of Semiotics. Martin Thellefsen, Torkild Thellefsen, & Bent Sørensen, chief eds. • Tartu Semiotics Library (book series), Peeter Torop, Kalevi Kull, Silvi Salupere, Editors. • Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Cornelis de Waal, Chief Editor—from The Charles S. Peirce Society. • Versus: Quaderni di studi semiotici, founded by Umberto Eco.

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Chapter 2

Sign (semiotics) In semiotics, a sign is something that can be interpreted as having a meaning, which is something other than itself, and which is therefore able to communicate information to the one interpreting or decoding the sign. Signs can work through any of the senses, visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory or taste, and their meaning can be intentional such as a word uttered with a specific meaning, or unintentional such as a symptom being a sign of a particular medical condition.

surean sign exists only at the level of the synchronic system, in which signs are defined by their relative and hierarchical privileges of co-occurrence. It is thus a common misreading of Saussure to take signifiers to be anything one could speak, and signifieds as things in the world. In fact, the relationship of language to parole (or speech-incontext) is and always has been a theoretical problem for linguistics (cf. Roman Jakobson’s famous essay “Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics” et al.).

There are two major theories about the way in which signs acquire the ability to transfer information; both theories understand the defining property of the sign as being a relation between a number of elements. In the tradition of semiotics developed by Ferdinand de Saussure the sign relation is dyadic, consisting only of a form of the sign (the signifier) and its meaning (the signified). Saussure saw this relation as being essentially arbitrary, motivated only by social convention. Saussure’s theory has been particularly influential in the study of linguistic signs. The other major semiotic theory developed by C. S. Peirce defines the sign as a triadic relation as “something that stands for something, to someone in some capacity”[1] This means that a sign is a relation between the sign vehicle (the specific physical form of the sign), a sign object (the aspect of the world that the sign carries meaning about) and an interpretant (the meaning of the sign as understood by an interpreter). According to Peirce signs can be divided by the type of relation that holds the sign relation together as either icons, indices or symbols. Icons are those signs that signify by means of similarity between sign vehicle and sign object (e.g. a portrait, or a map), indices are those that signify by means of a direct relation of contiguity or causality between sign vehicle and sign object (e.g. a symptom), and symbols are those that signify through a law or arbitrary social convention.

A famous thesis by Saussure states that the relationship between a sign and the real-world thing it denotes is an arbitrary one. There is not a natural relationship between a word and the object it refers to, nor is there a causal relationship between the inherent properties of the object and the nature of the sign used to denote it. For example, there is nothing about the physical quality of paper that requires denotation by the phonological sequence ‘paper’. There is, however, what Saussure called ‘relative motivation’: the possibilities of signification of a signifier are constrained by the compositionality of elements in the linguistic system (cf. Emile Benveniste's paper on the arbitrariness of the sign in the first volume of his papers on general linguistics). In other words, a word is only available to acquire a new meaning if it is identifiably different from all the other words in the language and it has no existing meaning. Structuralism was later based on this idea that it is only within a given system that one can define the distinction between the levels of system and use, or the semantic “value” of a sign.

2.1 Dyadic signs According to Saussure (1857–1913), a sign is composed of the signifier[2] (signifiant), and the signified (signifié). These cannot be conceptualized as separate entities but rather as a mapping from significant differences in sound to potential (correct) differential denotation. The Saus-

2.2 Triadic signs Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) proposed a different theory. Unlike Saussure who approached the conceptual question from a study of linguistics and phonology, Peirce was a somewhat Kantian philosopher who distinguished “sign” from “word” as only a particular kind of sign, and characterized the sign as the means to understanding. He covered not only artificial, linguistic, and symbolic signs, but also all semblances (such as kindred sensible qualities), and all indicators (such as mechanical reactions). He counted as symbols all terms, propositions, and arguments whose interpretation

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2.2. TRIADIC SIGNS is based upon convention or habit, even apart from their expression in particular languages. He held that “all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs”.[3] The setting of Peirce’s study of signs is philosophical logic, which he defined as formal semiotic,[4] and characterized as a normative field following esthetics and ethics, as more basic than metaphysics,[5] and as the art of devising methods of research.[6] He argued that, since all thought takes time, all thought is in signs,[7] that all thought has the form of inference (even when not conscious and deliberate),[7] and that, as inference, “logic is rooted in the social principle”, since inference depends on a standpoint that, in a sense, is unlimited.[8] The result is a theory not of language in particular, but rather of the production of meaning, and it rejects the idea of a static relationship between a sign and that which it represents, its object. Peirce believed that signs are meaningful through recursive relationships that arise in sets of three. Even when a sign represents by a resemblance or factual connection independent of interpretation, the sign is a sign only insofar as it is at least potentially interpretable by a mind and insofar as the sign is a determination of a mind or at least a quasi-mind, that functions as if it were a mind, for example in crystals and the work of bees[9] — the focus here is on sign action in general, not on psychology, linguistics, or social studies (fields which Peirce also pursued). A sign is something which depends on an object in a way that enables (and, in a sense, determines) an interpretation, an interpretant, to depend on the object as the sign depends on the object. The interpretant, then, is a further sign of the object, and thus enables and determines still further interpretations, further interpretant signs. The process, called semiosis, is irreducibly triadic, Peirce held, and is logically structured to perpetuate itself. It is what defines sign, object, and interpretant in general.[10] As Jean-Jacques Nattiez (1990: 7) put it, “the process of referring effected by the sign is infinite.” (Note also that Peirce used the word “determine” in the sense not of strict determinism, but of effectiveness that can vary like an influence.[11] ) Peirce further characterized the three semiotic elements as follows:[12] 1. Sign (or representamen[13] ): that which represents the denoted object (cf. Saussure’s “signifier”).

15 may be (a) immediate to the sign, the object as represented in the sign, or (b) dynamic, the object as it really is, on which the immediate object is founded. 3. Interpretant (or interpretant sign): a sign’s meaning or ramification as formed into a further sign by interpreting (or, as some put it, decoding) the sign. The interpretant may be: (a) immediate to the sign, a kind of possibility, all that the sign is suited to immediately express, for instance a word’s usual meaning; (b) dynamic, that is, the meaning as formed into an actual effect, for example an individual translation or a state of agitation, or (c) final or normal, that is, the ultimate meaning that inquiry taken far enough would be destined to reach. It is a kind of norm or ideal end, with which an actual interpretant may, at most, coincide. Peirce explained that signs mediate between their objects and their interpretants in semiosis, the triadic process of determination. In semiosis a first is determined or influenced to be a sign by a second, as its object. The object determines the sign to determine a third as an interpretant. Firstness itself is one of Peirce’s three categories of all phenomena, and is quality of feeling. Firstness is associated with a vague state of mind as feeling and a sense of the possibilities, with neither compulsion nor reflection. In semiosis the mind discerns an appearance or phenomenon, a potential sign. Secondness is reaction or resistance, a category associated with moving from possibility to determinate actuality. Here, through experience outside of and collateral to the given sign or sign system, one recalls or discovers the object to which the sign refers, for example when a sign consists in a chance semblance of an absent but remembered object. It is through one’s collateral experience[14] that the object determines the sign to determine an interpretant. Thirdness is representation or mediation, the category associated with signs, generality, rule, continuity, habit-taking, and purpose. Here one forms an interpretant expressing a meaning or ramification of the sign about the object. When a second sign is considered, the initial interpretant may be confirmed, or new possible meanings may be identified. As each new sign is addressed, more interpretants, themselves signs, emerge. It can involve a mind’s reading of nature, people, mathematics, anything.

