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U-Turn to the Past? The Resurgence of the Military in Contemporary Thai Politics Paul Chambers In horseracing, horse owners hire jockeys to ride the horses. The jockeys do not own the horses. They just ride them. A government is like a jockey. It supervises soldiers but the real owners are the country and the King. The government supervises and employs us in compliance with the policy declared to parliament ... What I mean is that we are the country's soldiers. Governments come and go.

--Privy Council Chair Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, July 14, 20061 I don't care which government is in power because we're not involved in politics. If this government is gone, a new administration will come in. However, the military has to remain neutral and defend the country as we don't want people to kill one another.

--Army Commander Gen.Anupong Paochinda, October 8, 20082 At the moment the army is interfering... Those people who interfere in forming the government must stop and withdraw. We are still under a military coup...They should behave with a sportsman's spirit and not interfere.

--Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, December 12, 20083 The above remarks by three Thai political leaders reflect alternative attitudes on the role of the military in contemporary Thai politics. The first view locates King and country as the “owners” of military “horses” while a civilian government is the “jockey” which merely “supervises” them. The second standpoint contends that the armed forces, as a non-partisan grouping, seeks only to avert domestic bloodshed. The last stance points to military interference in Thailand’s democracy. The differing views—each publicly expressed—send a message that the military today must either involve itself or defend itself from claims of hindering Thailand’s democratization. Across the last eight decades, Thailand’s armed forces have undergone a circuitous trajectory in terms of political autonomy vis-à-vis civilian control. One can designate 20 core eras illustrating alternative levels of military prowess since 1932. In 1992, following the bloody Black May massacre, the Thai military seemed to be at its nadir in terms of support from the people and the palace. As such, it seemed reasonable to imagine that soldiers might be returning to the barracks indefinitely. If that were the case, Thailand might finally be joining the ranks of “Third Wave” democracies in a unlinear historical move toward more

expansive democratization (Huntington, 1991). During the 1990s, the Thai armed forces appeared to be becoming indoctrinated under a professionalism of compliance to elected civilians. And yet in 2006, there occurred a sudden military coup. The takeover immediately enhanced the role of soldiers in domestic politics. Even after the return to civilian governance in 2008 Thailand’s armed forces find themselves enjoying a privileged position of authority— though this is emasculated by apparent civilian control. Among the emerging democracies of Southeast Asia today, there is no country other than Thailand which exhibits such explicit military intrusions over civilian governance. The military occupies a major position in what noted political scientist Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak refers to as the “nonelected ‘holy trinity’ of monarchy, military, and bureaucracy.”4 Increasingly, Thai military influence today exhibits haunting echoes back to the era of pervasive military authority during the civilian government of Gen. Chatchai Chunhavan (1988-91). Clearly, the armed forces today deserve much greater scrutiny as an actor on the Thai political landscape. Yet such an enhanced position in society gives rise to several questions. How has the role of the military in Thai politics evolved from 1992 until 2009? What accounted for the coup of 2006? Is this renewed clout evidence of a U-turn back to the Thai military of the 1980s? How has the armed forces continued to involve itself in Thai politics since the country’s return to civilian governance in 2008? In what areas of civilian control do the armed forces today hold the most sway? What does continuing military involvement say about the contemporary state of Thai democracy? This study addresses these and other questions The objective of this investigation is to contribute to research on the current state of democratization and civil-military relations in Thailand (particularly 1992-2009). The study first examines factors contributing to unity in the Thai armed forces.

It then offers an

analytical framework which attempts to shed light on the relations between civilians and 2

militaries in various areas of decision-making. The investigation applies this framework to Thailand. Afterwards, it focuses on the current and future role of the military in Thai politics.

Locating Unity in Thailand’s Armed Forces Thailand’s armed forces are an institutionalized mechanism that monopolizes the legal use of force throughout the country. The military, however, has been prone to be factionprone. Yet where the institution can find unity, it has through history usually succeeded in trumping weak loosely-structured civilian authority. Unity has allowed it to carry out coup d'états with impunity. Yoshifumi Tamada (1995) describes four causes of coups in Thailand: domestic disturbances allowing the military to step in; civil-military conflicts giving rise to a coup; military factional conflict leading to a military takeover; auto-coups to enhance military power.5 Yet military unity (or precisely the lack thereof) has either facilitated or led to attempted or successful coups, increasingly against civilian governments. The section below details various forms of Thai military unity. Ideology has long been a principle unifier of the Thai military machine. The Royal Thai Army, originally established in 1884 under King Rama V (Chulalongkorn) initially included as its mission the safeguarding of the monarchy from perceived or domestic threats. This was true for the Navy and Air Force as well. Such a pro-royalist agenda helped to unite the military, and unity was further guaranteed by the fact that various princes sat at the senior positions of the armed forces. Yet following the 1932 coup against the absolute monarchy, the ideology unifying the military shifted to protecting the fatherland from royalists and foreign powers (who might seek to colonize Thailand). The mission now was to promote Thai-centric constitutionalism and democracy.

From 1947 until 1991, the military’s struggle

turned to combating communism, seen as externally-devised and (after 1957) a threat to the Thai monarchy. In an attempt to stamp out rural support for the Communist Party of Thailand, the armed forces set up numerous rural development projects—in a close alliance

3

with the United States. Fears of a “red” menace and counter-insurgency objectives helped to solidify armed forces unity behind the ideology of anti-communism until the end of the Cold War in 1991. During the 1990s, with external threat perception at an all-time low, the military took a back-seat to civilian political players.6Today the Armed Forces have “the important role…to safeguard independence, sovereignty, internal order, as well as protect nation, religion, monarch, and interests of nation.”7 In terms of ideology, monarchy has proved to be an especially unifying factor. This trend commenced with the the coup of Gen.Sarit Thanarat in 1957. Sarit’s emphasis on the safeguarding royalism contributed to monarchy’s becoming--once again—a central ideology uniting Thai soldiers (and Thai people). This renewed importance of kingship to the Thai state—as undergirded by a royalist military—strengthened the institutions of the monarchy and armed forces across the nation. It also united the military under the king. Indeed, the king’s close relationship with arch-royalist Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda (at least since the latter’s term as PM from 1980 to 1988) contributed to Prem’s military faction becoming dominant across the armed forces. Beyond ideology, factors linking soldiers together include family or marriage connections, service in the same unit or service (especially in terms of patron-clientelism), school ties, and personal charisma. Family connections might seem naturally important. For example, Gens. Akradej and Yuthasak Sasiprapa are brothers and the latter is married to a daughter of Field Marshal Prapas Charusatien (another daughter of Prapas is married to Gen. Somdhat Attanand). But such connections do not lead to automatic promotion since they can stir up rage and frustration in military circles if it is thought that matters of blood are being given higher priority to considerations of seniority and capability. Indeed, one could argue that the October 14, 1973 fall of Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapas owed partly to the fact that Thanom’s son Narong appeared to be being groomed to succeed more seasoned military

4

officials. As such, Gen. Krit Sivara found enough support in the corps for his coup against the three. As for same service experiences, I am referring to instances where soldiers served in the same region, regiment, or battalion. They might have all known each other in the Army through shared service in the infantry, cavalry, etc. As for navy or air force military officials, their shared service experiences are of less importance to the Thai case given that the Army dominates the three service corps. Moreover, the notion of patron-clientelism can be crucial to intra-service comraderie.

For example, a promoted senior official may appoint his former

assistants to higher positions of power. It is assumed that the client’s proven loyalty to the patron will carry on to higher levels. Personal charisma is yet another factor which can unite a military together in support of a coup or a military government. Some soldiers with enormous barami (loosely translated as “charisma”) can continue to perpetuate their hold across networks or entourages of active duty military personnel. Examples of highly charismatic military personnel have been Field Marshall Gen.Phibul Songkram (dominated Thailand1938-44; 1948-57), Field Marshall Gen.Sarit Thanarat (exerted control over Thailand 1957-63), and Gen.Prem Tinsulanond (exerted influence 1979-Present). A final factor uniting soldiers together is military class (see section on military education below). By this I mean school ties in either one of two institutions. First there is the Armed Forces Academy Preparatory School or AFAPS. The AFAPS is a 2-year pre-cadet school for any student aspiring to work in the police or armed forces. Ties within AFAPS became important in 1960 with the graduation of Class 1. To some extent, AFAPS ties created a new tier of linkages—stronger even than cadet academy class connections.8 AFAPS ties became even more important during the Thaksin Shinawatra administrations (2001-6) given Thaksin’s pre-cadet Class 10 school ties with individuals who later became highranking officers. 5

Besides AFAPS, there are school ties in army, air force, navy, or police academies. Originally there was one single cadet academy. However, in 1949 the school was split into four separate corps academies partly to prevent intra-class interests from spilling over into coup attempts. Given the enormous size and budget allocation of the Thai army relative to other services, the cadet school of any real political importance is the Chulachomklao Royal Army Academy (CRAA). Class ties in CRAA have remained strong for many of the school’s graduates. There are sporting and other entertainment events among class members. More recent classes even have their own websites. Such comraderie has even pushed into the political arena. Elements of CAA class 7, which included such politicos as Gen. Chamlong Srimuang, Gen. Pallop Pinmanee, Gen. Manoonkrit Rupkachorn, and Gen.Sanan Kachonprasert, played an active role in the 1976 and 1980 coups as well as the 1981 and 1985 coup attempts. Meanwhile, elements of CRAA Class 5 carried out the coup of 1991. Following the takeover, members of Class 5 assumed senior positions in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Police, and Supreme Command.9 The coup of 2006 was less derived from class. Though the coup leader emerged from AFAPS Class 6 and CRAA Class 17 (as did one of his stalwarts), other essential coup leaders emerged from Class 18, Class 20, and Class 21. Thus, one could argue that, at least in terms of the most recent coup, school ties are becoming of less importance in determining military loyalty. Yet in terms of class connections today, pre-cadet ties trump cadet school connections. This phenomenon amounts to the undoing of the 1949 military education reform. Though the original military academy was split up 60 years ago to prevent significant unity of soldiers across services, the current prevalence of AFAPS (where future soldiers and police study together before heading to separate academies) reverses this trend. The table below illustrates the school ties of Thailand’s Supreme Commander and Army Commander (1954-Present). The information below reveals that there was a correlation between the academy entrance date (or class number) of the Supreme and Army 6

Commander during several military terms. For example, see the years 1975-76; 1992; 199698; 2000-2002; 2007; 2008-Present. Such occasions represent periods where the Thai military has been much more monolithic.

Table 1: Thai Supreme Commanders and Army Commanders Supreme Commander

Term

Chulachomklao Military Academy (Class or first year in school)

Army Commander

Term

(P ) = Armed Forces Academy Preparartory School—if applicable

Gen.Sarit Thanarat Gen.Thanom Kittikackorn ACM Thawee Chullasap Gen.Kris Sivara Adm.Sangad Chalawu ACM Kamol Dechatungka Gen. Kriangsak Chamanand Gen. Serm Na Nakhon Gen. Saiyud Kerdpol Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek Adm. Supha Gajaseni Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh Gen. Sunthorn Kongsompong Gen.Suchinda Kraprayoon ACM Kaset Rojanan ACM Voranat Apichari Gen.Watanachai Wootisiri Gen.Viroj Sangsanit

19571963 19631973 19731974 19741975 19751976 19761977 19771979 19791981 19811983 19831986 19861987 19871990

1920

19901991 19911992 19921992 19921994 19941995 19951996

1

1921 1933 1931 1935 1936 1936 1939 1941 1943 1945 1

5 5 4 4 5

Chulachomklao Military Academy (Class or first year in school) (P ) = Armed Forces Academy Preparartory School—if applicable

Gen.Sarit Thanarat Gen.Thanom Kittikackorn Gen.Prapas Charusatien Gen.Kris Sivara Gen.Bunchay Bamrungpong Gen. Serm Na Nakhon Gen. Prem Tinsulanond Gen. Prayuth Jarunee Gen.Arthit Kamlang-ek Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh Gen.Suchinda Kraprayoon Gen. Issarapong Noonpakdi Gen.Wimol Wongwanich Gen.Pramol Plasin Gen.Chettha Thanajaro Gen. Surayud Chulanond Gen. Somdhat Attanand Gen.Chaisit Shinawatra

19541963 19631964 19641973 19731975 19751976 19761978 19781980 19801981 19811985 19861990 19901992 19921992

1920

19921995 19951996 19961998 19982002 20022003 20032004

5

1921 1921 1931 1935 1936 1938 1941 1943 1 5 5

6 9 12 (P1) 14 (P3) 16(P5)

7

Gen.Mongkol Ampornpisit Gen. Sampao Chusri

19962000 20002001

9 12 (P1)

Gen.Prawit Wongsawan Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratkli n Gen.Anupong Paochinda

20042005 20052007

17(P6) 17 (P6)

Adm. Narong 200112(P1) 200721 (P10) Yuthavong 2002 2010 200212 (P1) Gen. Surayud 2003 Chulanond Gen. Somdhat 200314 (P3) Attanand 2004 Gen. Chaisit 200416 (P5) Shinawatra 2005 Gen. Ruengroj 200516 (P5) Mahasaranond 2006 Gen. Boonsrang 200617 (P6) Niampradit 2008 Gen. Songkitti 200821(P10) Jakkapat Present Note: Prior to Army Cadet School Class 1 (1949—first year), only the dates are given for school entry. Beginning in 1949, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police were split into separate academies. “P” refers to the Armed Forces Academy Preparatory School in which pre-cadets from all services could go for education. Names in bold represent soldiers reputed to be close to Gen.Prem Tinsulanond. Names in italics represent soldiers reputed to be close to Thaksin Shinawatra.

The Tug-of-War of Civil-Military Relations10 When a military stands united, except in terms of a commitment to civilian control, then democracy is under threat. Yet how might we analyze the tussle for power between civilians and the armed forces? This study defines civilian control as that distribution of decision- making power where civilians alone have the power to decide on domestic political issues.11 “Under civilian control, civilians alone have the right to delegate decision-making power and the implementation of specific policies to the armed forces and the military has no autonomous decision-making power outside those areas that were specifically defined by civilians.”12 Moreover, it is civilians alone who decide which particular policies, or aspects of policies, the military implements. In addition, civilian authorities control sanctioning power vis-à-vis the military, and they can—in principle—revise their delegations at any time.13 To be sure, civilian control is not the same as democracy and civilian control is possible without a democratic regime. Democracy, however, is not feasible without firm and effective civilian control of the coercive state organs, and in particular of the military. In many cases, “the failure of civilian control of the military is sufficient to account for the existence of non8

democratic regimes in many countries.”14 On the other hand, the existence and soundness of civilian control does neither imply good governance, nor does it necessarily enhance the quality of policy decisions, it does neither guarantee the respect of human rights by the ruling elites nor the stability of the political regime. Civilian control has only one primary function: it ensures that civilians alone are responsible for political decision-making.15 Ultimately then, to differentiate various patterns of civil-military relations and systematically assess the degree of civilian control, this study uses a framework for understanding civil-military relations which focuses on this balance of decision-making between soldiers and civilians. Civilian control is on one pole of the continuum which refers to the distribution of decision-making power under which the “civilians make all the rules and can change them at any time”16 In addition, civilian authorities are entitled to and indeed possess the capacity to effectively control the implementation of their decisions. They also possess sanctioning power vis-à-vis the military, and they can—in principle—revise their delegations at any time.17 On the other pole of the continuum is the military regime, in which the military controls all decisions concerning political structures, processes, and policies and the civilians do not possess any autonomous political decision-making power. In this sense, civilian control is a relative condition, i.e., it is possible to distinguish different degrees of civilian control (e.g., strong or weak, encompassing or limited). This continuum between civilian and military dominance over decision-making authority can be analyzed in five areas: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization. The area of elite recruitment refers to the core defining aspects of the political regime, namely the rules, criteria and processes of recruiting, selecting and legitimizing the holders of political office. Any actor who controls this area thus is able to define “who rules and who decides who rules”.18 Civilian control over elite recruitment means that the military is proscribed from establishing an alternative channel for access to political office, and, simultaneously, the processes of elite selection in terms of the formation, working, and end of 9

political leadership are not subject to the explicit consent or implicit acquiescence of the military.19 Table 2: Indicators of Elite Recruitment Dimension Competition for public office

Political Participation

Indicator Reserved representation for military personnel. Military influence on the procedures of political competition Eligibility of active duty military officers for public office. Military veto power over forming and dissolving of governments.