2. Object (or semiotic object): that which the sign represents (or as some put it, encodes). It can be anything thinkable, a law, a fact, or even a possibility (a semiotic object could even be fictional, such as Peirce generalized the communicational idea of utterance [15] Hamlet); those are partial objects; the total object is and interpretation of a sign, to cover all signs: the universe of discourse, the totality of objects in that world to which one attributes the partial object. Admitting that connected Signs must have For example, perturbation of Pluto’s orbit is a sign a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that about Pluto, but not only about Pluto. The object there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs

16

CHAPTER 2. SIGN (SEMIOTICS) require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasiutterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic.

According to Nattiez, writing with Jean Molino, the tripartite definition of sign, object, and interpretant is based on the "trace" or neutral level, Saussure’s “sound-image” (or “signified”, thus Peirce’s “representamen”). Thus, “a symbolic form...is not some 'intermediary' in a process of 'communication' that transmits the meaning intended by the author to the audience; it is instead the result of a complex process of creation (the poietic process) that has to do with the form as well as the content of the work; it is also the point of departure for a complex process of reception (the esthesic process that reconstructs a 'message'"). (ibid, p. 17) Molino’s and Nattiez’s diagram: (Nattiez 1990, p. 17) Peirce’s theory of the sign therefore offered a powerful analysis of the signification system, its codes, and its processes of inference and learning, because the focus was often on natural or cultural context rather than linguistics which only analyses usage in slow-time whereas, in the real world, there is an often chaotic blur of language and signal exchange during human semiotic interaction. Nevertheless, the implication that triadic relations are structured to perpetuate themselves leads to a level of complexity not usually experienced in the routine of message creation and interpretation. Hence, different ways of expressing the idea have been developed.

2.2.1

Classes of triadic signs

By 1903[16] Peirce came to classify signs by three universal trichotomies dependent on his three categories (quality, fact, habit). He classified any sign:[17]

3. by how the sign stands for its object to its interpretant — either (rheme, also called seme,[18] such as a term) as regards quality or possibility, as if the sign were a qualisign, though it can be qualisign, sinsign, or legisign — or (dicisign, also called pheme, such as a proposition) as regards fact, as if the sign were an index, though it can be index or symbol — or (argument, also called delome[19] ) as regards rule or habit. This is the trichotomy of all signs as building blocks in an inference process. • Any qualisign is an icon. Sinsigns include some icons and some indices. Legisigns include some icons, some indices, and all symbols. • Any icon is a rheme. Indices (be they sinsigns or legisigns) include some rhemes and some dicisigns. Symbols include some rhemes, some dicisigns, and all arguments. Because of those classificatory interdependences, the three trichotomies intersect to form ten (rather than 27) classes of signs. There are also various kinds of meaningful combination. Signs can be attached to one another. A photograph is an index with a meaningfully attached icon. Arguments are composed of dicisigns, and dicisigns are composed of rhemes. In order to be embodied, legisigns (types) need sinsigns (tokens) as their individual replicas or instances. A symbol depends as a sign on how it will be interpreted, regardless of resemblance or factual connection to its object; but the symbol’s individual embodiment is an index to your experience of the object. A symbol is instanced by a specialized indexical sinsign. A symbol such as a sentence in a language prescribes qualities of appearance for its instances, and is itself a replica of a symbol such as a proposition apart from expression in a particular language. Peirce covered both semantic and syntactical issues in his theoretical grammar, as he sometimes called it. He regarded formal semiotic, as logic, as furthermore encompassing study of arguments (hypothetical, deductive, and inductive) and inquiry’s methods including pragmatism; and as allied to but distinct from logic’s pure mathematics.

Peirce sometimes referred to the “ground” of a sign. The ground is the pure abstraction of a quality.[20] A sign’s ground is the respect in which the sign represents its object, e.g. as in literal and figurative language. For example, an icon presents a characteristic or quality attributed 2. by how the sign stands for its object — either (icon) to an object, while a symbol imputes to an object a quality by its own quality, such that it resembles the object, either presented by an icon or symbolized so as to evoke regardless of factual connection and of interpretive a mental icon. rule of reference — or (index) by factual connec- Peirce called an icon apart from a label, legend, or other tion to its object, regardless of resemblance and of index attached to it, a “hypoicon”, and divided the hyinterpretive rule of reference — or (symbol) by rule poicon into three classes: (a) the image, which depends or habit of interpreted reference to its object, re- on a simple quality; (b) the diagram, whose internal regardless of resemblance and of factual connection; lations, mainly dyadic or so taken, represent by analogy the relations in something; and (c) the metaphor, which and 1. by what stands as the sign — either (qualisign, also called a tone) a quality — or (sinsign, also called token) an individual fact — or (legisign, also called type) a rule, a habit;

2.4. POSTMODERN THEORY represents the representative character of a sign by representing a parallelism in something else.[21] A diagram can be geometric, or can consist in an array of algebraic expressions, or even in the common form “All __ is ___” which is subjectable, like any diagram, to logical or mathematical transformations. Peirce held that mathematics is done by diagrammatic thinking — observation of, and experimentation on, diagrams. Peirce developed for deductive logic a system of visual existential graphs, which continue to be researched today.

2.3 20th century theories It is now agreed that the effectiveness of the acts that may convert the message into text (including speaking, writing, drawing, music and physical movements) depends upon the knowledge of the sender. If the sender is not familiar with the current language, its codes and its culture, then he or she will not be able to say anything at all, whether as a visitor in a different language area or because of a medical condition such as aphasia (see Roman Jakobson). Modern theories deny the Saussurian distinction between signifier and signified, and look for meaning not in the individual signs, but in their context and the framework of potential meanings that could be applied. Such theories assert that language is a collective memory or cultural history of all the different ways in which meaning has been communicated, and may to that extent, constitute all life’s experiences (see Louis Hjelmslev). Hjelmslev did not consider the sign to be the smallest semiotic unit, as he believed it possible to decompose it further; instead, he considered the “internal structure of language” to be a system of figurae, a concept somewhat related to that of figure of speech, which he considered to be the ultimate semiotic unity.[22][23][24] This position implies that speaking is simply one more form of behaviour and changes the focus of attention from the text as language, to the text as a representation of purpose, a functional version of the author’s intention. But, once the message has been transmitted, the text exists independently. Hence, although the writers who co-operated to produce this page exist, they can only be represented by the signs actually selected and presented here. The interpretation process in the receiver’s mind may attribute meanings completely different from those intended by the senders. But, why might this happen? Neither the sender nor the receiver of a text has a perfect grasp of all language. Each individual’s relatively small stock of knowledge is the product of personal experience and their attitude to learning. When the audience receives the message, there will always be an excess of connotational meanings available to be applied to the particular signs in their context (no matter how relatively complete or incomplete their

17 knowledge, the cognitive process is the same). The first stage in understanding the message is therefore, to suspend or defer judgement until more information becomes available. At some point, the individual receiver decides which of all the possible meanings represents the best possible “fit”. Sometimes, uncertainty may not be resolved, so meaning is indefinitely deferred, or a provisional or approximate meaning is allocated. More often, the receiver’s desire for closure (see Gestalt psychology) leads to simple meanings being attributed out of prejudices and without reference to the sender’s intentions.