Meanwhile, the area of public policy focuses upon fiscal and economic policy, foreign policy, and public welfare. These are the cornerstones of public policy because they most directly affect the social, economic, and political environment which impinges upon the wellbeing of the people. According to Thomas Dye, public policy simply put is “whatever governments choose to do or not to do”20 More specifically, public policy can be understood as a “framework of governmental formation and deliberation, the intention of political actors, the formal statements of public activities, or the consequences of this activity for society”21 Table 3: Indicators of Public Policy Dimension Indicator Public policy decisionmaking

Policy implementation

Military influence on the state budget. Military influence on the processes of public policy decision-making (except for national defense and internal security) Military authority over public administration.

Internal security constitutes a third area of civil-military relations and can be defined in terms of two elements. First, it has a geographic element, focusing on the threats originating within the realm of one’s states own territory; and second, there is a second element which derives from the role and the duties of the various state agencies.22 In other words, it involves the use of armed forces, by both established and new democracies, in a purely domestic 10

environment, which includes public order in emergency situations (including disaster relief), preparation for counterinsurgency warfare and terrorism, domestic intelligence gathering, daily policing and border controlling.23 These activities are compatible with civilian control only if civilians have the right to make the decisions on the range, duration and frequency of all internal military operations as well as the civilian institutions, and are able to monitor their implementation.24 Table 4: Indicators of Internal Security Dimension Indicator Policy-making authority Control over internal security agents

Military influence in the making of internal security policies Separation of the police (and other internal security agencies) from the military Civilian oversight of military internal security operations

A fourth area, national security, remains the core function of any military, specifically refers to the external dimension of security policy and thus pertains to state decisions involving foreign military deployments and related operations. National defense “tasks involve preparing for and conducting war and related military missions, managing the military bureaucracy, training, and strategic planning.”25 Meanwhile, national defense policy— generally formulated into security doctrines—outlines the manner in which a state plans to ensure the security of its territory and citizens from foreign threats. Soldiers, as experts in security matters, are often involved in the formulation and implementation of national defense policies, even in established democracies. Since such strategies can determine the security of a nation’s people, it is crucial that they remain under civilian jurisdiction. Furthermore, all national defense activities can only be compatible with civilian control where civilians oversee the range, duration and frequency of these missions and related activities, and if civilian institutions are able to monitor the military’s external security operations.26 Table 5: Indicators of National Defense Dimension Indicator Policy-making authority Civilian influence in the processes of defense 11

Control over implementation of defense policies

policy making Civilian oversight of military defense activities

Finally, the area of military organization comprises decisions on all organizational aspects of the military as an institution, which can be organized into two dimensions (Alagappa 2001; Bland 1999; 2001; Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002; Lambert 2009, 279296; Pion-Berlin 1992; Stepan 1988). The first dimension refers to the material aspects or “hardware” of military organization: force size and structure, procurement and production of military equipment, as well as other institutional, financial and technological resources of the military. The second dimension (“software”), includes the ideational aspects of military organization (e.g. doctrine and education); and decisions on personnel selection such as recruitment, appointment and retirement.27

“Modern militaries tend to be structured as

rational organizations, emphasizing hierarchy, formal rules, and division of labor”.28 Moreover, they are divided into areas of specialization and generally follow standard operating procedures. Ultimately, their reliable resources and pre-determined goals facilitate efficiency in terms of task-execution ”29 Such expertise, training, hierarchy, and rules are not unlike situations in any organization. Such professional evolution can lead to organizational “autonomization,” where bureaucracies become increasingly isolated from civilian control at all levels. Likewise, in the case of military organization, one must consider the degrees of organizational autonomy.30 Table 6: Indicators of Military Organization Dimension Indicator “Hardware” of military organization Civilian influence in decisions on military “hardware” “Software” of military organization Civilian influence on military “software”

Application to Thailand This five-part conceptualization for determining the level of civil-military relations is applied below to the case of Thailand. The overall rating represents the additive parts of all 12

five areas together. Where soldiers possess either all or the lion’s share of decision-making power, civilian control is ranked low for the particular decision-making area. If civilians always or generally succeed in exerting authority over decision-making power for a specific decision-making area, civilian control is rated high for that area. Finally, where the military is able to cling to autonomy, often thwarts civilian government attempts to reign it in, or is effectively able to refuse directives from civilian leaders—without dominating them, then civilian control is at a level of medium. Sometimes ratings cannot be pigeonholed into neat, precise tiers. As such, I also have included low-medium and medium-high.

Elite Recruitment: Since none of our four indicators of elite recruitment were ever institutionally enshrined in Thai law, there was never any specific representation institutionally reserved for military personnel. Nor was military influence on the procedures of political competition enshrined into law. Further, there was no eligibility of active duty military officers for public office.

Finally, the military had no right to exercise veto power over the forming and

dissolving of governments. But informally, the armed forces did exercise authority over each of these areas. Civilian control of elite recruitment has differed across the years. Since 1988, six different periods can be observed. These are the following: 1) the Chatchai Chunhavan elected administration of 1988-91; 2) the military-installed government of 1991-92; 3) the 1992-2001 era of democratization; 4) the Thaksin Shinawatra elected administrations of 200106; 5) the military-instated government of 2006-08; and 6) the period since the return to democratization in early 2008.

Civilian Prime Minister, Military Autonomy: 1988-91

13

This period reflected a growing surge of pluralistic forces in Thailand, led by political parties, business associations, the print media, and elements of civil society (including NGOs). 1988 began with the decision by non-elected Prime Minister Gen.Prem Tinsulanond to resign from office, making way for Chart Thai Party leader Gen. Chatchai Chunhavan to become PM himself. Chatchai permitted Army Commander Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to control military reshuffles as well as the military budget. But, in 1990, Chavalit resigned, making way for Class 5 faction head Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon to succeed him. Quarreling between Chatchai and Suchinda over weapons purchases and military perceptions of civilian interference in its domain led to the coup of February 21, 1991.31 In terms of reserved representation, the 1978 constitution allowed the king to appoint the members of the Senate.

From 1989 to 1991,161 or 60.2% out of 267 members of the

Upper House were active duty military personnel. The Lower House and Office of Prime Minister, however, remained the domains of civilians.

With regard to the Council of

Ministers, 11/46 or 23.9% were retired military officials.32 Yet had it wished, the military could have seated a non-elected Prime Minister in 1988 given that it controlled the majority of Senate seats and it could probably have found enough Lower House MP allies to put together enough parliamentary votes to bring a non-elected PM to office. Moreover, the 1978 constitution remained ambiguous on this issue. Thus, the 1988 rise to office of elected PM Chatchai was more a matter of retiring PM Gen. Prem Tinsulanond resigning and the armed forces reluctantly agreeing to it. As such, from 1988 until 1991, the armed forces were informally able to exert influence on the procedures of political competition—this study’s second indicator relating to elite recruitment. As for eligibility of active duty military officers in positions of political decisionmaking, the 1978 constitution did indeed ban active military officers from entering political offices. Yet active duty military officers were informally allowed to participate in the decision-making bodies by way of formal rules. For example, Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, 14

Army Commander from 1986 until 1990, was informally allowed by PM Chatchai to control military promotions, the military budget, and even sit in on all cabinet meetings.33 Meanwhile, many Thai political parties allied themselves with or were mere fronts for military factions during this time. The Chart Thai party of PM Chatchai Chunhavan was close to his family and that of former Gen. Pramarn Adireksan. Former Army Commander Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh founded his New Aspiration Party in 1990. The Democrat party was meanwhile viewed as close to Gen. Prem Tinsulanond. Then there was the Rassadorn Party of Gen. Tienchai Sirisampan. These military-party alliances in some cases allowed powerful armed forces personnel the power to informally meddle in party or parliamentary politics. Finally, with regard to a military veto power over the forming and dissolving of governments, the Thai military could generally exert informal influence to either force a government to form governments of its choice or dissolve governments with which it came into disagreement. Military leaders (e.g. Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon) needed only to threaten a coup to get their way (though this was not always successful with Chatchai).34 Indeed, amidst incessant quarreling with Army Commander Gen. Suchinda, Chatchai resigned as Prime Minister on December 8, 1990, only to be renominated and elected the following day. Two months later the military overthrew him. Ultimately, civilian control was at a level of medium during the administration of Chatchai Chunhavan. The armed forces possessed a reserved domain in the Senate and varying levels of connections with different political parties in parliament.

Informally,

soldiers could influence the procedures of political competition as well as the formation or dissolution of a government.

However, such military authority was neither direct nor

institutionalized.

Military Supremacy: 1991-2 15

This brief interval witnessed a coup by the armed forces and establishment of military government.

The coup group ruled through its all-military National Peace-Keeping

Commission and then chose the civilian PM Anand Panyarachun to administer the country together with an appointed Council of Ministers while an appointed and unicameral National Legislative Assembly acted as parliament. These bodies acted under the aegis of the interim charter, which came into force on March 1, 1991, lasting until December 9 of the same year. But this charter did not specifically enshrine military supremacy into law, instead allowing for ambiguity which facilitated the establishment of a domain of military appointments within various political posts. For example, 152 or 52% of the 292 appointed lawmakers in the unicameral assembly were soldiers (active or retired).35 Within Anand’s own cabinet, the Ministers of Defense and Interior were simultaneously military men in the NPKC.

In

December 1991, a new constitution came into force, following which elections were held in March 1992 that propelled Gen. Suchinda himself to the post of PM.36 As for his cabinet, seven out of the 50 members had military backgrounds.

Also in 1992, a newly appointed

Senate was installed. Moreover, at least 36 senior armed forces personnel were allowed to either chair or sit near the top of state enterprise boards.37 In May 1992, following the violent crackdown on anti-government demonstrators, the Suchinda government was forced from office and Anand returned to lead a brief caretaker government until elections could be held. However, the military-dominated Senate remained in office though the Constitution was amended to accommodate the demands of the May uprising, a major one of which was that the PM must be an elected member of the Lower House. The NPKC coup group exerted influence over the procedures of political competition. This it did first by forbidding political activities until the drawing up of a constitution (following the temporary charter of March 1991). Ultimately, enhanced military prerogatives were enshrined in the December 1991 constitution, which gave inordinate powers of state to the chair of the NPKC coup group as well as to interim PM Anand. For example, this charter 16

allowed for a continuation of the appointed Senate as well as for the possibility of a nonelected MP.38 Both of these helped to ensure that the military could maintain a potential veto over elected civilian actors in terms of the procedures of political competition. In March 1992, Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon was able to pressure Sammakhitham party leader Narong Wongwan to step aside so that the former could assume the post of Prime Minister. Given that prime ministers were selected or censured through joint sittings of the Lower and Upper Houses, the military-dominated Upper House need only find alliances with a majority of lawmakers in the Lower House to influence their parliamentary preferences. The December 1991 constitution shored up the eligibility of active duty military officers for public office in the Senate and (potentially) the office of Prime Minister. The political prowess of the armed forces was further accentuated by Class 5’s establishment of the Samakhitham Party to act as its surrogate in the Lower House. Benefiting from state resources, political connections, and gathering together numerous parliamentary intra-party factions, Samakkhitham or STP was formed in April, 1991, by Thiti Nakorntab, an ex-Air Force officer-turned-businessman, who was also a close associate of Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon.

The STP was formed to act as a “`buffer’ party between the old power

group…and the new power group of the then recently formed New Aspiration Party.”39 Ultimately, by creating a political party, the Class Five military faction could compete with Chavalit’s Democratic Soldiers military faction (New Aspiration Party) as well as with Soi Rajakru (Chart Thai Party) upon the parliamentary playing field. Samakhitham won the March 1992 election by a landslide. As for military veto power over forming and dissolving of governments, the NPKC did indeed appoint the short-lived (1991-April 1992) Anand government and could have forced it from office if it had desired. As for the elected government of March 1992, though the military possessed no specific institutional powers over its duration in office, it could have threatened a coup to informally influence the government. 17

All in all, civilian control remained low during the period of direct military jurisdiction by the NPKC (February 1991-March 1992). Following the 1992 election however, civilian control rose to a level of medium-low. Civilian control failed to reach a medium level because the armed forces succeeded in informally dominating most areas of political recruitment through the election of their Sammakhitham party and its establishment of a coalition government and cabinet in April 1992.

Civilians Again at the Fore: 1992-2000 The mid-1990s witnessed the apparent flowering of civilian control over Thailand’s military. As such, the military itself seemed to step back from the political stage. Three factors helped to account for this state of affairs. First, after the Black May, 1992 massacre, the armed forces lost an enormous amount of respect and political capital, especially when PM Gen.Suchinda was seen being scolded by the king on national television. Suchinda was pressured to resign and returning appointed PM Anand dismissed three key army officers loyal to him. Moreover, Anand streamlined the state enterprise boards, decreasing military influence on them, and making new board appointments on the basis of capability and expertise.40 Indeed, many of these parastatals were set to be privatized. Second, two Army commanders during the 1990s (Gen. Wimol Wongwanich and Gen. Surayudh Chulanond) directed the military to undergo reforms and a restructuring. Actually, both Wimol and Surayud were close to Gen.Prem Tinsulanond, who was appointed to the Privy Council in 1988 and became its chair in 1998.41 Though Prem had retired from the military in 1981, his powerful position as chief advisor to the king (and continuing networks of influence in the military) catapulted him to become the “surrogate strongman” of Thai politics after Suchinda’s downfall in 1991.42

Thus, Prem’s domination of the military in the 1990s

facilitated what appeared to be the institution’s voluntary though reluctant de-politicization. Third, the financial crisis of 1997 brought down the government of PM Gen.Chavalit 18

Yongchaiyudh, a charismatic military leader and potential competitor of Prem.

This

facilitated the return to office of the Democrat party (closely allied with Prem) and its leader Chuan Leekpai. The financial crisis also gave the military less of a reason to compete for a higher budget given the country’s economic hard times. Moreover, Chuan in his second term (1997-2001) took the post of Defense Minister as well as PM, pushing the military toward various reforms. In terms of reserved representation for soldiers, the 1992-2000 period saw a growth in political space for civilians.43

In the Senate, the informal military reserved domain for

military appointees diminished from 154 or 55.2% out of 270 senators (1992-96) to 48 or 18.4% out of 260 (1996-2000).44 The Prime Minister and members of the Lower House were by law required to be elected civilians. As for the Council of Ministers, the four governments between 1992 and 2000 allowed between two and eight cabinet positions (out of approximately 50 slots) to be held by ex-military officials.45 As for military influence on the procedures of political competition, this appeared to diminish during the mid-1990s period. However, at least in the 1996 general election, reports surfaced that armed forces personnel were involving themselves in elections. For example, Gen. Akradej Sasiprapa, in assisting the New Aspiration Party of his patron Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, threatened Democrat party vote canvassers while campaigning for New Aspiration candidates.46 In a much more direct example of manipulation, it was rumored that Privy Council Chair ret.Gen. Prem interfered in parliamentary politics on November 6, 1997 by influencing 12 members Prajakorn Thai party to defect from the ruling coalition and join the opposition, thus enabling the Democrat Party to form a coalition government.47 In terms of active duty military officers’ eligibility to serve in positions of political decision-making, this was non-existent in 1992-2000. Fallout over the Black May massacre had seen to that. The only exception was in terms of the ability to serve in the Upper House (which continued to diminish during this period) or the cabinet (but only as a retired soldier). 19

Finally, with regard to military veto power over the forming and dissolving of governments, this was not extant during the period at hand. There were no rules allowing such a military monopoly over elected governance. Nor were any instances in which the military informally took a tutelary role to either form governments or bring about their dissolution. Given Thailand’s growing democratization after 1992 and diminished role of the military in politics, it is undeniable that civilian control grew in Thailand during this period. There were but three severe intrusions into elite recruitment. First there was military involvement in support of pro-military political parties or candidates at election time. Second, there was a continued reserved domain of soldiers in the Senate, despite the fact that such representation continued to diminish.

Finally, an ex-military bigwig (Gen. Prem

Tinsulanond) indirectly brought about a change of government (“silent coup”) through applying pressure on various members of the Lower House.48 Civilian control during this period might thus be termed medium-high given the fact that there were few rules which guaranteed the military’s role in politics during this period and moreover, the armed forces generally refrained from involving itself in politics.