2.4 Postmodern theory In critical theory, the notion of sign is used variously. “Many postmodernist theorists postulate a complete disconnection of the signifier and the signified. An 'empty' or 'floating signifier' is variously defined as a signifier with a vague, highly variable, unspecifiable or non-existent signified. Such signifiers mean different things to different people: they may stand for many or even any signifieds; they may mean whatever their interpreters want them to mean.”[25]

2.5 See also • Grapheme • Semantic • Semeiotic • Semiotic triangle • Sign (linguistics) • Sign relation • Triadic relation • Freudian slip

2.6 Notes [1] Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron, Analyzing Cultures. [2] Mardy S. Ireland defines a signifier as: A unit of something (i.e., a word, gesture) that can carry ambiguous/multiple meanings (e.g., as U.S. President Bill Clinton once said, “It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is’, is”) Ireland, Mardy S. (2003). The Art of the Subject: Between Necessary Illusion and Speakable Desire in the Analytic Encounter. Other Press. 159051033X. p. 13. [3] Peirce, C. S., Collected Papers, v. 5, paragraph 448 footnote, from “The Basis of Pragmaticism” in 1906.

18

[4] Peirce, C.S., 1902, Application to the Carnegie Institution, Memoir 12, “On the Definition of Logic”, Eprint. Note that by “logic” Peirce means a part of philosophy, not the mathematics of logic. (See Classification of the sciences (Peirce). [5] On his classifications, see Peirce, C.S. (1903), Collected Peirce v. 1, paragraphs 180–202 Eprint and (1906) “The Basis of Pragmaticism” in The Essential Peirce v. 2, pp. 372–3. For relevant quotes, see “Philosophy” and “Logic” in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms. [6] Peirce, C.S., 1882, “Introductory Lecture on the Study of Logic” delivered September 1882, Johns Hopkins University Circulars, v. 2, n. 19, pp. 11–12, November 1892, Google Book Eprint. Reprinted in Collected Papers v. 7, paragraphs 59–76, The Essential Peirce v. 1, pp. 210–14, and Writings of Charles S. Peirce v. 4, pp. 378–82. [7] Peirce, C.S. (1868), “Questions concerning certain Faculties claimed for Man” (Arisbe Eprint), Journal of Speculative Philosophy vol. 2, pp. 103–114. Reprinted in Collected Papers v. 5, paragraphs 213–63. [8] Peirce, C. S. (1878) “The Doctrine of Chances”, Popular Science Monthly, v. 12, pp. 604–15, 1878, reprinted in Collected Papers, v. 2, paragraphs 645–68, Writings of Charles S. Peirce v. 3, pp. 276–90, and The Essential Peirce v. 1, pp. 142–54. "...death makes the number of our risks, the number of our inferences, finite, and so makes their mean result uncertain. The very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the assumption that this number is indefinitely great. .... ...logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. .... Logic is rooted in the social principle.” [9] See under "Quasi-mind" in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms. [10] For Peirce’s definitions of sign and semiosis, see under "Sign" and "Semiosis, semeiosy" in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms; and "76 definitions of sign by C. S. Peirce" collected by Robert Marty. Peirce’s "What Is a Sign" (MS 404 of 1894, Essential Peirce v. 2, pp. 4–10) provides intuitive help. [11] For example, Peirce said “determined (i.e., specialized, bestimmt)" in a letter to William James, dated 1909, see p. 492 in The Essential Peirce v. 2. [12] For Peirce’s definitions of immediate object and the rest, see the Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms. [13] Pronounced with the “a” long and stressed: /rɛprᵻzɛn.ˈteɪmən/. See wiktionary:representamen. [14] In that context Peirce speaks of collateral experience, collateral observation, collateral acquaintance, all in much the same terms. See pp. 404–9 in “Pragmatism” in The Essential Peirce v. 2. Ten quotes on collateral experience from Peirce provided by Joseph Ransdell can be viewed here at peirce-l’s Lyris archive. [15] Peirce (1906), “Prolegomena To an Apology For Pragmaticism”, The Monist, v. XVI, n. 4, pp. 492–546, see pp. 523–4, Google Books Eprint. Reprinted in Collected Papers v. 4, paragraphs 530–72, see 551.

CHAPTER 2. SIGN (SEMIOTICS)

[16] Peirce (1903 MS), “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined”, under other titles in Collected Papers (CP) v. 2, paragraphs 233– 72, and reprinted under the original title in Essential Peirce (EP) v. 2, pp. 289–99. Also see image of MS 339 (August 7, 1904) supplied to peirce-l by Bernard Morand of the Institut Universitaire de Technologie (France), Département Informatique. [17] For more as to the definitions, terminology, and development of the classifications, see the Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms [18] In 1902 Peirce used the word “seme” instead for an index, especially an indexical sinsign. See Collected Papers v. 2, paragraph 283. [19] Peirce said, “pronounce deeloam, from δήλωμα", Peirce (1906), “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism”, The Monist, v. 16, n. 4, pp. 492–546, see 507. Reprinted in Collected Papers v. 4, paragraphs 530–572, see 538. Eprint. [20] Peirce, C.S. (1867), "On a New List of Categories", Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, v. 7 (1868), pp. 287–98. (Delivered orally by Peirce in 1867 and distributed by him in 1867 as part of an extract). [21] Peirce, Collected Papers v. 2, paragraphs 276–7, written circa 1902. See under "Diagram" in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms. [22] Hjelmslev [1943] Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, pp.47, 65, 67, and cf. 6.26, 30 [23] Robert de Beaugrande (1991) [Linguistic Theory: The Discourse of Fundamental Works], section on Louis Hjelmslev. [24] Nöth, Winfried (1990) Handbook of semiotics, pp.66, 701 section 3 [25] Daniel Chandler, Semiotics: The Basics, Routledge 2007, page 78

2.7 External links • “Semiotics For Beginners” full text online, Daniel Chandler Associations and journals • American Journal of Semiotics, Joseph Brent, Editor, & John Deely, Managing Editor—from the Semiotic Society of America. • Applied Semiotics / Sémiotique appliquée(AS/SA), Peter G. Marteinson & Pascal G. Michelucci, Editors. • Approaches to Applied Semiotics (2000–2009 book series), Thomas Sebeok et al., Editors.

2.7. EXTERNAL LINKS • Approaches to Semiotics (1969–97 book series), Thomas A. Sebeok, Alain Rey, Roland Posner, et al., Editors. • Biosemiotics, Marcello Barbieri, Editor-in-Chief— from the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies. • Center for Semiotics, Aarhus University, Denmark. • Cognitive Semiotics, Per Aage Brandt & Todd Oakley, Editors-in-Chief. • Cybernetics and Human Knowing, Søren Brier, Chief Editor. • International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems (IJSSS), Angelo Loula & João Queiroz, Editors. • Open Semiotics Resource Center. Journals, lecture courses, etc. • The Public Journal of Semiotics, Paul Bouissac, Editor in Chief; Alan Cienki, Associate Editor; René Jorna, Winfried Nöth. • S.E.E.D. Journal (Semiotics, Evolution, Energy, and Development) (2001–7), Edwina Taborsky, Editor—from SEE. • The Semiotic Review of Books, Gary Genosko, General Editor; Paul Bouissac, Founding Editor. • Semiotica, Marcel Danesi, Chief Editor—from the International Association for Semiotic Studies. • Semiotiche, Gian Paolo Caprettini, Managing Director; Andrea Valle & Miriam Visalli, Editors. Some articles in English. Home site seems gone from Web, old url no longer good, and Wayback Machine cannot retrieve. • Semiotics, Communication and Cognition (book series), Paul Cobley & Kalevi Kull, Editors. • SemiotiX New Series: A Global Information Bulletin, Paul Bouissac et al. • Sign Systems Studies, Kalevi Kull, Kati Lindstrom, Mihhail Lotman, Timo Maran, Silvi Salupere, Peeter Torop, Editors—from the Dept. of Semiotics, U. of Tartu, Estonia. • Signs and Society, Richard J. Parmentier, Editor. • Signs: International Journal of Semiotics. Martin Thellefsen, Torkild Thellefsen, & Bent Sørensen, chief eds. • Tartu Semiotics Library (book series), Peeter Torop, Kalevi Kull, Silvi Salupere, Editors. • Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Cornelis de Waal, Chief Editor—from The Charles S. Peirce Society.

19 • Versus: Quaderni di studi semiotici, founded by Umberto Eco.

Chapter 3

Code (semiotics) For other uses, see Code (disambiguation). In semiotics, a code is a set of conventions or sub-codes currently in use to communicate meaning. The most common is one’s spoken language, but the term can also be used to refer to any narrative form: consider the color scheme of an image (e.g. red for danger), or the rules of a board game (e.g. the military signifiers in chess). Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) emphasised that signs only acquire meaning and value when they are interpreted in relation to each other. He believed that the relationship between the signifier and the signified was arbitrary. Hence, interpreting signs requires familiarity with the sets of conventions or codes currently in use to communicate meaning.

the social identity each individual constructs through the way the language is spoken (i.e. with an accent or as a dialect) or written (i.e. in sentences or in SMS format), the place of residence (see Americanisms), the nature of any employment undertaken, the style of dress, and nonverbal behaviour (e.g. through differentiating customs as to the extent of private space, whether and where people may touch or stare at each other, etc.). The process of socialisation is learning to understand the prevailing codes and then deciding which to apply at any given time, i.e. acknowledging that there is sometimes an ideological quality to the coding system, determining levels of social acceptability, reflecting current attitudes and beliefs. This includes regulatory codes that are intended to control behaviour and the use of some signifying codes. The human body is a means of using presentational codes through facial expressions, gestures, and dress. So words spoken may change their connotation to unacceptable if accompanied by inappropriate nonverbal signs.

Roman Jakobson (1896–1982) elaborated the idea that the production and interpretation of texts depends on the existence of codes or conventions for communication. Since the meaning of a sign depends on the code within The other code forms rely upon knowledge held by, and which it is situated, codes provide a framework within the interests of, the addressees. Specialised denotational which signs make sense (see Semiosis). codes may provide a more objective and impersonal form of language for mathematical, philosophical, and scientific texts. Hence, for example, the ability to read this text depends upon a more specialised form of vocabulary 3.1 Discussion and different skills to those required to read a genre text detailing the investigations of a detective or the advenTo that extent, codes represent a broad interpretative tures of a secret agent. There are also specialised connoframework used by both addressers and their addressees tational and ideological codes to reflect particular social, to encode and decode the messages. Self-evidently, political, moral, and aesthetic values. Musical and iconic the most effective communications will result when codes would be relevant as between a work by Arnold both creator and interpreter use exactly the same code. Schoenberg and a piece of bubblegum pop, and a paintSince signs may have many levels of meaning from the ing by Rembrandt and a comic book by Frank Miller, denotational to the connotational, the addresser’s strategy etc. Each medium has its own specialised codes and, by is to select and combine the signs in ways that limit the making them more explicit, semiotics is attempting to range of possible meanings likely to be generated when explain the practices and conventions have appeared in the message is interpreted. This will be achieved by in- each form and to understand how meaning is being comcluding metalingual contextual clues, e.g. the nature of municated. In return, this assists addressers to improve the medium, the modality of the medium, the style, e.g. their techniques, no matter what their functional needs, academic, literary, genre fiction, etc., and references to, e.g. as politicians, journalists, advertisers, creative artists, or invocations of, other codes, e.g. a reader may initially etc. Indeed, awareness leads to an intentional blending of interpret a set of signifiers as a literal representation, but codes for effect, e.g. an advertiser may produce a more clues may indicate a transformation into a metaphorical effective campaign with a slogan, images and a jingle usor allegorical interpretats diachronically. Distinctions of ing lexical, social gestural, and musical codes. class or memberships of groups will be determined by 20

3.3. REFERENCES

3.2 See also • genetic code

3.3 References • Chandler, Daniel, Semiotics: The Basics, Routledge, London, UK, 2002. ISBN 0-415-36375-6 • Jakobson, Roman, “Language in Relation to Other Communication Systems”, pp. 570–579 in Selected Writings, Volume 2, Mouton, The Hague, 1971. ISBN 90-279-3178-X

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Chapter 4

Connotation (semiotics) This word has distinct meanings in logic, philosophy, and common usage. See connotation.

information adds to other data forming a symptomology for the patient, a summation that takes place at a connotative cognitive level. Hence, the meanings as to health or illness are selected from the connotational framework which the interpreter has constructed through training and experience given that each possible state of wellbeing is represented by a cluster of symbolic attributes, one of which is the patient’s temperature.