Civilian Supremacy: 2000-2006 This era commenced following the enactment of the 1997 “People’s” constitution and its implementation regarding the Senate beginning in 2000. Indeed this constitution now established that senatorial candidates could only become part of that body through election. In the 2000-06 Senate, for the first time, all members (200) were elected. Meanwhile, only 2 per cent of these were retired military officers.49 On January 6, 2001, telecommunications tycoon and ex-police colonel Thaksin Shinawatra, together with his political party Thai Rak Thai, won the general election by a landslide and he formed a coalition government which was to last an entire four-year term, something which had never occurred in Thailand. In 20

February 2001, his government cobbled together a 40-person cabinet. Other than Thaksin himself, only two retired security officials sat on the cabinet, former PM Gen.Chavalit Yongchiayudh (Minister of Defense) and his close associate Yuthasak Sasiprapha (Deputy Minister of Defense).50 Thaksin was re-elected by an even greater landslide in 2005, and he maintained the quota of two former military personnel other than himself. During this period, the armed forces possessed very little authority over procedures of political competition. Gone were the days when they could sit on the Senate or dominate the executive branch. Indeed, if anyone was manipulating the procedures of political competition it was Thaksin, the elected civilian. Indeed, Thaksin’s clout in 2001 was such that he was able to exert overriding authority throughout parliament, courts, and even compete with Gen.Prem in terms of political influence. Thaksin saw to it that a great many top seats on the state monitoring agencies (e.g. Constitutional Court, Election Commission) were filled by his own loyalists. As for the military, Thaksin used a policy of appeasement. This he did by appointing 55 Army generals to be advisors to the Prime Minister. 30 more were later added.51

At the same time, Thaksin used Chavalit and the latter’s close supporters to

establish a wedge against Prem until the PM could maneuver his own cousin Chaisit Shinawatra in to the post of Army Chief.52 Ultimately, whatever power the military had over procedures of political competition derived from its association with Thaksin. As in the past, active duty military officers were generally forbidden to hold public office.

Nor did the armed forces exert informal tutelage over Thaksin’s government.

Thaksin’s success in co-opting Chavalit and other retired military officers into Thai Rak Thai helped to ensure that none of them would informally score political points without some association with him. Chavalit’s New Aspiration party was merged into Thai Rak Thai as was the Chart Pattana party (associated with Gen.Arthit Kamlang-ek). Thus, the Thai military found political voice only through Thai Rak Thai or through the opposition Democrats (e.g.

21

Gen.Sanan Kachonprasert--deputy leader of the Democrat party).

Meanwhile, Gen.

Manoonkrit Rupkachorn, a Thaksin critic, served as Senator and Senate President. The military as an institution did not, during 2000-06 possess any veto power over forming and dissolving of governments. There were neither formal rules nor informal tutelary rights which allowed for armed forces’ breaches in civilian control during this time. Given the implementation of the 1997 constitution and the 2001-06 dominance of civilian strongman Thaksin across Thailand, civilian control of the military perhaps grew to its highest levels in Thai history. Thaksin made use of the new constitution which buttressed the powers of political parties and Prime Ministers against corrupt and non-democratic forces. He also utilized his enormous financial resources to market himself or buy off potential enemies. His landslide electoral victories, enormous popularity among the masses, and ability to successfully joust against Gen.Prem allowed Thaksin to monopolize the political space once dominated by the armed forces and other political parties.

Resurgence of Military Supremacy: 2006-08 Yet Thaksinocracy was not to last. Thai society became polarized between Thaksin loyalists and opponents (the latter included royalist elites, businesspeople, civil libertarians, the parliamentary opposition (Democrats) and disaffected soldiers). Citing disorder and lack of unity, Gen.Sonthi Limthongkul, then Army Commander, led a coup against Thaksin, voiding the 1997 constitution, and established a military government in Thailand—the first in 15 years. Sonthi’s military junta was called the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), the name of which was later changed to CNS (Council for National Security). Though Sonthi had been a compromise candidate to become Army head, he had actually been supported by Prem.53 The 2006 coup was directed by arch-royalist Prem supporters in the armed forces.54 Sonthi appointed as interim PM the anti-Thaksin Prem stalwart Gen.Surayudh Chulanond. Surayudh and his cabinet of 26 administered the country, with two ministers coming from the 22

military (longtime Surayud confidant Gen. Boonrawd Somtas at Defense and Adm. Threera Haocharoen at Transportation). Meanwhile, a National Legislative Assembly (NLA) was put together to draw up a new constitution. The NLA was composed of 242 persons, including 76 or 31.4% active/retired military or police55). While such military representation does not appear to approach a majority, non-military NLA representatives allied with soldiers in the assembly to ensure voting majorities. In terms of military influence on the procedures of political competition, political parties, demonstrations, and related activities, were banned by the junta until July 2007. The military-endorsed constitution of 2007 allowed for a propular referendum on the charter. Yet soldiers were said to be attempting to influence rural Thais to vote for it. Martial law was lifted only little-by-little from provinces considered to be pro-Thaksin in time for the December 2007 pre-election campaign. Yet there were allegations of covert military involvement in seeking to influence the election’s outcome. The purported plan involved using state-run media to attack and discredit the pro-Thaksin People’s Power Party—in the name of national security.56Another alleged plot entailed military lobbying of political parties in a bid to prevent People’s Power from forming a government after the election.57The military may also have similarly lobbied parties in December 2008. With regard to the eligibility of active duty military officers for public office, this did not transpire following the coup of 2006—though some unsuccessfully sought to enshrine the possibility of a non-elected PM into the 2007 constitution. Still, armed forces personnel managed to acquire greater access to positions of public decision-making. At least11 army generals and two police generals became board members of approximately 13 state enterprise agencies.58The trend in military involvement on state enterprise boards had gradually dissipated after 1992 but the 2006 coup saw new hope for soldiers to re-gain their status on these boards, increasing the potential for financial inducements in return for their influencing public policy. 23

Lastly, one could say with confidence that the military possessed the right to veto either the formation or dissolution of government from 2006-08. After all, the military was ruling directly. As such, had Surayud fallen out of favor with Sonthi, one would think that Sonthi could simply replace him with a more trustworthy PM. But despite such power, Sonthi could not have simply replaced Surayud if he had desired. This is because Prem Tinsulanond was Surayud’s close patron and mentor. And Prem was influential throughout the coup government—including with Sonthi. Despite occasional disagreements, Sonthi’s CNS coup group and the appointed government of Surayud managed to cooperate enough to maintain order, administer the economy, produce a new constitution, and carry out elections on December 27, 2008. Ultimately, during this period, civilian control was quite low. The PM was an appointed ex-military man and his cabinet was all appointed. Meanwhile the legislature (the NLA) was similarly appointed with several members derived from the military. Prior to the election campaign of late 2007, little political competition was allowed by the military accept at the local level. Though the constitution forbade soldiers from holding public office, many generals held posts at state agencies. Finally, since the military maintained a monopoly over coercive force while dominating the country’s politics, it could conceivably influence the formation or dissolution of any Thai government—though this was unlikely.

Civilian Prime Minister, Military Autonomy: 2008-Present Since the return to electoral democracy in December 2007, political space has slightly widened since the coup, seeming to represent a fall-back to the era prior to Thaksin. Lower House MPs are still elected. Yet the 2007 constitution also called for a half-appointed (74 members), half-elected (76 members) Upper House. Following senatorial elections in early 2008, 15.3% of the entire 76 directly elected/74 appointed Senate is now composed of retired military officials to make this an indirect reserved domain. Among the 74 appointed 24

Senators, 14 were ex-soldiers for a 9.3% military reserved domain.59 The 2008 cabinets of civilian pro-Thaksin Prime Ministers Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat contained 2-3 ex-military men respectively. The government of civilian Democrat Abhisit Vechachiwa (coming to office in late December 2008) contained two retired military officials.60 With regard to military influence on the procedures of political competition, this has occurred very recently. On December 2, 2008, the pro-Thaksin People’s Power party was dissolved, forcing the resignation of Somchai. Thereupon, throughout December, Anupong and other military elements (including Gen. Prawit Wongsawan) met with Democrat bigwig Suthep Thaugsuban and (former Thai Rak Thai deputy leader, now roving faction head) Newin Chidchob to cobble together a coalition government under Democrat Abhisit Vechachiwa which would exclude Puea Thai.61 This latent oblique intrusion into civilian political competition indicated that despite the return to ostensible civilian rule in 2008, the military was perfectly willing to be a more subtle political player in Thailand’s post-coup politics. As for the involvement of active duty soldiers in public office, this remains a preserve at least institutionally off-limits to soldiers. Informally however, in the first half of 2009, a nexus of power seemed to have been formed among Gen. Anupong, Defense Minister Gen. Prawit (both of whom earlier served together in the Queen’s Guard), and Prawit’s brother Gen. Pacharawat (Chief of Police). Prawit was already retired and Anupong was close to Prawit. At the same time, the Army Chief was generally allowed to have his way with regard to the military budget as well as promotions. Meanwhile, though the police were directly overseen by the Prime Minister, PM Abhisit appeared to have granted Patcharawat carte blanche authority—working in tandem with his brother Prawit as well as Anupong. Public security policy has thus been more in the hands of active duty security personnel rather than civilians or retired soldiers.

25

Lastly, in terms of military veto power over forming and dissolving of governments, the Thai military did seek to informally influence the fall of two pro-Thaksin governments in 2008. This it sought to do in at least two instances since the election of December 2007. All occurred during the 2008 anti-Thaksin PAD (People’s Alliance for Democracy) yellow-shirt demonstrations and subsequent Supreme Court-ordered dissolution of the People’s Power Party (the substitute party of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai following the court-ordered dissolution of the latter). First, during the demonstrations, Army Commander Gen. Anupong Paochinda refused to order his troops to defend government buildings against advancing protestors. Without troops to defend them, each government relied on the police—though public support from the latter faded when the Queen attended the funeral of yellow shirt protestor, killed during a police attempt to repress a PAD demonstration. Second, in late November, as PAD protests in Bangkok continued unabated, Army Chief Anupong went on national television to call for the resignation of Somchai or his dissolution of the Lower House.62 Though Somchai refused to take heed of Anupong’s words, he could eventually only find refuge in Chiang Mai, where pro-Thaksin opinion was much more dominant and the Democratic Alliance Against Dictatorship (DAAD) red-shirts promised to protect the PM. Today the level of civilian control when it comes to elite recruitment stands at medium. Though civilian authority appears to have reemerged following the late 2007 elections, Thailand’s military continues to wield considerable influence in terms of political influence and participation. Such a strong military is a worrying development in a country where democratic institutions remain weakly formed. The tables below show the evolution of military or retired military elite recruitment in Thailand. The first follows such influence in Thai cabinets, 1932-Present. The second reflects the sway of the armed forces in Thailand’s legislature from 1932 to the Present. The tables show that military influence on elite recruitment was weakest when armed forces influence was in recession (1945-47; 1973-76; after 1992). The tables reflect a general 26

chronological trend: less military representation in cabinets. The devolution of an armed forces representation in the legislature also lessened over time, except that after 2006 you see it spiking upward again. This possibly indicates the rise again of military influence in Thai politics. Surprisingly, the cabinets of such military stalwarts as Sarit, Suchinda, and Chavalit tended to have more civilians on their cabinets than did other PMs, perhaps reflecting confidence in their own abilities to control the armed forces. Table 7: Chronology of Thai Military Influence in Cabinet Elite Recruitment (1932Present) Cabinet Duration of Government Proportion of Military or Retired Military to Civilian Cabinet Ministers Phya Manopakorn Nitithada 1932-33 7/15 or 46.6% Col.Phya Phahon 1933-38 7/15 or 46.6% Phonpayuhasena (Phayon Yothin) Col.Luang Phibunsongkram 1938-44 16/26 or 61.5% (Plaek Pibulsongkram) Major Kuang Apaiyavong 1944-45 12/23 or 52.1% Tawee Punyaketu 1945-45 6/30 or 20% M.R. Seni Pramoj 1945-46 2/23 or 8.6% Major Kuang Apaiyavong 1946-46 7/22 or 31.8% Pridi Banomyong 1946-46 3/17 or 17.6% Adm. Thawal 1946-47 6/19 or 31.5% Thamrongnavaswadhi Major Kuang Apaiyavong 1947-48 8/22 or 36.3% Field Marshall Gen.Plaek 1948-57 11/27 or 40.7% Phibulsongkram Pote Sarasin 1957-57 16/30 or 53.3% Field Marshall Gen. Thanom 1957-58 17/35 or 48.5% Kittikachorn Field Marshall Gen. Sarit 1958-63 6/15 or 40% Thanarat Gen. Thanom Kittikachorn 1963-69 9/20 or 45% Gen.Thanom Kittikachorn 1969-71 14/29 or 48.2% Gen.Thanom Kittikachorn 1971-73 13/29 or 44.8% Sanya Dharmasakdi 1973-75 9/28 or 32.1% M.R. Seni Pramoj 1975-75 4/31 or 12.9% MR Krukrit Pramoj 1975-76 10/27 or 37% MR Seni Pramoj 1976-76 9/36 or 25% Thanin Kravichien 1976-77 5/18 or 27.7% Gen.Kriangsak Chamanand 1977-79 11/34 or 32.3% 27

Gen.Kriangsak Chamanand Gen.Prem Tinsulanond I Gen.Prem Tinsulanond II Gen.Prem Tinsulanond III Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan Anand Panyarachun Gen.Suchinda Kraprayoon Chuan Leekpai 1 Banharn Silpa-archa Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyud Chuan Leekpai II Thaksin Shinawatra I Thaksin Shinawatra II Gen. Surayud Chulanond Samak Sundaravej Somchai Wongsawat

1979-80 1980-83 1983-86 1986-88 1988-91 1991-92; 1992 1992-92 1992-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-01 2001-05 2005-06 2006-08 2008-08 2008-08

19/45 or 42.2% 13/38 or 34.2% 11/44 or 25% 13/45 or 28.8% 11/46 or 23.9% 8/35 or 22.8% 7/50 or 14% 7/49 or 14.2% 8/51 or 15.6% 3/54 or 5.5% 4/50 or 8% 4/40 or 10% 4/38 or 10.5% 3/27 or 11.1% 3/39 or 7.6% 2/38 or 5.2%

Abhisit Vechachiwa

(2008-Present)

2/36 or 5.5%

Note: Each Cabinet above represents the first Coalition of Ministers of the respective Prime Minister. Each number of ministers includes the Prime Minister as well. Cabinet ministers holding more than one position are double-counted. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the following: 24 Thai Prime Ministers: History and Name Index, Bangkok: Office of the Parliament, 2007; the Government of Thailand, http://www.cabinet.thaigove.go.th/.

Table 8: Chronology of Thai Military Influence in Legislative Elite Recruitment (1932Present) Duration

Method of Membership

Unicameral

1932-1933

Appointed

Unicameral

1933-1937

Unicameral

1937-1946

Bicameral (First Senate)

1946-1947 (terminated by military coup)

Bicameral (Second Senate)

1947-1951 (terminated by military coup)

78 elected by Eligible Voters/78 appointed 91 elected by Eligible Voters/91 appointed Indirectly Elected (by the Lower House)63 Appointed 64

Unicameral

1951-1957

Unicameral

1957-1957 (terminated by military coup)

Unicameral

1957-1958 (terminated by military coup)

Parliament Type

123 elected by Eligible Voters/123 appointed 160 elected by Eligible Voters/123 appointed 186 elected by Eligible

Number of Seats in Unicameral Chamber or Senate/ Level of Military Influence 70 (55 or 78.5% military reserved domain of the appointed) 156 (50 or 64.1% military reserved domain of the appointed) 182 (58 or 63.7% military reserved domain of the appointed) 80 (33 or 41.2% ex-military reserved domain)

100 (35 or 35% ex-military reserved domain of the appointed) 246 (106 or 86.1% military reserved domain of the appointed) 186 (106 or 86.1% military reserved domain of the appointed

307 (98 or 80.9% military reserve domain of the appointed)

28

Voters/121 appointed Appointed

Unicameral

1959-1968

Bicameral (Third Senate)

1968-1971 (terminated by military coup)

Appointed

Unicameral (Constitutional Drafting Assembly 1) Unicameral (Constitutional Drafting Assembly 2) Bicameral (Fourth Senate) Advisory Council of Prime Minister Administrative Reform Assembly Unicameral (Constitutional Drafting Assembly 3) Bicameral (Fifth Senate)

1971-1973

Appointed

1973-75

Appointed

299 (41 or 13.7% military reserved domain)

1975-1976 (terminated by military coup) 1976-1976

Appointed Appointed

1976-1977

Appointed

1977-1979

Appointed

100 (20 or 20% military reserved domain 24 (24 or 100% military reserved domain) 340 (185 or 54.4% military reserved domain) 360 (245 or 68% military reserved domain)

1979-1985 (served 6-year term)

Appointed

Bicameral (Sixth Senate)

1985-1991 (terminated by military coup)

Appointed

Unicameral

1991-2

Appointed

Bicameral (Seventh Senate) Bicameral (Eighth Senate) Bicameral (Ninth Senate)

1992-1996 (served 4-year term) 1996-2000 (served 4-year term) 2000-2006 (served 6-year term)

Appointed

Bicameral (Tenth Senate)

2006-2006 (terminated by military coup)

Directly Elected

200 (0% ex-military)

Unicameral

2006-2008

Appointed

Bicameral (Eleventh Senate)

2008-Present (serves until 2014)

242 (76 or 31.4% active/retired military or police ) 150 (23 or 15.3% ex-military)65

Appointed Directly Elected

240 (175 or 72.9% military reserved domain 1968:120 (93 or 78% military reserved domain); 1969: 44 additions: (26 military) =164 total and 72.5% military reserved domain 299 (197 or 65.8% military reserved domain)

1979: 225 (193 or 85.7% military reserve domain); 1981:225 (176 or 78.2% military reserve domain); 1983:243 (145 or 59.6% military reserve domain) 1985:260 (161 or 61.9% military reserve domain); 1987:267 (156 or 58.4% military reserve domain); 1989:267 (161 or 60.2% military reserve domain) 292 (152 or 52% military reserve domain) 270 (154 or 55.2% military reserve domain) 260 (48 or 18.4% military reserve domain) 200 (2% ex-military)

76 directly elected/ 74 appointed Note: Military reserved domain includes personnel of the army, air force, navy, and police. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the following: Secretariat of the Senate, 2001: 1-3;Parliament Library, Bangkok (1991): Members of Senates 1932-1991; Neher, 1970: 241; LePoer, 1987; Surachart Bamrungsuk, United States Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule, 1947-1977, Duang Kamol, 1988, p.172; Murray, 1996: 6; Dorman, 1993: 7; Surachart, 1999: 161; The Nation, 13 October 2006; The Nation, 20 February 2008; authors’s calculations.