In semiotics, connotation arises when the denotative relationship between a signifier and its signified is inadequate to serve the needs of the community. A second level of meanings is termed connotative. These meanings are not objective representations of the thing, but new usages produced by the language group. Connotation is concerned with how the sign system is used in each message. The semantic content is selected by the addresser and represents that individual’s values and intentions. Limiting an analysis purely to the sign 4.1 Discussion system comprised by paradigms and syntagms excludes Drawing from the original definition proposed by key elements in the interpretive process. Thus, subjective tests such as the commutation test have been developed to Saussure (1857-1913), a sign has two parts: map connotations and so decode more of the addresser’s intentions. This is achieved by changing the form of the • as a signifier, i.e. it will have a form that a person signifiers, by substituting signifiers to assess what the alcan see, touch, smell, and/or hear, and ternative connotations would be and by considering what • as the signified, i.e. it will represent an idea or men- signifiers are absent and why their absences might be significant. Changes of form would require substituting diftal construct of a thing rather than the thing itself. ferent fonts for the same text, or different colours or designs for the same visual content. The use of synonyms Connotative meanings are developed by the community and antonyms clarifies connotational choices as between, and do not represent the inherent qualities of the thing say, pejorative and euphemistic usages. As to absences, or concept originally signified as the meaning. The adif a modern image of a group of people employed in a dition of such meanings introduces complexity into the major public enterprise only contains individuals of the coding system. If a signifier has only a single denotational same gender and ethnicity, the analyst would enquire into meaning, the use of the sign will always be unambiguthe significance of the exclusion of those of the opposite ously decoded by the audience. But connotative meangender and a different ethnicity. The editorial decision ings are context-dependent, i.e. the addresser must learn may be supporting social values, attitudes and beliefs that how to match the meaning intended by the addresser to are embedded into the culture---for example, that nations one of the various possible meanings held in memory. ought to conscript only men to serve on the front-lines of a The power of connotation is that it enables the addresser war. Other explanations of different contexts may expose to more easily consider abstract concepts and to intro- cultural myths and prejudices which are less reasonable. duce subtlety into the discourse. For example, a digital thermometer produces a numerical value that indicates the current state of a specific operational parameter. 4.2 References This technology provides an indexical sign of heat (adopting the classification of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839• Barthes, Roland. Elements of Semiology (trans. An1914), an indexical sign by real connection between the nette Lavers & Colin Smith). London: Jonathan signifier and the signified). The number is a denotative Cape. (1967). value, i.e. it speaks only for itself. The doctor, nurse • Chandler, Daniel. (2001/2007). Semiotics: The Baor patient will relate to the number as a visual trope, in this case a metaphor, for the health of the body. Such sics. London: Routledge. 22

4.3. FURTHER READING

4.3 Further reading • Georgij Yu. Somov, Semiotic systems of works of visual art: Signs, connotations, signals, Semiotica 157 (1/4), 1-34, 2005 . • Georgij Yu. Somov, Connotations in semiotic systems of visual art (by the example of works by M. A. Vrubel). Semiotica 158 (1/4), 147-212, 2006 .

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Chapter 5

Denotation (semiotics) In semiotics, denotation is the surface or literal meaning Barthes and others have argued that it is more difficult encoded to a signifier, and the definition most likely to to make a clear distinction when analysing images. For appear in a dictionary. example, how is one to interpret a photograph? In the real world, a human observer has binocular vision, but the two-dimensional picture must be analysed to determine depth and the relative size of objects depicted by applying 5.1 Discussion rules of perspective, the operation of which can be confused by focus and composition. One view might be that Drawing from the original word or definition proposed by the picture as interpreted is evidence of what it depicts Saussure (1857-1913), a sign has two parts: and, since the technology collects and stores data from the real world, the resulting picture is a definition of what the camera was pointed at, and so denotational. Adopting • as a signifier, i.e. it will have a form that a person the classification of Charles Sanders Peirce, this would be can see, touch, smell, and/or hear, and considered an indexical sign, i.e. there is a direct connection between the signifier and the signified. While it is • as the signified, i.e. it will represent an idea or mental true that an unedited photograph may be an index, digital construct of a thing rather than the thing itself. technology is eroding the viewer’s confidence that the image is an objective representation of reality. Further, the To transmit information, both the addresser and the ad- photographer made conscious decisions about the comdressee must use the same code, whether in the literal position of the image, how to light it, whether to take a sense, e.g. Morse Code or in the form of a language. The close-up or long shot, etc. All of these decisions repredenotative meaning of a signifier is intended to commu- sent both the intention and the values of the photographer nicate the objective semantic content of the represented in wishing to preserve this image. This led John Fiske to thing. So, in the case of a lexical word, say “book”, the in- suggest that, “denotation is what is photographed, connotention is to do no more than describe the physical object. tation is how it is photographed”. Such problems become Any other meanings or implications will be connotative even more difficult to resolve once the audience knows meanings. that the photograph or moving image has been edited or The distinction between denotation and connotation can staged. (See also modality) be made in textual analysis and the existence of dictionaries is used to support the argument that the sign system begins with a simple meaning that is then glossed as new usages are developed. But this argument equally means that no sign can be separated from both its denotational and connotational meanings, and, since the addresser is always using the sign for a particular purpose in a context, no sign can be divorced from the values of the addresser. Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965) therefore proposes that although the function of signification may be a single process, denotation is the first step, and connotation the second. Roland Barthes (1915-1980) added a third possible step in world view or Weltanschauung in which metacognitive schema such as liberty, sexuality, autonomy, etc. create a framework of reference from which more abstract meanings may be attributed to the signs, depending on the context.

5.2 References

24

• Barthes, Roland. Elements of Semiology (trans. Annette Lavers & Colin Smith). London: Jonathan Cape. (1967). • Chandler, Daniel. (2001/2007). Semiotics: The Basics. London: Routledge. • Fiske, John. Introduction to Communication Studies. London: Routledge. (1982)

5.3. FURTHER READING

5.3 Further reading • Georgij Yu. Somov, Semiotic systemity of visual artworks: Case study of The Holy Trinity by Rublev. Semiotica 166 (1/4), 1-79, 2007 . • Georgij Yu. Somov, The role of structures in semiotic systems (analysis of some ideas of Leonardo da Vinci and the portrait Lady with an Ermine). Semiotica 172 (1/4), 351-417, 2008 .

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Chapter 6

Content word In linguistics content words are words such as nouns, most verbs, adjectives, and adverbs that refer to some object, action, or characteristic. Content words contrast with function words, which function primarily to express the grammatical relationships between other words in a sentence. Content words are most often open class words, meaning that new content words can be added to the lexicon easily.[1] In relation to phonology, content words adhere to the minimal word constraint, while function words do not.[2]

6.1 See also • Lexical verb • Grammaticalization, the process by which words may change from content to function words

6.2 References [1] Winkler, Elizabeth Grace (2007). Understanding Language. Continuum. pp. 84–85. ISBN 978-08264-84833. [2] http://www.psych.nyu.edu/pylkkanen/Neural_Bases/13_ Function_Words.pdf

26

Chapter 7

Modality (semiotics) In semiotics, a modality is a particular way in which information is to be encoded for presentation to humans, i.e. to the type of sign and to the status of reality ascribed to or claimed by a sign, text or genre. It is more closely associated with the semiotics of Charles Peirce (1839– 1914) than Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) because meaning is conceived as an effect of a set of signs. In the Peircean model, a reference is made to an object when the sign (or representamen) is interpreted recursively by another sign (which becomes its interpretant), a conception of meaning that does in fact imply a classification of sign types.

7.1 Discussion of sign-type The psychology of perception seems to suggest the existence of a common cognitive system which treats all or most sensorily conveyed meanings in the same way. If all signs must also be objects of perception, there is every reason to believe that their modality will determine at least part of their nature. Thus, the sensory modalities will be visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, kinesthetic, etc. A list of sign types would include: writing, symbol, index, image, map, graph, diagram, etc. Some combinations of signs can be multi-modal, i.e. different types of signs grouped together for effect. But the distinction between a medium and a modality should be clarified:

Braille, and kinetic media as sign language. When meaning is conveyed by spoken language, it is converted into sound waves broadcast by the speaker and received by another’s ears. Yet this stimulus cannot be divorced from the visual evidence of the speaker’s manner and gestures, and the general awareness of the physical location and its possible connotative significance. Similarly, meaning that is contained in a visual form cannot be divorced from the iconicity and implications of the form. If handwritten, is the writing neat or does it evidence emotion in its style. What type of paper is used, what colour ink, what kind of writing instrument: all such questions are relevant to an interpretation of the significance of what is represented. But images are distinguishable from natural language. For Roland Barthes (1915–80), language functions with relatively determinate meanings whereas images “say” nothing. Nevertheless, there is a rhetoric for arranging the parts which are to signify, and an emerging, if not yet generally accepted, syntax that articulates their parts and binds them into an effective whole. Rhetorician Thomas Rosteck defined rhetoric “as the use of language and other symbolic systems to make sense of our experiences, construct our personal and collective identities, produce meaning, and prompt action in the world.”[1]

7.2 See also • denotation • narrative paradigm

• text is a medium for presenting the modality of natural language;

• semantics

• image is both a medium and a modality;

• pragmatics

• syntactics

• music is a modality for the auditory media. So, the modality refers to a certain type of information and/or the representation format in which information is stored. The medium is the means whereby this information is delivered to the senses of the interpreter. Natural language is the primary modality, having many invariant properties across the auditory media as spoken language, the visual media as written language, the tactile media as

7.3 References

27

[1] Borchers, Timothy (2006). Rhetorical Theory: An Introduction. Belmont, CA. p. 8. ISBN 978-1-57766-731-5.

• Barthes, Roland. Elements of Semiology. (Translated by Annette Lavers & Colin Smith). London: Jonathan Cape. ([1964] 1967)

28 • Barthes, Roland. “The Rhetoric of the Image” in Image, Music, Text, (Translated by Stephen Heath). Hill and Wang. (1977) • Chandler, Daniel. (2001/2007). Semiotics: The Basics. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 7. MODALITY (SEMIOTICS)

Chapter 8

Representation (arts) Representation is the use of signs that stand in for and The term 'representation' carries a range of meanings and take the place of something else.[1] It is through rep- interpretations. In literary theory, 'representation' is comresentation that people organize the world and reality monly defined in three ways. through the act of naming its elements.[1] Signs are arranged in order to form semantic constructions and ex1. To look like or resemble press relations.[1] 2. To stand in for something or someone 3. To present a second time; to re-present[2] Representation began with early literary theory in the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and has evolved into a significant component of language, Saussurian and communication studies.[2]

8.1 Defining representation To represent is “to bring to mind by description,” also “to symbolize, to be the embodiment of;" from O.Fr. representer (12c.), from L. repraesentare, from re-, intensive prefix, + praesentare “to present,” lit. “to place before”. A representation is a type of recording in which the sensory information about a physical object is described in a medium. The degree to which an artistic representation resembles the object it represents is a function of resolution and does not bear on the denotation of the word. For example, both the Mona Lisa and a child’s crayon drawing of Lisa del Giocondo would be considered representational, and any preference for one over the other would need to be understood as a matter of aesthetics. Bust of Aristotle, Greek philosopher

For many philosophers, both ancient and modern, man is regarded as the “representational animal” or animal symbolicum, the creature whose distinct character is the creation and the manipulation of signs – things that “stand for” or “take the place of” something else.[1]

8.2 History

Since ancient times representation has played a central role in understanding literature, aesthetics and semiotics. Plato and Aristotle are key figures in early literary theory who considered literature as simply one form of Representation has been associated with aesthetics (art) representation.[3] Aristotle for instance, considered each and semiotics (signs). Mitchell says “representation is an mode of representation, verbal, visual or musical, as beextremely elastic notion, which extends all the way from ing natural to human beings.[4] Therefore, what distina stone representing a man to a novel representing the day guishes humans from other animals is their ability to crein the life of several Dubliners”.[1] ate and manipulate signs.[5] Aristotle deemed mimesis as 29

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CHAPTER 8. REPRESENTATION (ARTS) of evil.[5] Aristotle went on to say it was a definitively human activity.[1] From childhood man has an instinct for representation, and in this respect man differs from the other animals that he is far more imitative and learns his first lessons though imitating things.[1] Aristotle discusses representation in three ways— 1. The object: The symbol being represented. 2. Manner: The way the symbol is represented. 3. Means: The material that is used to represent it. The means of literary representation is language. An important part of representation is the relationship between what the material and what it represents. The questions arising from this are, “A stone may represent a man but how? And by what and by what agreement, does this understanding of the representation occur?"[1]

Reproduction of the Mona Lisa

One apprehends reality only through representations of reality, through texts, discourses, images: there is no such thing as direct or unmediated access to reality. But because one can see reality only through representation it does not follow that one does not see reality at all… Reality is always more extensive and complicated than any system of representation can comprehend, and we always sense that this is so-representation never “gets” reality, which is why human history has produced so many and changing ways of trying to get it.[7] Consequently, throughout the history of human culture, people have become dissatisfied with language’s ability to express reality and as a result have developed new modes of representation. It is necessary to construct new ways of seeing reality, as people only know reality through representation.[7] From this arises the contrasting and alternate theories and representational modes of abstraction, realism and modernism, to name a few.

Greek theatrical masks depicted in Hadrians Villa mosaic

8.3 Contemporary ideas about representation

natural to man, therefore considered representations as necessary for people’s learning and being in the world.[4] Plato, in contrast, looked upon representation with more caution. He recognised that literature is a representation of life, yet also believed that representations create worlds of illusion leading one away from the “real things”.[6] For Plato, representation, like contemporary media, intervenes between the viewer and the real, creating illusions that lead one away from “real things”. Plato believed that representation needs therefore, to be controlled and monitored due to the possible dangers resulting in its ability to foster antisocial emotions or encourage the imitation

It is from Plato’s caution that in the modern era many are aware of political and ideological issues and the influences of representations. It is impossible to divorce representations from culture and the society that produces them. In the contemporary world there exist restrictions on subject matter, limiting the kinds of representational signs allowed to be employed, as well as boundaries that limit the audience or viewers of particular representations. In motion picture rating systems, M and R rated films are an example of such restrictions, highlighting also society’s attempt to restrict and modify representations to promote a certain set of ideologies and values. Despite these restrictions, representations still have the ability to