29

Yet another council where elite recruitment has allowed the military to increase its influence is on the Privy Council, the advisory body of the King. This regal board, though civilian in nature, does not derive from popularly elected representatives. Rather, the monarch appoints these representatives at his pleasure. Moreover, the Thai kingdom’s character—with monarchically-guided democratization—has ensured that the Privy Council complements rather than collide with the armed forces. Indeed, the military has increasingly cooperated with and served under the monarchy since 1957.

The Privy Council is

particularly influential in Thailand given its role in deliberating Thai law and offering advice to the King, considering the promotion of civil servants including military officials, as well as the fact that three privy councilors have also served as Prime Minister.66 Amidst military collaboration with the monarchy, statistics show that from 1949 until 2009, the number of retired military officials holding positions in the Privy Council has continued to expand (see Table 2 below). In total, 46 Privy Councillors have served since 1949. Of this number, 16 have been retired military personnel. Prior to the chairmanship of Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda (1949-1998), 9 possessed military backgrounds. But only since Prem became chair (1998-Present), 7 soldiers have gained seats. Perhaps this is understandable since Prem is the first longlasting Privy Council chair with a military background. Regardless, the increase in numbers of armed forces personnel on the Privy Council represents a growth of military influence in this regally-created body and, as such, a boost for military prowess in the Thai polity. The tables below offer greater elaboration:

Table 9: Presidents of the Privy Council (1949 - Present) Source: Jirawat Kraunggaeow, The Privy Council. Bangkok: Tonbonpinklao Limited, 2007, p.230. # 1

Name HRH Prince Thaneeniwat Krom Muen Pittaya Larpa Pruetiyakorn

Period of Presidency Presidency 18 June 1949 – 25 March 1950 8 April 1952 – 20 October 1958 24 April 1959 – 27 May 1963 8 June 1963 – 9 Juli 1963 14 Juli 1963 – 20 June 1968

30

30 Juli 1968 – 17 November 1971 15 December 1972 – 8 September 1974 2

HRH Prince Rangsit Prayurasakdi Krom Khun Jainad Narendhorn (later appointed as HRH Krom Phraya Jainad Narendhorn on 28 January 1952)

25 March 1950 – 7 March 1951

3

Lieutenant General HRH Prince Alongkod (later appointed as HRH Krom Muen Adisorn Udomsakdi on 5 may 1952)

13 March 1951 – 29 November 1951

4

Chao Phraya Sri Dharma Tibet (Jitra Na Songkla)

(temporary presidential term) 27 May 1963 – 8 June 1963 9 – 14 July 1963

5

ML Det Sanitwong

24 March 1975 – 8 September 1975

6

Mr. Sanya Dharmasakti

5 December 1975 – 4 September 1998

7

General Prem Tinsulanonda

4

September 1998

31

Table 10: Members of the Privy Council (1949-Present) Source: Jirawat Kraunggaeow, The Privy Council. Bangkok: Tonbonpinklao Limited, 2007, p.231-5.

#

Name

Period of Membership

1

Lieutenant General HRH Prince Alongkod (later 18 June 1949 – 13 March 1951 appointed as HRH Krom Muen Adisorn Udomsakdi on 8 April 1952 – 19 December 1952 5 may 1952)

2

Phraya Manna Varajasaevi (Plod Na Songkla)

18 June 1949 – 29 November 1951 8 April 1952 – 20 October 1958 24 February 1959 – 20 June 1968 31 July 1968 – 17 November 1971 15 December 1972 – 7 October 1974

3

General Adul Aduldej-charas

18 June 1949 – 29 November 1951

4

HRH Prince Wiwattanachai

8 April 1952 – 20 October 1958 24 February 1959 – 22 August 1960

5

General HRH Prince Nakatara Mongkol (later appointed as HRH Krom Muen Chantaburi Suranata on 5 May 1952)

8 April 1952 – 11 February 1953

6

Chao Phraya Sri Dharma Tibet (Jitr Na Songkla)

8 April 1952 - 20 October 1958 24 February 1959 - 27 May 1963 8 June 1963 - 9 July 1963 14 July 1963 - 20 June 1968 31 July 1968 - 17 November 1971 15 December 1972 - 7 October 1974

7

Phraya Sri Visarn Vaja (Tian-lieng Huntrakul)

8 April 1952 - 20 October 1958 24 February 1959 - 27 August 1962

8

ML Det Sanitwong

24 April 1953 - 20 October 1958 24 February 1959 - 20 June 1968 31 July 1968 - 17 November 1971 15 December 1972 - 7 October 1974

9

General Luang Sena Narongka (Sak Sena Narongka)

14 - 19 July 1955

10

Phraya Bhorriraka Vechakarana (Bhorriraka Tittiranonda)

2 May 1957 - 20 October 1958 24 February 1959 - 26 March 1968

11

Mr. Srisena Sombatrasiri

21 March 1958 - 20 October 1958 24 February 1959 - 20 June 1968 31 July 1968 - 17 November 1971 15 December 1972 - 7 October 1974 26 March 1975 - 6 July 1982

12

General Luang Kampanatra Saenyagorn (Kampan Uttara-vanij)

5 February 1960 - 20 June 1968 30 July 1968 - 17 November 1971 15 December 1972 - 7 October 1974

13

General Luang Suranarongka (Thongchai Chotikasathira)

7 July 1964 - 20 June 1968 31 July 1968 - 20 June 1971 15 December 1972 - 7 October 1974 26 March 1975 - 18 January 1986

14

Major General Mom Thaweewongsa Tawalayasakdi (MR Chalermlarpa Thaweewongsa appointed as Mom Thaweewongsa Tawalyasakdi on 10 November 1929)

24 November 1966 - 20 June 1968 31 July 1968 - 27 October 1970

15

Mr. Sanya Dharmasakdi

18 - 20 June 1968 31 July 1968 - 17 November 1971 15 December 1972 - 14 October 1973 26 March 1975 - 5 December 1975

16

MJ Wongsanuwattara Devakula

4 September 1998 - 6 January 2002

32

1 - 17 November 1971 15 Decempber 1972 - 7 October 1974 26 March 1975 - 10 February 1986 17

Mr. Phrakob Huta-singha

26 March 1975 - 28 July 1994

18

Police General Atthasidha Siddhisuntara

26 March 1975 - 16 September 1998

19

Mr. Chinda Bunnaya-arkom

26 March 1975 - 8 November 1987

20

MJ Chakrabongse Pensiri Chakrapanda (appointed as 26 March 1975 - 13 October 1993 HRH Prince Chakrabongse Pensiri on 29 March 1994)

21

Mr. Kitti Sihanondana

26 March 1975 - 24 October 1993

22

Mr. Charuenpanda Isarankula Na Ayudhaya

26 March 1975 - 12 August 1991

23

ML Jirayu Napawongsa

26 March 1975 - 7 November 2003

24

General Samran Pattayakula

19 December 1975 - 24 July 1986

25

Mr. Chaovana Nasylvanta

19 December 1975 -

26

Mr. Tanin Kraivixien

15 December 1977 -

27

Mr. Kanlaya Isarasena Na Ayudhaya

18 April 1979 - 12 August 1996

28

Mr. Jitti Tingsapattiya

3 March 1984 - 3 March 1995

29

Rear Admiral ML Usni Pramoj (appointed ML Rear Admiral on 25 July 1992)

3 March 1984 -

30

Air Vice Marshal Kamthon Sindhvananda

28 November 1987 -

31

General Prem Tinsulanonda

23 August 1988 - 4 September 1998

32

Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila

24 December 1991 -

33

Nr. Chulanoppa Sanitawongse Na Ayudhaya

24 December 1991 -

34

MR Adulyakitti Kittiyakorn

9 April 1992 - 5 May 2004

35

General Pichitr Kullavanijaya

13 July 1993 -

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Mr. Ampol Senanarong

9 September 1994 -

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Mr. Chamras Kemacharu

15 November 1994 -

38

ML Thaweesanti Ladawalaya

3 October 1995 -

39

MR Thepkamol Devakula

7 August 1997 -

40

Mr. Sakda Mokkamakkul

6 January 1999 -

41

Mr. Kasem Watanachai

18 July 2001 -

42

Mr. Palakorn Suwanrath

18 July 2001 -

43

Mr. Sawad Wattanayagorn

18 July 2002 -

44

General Surayud Chulanont

14 November 2003 -

45

Mr. Santi Thakral

15 March 2005 -

46

Admiral Chumpol Pachusanon

15 March 2005 -

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Public Policy Public policy, representing the entirety of the formulation and implementation of government planning which impinge upon society’s welfare, has traditionally been a topdown affair in Thailand. Public policy was determined by the absolute monarchy until 1932. After that, the bureaucracy monopolized control over it and for only a brief period (19441948) did civilians oversee it. The bureaucratic polity (in terms of the armed forces) returned to dominate all aspects of public policy from 1948 until 1973. In terms of foreign policy, this period saw Thailand aligned closely with the United States. As such, Bangkok sent troops to participate in various US-led campaigns Korean War (1950-53), Vietnam War (1965-73), and the War in Laos (1964-73). However, from 1973 to 1977, civilian-led administrations finally began to challenge the military with regard to control over public policy. During this period, three issues cropped up which greatly heightened the suspicions of the armed forces toward the civilian governments of PMs Sanya Dharmasakdi, MR Kukrit Pramoj, and MR Seni Pramoj. These were 1) establishing formal ties with communist countries (particularly China and the USSR); 2) withdrawing US troops from Thailand; and 4) the attempt by civilian governments to oversee rural development policy. Despite open hostility toward these moves by military officers such as Col. Chamlong Srimuang, no senior military personnel publicly moved to try and prevent these civilian policy modifications, given the fallout from the October 14, 1973 military massacre of students. But “it was unacceptable to the military that, after [1973] civilian governments played a significant role in both domestic and foreign policy-making.”67 Despite military opposition, civilian governments did succeed in renegotiating agreements so that US troops to withdrew from Thailand by 1976. Also, Thailand began to build bridges toward an apertura with communist countries (though full diplomatic ties were not established until the Kriangsak Chomanan regime (1977-80). As for attempts to gain greater control over rural development, civilian governments managed to partially succeed through 34

their control of the Ministry of Interior (which appointed governors and oversaw rural development). At the same time, the Kukrit government initiated the tambon scheme which distributed state financing through sub-district authorities instead of the central government.68 The enhanced power of civilians in pacifying the country was seen as a direct challenge by the military. The latter began to recruit vocational students into paramilitary groups allied with the armed forces while the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) became a sort of parallel state to the civilian regime. The climax of civilian-military tensions over public policy during this time however surrounded the US attempt to rescue the crew members of the USS Mayaguez in May 1975. During this crisis, Thailand’s elected Kukrit administration refused US permission to launch operations from Thai bases against Khmer Rouge forces. Thereupon, the US contacted Gen.Kriangsak Chomanand (then Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, later PM) who gave the green light for the US to utilize Utapao base to stage the assault without PM Kukrit’s knowledge.69 Following the 1976 coup and especially from 1977 until 1979, the military was returned to the driver’s seat of controlling public policy. However, from 1979 until 1988, during the era of the half-democracy, civilians were allowed to occupy a multiplicity of cabinet portfolios. Thus, despite the fact that first Gen. Kriangsak (1979-80) and then Gen. Prem Tinsulanond served as unelected PMs, many elected civilians managed to direct public policy during this period. However, the portfolios of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Finance were reserved for retired soldiers. Indeed, ACM Siddhi Savetsila served as Foreign Minister from 1980 until 1988.

Moreover, the military’s Internal Security Operations

Command (ISOC) and Capital Security Command (CSC) continued to exert influence on social, economic, and rural development policies, rationalizing their efforts by citing the need to ensure economic and policial stability to prevent communist subversion.70 From 1988 until 1991, the civilian government of Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan oversaw public policy. The gradual drawback by the armed forces from dominating most areas of 35

public policy (which occurred during the Prem years) had led the military to diminish its hold over influencing most aspects of public policy—except for those pertaining to national security. As such, ACM Siddhi was initially kept on by Chatchai as Foreign Minister. But Chatchai took the post of Defense Minister, gave Interior to his brother-in-law Gen.Pramarn Adireksan, and placed a civilian (Pramuan Sabhavasu) in the Finance portfolio. In terms of policy, the military clashed with the Chatchai government in four areas: foreign policy, interior policy, and defense policy. In terms of foreign policy, Chatchai sought to boost trade with Thailand’s neighbors now the Cold War was dwindling down. But the military, whose claims to huge budget allocations necessitated enemies along the borders, generally opposed Chatchai’s opening to former Communist and Socialist enemies.

In

addition, during the 1980s, close economic and political links between Thai generals and their counterparts in Burma Lao PDR, and anti-government forces in Cambodia helped these Thai generals become informal Thai leaders in terms of relations with Thailand’s neighbors. An example is Army Commander (and later PM) Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who profited handsomely from a lucrative timber trade in Burma.

Yet the Chatchai government’s

“civilianization” of foreign policy meant a potential lessening of military links and prowess with Thailand’s neighbors.71 In term of interior policy, the armed forces were angered when Interior Minister Gen. Praman Adireksan transferred his own loyalists into provincial governorship positions, ousting bureaucrats allied to the military. Praman also sought to exert his control over the police, a domain which the military (especially Class 5) was seeking to control.72 Finally, with regard to defense policy, the Chatchai government rejected a military plan for a new intelligence unit and the Auditor-General attempted to audit military purchases. Indeed, Chatchai saw eye to eye with parliament in demanding more military budget transparency. Finally, the straw that broke the camel’s back, helping to facilitate the

36

1991 coup was the Chatchai government’s attempt to put a lid on massive military requests in late 1990.73 Following the 1991 coup, the military was once again in the shadow of power. However, the armed forces’ appointment of a civilian (Anand Panyarachun) as PM and Anand’s appointment of a mostly civilian cabinet showed that the military was now ready to live with more civilian control over public policy. Indeed, the junta sought and was granted three top positions in the Defense and Interior Ministries, while a civilian veteran diplomat close to Gen.Prem Tinsulanond was made Foreign Minister.74The second Anand government, however, lessened the role of the military in public policy by diminishing the number of soldiers who could serve on state enterprise boards and moving to privatize them.75 From 1992 until 2006, public policy was in the hands of civilians for 15 years. During this period, Interior policy gradually became the preserve of civilian control. This was enabled by popular policies such as administrative decentralization and elections at local levels. Moreover, the enhanced power of political parties during this period saw to it that cabinet ministers and prime ministers must always be civilians (Constitution 1997). Various aspects of the 1997 “people’s” constitution gave teeth to judicial bodies such as the Administrative Court, Office of the Ombudsman, and National Counter Corruption Commission. During the Chuan Leekpai II government, PM Chuan took the Defense portfolio while reformist Army Commander Gen.Surayud Chulanond (following the example of army Commander Gen.Wimol Wongawanich) sought to get the Thai military out of politics and policy-making altogether. Chuan and Surayud added a new role for the military in Thai foreign policy: participation in United Nations peace-keeping missions. Still, in terms of foreign policy the armed forces continued to play an important though reduced role in relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Burma because of shared borders…and the Thai battle with communism.76

37

The 2001 election of Thaksin Shinawatra increased civilian control over public policy. Indeed, the popularity of the socioeconomic programs initiated by the Thaksin government ensured people’s continuing support for civilian control over politics and public policy. Indeed, the Thaksin government represented the nadir of military influence over Thai public policy.

Perhaps the only occasion where the military successfully influenced Thaksin

involved the decision by the Thai government in October 2001 to reverse itself and give full support to the US against Al Qaeda in the aftermath of 9/11.77 Under Thaksin, foreign policy became more closely aligned with the United States. Indeed, elements of the Thai military were sent in support of US forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Though the Thai armed forces took a back seat to Thaksin during this time, they generally supported the PM’s pro-US tilt. The 2006 coup brought the military back to a dominant position in policy formulation as well as implementation. The fact that a military man (Gen. Surayud) was appointed as PM vouches for the argument that the armed forces once again dominated public policy despite the fact that most of the cabinet was composed of civilian appointees. Since the return of electoral government in 2008, the military has once again retreated from towering over the public policy arena. However, both external and internal crises have led to military involvement in security-related policies. Thus, the shirt colors crisis and ThaiCambodian border disputes have facilitated the return of the military to various aspects of public policy. These are foreign policy, defense policy, and rural pacification policy, all of which impinge directly upon the military’s prime objective: maintenance of national security. In addition to national security-related public policy, the military today has continued to exert control over public policy toward the media. This owes to partly to a tradition of armed forces control over the Ministry of Communications.

Currently the Army controls

television channels 5 and 7.78 The military also influences the media through the fact that some members of the Mass Communication Organization of Thailand (MCOT) executive 38

board have been retired soldiers. MCOT (a former state enterprise ¾ owned by the state) owns channels 3 and 9. As for radio stations, the military controlled 245 out of 524 stations in 2002. This amounted to 127 owned by the Army, 21 by the Navy, 36 by the Air Force, 44 by the Police, 3 by the Ministry of Defense, and 14 by the Military High Command.79 This proportion remained generally the same in 2008.80 The 2006 coup ushered in greater state control of the media (at least for the period 2006-08). According to a Freedom House report on media freedom in Thailand, in 2007, the military-backed Surayud government toughened regulations on the media, including one of the world’s harshest internet crime laws, imposed tight controls on the state-run broadcasting sector, and manipulated the media in efforts to influence the outcome of the August constitutional referendum and the longawaited general elections on December 23. The continuation of martial law in 35 out of the country’s 76 provinces for most of the year [2008] also hampered the media, especially local radio broadcasters.81

Since 2008, amidst a heightened political role for Thailand’s military, state interference in the media “has intensified.”82 Under the 2008 Sonthi Boonyaratklin military government, a Broadcasting Act was implemented which continued to grant broadcasting concessions to military vested interests.83

Ultimately the armed forces remain deeply ensconced in

regulating, influencing, and profiting from much of Thailand’s television and radio media. In terms of foreign policy, the Thai military has recently showed itself to act independent of civilian authorities. The dispute over territory adjacent to Preah Vihear temple (the Thais call it Khao Phra Wihaan), which straddles the Thai-Cambodian border, touched off a violent clash between the Thai and Cambodian armies there in July 2008. The Thai Army exercises relative autonomy over the civilian administration in matters related to border security.

In August 2008, Thailand’s Supreme Commander Gen.Boonsrang Niempradit

injected himself into foreign policy when he warned Cambodia to “back off” from another border temple claimed by Thailand.84 As for rural pacification, the military has involved itself in three recent attempts at undermining support for Thaksin Shinawatra in rural North and Northeast where the former PM is widely adulated. First, under the Surayud military government, elements in the Thai

39

military worked to build support for political parties opposed to Thaksin Shinawatra. Second, during this same period, “officers were sent out to villages throughout the country to ‘create a better understanding’ about the government.”85 The efforts also focused on chipping away at Thaksin’s base.

These ISOC-led efforts have been repeated under the Abhisit government,

but the goal now is to weaken support for the red-shirts. Third, and most recently, Army Commander Gen.Anupong Paochinda ordered his troops to explain to people nationwide the proper procedure for seeking a royal pardon. This was done on the heels of an attempt by the pro-Thaksin red shirts to gather petitions for a royal pardon for Thaksin Shinawatra while several anti-Thaksin groups saw this effort as an attempt to involve the King in politics.86 Finally, with regard to defense policy, the military under PM Abhisit Vechachiwa, has found a powerful ally in Defense Minister Gen.Prawit Wongsawan, a longtime friend of Army Commander Gen.Anupong Paochinda. Prawit’s brother Pacharawat serves as Police Chief. This troika of associates has proved to be a strong block in seeking an enhanced budget for Thailand’s security forces. At the same time, the military has long succeeded in exerting power in the parliament through control over seats on the Armed Forces Committee in Thailand’s Upper and Lower Houses. Indeed, in 2009 the Senate, the Armed Forces committee is composed of five retired soldiers (including the Chair) out of 10 committee members.87 Meanwhile, in the 2009 Lower House, four out of 15 committee members are retired army personnel, including the chair.88 These positions allow the military greater access to MPs and public policy making in parliament. Ultimtely, though the 2010 fiscal defense budget was slightly pared down by the Abhisit government, the armed forces appear to have prevailed in setting almost all aspects of defense policy and obtaining desired appropriations. Ultimately, though Thailand’s military, through direct control over the ruling administration and state budget, was once able to formally set public policy as it wished, this authority is today only informal and exists in the areas of foreign policy (in relation to border 40

security), rural pacification policies (in relation to internal security), media policy (though control over its own media outlets), and defense policy (especially with regard to appropriations requests). As such, although the civilianization of public policy continued to grow in the early 2000s, the 2006 coup ushered in a renewal of armed forces’ influence. Today, amidst this lingering military sway, civilian control over public policy stands at a medium level.

Internal Security Civil-military relations in terms of Thai internal security turns on the question of who—civilians or soldiers—exerts more authority over the maintenance of order in emergency situations counterinsurgency and counter-terror programs, domestic intelligence gathering, daily policing and border control.

Recent Thai constitutions have contained

sections which grant the King and military enormous power to declare martial law: The King has the prerogative of declaring and lifting the martial law in accordance with the condition and manner under the martial laws In the case where it is necessary to declare martial law in a certain locality as a matter of urgency, the military authority may do so under the martial law (see for example, Section 159, 1978 constitution: Section 222, 1997 constitution; Section 188, 2007 constitution).

The 2007 constitution also grants the king the power to issue an emergency decree “for the purpose of maintaining national or public safety or national economic security, or averting public calamity.“ However use of this decree must be approved by the PM, Council of Ministers, Parliament, and the Constitution Court (Section 184, 185, 2007 constitution). In actuality, the PM applies the emergency decree. It must then be approved by the legislature before being sent to the palace for endorsement. Outside of various constitutions, internal security powers have traditionally been under military control. In 1960, with the promulgation of the Ministry of Defense Administration Act, the military enshrined two military responsibilities into law: internal security and rural development. Furthermore, the act placed the Army, Navy, and Air Force under the aegis of 41

the Supreme Commander instead of the Ministry of Defense (the previous state of affairs). In 1962, the Supreme Command Headquarters set up the Central Security Command (CSC)— the first military agency charged with stemming the communist insurgency. 1965 saw the establishment of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) to coordinate national anti-Communist operations.

CSOC organized rural villagers as local militia,

intelligence sources, and additional military manpower. CSOC was originally placed under the direct control of the Prime Minister (Gen.Thanom Kittikachorn) but in 1969, amidst the opening of an elected Lower House of parliament, direct control was transferred to the Army Commander—Gen.Prapas Charusatien.89 In 1974, following the 1973 fall of the ThanomPrapas-Narong dictatorship, the name CSOC was changed to ISOC (Internal Security Operations Command).

By 1975, ISOC had helped to launch two ultra-right-wing

paramilitary organizations called Nawaphon and Gratin Daeng, turning the government’s anticommunist campaign into more of a repressive vigilante crusade.90 To improve its relations with rural people, the Army, in 1976, issued Order No.298/2519 which elaborated upon the Army’s role in national development by supporting community development, promote better relations between soldiers and the people, and suppress communism. As part of this effort, ISOC established three mass organizations relating to these goals: the Thai National Defense Volunteers, the Volunteer Development and Self Defense Villages, and the Military Reservists for National Security. Though the trainees were peripherally taught about communism, most of the training was on military practice. By 1983 the structure of ISOC had been modified such that ISOC was not officially part of the Army, but rather under the Prime Minister though the Army Chief served as its director and remained in de facto control of it. All senior army officials concurrently held the top postings at ISOC91Under Order 83/2526, the Army Commander, as Director of ISOC, was granted tremendous powers over national security government agencies, civilian-policemilitary forces, [and] paramilitary forces. Ultimately ISOC became the vehicle through 42

which Thailand’s military, in the name of maintaining internal security, was able to exert considerable authority over the civilian bureaucracy. In 1987, ISOC was again restructured, with the Prime Minister (then Gen.Prem Tinsulanond) becoming Director and the Army chief moving to be ISOC deputy chief. But this was only a cosmetic alteration given that the Army Commander, in his new post as ISOC Deputy Director, “was empowered fully to act on behalf of the Director-General.92 Moreover, some criticized this change as a strategy by which the Army might be able to extend its powers over civilian agencies.93 ISOC also announced that henceforth it would be promoting democratic values throughout Thailand. ISOC further sought to informally co-opt politicians and political parties thought to be amenable to ISOC objectives.94 At the same time that ISOC was growing to become the military leviathan driving Thailand’s security state against internal threats at the national level, the military separately sought to address the maintenance of security in the country’s capital. In 1976, the Army established the Capital Security Command (CSC) in Bangkok. CSC Commanders had the right to exercise authority over all military forces (including all services) in the capital, potentially making that person key to any coup and one of the most powerful soldiers in the country. Objectives included preserving order, countering terrorism and communism, as well as eradicating the conditions which might help communists win their struggle. As a result of this latter objective, CSC heads often involved themselves in debates on all aspects of public policy—normally under the purview of elected civilians. Indeed, in the early 1980s, CSC head Gen.Arthit Kamlang-ek used his CSC powers to criticize PM Prem’s baht devaluation. Arthit also worked to assist poor slum dwellers, and marketed military solutions to the public.95 However, the CSC’s power to disperse unruly demonstrators was used by Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon in May 1992 to rationalize the violent army crackdown on protestors. Following Black May, with much of the public disenchanted with military behavior, however, the CSC was dissolved.96In addition, the second Anand Panyarachun government modified 43

the Government Administration in a Crisis Act of 1952, the Martial Law Act of 1954, abolished the Internal Security Act of 1976, all of which “so that the use of armed forces in riot control now [required] authorization by the cabinet.”97 The dwindling of the Thai communist insurgency in the 1980s, the 1991 end of the Cold War and the diminished credibility in the armed forces after Black May placed ISOC in growing limbo as successive governments could not agree on what to do with it. Moreover, the 1997 financial crisis increased financial burdens for the agency as military budget cutbacks left ISOC leaner. Though the 1990s was a period in which the military had lost enormous credibility, its role in development proved to be one way in which it could still connect positively with Thai society. Originally in the 1960s-80s, rural development had been seen by the military as a strategy to stabilize internal security by winning over rural people from Communist influence. This followed the King’s pronouncement that “combat” and “development must be achieved simultaneously. Moreover, the armed forces possessed a track record for military success in development projects—success that improved living conditions, won many “hearts and minds,” and thus reinforced national security.98 Examples of past military development projects have been the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Operation “Greening” the Northeast (in arid parts of the Northeast). Doi Tung Development Project (in the far North) Penang Basin Development Project (in the far South) New Hope Project (in the far South) Royal Development Projects (in association with the palace throughout Thailand)99

Current national development and civic action programs include relief operations against national disasters, helping farmers to harvest their crops, and seeking ways to help stabilize the price of agricultural produce.100As part of development work, soldiers have also been instructed to teach political ideology and inculcate notions of democracy.101 The 1994 Thai Defense White Paper stated that military’s role in rural development work might grow to encompass more areas such as environmental protection projects.102Indeed, development was 44

enshrined as a key plank of this White Paper.103 By the late 1990s, the armed forces seemed to have lost focus from its earlier clear objective of guaranteeing national security against communism, protection of the King, and protecting the country from unscrupulous politicians. The Cold War and insurgency were over, the monarchy seemed safer than ever, and democracy appeared to be on the rise in Thailand. Many were split on what should be the future of the military as well as ISOC. When PM Thaksin Shinawatra entered office in 2001, he delegated a military ally, General Pallop Pinmanee (a military man often involved in political machinations), to oversee ISOC. In 2005, the Thaksin administration passed the Decree on Government Administration in a State of Emergency, which allowed the Prime Minister to authorize a three-month state of emergency in response to internal or external threats. This decree was immediately applied to cover the three provinces in Thailand’s far South where a separatist insurgency was raging. The committee to administer states of emergency and issue recommendations to the PM was composed of 19 persons, four of whom were civilian non-bureaucrats and five others from Thailand’s military and police (See Section 6, Decree on Government Administration in a State of Emergency, 2005). At the same time, the Prime Minister, upon coming to office, was able to personally centralize authority over the Royal Thai Police. This owed to his network of connections within the force as well as the fact that the police were structured directly under the Office of the Prime Minister. Originally, the Thailand National Police Department had served under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. During the 1990s, in an attempt to dilute Interior’s powers, the police were made an independent entity. Under PM Chuan, the police were again set to be restructured: they were to be moved from their independent status to the Justice Ministry. But Thaksin cancelled this order, keeping direct prime ministerial control over them. As such, under his government, “police officers had shifted to ‘neutral gear’ when dealing with those in power…who were subject to criminal liability, but had diligently taken 45

action against those in the anti-Thaksin movements.”104 Indeed, under Thaksin, most the Thai police in general seemed to become embedded in the pro-Thaksin superstructure. Sometimes they had no choice. “Before the coup, the police could hardly not respond to orders given by the former prime minister who was a police officer, or they faced hardship in their career for disobeying orders.”105 Meanwhile, Thaksin was planning to restructure ISOC, centralizing control over it in the Office of the Prime Minister--himself. But not everyone in the military approved of this reform. In 2006, an alleged bomb-plot against Thaksin was traced back to some in ISOC itself. After the 2006 coup, junta chief and Army Commander Gen. Sonthi Bunyaratklin served as head of ISOC. Appointed PM Surayud and the Council for National Security (CNS) coup leaders determined that ISOC must be rejuvenated to confront terrorism, new security challenges (e.g. cyber threats), coordinate the counterinsurgency campaign in Thailand’s far South, unify much of the security bureaucracy, “as well as taking the lead role for the bureaucracy to counter-balance the runaway power of any rogue government.”106 The ISOC director was empowered to simultaneously head up the National Counter Corruption Commission, the Department of Special Investigation and the Anti Money Laundering Office. In June 2007, Surayud and the CNS junta resolved to once again shift the Army Commander to be the head of ISOC, instead of the Prime Minister.107 Only after intense public criticism was this proposal squelched. Yet regardless of that small civilian victory, the revamped ISOC was criticized for being a quiet coup through which the power of civilian governments would pass to the Army, eventually paving the way for Thailand to become a military state such as that in Burma. Indeed, the new act allows for the curtailment of the right of assembly, the placing of anyone under house arrest, search and arrest without warrant, “intervention in the judicial process to appoint joint police interrogators and the subpoenaing of police investigation documents without being answerable to a court of law and with no legal redress by those affected.”108 As 46

such, the military could more easily transgress upon civilian realm and commit human rights violations with impunity. Despite opposition, the Surayud government approved the Internal Security Act in October 2007, though revisions were made to ensure that there would be no redundancies between this Act and the power of the government to declare emergency decrees. Then, in early November the National Legislative Assembly passed the bill, only one month before the general election. After the vote, one NLA appointee (Gen. Chockchai Hongthong), in response to criticism that the new act would erode Thai democracy, stated that “People must sacrifice their basic rights for the security of the country”109The Act became effective on February 27, 2008. So what exactly does the 2007 Internal Security Act say? It first “states that the armed forces shall have role and responsibility to safeguard the internal security…through the Internal Security Committee and the Cabinet’s decision-making process…having the army as the main operation unit.”110 The Act establishes a structure of control whereby the Prime Minister is ISOC director, the Army Commander is Deputy Director, and the Army Chief of Staff is Secretary. This Secretary is empowered to take responsibility for the direction and activity of ISOC. There can also be an optional Assistant Director (who must be a bureaucrat), appointed by the PM “The Deputy Director, Assistant Director, and Secretary of ISOC have power to command government servants, officers and employees in ISOC as deputies of the Director, and have other powers and duties as assigned by the Director (Chapter 1, Section 5, ISA).” There is also a board of up to 24 members chaired by the prime minister or deputy prime miinster and comprising four other civilian ministers. Other board members include the defense permanent secretary, the Supreme Commander, commanders of the armed forces, high-ranking officials from the police force and other civil servant agencies (Chapter 1, Section 10, ISA). Under the national ISOC board, there are regional and provincial branches. Each regional branch parallels Thailand’s four military regions. As 47

such, the Internal Security Act provides that the Commander of each regional army shall be the director of each regional ISOC subdivision (Chapter 1, Section 11, ISA). Human Rights Watch has expressed its concern that by establishing the army chief as ISOC deputy director and regional commanders become regional ISOC heads, this “would place the military at the heart of a future civilian government at all levels.”111 Since late 2007, two Army officials have succeeded in dominating ISOC. These are Army Commander Gen.Anupong Paochinda and his close friend Army Chief of Staff Gen.Prayuth Chanucha (seen to be Anupong’s potential successor once the former retires as Army Chief in 2010. Gen Anupong is ISOC deputy head of ISOC while Gen Prayuth serves as ISOC secretary-general. Meanwhile, under PM Somchai Wongsawat, Lt.Gen.Athichart Charoenying (Prayuth’s classmate from AFAPS Class 12) was appointed to head up ISOC on behalf of Somchai. Furthermore, Lt-Gen Yuwanat Suriyakul Na Ayutthaya, also from Class 12, serves under Prayuth at the ISOC secretary-general's office. Finally, the ISOC restructuring has witnessed the appointment of other generals, as well as colonels and regiment commanders close to Anupong and Prayuth to key ISOC positions at the national and regional levels.112 In 2009, although PM Abhisit Vechachiwa officially has direct command of ISOC, it is essentially a military-controlled agency. 113