8.4. PEIRCE AND REPRESENTATION

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take on a life of their own once in the public sphere, and can not be given a definitive or concrete meaning; as there will always be a gap between intention and realization, original and copy.[5] Consequently, for each of the above definitions there exists a process of communication and message sending and receiving. In such a system of communication and representations it is inevitable that potential problems may arise; misunderstandings, errors, and falsehoods. The accuracy of the representations can by no means be guaranteed, as they operate in a system of signs that can never work in isolation from other signs or cultural factors. For instance, the interpretation and reading of representations function in the context of a body of rules for interpreting, and within a society many of these codes or conventions are informally agreed upon and have been established over a number of years. Such understandings however, are not set in stone and may alter between times, places, peoples and contexts. How though, does this ‘agreement’ or understanding of representation occur? It has generally been agreed by semioticians that representational relationships can be categorised into three distinct headCharles Sanders Peirce ings: icon, symbol and index.[5] For instance objects and people do not have a constant meaning, but their meanings are fashioned by humans in the context of their culture, as they have the ability to make things mean or signify something.[6] Viewing representation in such a way focuses on understanding how language and systems of knowledge production work to create and circulate meanings. Representation is simply the process in which such meanings are constructed.[6] In much the same way as the post-structuralists, this approach to representation considers it as something larger than any one single representation. A similar perspective is viewing representation as part of a larger field, as Mitchell, saying, "…representation (in memory, in verbal descriptions, in images) not only 'mediates’ our knowledge (of slavery and of many other things), but obstructs, fragments, and negates that knowledge”[8] and proposes a move away from the perspective that representations are merely “objects representing”, towards a focus on the relationships and processes through which representations are produced, valued, viewed and exchanged.

8.4 Peirce and representation Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) was an innovative and accomplished logician, mathematician, and scientist, and founded philosophical pragmatism. Peirce’s central ideas were focused on logic and representation.

8.4.1

Semiotics and logic

Peirce distinguished philosophical logic as logic per se from mathematics of logic. He regarded logic (per se)

as part of philosophy, as a normative field following esthetics and ethics, as more basic than metaphysics,[9] and as the art of devising methods of research.[10] He argued that, more generally, as inference, “logic is rooted in the social principle”, since inference depends on a standpoint that, in a sense, is unlimited.[11] Peirce held that logic is formal semiotic,[12] the formal study of signs in the broadest sense, not only signs that are artificial, linguistic, or symbolic, but also signs that are semblances or are indexical such as reactions. He held that “all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs”,[13] along with their representational and inferential relations, interpretable by mind or quasi-mind (whatever works like a mind despite perhaps not actually being one);[14] the focus here is on sign action in general, not psychology, linguistics, or social studies). He argued that, since all thought takes time, “all thought is in signs”[15] and sign processes ("semiosis") and that the three irreducible elements of semiosis are (1) the sign (or representamen), (2) the (semiotic) object, the sign’s subject matter, which the sign represents and which can be anything thinkable—quality, brute fact, or law—and even fictional (Prince Hamlet), and (3) the interpretant (or interpretant sign), which is the sign’s meaning or ramification as formed into a kind of idea or effect that is a further sign, for example, a translation.[16] Even when a sign represents by a resemblance or factual connection independent of interpretation, the sign is a sign because it is at least potentially interpretable. A sign depends on its object in a way that enables (and, in a sense, determines) interpretation, forming an interpretant which, in turn, de-

32 pends on the sign and on the object as the sign depends on the object and is thus a further sign, enabling and determining still further interpretation, further interpretants. That essentially triadic process is logically structured to perpetuate itself and is what defines sign, object, and interpretant. An object either (1) is immediate to a sign, and that is the object as represented in the sign, or (2) is a dynamic object, which is the object as it really is, on which the immediate object is founded. Usually, an object in question, such as Hamlet or the planet Neptune, is a special or partial object. A sign’s total object is the object’s universe of discourse, the totality of things in that world to which one attributes the object. An interpretant is either (1) immediate to a sign, for example a word’s usual meaning, a kind of interpretive quality or possibility present in the sign, or (2) dyanamic, an actual interpretant, for example a state of agitation, or (3) final or normal, a question’s true settlement, which would be reached if thought or inquiry were pushed far enough, a kind of norm or ideal end with which any actual interpretant may, at most, coincide. Peirce said that, in order to know to what a sign refers, the mind needs some sort of experience of the sign’s object, experience outside, and collateral to, the given sign or sign system. In that context he spoke of collateral experience, collateral observation, collateral acquaintance, all in much the same terms.[17] For example, art work can exploit both the richness and the limits of the audience’s experience; a novelist, in disguising a roman à clef, counts on the typical reader’s lack of personal experience with the actual individual people portrayed. Then the reader refers the signs and interpretants in a general way to an object or objects of the kind that is represented (intentionally or otherwise) by the novel. In all cases, the object (be it a quality or fact or law or even fictional) determines the sign to an interpretant through one’s collateral experience with the object, collateral experience in which the object is newly found or from which it is recalled, even if it is experience with an object of imagination as called into being by the sign, as can happen not only in fiction but in theories and mathematics, all of which can involve mental experimentation with the object under specifiable rules and constraints. Through collateral experience even a sign that consists in a chance semblance of an absent object is determined by that object. Peirce held that logic has three main parts: 1. Speculative grammar,[18] on meaningfulness, conditions for meaning. Study of significatory elements and combinations. 2. Logical critic,[19] on validity, conditions for true representation. Critique of arguments in their various distinct modes. 3. Speculative rhetoric, or methodeutic,[20] on conditions for determining interpretations. Methodology of inquiry in its mutually interacting modes.

CHAPTER 8. REPRESENTATION (ARTS) 1. Speculative Grammar. By this, Peirce means discovering relations among questions of how signs can be meaningful and of what kinds of signs there are, how they combine, and how some embody or incorporate others. Within this broad area, Peirce developed three interlocked universal trichotomies of signs, depending respectively on (1) the sign itself, (2) how the sign stands for its object, and (3) how the sign stands for its object to its interpretant. Each trichotomy is divided according to the phenomenological category involved: Firstness (quality of feeling, essentially monadic), secondness (reaction or resistance, essentially dyadic), or thirdness (representation or mediation, essentially triadic).[21] 1. Qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns. Every sign is either (qualisign) a quality or possibility, or (sinsign) an actual individual thing, fact, event, state, etc., or (legisign) a norm, habit, rule, law. 2. Icons, indices, and symbols. Every sign refers either (icon) through similarity to its object, or (index) through factual connection to its object, or (symbol) through interpretive habit or norm of reference to its object. 3. Rhemes, dicisigns, and arguments. Every sign is interpreted either as (rheme) term-like, standing for its object in respect of quality, or as (dicisign) proposition-like, standing for its object in respect of fact, or as (argument) argumentative, standing for its object in respect of habit or law. This is the trichotomy of all signs as building blocks of inference. Some (not all) sign classes from different trichotomies intersect each other. For example, a qualisign is always an icon, and is never an index or a symbol. He held that there were only ten classes of signs logically definable through those three universal trichotomies.[23] He thought that there were further such universal trichotomies as well. Also, some signs need other signs in order to be embodied. For example, a legisign (also called a type), such as the word “the,” needs to be embodied in a sinsign (also called a token), for example an individual instance of the word “the”, in order to be expressed. Another form of combination is attachment or incorporation: an index may be attached to, or incorporated by, an icon or a symbol. Peirce called an icon apart from a label, legend, or other index attached to it, a “hypoicon”, and divided the hypoicon into three classes: (a) the image, which depends on a simple quality; (b) the diagram, whose internal relations, mainly dyadic or so taken, represent by analogy the relations in something; and (c) the metaphor, which represents the representative character of a sign by representing a parallelism in something else.[24] A diagram can be geometric, or can consist in an array of algebraic expressions, or even in the common form “All __ is ___” which is subjectable, like any diagram, to logical or mathematical transformations.