The new ISOC organizational structure is cosmetically geared to appear to be under civilian control—given that the Prime Minister serves as Director while four other civilian ministers can serve on the ISOC board. But the civilian board members are outnumbered by bureaucrats (many allied with or belonging to the military) 19-5. At the same time, the Deputy Director and Secretary (both soldiers) possess an inordinate amount of autonomy in relation to the Director (the elected Prime Minister). Finally, ISOC is decentralized toward higher military control. That is, regional branches are under the total control of the armed forces. Though provincial subdivisions of ISOC are headed up by governors who were

48

appointed by the Minister of the Interior, provincial ISOC heads rank lower than provincial ones. Moreover, the more paltry budget of governors in relation to the regional commanders (with sizeable armed forces allocations) ensures that the military maintains control should governors come into dispute with the military. Ultimately, the new ISOC provides Thailand’s armed forces a convenient subterfuge from which they can enhance their power due to and despite the authority of civilian governments. This is because civilian governments who wish to govern effectively must cooperate and lend legitimacy to ISOC, allowing the armed forces greatly heightened authority. At the same time, soldiers cannot be officially blamed for launching a violent crackdown given that the PM is the ISOC Director. Civilian governments are even forced to uphold ISOC where military officials entirely control internal security missions. However, the same civilian PM is responsible for negative fallout related to such operations. Moreover, as Wassana Nanuam points out, the restructured ISOC gives the army “a justification for stepping in to handle a political problem without fear that it will be criticized for trying to intervene in politics.”114

Under the new ISA, ISOC, with a whopping new Thai Baht 8.2, has been granted several powers which could be used to stifle civil liberties and civilian control, all in the name of maintaining internal security. The provisions below exemplify this trend: Section 15. In the event of an occurrence which affects internal security but which does not yet require the declaration of a state of emergency under the Act on Public Administration in an Emergency Situation…the Cabinet shall pass a resolution to have ISOC take responsibility for prevention, suppression, and eradication or mitigation of this occurrence which affects internal security, within an assigned area and time-period, and shall make a general announcement of this fact (ISA, 27 February 2008). Section 16 allows ISOC to order that any state official whose behavior is a threat to internal security or an obstruction to the maintenance of internal security be excluded from a designated area (ISA, 27 February 2008). Section 17 authorizes ISOC to establish six centres “to coordinate efforts in dealing with various pressing issues, including the war on drugs, illegal immigrant workers, terrorism and transnational crime, special security concerns, the southern unrest, and the royal project to protect and preserve forests and the natural environment.”115 The centre dealing with "special security concerns" may be especially controversial for democracy. This is because the cenre’s 49

name itself is ambiguous and can be widely interpreted, potentially allowing the government to invoke the aforementioned Article 15 of the National Security Act to declare a "security area" where soldiers can be called in to instill order.116 This section also permits ISOC to take charge of state agencies by “issuing a notification commanding state officials not to perform any act or to perform any act” in the name of internal security.117 Section 18 allows ISOC “to undertake criminal investigators without providing any safeguards or judicial oversight of summons, arrests and detentions.”118 Section 19 permits ISOC the right to “act as criminal investigation officials and have powers similar to those of public prosecutors and judges. They are given the authority to sentence any person found involved in a threat to internal security to attend re-education camps for up to six months. The draft does not state where such camps will be set up or under whose authority (civilian or military). This provision will allow for arbitrary incommunicado detention in undisclosed or inaccessible places where independent monitoring is impossible. It also sidesteps the protections in Thailand’s criminal justice system.”119 Section 23 states that any ISOC regulation, notification, order, or action is not subject to the law on administrative procedures. As such, civilians lose their right to legally redress human rights violations by ISOC through the Administrative Court (ISA, 27 February 2008). Human Rights Watch’s Sunai Phasuk has expressed deep reservations about the ISA amnesty clause which could allow soldiers to get away with human rights violations as long as they are on duty. In addition, he stresses that the Act does not define “security threat” and fails to make ISOC answerable to elected representatives in Parliament.120HRW has further opined that the establishment of ISOC will facilitate the rise of arbibrary military rule in Thailand. “No declaration of a state of emergency would be required for the ISOC to exercise its powers. The parliament and the courts are given no role in debating, reviewing or approving the use of these emergency-style powers.”121 Aside from establishing a strengthened ISOC, the Surayud government, in early July 2007, approved a bill to drastically restructure the Royal Thai Police. According to the interim Justice Minister, direct control of the police by the Prime Minister was much too “prone to political interference and favoritism.122 The bill amounted to a wholesale decentralization of Thailand’s constabulary, with heightened independent authority for police director-generals in each of nine provincial police regions. Officers could only work and be promoted in the regions where they served. In addition, several police divisions (marine

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police, railway police, foresty police, and immigration police) would be shorn from the control of central police authorities, instead being supervised by other state agencies.123 Given that a military government had proposed this bill, its objective appears to have been to attenuate the power of the police vis-à-vis the armed forces and weaken the power of a coercive body known to harbor multiple security personnel sympathetic to Thaksin. Yet with the return to elective office of pro-Thaksin Prime Ministers Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat, these governments placed on hold the police restructuring reforms. As such, the police could perhaps still be counted on as a loyal security tool—given that the generally anti-Thaksin military leadership at the time could not be relied upon. When Abhisit Vechachiwa became Prime Minister, the Prime Minister’s office continued to exert direct control over the Royal Thai police. But Abhisit did allow the Surayud reforms to take effect on September 7, 2009. The reforms allowed politicians to reassign more than 100,000 police officials. As a result, police power was dispersed, the Office of the Prime Minister lost direct control over the national constabulary, and, henceforth, the military (specifically the Army) could affectively trump all security forces in Thailand. Reliable police leadership remained an open question for Thailand’s military after the 2006 coup. The CNS had dismissed Police Chief Gen.Kowit Wattana in favor of Police Gen.Seripisut, who, it was felt, was not as beholden to Thaksin. However, following the election again of a pro-Thaksin government in 2007, Prime Minister Thaksin appointed as Police Chief Gen.Patcharawat Wongsuwan. This was seen as a safe choice for Samak since Patcharawat was the younger brother of ex-Army chief Prawit Wongsawat. Moreover, Patcharawat had attended Thai Police Academy Class 25 with former interior minister Purachai Piemsombun and former deputy prime minister Pol.Gen. Chidchai Vanasatidya.124 As such, he was seen as a potentially loyal minion to Samak. With the coming to office of Democrat Prime Minister Abhisit in December 2008, the new government viewed 51

Patcharawat suspiciously because of his former connections with pro-Thaksin elements. Indeed, Patcharawat was suspected of failing to adequately safeguard the March 2009 ASEAN Summit in Pattaya, unsatisfactorily provided security against violent Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok, and to have perhaps helped to mastermind the April attempted assassination of PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul (though this could have been a mere pretext to discredit him).125 In early August, Patcharawat completed a reshuffle list of promotions/transfers for 152 police generals which may have been viewed by the Abhisit government as continuing to contain pro-Thaksin elements. Though the Police Commission quickly concurred with this list, to Abhisit, such a state of affairs could not be allowed to pass muster. The perception that most police were aligned with Thaksin, their control over the annual police reshuffle (set to officially occur on October 1, 2009), and the desire by Abhisit to sideline police generals appearing to be pro-Thaksin most likely influenced the Abhisit government to send the police chief abroad, to the South, and pressure him to take leave (his retirement was set for October 1). In his place, Pol.Gen.Wichien Potposri was appointed as acting Police Chief. Wichien had previously served as head of the Royal Court Security Police, but following the 2006 coup, he was transferred to direct “special operations and security during national elections.”126Unlike many top police generals (e.g. Pol.Gen.Prieopan Damapong, brother of Thaksin’s wife, who in 2009 possessed seniority in terms of promotions), Wichien has proven to be a pliable partner by Thailand’s military establishment and thus a more practical police chief by the Abhisit administration. With Wichien guiding the police, the military could finally erode the often hostile (even pro-Thaksin) police leadership and reign supreme over internal security. Wichien and Deputy PM Suthep Thuagsuban (in charge of national security for the Democrat government) decided to postpone a decision on endorsing the Patcharawatinfluenced reshuffle until September 7. Neither wanted to upset the police chief’s brother— Defense Minister Prawit—who holds enormous sway in the armed forces.127 52

Since the NLA’s passage of the Internal Security Act in December 2008, ISOC has been used to “promote democracy” during the countdown to the December 2007 election. (during which the military had been accused of backing and financially supporting parties opposed to the pro-Thaksin Palang Prachachon party).128 At the same time, ISOC became more involved in coordinating the southern Thailand counter-insurgency.129At the same time, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), relied on ISOC for funding.130 During 2008, the Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat Palang Prachachon party governments allowed ISOC power to be centralized in the hands of Army Chief Anupong for fear of otherwise upsetting the anti-Thaksin senior military leaders. Yet the ability of Anupong to dominate ISOC allowed him to deny assistance to guaranteeing stability for the two civilian governments whenever he saw fit. Indeed, Anupong refused to order troops to end the PAD takeover of Government House, break up PAD rallies at Parliament, or stop the PAD seizures of Bangkok’s two international airports. These moves demonstrated a military refusal to maintain internal security for elected governments in Thailand. Yet everything changed following the coming to power of an anti-Thaksin civilian government at the end of 2008. Thereupon, Anupong’s ISOC moved from evading responsibility for internal security to guaranteeing it. Indeed, in March 2009 it was revealed that Bt1 billion had been apportioned to ISOC for rural projects aimed at weakening the proThaksin red-shirt movement.131 In April, PM Abhisit declared a state of emergency in Bangkok and surrounding areas, following a flurry of pro-Thaksin anti-government demonstrations in Bangkok and Pattaya which led to the cancellation of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit. The meeting was re-scheduled to convene in Thailand two months later.

Use of the State of

Emergency (rather than ISOC) placed greater power in the hands of Abhisit’s cabinet rather than if the Internal Security Act had been implemented (in which case Gen.Anupong would have had more influence). As such, Minister of Defense Prawit and Minister of the Interior 53

Chaovarat Chanvirakul were able to see to it that the Red Shirts were dispersed. The former was able to exert influence on Anupong while the latter created a royalist state-sponsored militia called the Blue Shirts which was officially under the Ministry of Interior but actually under the control of Newin Chidchob and the Bhumjai Thai Party.132 The military ultimately resorted to force in its crackdown on the protestors, and the demonstration dissipated.133 Not long afterward, during the July 2009 ASEAN Summit (held in Phuket), the Internal Security Act was instituted to keep order, prevent any demonstrations, and prohibit the movement of people. The order was aimed at potential pro-Thaksin rallies at the Conference venue. Ultimately, the entire structure of a revamped ISOC under the Internal Security Act officially took effect on August 20, 2009. But what are the implications of this revised ISOC for civil-military relations in Thailand? In terms of individual liberties, ISOC grants greater powers to the armed forces to decide for itself when internal security interests require it to run roughshod over political rights, including the use of intelligence-gathering against civilians. Meanwhile, where ISOC utilizes its powers under the Internal Security Act, the military can generally have jurisdiction over non-military personnel. As for separation of civilian police from military police, ISOC has facilitated a merging of functions and duties for purposes of strengthening domestic protection. In terms of a declaration of a state of emergency or martial law, the cabinet must initiate such actions and can be held responsible for abuses of them. Yet the Internal Security Act allows ISOC to engage in blanket repression without a state of emergency being declared. Indeed, given the overwhelming influence of the Army over the ISOC, soldiers now have much more control over the issuing of such decrees. Finally, with regard to civilian monitoring of military internal security operations, the Internal Security Act allows very little parliamentary or judicial oversight of ISOC programs. Ultimately then, the emergence of a restructured and strengthened ISOC has paralleled the erosion of civil liberties as well as civilian predominance over internal security decisions. As such, civilian control over the military in the area of internal security has moved from being 54

robust under Thaksin Shinawatra to quite low under AbhisitVechachiwa. Given the continuing growth of Thai military prowess, this study can only predict that soldiers will either continue to exert enormous influence on internal security or eventually monopolize it. Moreover, where the armed forces are unable to see their domestic security prerogatives enshrined into law (e.g.ISA), they will informally flout legal institutions and impose their will, doing whatever they wish in the name of ensuring domestic peace and order.

National Defense In Thailand, authority over National Defense was in the domain of the military until 1988.134 Such power was in the hands of a military (e.g. Gen.Kriangsak Chomanand, 197779) or ex-military (e.g. Gen.Prem Tinsulanond) Prime Minister. Recent constitutions have stated that “the King has the prerogative to declare war with the approval of the National Assembly.” In addition, “the King has the prerogative to conclude a peace treaty, armistice, and other treaties with other countries or international organizations” (see, for example, Sections 161, 162, 1978 constitution, Sections 223, 224 , 1997 constitution, Sections 189, 190 , 2007 constitution). However, such royal power entailed an executive decision (sometimes requiring legislative assent) sent to the palace for endorsement. Thus, only the executive (with concurrence on some issues from the legislature) possessed formal control over National Defense authoritative rights. This included the right to declare war or initiate hostilities with another state.

However, since the advent of civilian Prime Ministers beginning with

Chatchai Chunhavan (1988-91), authority over national defense issues has resided in elected civilians (excluding the 1991-2, 2006-8 years of military rule).

Yet informally, given the

porous nature of the border which Thailand shares with its neighbors and a lack of complete demarcation, Thai soldiers sometimes involved themselves in hostilities (even initiating hostilities) with the militaries of Burma, Cambodia, and Lao PDR, even without the sanction of the Thai Prime Minister. For example, on at least two occasions in 2008 (June, October), 55

the Thai Army clashed with the Cambodian military along the two countries’ shared boundary. With regard to determinations of external military missions, civilian Prime Ministers formally possess such authority. Moreover, there have been no instances where the military informally embarks on external military missions of its own—without the approval of civilian authorities. As for the power of civilian governments to monitor military’s national defense activities, such formal power is vested in the Ministry of Defense. Yet where the Minister of Defense is himself or herself a former soldier, the Ministry rarely monitors military conduct in a thorough manner. This is because such a Defense Minister often identifies more with the armed forces than the civilian government (which generally only administers the country for a brief period anyway). The armed forces have, however, sought to remain isolated from civilian monitoring with regard to National Defense—a situation deriving from the military’s tradition of autonomy from civilian intrusions which has led it to jealously guard its prerogatives regarding National Defense. Still, the external nature of National Defense issues has boded well for civilian control. This is because Thailand’s armed forces have oriented themselves in a domestic direction towards internal order and development. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War in 1991, the military lost its chief external enemy (communism) and found itself seeking a new objective.

As such, in terms of National Defense issues, the

armed forces have receded behind the lead of civilian Prime Ministers. It thus readily cooperated with and obeyed the Chuan II government in terms of the latter’s 1999 decision to send Thai troops abroad as part of a peace-keeping force in East Timor. Aside from authoritative rights, the selection of National Security-related advisors has been another area where the Thai military has exercised its influence. Such advisors belong to either the Defense Ministry or the National Security Council. With regard to the Minister of Defense, Thai constitutions have often allowed active military personnel to occupy this slot. This can be seen in the 1932a, 1932b, 1952 (1932b), 56

1947, 1959, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1977, 1991a, and 2006 charters. However, the 1946, 1949, 1974, 1978 (Section 148), 1991b, 1997 (Section 207), and 2007 (Section 194) constitutions represent the trend toward requiring the Defense Minister to be a civilian. Six elected PMs have acted as Defense Minister: MR Seni Pramoj (1976); ret.Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan (198891); ret.Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh; Chuan Leekpai (1997-2001); Samak Sundaravej (2008); and Somchai Wongsawat (2008). In such cases, there has often been a decentralization of the Defense Ministry. That is, civilians, instead of challenging the military, have more or less stood aside and allowed soldiers to dominate the Defense Ministry.135Perhaps the only exceptions to this rule have been the cases of Chavalit and, to a lesser extent, Chatchai. Table 11: Thai Defense Ministers (1932-Present) Civilians are indicated in bold; retired soldiers are indicated in italics Date Name 1932-33

Phya (Gen.) Rajawangsan

1933-34

Phya (Gen.) Prasersongkram

1934-34

Phya (Gen.) Pahon Yothin

1934-41

Gen.Plaek Phibunsongkram

1941-41

Gen.Mangkorn Phromyothi

1941-43

Gen.Plaek Phibunsongkram

1943-44

Gen.Pichit Kriangsakpichit

1944-45

Gen.Sindhu Kamalanavin

1945-46 1946-47

Gen.Chit Munsilpa Sinadyodharaksa Gen. Jira Wichitsongkram

1947-49

Gen.Suk Nakrob

1949-57

Gen.Plaek Phibunsongkram

1957-57

Gen.Sarit Thanarat

1957-71

Gen.Thanom Kittikachorn

1971-72

Gen.Prapas Charusatien

1972-73

Gen.Thanom Kittikachorn

1973-74

Gen.Thawee Chullasap

57

1974-75

Gen.Kruan Suddhanin

1975-75 1975-76

Gen.Tawich Senivansa Ayudhya Gen.Pramarn Adireksan

1976-76

Gen.Krit Sivara

1976-76 1976-76

Gen.Tawich Ayudhya Seni Pramoj

1976-77

Adm.Sa-ngad Chaloryu

1977-78

Gen.Lek Naeomali

1978-79

Gen.Kriangsak Chamanand

1979-86 1986-88

Gen.Prem Tinsulanond from military in 1981) Gen.Panieng Kantarat

1988-90

Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan

1990-90

Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh

1990-91

Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan

1991-92

Gen.Prapat Krisnachan

1992-92

Gen.Suchinda Kraprayoon

1992-92

Gen. Banjob Bunnag

1992-95

Gen.Wijit Sukmak

1995-97

Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh

1997-2001

Chuan Leekpai

2001-02

Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh

2002-04 2004-04

Gen.Thammarak Issarakul Ayudhaya Gen.Chettha Thanajaro

2004-05

Gen.Samphan Bunyanan

2005-06 2006-08

Gen.Thammarak Issarakul Ayudhaya Gen.Bunrod Somdej

2008-08

Samak Sundaravej

2008-08

Somchai Wongsawat

2008-Present

Gen.Prawit Wongsawan

Na

Senivansa

Na

(retired

na

na

58

Where the PM has not taken the Defense Minister’s slot, civilian governments have always appointed retired military personnel. For example, ret.General Krit Sivara served as Defense Minister (1976-76); ret.Gen.Prem Tinsulanond concurrently served as PM and Defense Minister (1981-88); ret.Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan followed in the model of Prem (1988-91); ret.Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh variously acted as Defense Minister; and Thaksin Shinawatra also utilized retired soldiers to head the Defense Ministry.

PM Abhisit

Vechachiwa has continued this trend with the appointment of ret.Gen.Prawit Wongsawat at the end of 2008. Placing retired army generals in the position of Defense Minister is practical for civilian governments desirous of close cooperation with and support from active senior military leaders. The goal is to put someone in the Minister’s post who can guarantee military support for the civilian government in power while influencing the armed forces on a range of issues. Still, the danger is that this person may align with the active military chiefs against the civilian government. Thus, the PM must take care to ensure that the Defense Minister is effective but loyal. Besides the Minister, it is also necessary to maintain civilian control over the staff personnel in Thailand’s Defense Ministry. These staff personnel are the advisors to the Defense Minister.

They make recommendations regarding defense budget, troop

mobilization, deployments, training, and are collectively referred to as the Defense Council. Though the Minister of Defense chairs this council, it is also comprised of his/her two civilian deputies, the undersecretary of defence; the supreme commander of the armed forces; the chief of staff of the Supreme Command; the commanders in chief of the three services (the army, navy, and air force); their deputies, and chiefs of staff; „and not more than three additional general officers selected for their outstanding ability.”

Of these 18 council

members, only the three ministers and deputy ministers are civilians. The MOD is also advised by a Permanent Secretary (currently Gen.Apichart Penkitti) and four deputies. All of these officials are active military personnel. 59

Meanwhile, the Council of Armed Forces Commanders advises the Minister of Defense and Defense Council on matters of force mobilization and combat operations. It is an all-military body, chaired by the Supreme Commander and is also composed of the Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Council furthermore commands “joint task forces established in circumstances affecting order and security in the country.”136 This vaguely defined objective has the potential to offer the Council a wide array of power. The National Security Council represents another arena where the military has exerted great authority. The National Security Council advises the Prime Minister when the country faces a national security challenge that necessitates coordinated cabinet action or presents a serious threat to the country's sovereignty. The PM serves as the Chair of this body but he/she is advised by This body consists of the prime minister as chairman; the deputy prime ministers; the NSC secretary general; the ministers of defence, foreign affairs, interior, communications, and finance; and the supreme commander of the armed forces. Given that only two NSC member are active duty soldier (the NSC secretary-general and the Supreme Commander [ now called the Chief of Defense Forces]), the prime minister has been able to dominate „the workings of the council“137 In July 2009, civilian power on the NSC increased even more with PM Abhisit Vechachiwa’ appointment of Thawil Pliensri as NSC secretarygeneral. This occurred despite intense lobbying by Army Commander Anupong Paochinda for a replacement with an army background. „The NSC has had 14 secretary-generals over the years, with only three of them civilians.138 All in all, in terms of National Defense, civilians and soldiers continue to struggle for control. Though the military has traditionally dominated this issue-area, civilians have, since the early 1990s, succeeded in chipping away at the prevailing armed forces influence. This can be seen in terms of the dimensions of authoritative rights and selection of advisors. In terms of the former, the military today allows the civilian PM to officially take the lead. Only in informal situations (e.g. border conflicts) do soldiers sometimes involve themselves in 60

cross-border melees without the PM’s permission. As for the selection of advisors, the military today remains dominant at the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, despite the fact that defense ministers must be civilians, many of these have been retired military personnel still enjoying close ties with active duty soldiers. The alignment of these ministers with the armed forces and the majority representation of active duty officers in advisory posts has allowed the military to exert considerable influence upon the MOD. Meanwhile, the National Security Council is today dominated by Thailand’s civilian governments. Yet the military-dominated MOD Defense Council acts as a sort of parallel body to the NSC, overlapping the latter’s functions. As such, though civilian influence may seem to have grown in the area of National Defense, it remains at a medium-high level.

Military Organization Thailand’s armed forces, originally beholden to an absolute monarchy, passed through the era of anti-monarchical absolutism (1932-44), re-established itself as a royal protector in 1957, and thus predated the advent of democratization in Thailand.

As such, military

organization has traditionally operated outside the purview of civilian control. Current laws regulating Thai armed forces doctrine, mission, resources, etc. have, for the most part, derived from Thailand’s authoritarian era (1932-73; 1976-88). Still, institutional modifications in terms of downsizing and increased transparency were implemented in the late 1990s while military organizational autonomy grew in 2007. Military behavior represents Dimension One of military organization. It encompasses factors shaping the military mindset as well as military law. Military doctrine and mission With regard to military mindset, we are referring to the development of and regulations regarding military doctrine, mission, and educational curricula. In Thailand these stem from three sources: the king, the armed forces themselves, and, most recently, civilians 61

through the enactment of the 1997 constitution. Thailand’s monarch (as well as Privy Council Chair Gen.Prem Tinsulanonda) periodically makes remarks on the Thai soldier’s role and his opinions are revered by the Thai people. For example, in December, 1995, the king stated: The soldier’s primary mission is to defend the Nation and safeguard national sovereignty and independence with military power. In addition, soldiers have another duty which is equally important, that is, performing relief and development work that will bring prosperity and happiness to the country and the people.139

Military influence in shaping military doctrine and mission, can be found in the 1960 Ministry of Defense Act.

During this time, Thailand was ruled by the Sarit Thanarat military

dictatorship. Article 4 of the Act defined the role and duty of the Thai armed forces as defending and maintaining the stability of the Kingdom from external and internal threats. The military would be specifically utilized to safeguard the monarchy, combat insurrection, develop the country and protect national interests as defined by law (Ministry of Defense website). In 1994, a Defense White Paper, again outlined the mission of the Thai military: The Royal Thai Armed Forces has the responsibility of safeguarding the sovereignty, security, and national interests of the State, conducting armed conflict or war, acting as a deterrent in order to protect the Institution of the Monarchy, and suppressing and deterring rebellion and anarchy in order to maintain the security of the State and to develop the country. The Armed Forces conducts its mission in accordance with the Constitution and follows the policies laid down by the Ministry of Defense.140

Though this 1994 White Paper stipulated that the Armed Forces’ doctrine and mission would accord with the Constitution, the two previous charters (1978, 1991) had been ratified where an unelected government had held sway. Given that the drafters of the 1997 constitution were chosen under a civilian government, it can be argued that this charter established, for the first time in Thailand’s history, the civilian orientation toward the armed forces. Yet in no part of the charter did the drafters specifically discuss the role, mission, or doctrine of the armed forces, perhaps reflecting a civilian fear of upsetting military leaders. Indeed, there was, as Hänggi (2009: 10) points out, only an allusion to the military in Article 6, which established the supremacy of the Constitution over the various parts of the state.

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In 1998, seven years since the end of the Cold War, a year after the 1997 financial crisis and amidst efforts to restructure the armed forces, the Thai army began to look for more missions which would keep it busy and perhaps provide it with income. As such, it donated peacekeeping troops to the United Nations (UN), in the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), from 1999 to 2002.141 The Thai military also participated in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan (2001-2002), and the Multinational force in Iraq, offering 423 personnel from 2003 to 2004.142

The armed forces also continued to work in rural

development projects. By the early 2000s, the military appeared to have become more professional, apolitical, and a force for good. This changed with the 2006 military coup, after which the 1997 constitution was voided and replaced in 2007 with a charter which had been written by drafters partly chosen by the coup leaders themselves. Among the new provisions was one which enshrined civilian obligations to a (more financially-strong) military. Section 77 stated the following:

The State shall protect and uphold the institution of monarchy, independence, sovereignty and integrity of the territorial jurisdiction of the State and shall provide such armed forces, military weapons and technology as are modern, necessary and sufficient for protecting and upholding the independence, sovereignty, national security, the institution of monarchy, national interests and the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State and for the development of the country.

In 2009, the royal Thai armed forces website stated its vision as being the country’s “main organization in security with capabilities in defending and protecting the monarchy with modern and effective organization deserving of the people’s and friendly countries’ confidence."143 It sees its missions today as follows: 1. To prepare the readiness of military forces and to use of military forces to protect the territory 2. To protect and uphold independence and sovereignty of the State from internal and external threats 3. To protect and safeguard the national interests and the democratic regime of government with the King as the Head of the State 4. To protect, respect and safeguard the institution of the monarchy 5. To develop the country and assist the people

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6. To maintain internal security 7. To promote good relations with neighboring countries and alliance countries 8. Peace Keeping and Humanitarian Assistance Operations 9. To support government in solving urgent national problems144

The Thai military today is in a heightened position of influence. Since the enactment of the military-endorsed 2007 constitution, current regulations establishing military doctrine and missions reflect a lack of civilian control. Rather, armed forces autonomy from “civilianization” as well as the direct top-down link between monarchy and armed forces are ensuring that elected governments will have little authority in shaping the military mindset.

Military education Education is another crucial component of developing the military mindset. Prospective soldiers generally spend two years at the pre-cadet Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School (AFAPS) and then study for up to five years at the Chulachomklao Royal Army Academy (CRAA), Royal Navy Academy (RNA), The Royal Air Force Academy (RAFA), or Royal Police Cadet Academy (RPCA). The most pre-eminent of the service schools is the CRAA—all seven military prime ministers studied there. It has as its aim to instill “a sense of loyalty to the nation, the religion and the monarch.”145 The same is true for the other service academies, including the pre-cadet school. Yet nowhere does the curriculum at these institutions offer any courses relating to democracy, however. These academies are under the aegis of the Armed Forces Education Department. Other facilities include the Joint Staff College, the National Defense College, and the National Defense Studies Institute. All of the aforementioned training schools are ultimately accountable to the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, not the Ministry of Defense. Given such obstacles to direct civilian control, it is difficult for elected governments to make in the armed forces’ educational curricula, to, for example, alter the military mindset in favor of greater appreciation of democratic principles. 64

Military law As for military courts, law and conduct in relation to civilian law, Section 228 of the 2007 constitution differs little from Section 281 of the 1997 constitution. Section 228 reads as follows:

Military Courts shall have the jurisdiction to try and adjudicate criminal cases committed by persons who are subjected to the jurisdiction of the Military Courts and other cases as provided by law. The appointment and removal from office of military judges shall be as provided by law.

Furthermore, the 2007 constitution (carrying on from previous Thai constitutions) proclaims that “members of the armed forces or the police force, government officials, other State officials and officials or employees of State agencies shall enjoy the same rights and liberties under the Constitution as those enjoyed by other persons…(Section 31).” Though Section 31 raises questions about if and where there is separation between military and civilian law, it could increasingly mean that civilian law could possibly become the “law of the land.” Under conditions where military law is imposed, civilians who defy such law can be subject to military courts. Unfortunately for civilian control, there remains no mechanism for challenging a decision of the Military Supreme Court in the civilian Supreme Court. (Lt. Col. Suthee Charunbara, “The Organization of Military Courts in Thailand,” Military Law Review. Dept. of the Army, Summer 1981, Volume 93, p.26). Yet ironically, the military-endorsed 2007 constitution modified the Human Rights Commission such that it now has the teeth to 1) submit a case together to the Constitutional Court where the Commission agrees with the complainant that the provisions of any law are detrimental to human rights and may contravene the constitution; (2) submit a case to the Administrative Court where the Commission agrees with the complainant that any rule, order or administrative act is detrimental to human rights and might be unconstitutional as provided by the law on establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court Procedure. Among cases

65

which the Human Rights Commission has accepted are those pertaining to potential human rights transgressions by Thailand’s military (e.g. extra-judicial killings during the Thaksin administration’s 2003 anti-narcotics campaign). (Interview with Human Rights Commissioner, August 2008). Ultimately, civilians today are still not in control of Thai military law. But, as evidenced by the strengthened Human Rights Commission, change may be around the corner. Dimension Two of military organization pertains to the resources available to the Thai armed forces. By resources, I mean military force size and structure; the Thai armed forces’ financial resources; and finally the appointment/retirement of top military officials.

Force Size and Structure Until the early 1990s, Thailand’s armed forces was a large, non-tranparent force which lacked proper training, equipment, and whose decision-making structure often lacked unity and ability to adequately coordinate. As the Cold War receded in the late 1980s, questions began to arise as to the future force size and structure of the armed forces. Policies aimed at downsizing the armed forces began during the Chatchai Choonhavan administration when Chatchai began balking at certain military weapons requests and reducing parts of Prem’s “national security state.146 Even after the 1991 coup, PM Anand Panyarachun announced that “military might is no longer a guarantee of national security.” In late November, the army proclaimed that it would cut its force levels by 25 percent in the next 10 years.147 Black May 1992 (which placed the military in disrepute) as well as the 1997 financial crisis added impetus to the drive towards a reordered and restructured military. These events forced the armed forces to reluctantly shift out of its preferred political role to a greater emphasis on restructuring and professionalism.