8.5. SAUSSURE AND REPRESENTATION 2. Logical critic or Logic Proper. That is how Peirce refers to logic in the everyday sense. Its main objective, for Peirce, is to classify arguments and determine the validity and force of each kind.[19] He sees three main modes: abductive inference (guessing, inference to a hypothetical explanation); deduction; and induction. A work of art may embody an inference process and be an argument without being an explicit argumentation. That is the difference, for example, between most of War and Peace and its final section.

33 words they depend on interpretation, they are indices in depending on the requisite factual relation to their individual objects. A personal name has an actual historical connection, often recorded on a birth certificate, to its named object; the word “this” is like the pointing of a finger. Symbol

Peirce treats symbols as habits or norms of reference and meaning. Symbols can be natural, cultural, or abstract and logical. They depend as signs on how they will be interpreted, and lack or have lost dependence on resemblance and actual, indexical connection to their represented objects, though the symbol’s individual embodiment is an index to your experience of its represented object. Symbols are instantiated by specialized indexical sinsigns. A proposition, considered apart from its ex8.4.2 Using signs and objects pression in a particular language, is already a symbol, but many symbols draw from what is socially accepted and Peirce concluded that there are three ways in which signs culturally agreed upon. Conventional symbols such as represent objects. They underlie his most widely known “horse” and caballo, which prescribe qualities of sound trichotomy of signs: or appearance for their instances (for example, individual instances of the word “horse” on the page) are based • Icon on what amounts to arbitrary stipulation.[5] Such a symbol uses what is already known and accepted within our • Index society to give meaning. This can be both in spoken and written language. • Symbol[25] 3. Speculative rhetoric or methodeutic. For Peirce this is the theory of effective use of signs in investigations, expositions, and applications of truth. Here Peirce coincides with Morris’s notion of pragmatics, in his interpretation of this term. He also called it “methodeutic”, in that it is the analysis of the methods used in inquiry.[20]

Icon This term refers to signs that represent by resemblance, such as portraits and some paintings though they can also be natural or mathematical. Iconicity is independent of actual connection, even if it occurs because of actual connection. An icon is or embodies a possibility, insofar as its object need not actually exist. A photograph is regarded as an icon because of its resemblance to its object, but is regarded as an index (with icon attached) because of its actual connection to its object. Likewise, with a portrait painted from life. An icon’s resemblance is objective and independent of interpretation, but is relative to some mode of apprehension such as sight. An icon need not be sensory; anything can serve as an icon, for example a streamlined argument (itself a complex symbol) is often used as an icon for an argument (another symbol) bristling with particulars. Index Peirce explains that an index is a sign that compels attention through a connection of fact, often through cause and effect. For example, if we see smoke we conclude that it is the effect of a cause – fire. It is an index if the connection is factual regardless of resemblance or interpretation. Peirce usually considered personal names and demonstratives such as the word “this” to be indices, for although as

For example, we can call a large metal object with four wheels, four doors, an engine and seats a “car” because such a term is agreed upon within our culture and it allows us to communicate. In much the same way, as a society with a common set of understandings regarding language and signs, we can also write the word “car” and in the context of Australia and other English speaking nations, know what it symbolises and is trying to represent.[26]

8.5 Saussure and representation Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) played a major role in the development of semiotics with his argument that language is a system of signs that needs to be understood in order to fully understand the process of linguistics.[27] The study of semiotics examines the signs and types of representation that humans use to express feelings, ideas, thoughts and ideologies.[28] Although semiotics is often used in the form of textual analysis it also involves the study of representation and the processes involved with representation. The process of representation is characterised by using signs that we recall mentally or phonetically to comprehend the world.[29] Saussure says before a human can use the word “tree” she or he has to envision the mental concept of a tree. Two things are fundamental to the study of signs:[30]

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CHAPTER 8. REPRESENTATION (ARTS) may associate the term “sister” to represent a close friend that they have a bond with. This means that the representation of a signifier depends completely upon a person’s cultural, linguistic and social background. Saussure argues that if words or sounds were simply labels for existing things in the world, translation from one language or culture to another would be easy, it is the fact that this can be extremely difficult that suggests that words trigger a representation of an object or thought depending on the person that is representing the signifier.[32] The signified triggered from the representation of a signifier in one particular language do not necessarily represent the same signified in another language. Even within one particular language many words refer to the same thing but represent different people’s interpretations of it. A person may refer to a particular place as their “work” whereas someone else represents the same signifier as their “favorite restaurant”. This can also be subject to historical changes in both the signifier and the way objects are signified.

Saussure claims that an imperative function of all written languages and alphabetic systems is to “represent” spoken language.[33] Most languages do not have writing systems that represent the phonemic sounds they make. For example, in English the written letter “a” represents different phonetic sounds depending on which word it is written in. The letter “a” has a different sound in the word in each of the following words, “apple”, “gate”, “marFerdinand de Saussure garine” and “beat”, therefore, how is a person unaware of the phonemic sounds, able to pronounce the word prop1. The signified: a mental concept, and erly by simply looking at alphabetic spelling. The way the word is represented on paper is not always the way 2. The signifier: the verbal manifestation, the sethe word would be represented phonetically. This leads quence of letters or sounds, the linguistic realisation. to common misrepresentations of the phonemic sounds of speech and suggests that the writing system does not The signifier is the word or sound; the signified is the rep- properly represent the true nature of the pronunciation resentation. of words. Saussure points out that signs: • Are arbitrary: There is no link between the signifier and the signified • Are relational: We understand we take on meaning in relation to other words. Such as we understand “up” in relation to “down” or a dog in relation to other animals, such as a cat. • constitute our world – “You cannot get outside of language. We exist inside a system of signs”.[30] Saussure suggests that the meaning of a sign is arbitrary, in effect; there is no link between the signifier and the signified.[31] The signifier is the word or the sound of the word and the signified is the representation of the word or sound. For example, when referring to the term “sister” (signifier) a person from an English speaking country such as Australia, may associate that term as representing someone in their family who is female and born to the same parents (signified). An Aboriginal Australian

8.6 Notes [1] Mitchell, W. 1995, “Representation”, in F Lentricchia & T McLaughlin (eds), Critical Terms for Literary Study, 2nd edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago [2] O'Shaughnessy, M & Stadler J, Media and society: an introduction, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2005 [3] Childers J (ed.), Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and Cultural Criticism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995 [4]