The 1994 Defense White Paper stressed the military’s streamlined defense policy, including the following clause: 66

1. Restructure the Armed Forces so that it is more compact and has professional personnel with modern weapons and equipment so that it can guarantee the independence, sovereignty, and national interests of the nation.148

The trend of such professional commitments continued through the 1990s. Indeed, the Chavalit Yongchaiyudh government (1996-7) initiated proposals aimed at restructuring the armed forces and improving public oversight of the military. The incoming Chuan Leekpai government (1997-2001) took up these recommendations (through the Ministry of Defense or MOD) and, in October 1999, with the necessary cooperation of reformist Army Commander Surayud Chulanond, approved a plan to reform the MOD and restructure the military. The goal was to build a smaller, credible, professional, more efficient, more capable, and more transparent armed forces over the following 10 years.149There was also to be a “reallocation of military spending from personnel to procurement and training.”150 Ultimately, the military downsizing involved transforming the armed forces which had become top-heavy in terms of excess high-ranking officers by encouraging early retirements by many of these officials. The entire downsizing plan involved a total reduction of 72,000 personnel posts as well as a more unified structural command among the three services (Army, Navy, Air Force), the Defense Permanent Secretary, and the Supreme Command to improve coordination and facilitate control from the Office of the Prime Minister. Yet the plan was hindered by disagreements over whether the Defense Permanent Secretary or the Supreme Commander should have more authority. The advent of the Thaksin administration temporarily put the reforms on hold. From 2002 to 2004, the reforms were reviewed but the political crisis (beginning in 2005) prevented the government from seriously taking up the armed forces reform. As such, the aforementioned reforms appear to have been put on ice in all but name. The 2006 coup—and heightened role of the military in Thai politics today—could mean that any military restructuring will have to come through the initiative of the military itself. In 2008, there was a slight inching forward of military leadership—the Office of the Supreme Commander was renamed the the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters. As part 67

of the change, each of the armed forces’ leaders concurrently holds the post of deputy Supreme Commander. The chief rationale for the move is that the dual posts will increase proximity in terms of “a shortened chain of command between the Supreme Commander and the Armed Forces leaders.”151Yet this could also increase military unity against civilian Prime Ministers seeking to trump armed forces prerogatives. Meanwhile, in 2009, as budget outlays for the armed forces continue to grow, military force size is simply continuing to expand— given the rationale of the insurgency in southern Thailand and the border tiff with Cambodia. There is in 2009 little civilian control of the Thai armed forces’ force size and structure unless one insists that retired Gen.Prawit Wongsawat is a true representative of Thai civilian control. Yet Prawit stands closer to Army Commander Anupong Paochinda than to PM Abhisist Vechachiwa. Moreover, even if Prawit was proactively on the side of civilians, he would be only one man against the corps. Ultimately, the military more than ever today guides questions of force size, structure, and any restructuring or downsizing which Thailand may undertake in the future. Yet with the political crisis continuing, such questions are unlikely to be broached any time soon.

Military budgeting As for military resources, Thailand’s military budget and military-controlled state enterprises have provided the lion’s share of appropriations. Of these two, defense appropriations derive mostly from the annual parliamentary budget approval process (though there have also been “blind” military appropriations). Prior to 1992, the National Assembly rarely rejected a defense appropriation and few details of the military budget were revealed.152 Only since the early 1990s has parliament seriously scrutinized military appropriations.

The process begins with a Lower House subcommittee, comprising MPs and outside advisors which produces recommendations. The military standing committee may then require hearings and interpellations. However, the legislature’s regulating of military 68

appropriations has often been ineffective given that civilians often have a lack of military expertise Moreover, given that the chair of military standing committee is invariably part of the ruling party, government defense policy and that of the Lower House are often one in the same. On other occasions, either the head of the committee or several of its members are former military officials who may be beholden to the armed forces. In such situations, the military standing committee rarely offers sufficient civilian checks and balances of the military with regard to the latter’s budgetary request. The only exception to this situation occurs where an opposition MP is the chair of the standing military committee, but this has never occurred in Thailand. Another problem derives from the fact that the Ministry of Defense (MOD) is structured in such a way that the Armed Forces and the Permanent Secretary of Defense (an active military officer in charge of controlling and overseeing the MOD’s resources) are not separated. There is thus little division between the interests of these two entities. Such a state of affairs has had the effect of diminishing civilian control over the military in terms of military appropriations. Yet another challenge is the decentralization of budgetary requests within the military. Indeed, though other civilian ministries were transformed during the Thaksin administration, the MOD has remained too dispersed.

This “structure of the Thai MOD grants autonomy status (by law) to each of the

forces, empowering the commanders of each force to design or request budget items, without having another force intervening in this matter.”153 Coups and the establishment of military governments are of course another means through which the military has traditionally increased its budgetary outlays. Following the 1991 coup, the armed forces anticipated that military appropriations would become much easier to obtain. But the junta’s appointment of civilian Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun proved its undoing, at least in regard to the arms budget. Time and again, Anand rebuffed military requests. For example, a Thai Baht 12.5billion supplemental request for fiscal year 1992 was flatly rejected.154 Though the military did get its way in some appropriations, the 69

lesson learned was that if the armed forces wanted more appropriations, a retired military Prime Minister was preferable. This lesson was not lost on the 2006 coup leaders, who appointed Gen.Surayudh Chulanond to the premiership. In the aftermath of the 1992 Black May massacre, the military under Army Commander Gen. Wimol Wongwanich, facing massive negative perceptions by the public, media, and parliament, reluctantly agreed to a defense budget reduction for fiscal year 199394. The general mid-1990s decline in military appropriations continued, owing partly to the 1997 Asian financial crisis as well as to the growing supremacy of “civilianization” in Thai politics: the “people’s” constitution was adopted in 1997.155 Parliamentary scrutiny of military appropriations now grew even more intense and the result was a decline in armed forces funding. This loss in revenue led many soldiers to increasingly expand their commercial interests as well as rely on sometimes-shady business activities156To rein in illegal military activities and limit armed forces economic autonomy, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and then-Army Commander Surayudh Chulanond, ordered crackdowns military-related “narcotics trafficking, extortion rackets, illegal bookmaking, unsecured loans from Thai Military Bank, and corruption in the conscription process.”157The Chuan government also sought to centralize weapons procurement, in order to establish greater government control over armed forces funding. But confronted with intense military resistance, this proposal was eventually shelved.158 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-06) established a new method for gaining control of military spending: ensuring that military allocation requests would have to pass through himself.159This he did in four ways. First, he drew former PM Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh closer to his Thai Rak Thai party (Chavalit’s New Aspiration party merged with TRT in 2002). Chavalit was made Defense Minister. Second, Chavalit’s close aide Gen.Yuthasak Sasiprapha was elevated to the post of Deputy Minister of Defense. Third, Yuthasak’s brother-in-law Gen.Somdhat Attanand was made Army Commander. Somdhat 70

was close to Thai Rak Thai and cooperated with Thaksin. Fourth, the PM elevated Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School Class 10 graduates (former classmates of Thaksin) to various military positions. Finally, he saw to it that his cousin Gen. Chaisit Shinawatra was made Army Commander in 2002. In this way, Thaksin was at last able to guarantee that he would personally control the Thai military budget. From 2001 to 2006, it declined by 0.4 percent of the GDP (see table below) as the government transferred greater moneys into alternative budget projects. Ultimately, under Thaksin, civilian control stood at its greatest apex over military spending. Yet the 2006 coup’s voiding of the 1997 constitution and dissolution of parliament (ending any scrutiny by elected representatives) enabled the armed forces to run roughshod over civilian control of defense budgeting. One military official, when asked about the ramifications of the coup, admitted that it helped the military budget expand rapidly—though at the expense of democracy.160 Under the 2006-2008 military-imposed Surayud government, armed forces spending spiraled higher and higher. “The regime's first budget, for fiscal year 2007, contained a 60% rise in military spending. The following year, the defense budget rose 18%.”161The enactment of the 2007 constitution saw a new charter clause (Section 77) which required the state to provide the armed forces with a sufficient (though unspecified) amount of money to guarantee national security. Another freed up moneys for potential military purposes. Indeed, new section 169 states that under martial law, the Council of Ministers has the power to transfer or relocate the expenditure determined for any Government agency or State enterprise for use in a different item from that previously determined in the Annual Appropriations Act.

The only stipulations are that the transfer request must originate from the cabinet and that it must be reported to the National Assembly. But parliament is given no room to modify or cancel the request. The return to elected governance in December 2007 paralleled the continuing growth in military spending. To curry favor with the armed forces and fearing a potential coup, pro-

71

Thaksin prime ministers Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat did little to restrain military requests for greater appropriations. Surprisingly, the anti-Thaksin Democrat government of PM Abhisit Vechachiwa (the rise to power of which was assisted through military cooperation) insisted on cuts in the military budget request for fiscal year 2010. Thus, though military expenditures had continued to rise from US$3,333 million in 2007 to US$4190 in 2008, to US$4500 in 2009 (with the armed forces seeking over US$5000 million for 2010, this has now been pared down for a projected US$4,400 million budget in 2010. Few know, of course, if the Abhisit government simultaneously promised any secret funding. Despite the ability of the Democrat government to reject higher armed forces appropriations requests, civilian governments in Thailand today have experienced a loss in their authority vis-à-vis the military since the fall of Thaksin and enactment of the 2007 constitution. Table 12: Thai Military Expenditures 1978-2009 Source: 1978-1987, 2004-2007data derived from IISS Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Routledge, various years. 1988-2003 data derived from Stockholm Institute for Strategic Studies (SIPRI), Stockholm, various years. 2008 data derived from “Military Spending to Soar A Further 24%,”The Nation, June 28, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com; 2009 data derived from Thai Post, May 21, 2009, http://thaimilitary.wordpress.com/2009/05/30/detail-of-defense-budget-cut/#more-407.

Fiscal Year

$US million

Percentage GDP

1978

1,202

4.0

1979

1,111

3.4

1980

1,094

3.3

1981

1,135

3.3

1982

1,361

3.9

1983

1,426

3.9

1984

1,630

4.2

1985

1,583

3.9

1986

1,562

3.7

1987

1,740

3.7

of

72

1988

2,132

2.8

1989

2,193

2.6

1990

2,484

2.6

1991

2,541

2.5

1992

2,914

2.6

1993

2,879

2.4

1994

3,122

2.4

1995

3,240

2.3

1996

3,240

2.2

1997

3,006

2.1

1998

2,440

1.9

1999

2,113

1.6

2000

1,982

1.4

2001

2,063

1.5

2002

2,087

1.4

2003

2,058

1.3

2004

1,962

1.2

2005

2,075

1.17

2006

2,373

1.15

2007

3,333

1.36

2008

4,190

1.4

2009

4,500

1.89

2010

4,400

NA

Figure 1: Thai Military Expenditures (1979-2009) 73

(in US$ millions) 4,5 4 3,5 3 2,5 2 1,5 1 0,5 0 '79 '81 '83 '85 '87 '89 '91 '93 '95 '97 '99 '01 '03 '05 '07 '09

Figure 2: Thai Military Expenditures (1979-2009) (% of GDP) 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 '79 '81 '83 '85 '87 '89 '91 '93 '95 '97 '99 '01 '03 '05 '07 '09

Appointment/retirement of top military officials The rotation in armed forces leadership is highly significant to military organization in terms of who stands at the top of and makes decisions in the name of the military pyramid. As such, the appointment of senior armed forces personnel is always a political decision in Thailand though matters of seniority (in terms of military class), proven loyalty, ability, and sometimes professionalism (in that order) are significant. The power to make reshuffles is three-tiered. The appointment or transfer of lower ranking officers (captain to second lieutenant) is made by division commanders. Meanwhile,

74

the army chief can appoint or transfer mid-ranking officers (major to colonel).162 Finally, with regard to reshuffle decisions for generals, each service commander-in-chief (Army, Navy, Air Force) composes a list of personnel to be rotated either on October 1 or February 1 (the mid-year reshuffle).163 Traditionally, the complete list would thereupon be checked by the Supreme Commander. It then proceeded to the Defense Minister who was required to sign off on it. After this the Prime Minister had to approve it, and the palace would endorse it on the advice of the Privy Council.164 As Prime Minister, Gen.Prem Tinsulanond had often meddled in the biannual reshuffles in order to buttress his military support base. However, PMs Chatchai Chunhavan, Chuan Leekpai (in the Chuan 1 government), Samak Sundaravej, Somchai Wongsawat, and (as yet) Abhisit Vechachiwa never interfered in the appointments process.

Civilian PM involvement in reshuffles began under the Banharn Silpa-archa

government in 1995. This set a precedent for the following three governments.165 The Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh government, as with that of Prem before him, meddled in appointments to help shore up Chavalit’s military connections.

During the Chuan II

government, Chuan (in his capacity as Defense Minister) prevented Gen.Chainrarong Noonpakdi (of Black May fame) from being promoted to the post of Army Commander. Yet the apparent success of civilian supremacy in the military promotions process obscured the fact that not every military faction had faded into oblivion during the 1990s. Just as two failed coup attempts of the 1980s had weakened Class 7, the Black May 1992 massacre did irreparable harm to Class 5 soldiers. Meanwhile, the faction of active military personnel connected with Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh was damaged by his handling of the 1997 financial crisis in his capacity as Prime Minister. Yet there was one remaining military strongman whose stature grew throughout the 1990s. This was Gen.Prem Tinsulanond who was appointed to the Privy Council in 1988 and became chair of that body in 1998 (See conclusion for a discussion of Prem). Prem has been extremely influential in terms of military appointments.

Indeed, Prem loyalist Wimol Wongwanich served as Army 75

Commander from 1992 until 1995 while Surayudh Chulanond served in the same capacity from 1998 until 2002. Surayud was then appointed to the Privy Council, served as unelected Prime Minister (2006-08), and then returned to the Privy Council. The 2001 advent of Thaksin represented a challenge to Prem in terms of armed forces promotions. During Thaksin’s tenure, given his success in eventually dominating top armed forces positions, senior reshuffles simply became a means for him to rotate and reward his own expanding military support base. The 2006 coup led to a drastic change in the senior military appointments system. On December 20, 2007, just six days prior to the election of pro-Thaksin PM Samak Sundaravej, the junta-created National Legislative Assembly passed a decree which vastly reduces the power of elected civilians over the reshuffles process. The new law requires that reshuffles of high-ranking officers be vetted by a committee, whose members include the army commander, the navy commander, air force commander, the supreme commander, and the permanent defense secretary (himself/herself a military official) as well as the civilian defense minister and prime minister. Previously, the defense and prime minister had the ultimate say on appointments (though these were to be endorsed by the king). In future, if any dispute occurs as to an appointment, a simple committee vote will settle the dispute. Given that unelected military portion of the committee accounts for five votes as opposed to two for civilians, the new arrangement should heighten military prowess at the expense of the authority of civilians with regard to reshuffles.166 With regard to military retirements, the Military Service Act of 1954 (adopted under the military dictatorship of Gen.Phibul Songkram) mandates that all armed forces personnel must retire at age 60. Though a potential retiree can petition the government to continue serving beyond this period, such exemptions are rarely issued, tend to be short-term, and are often unpopular with less senior soldiers. This owes to a fear that a general may seek to more permanently establish his/sway among officers as well as a desire by junior officers not to 76

upset the apple cart in terms of the military promotions line. Sometimes retirements serve as a launching pad for new careers. Gen.Kriangsak Chomanand retired in 1979, only to become PM that year. Gen.Prem Tinsulanond served as Army Commander until 1980, in time to start serving as premier the same year. Gen. Surayud Chulanond retired as Supreme Commander in 2003, joining the Privy Council that year. Generally, senior military promotions are timed such that the soldier promoted has only one or two years to serve in a top position, and thus has little time to centralize power. For example, Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratglin, Army Commander and leader of the 2006, was forced to retired at age 60 in 2007. Perhaps one reason why Gen.Saprang Kallayanamitr was not permitted to succeed to Sonthi was that he too would be forced to retire in 2008. The armed forces settled on Gen. Anupong Paochinda, whose retirement will occur in 2010. Generally, civilian governments have had little authority in dismissing soldiers. Moreover, even though civilian governments are legally empowered to transfer senior officers to inactive positions, this rarely occurs. In 2006, amidst the coup (popular with most Bangkokians), PM Thaksin sought to transfer coup leader Sonthi Boonyaratglin to an inactive posting, but the armed forces refused to follow Thaksin’s lead.

More common are instances where a

recalcitrant Army Commander is “retired” or “kicked upstairs” to become the armed forces’ Supreme Commander, a generally ceremonial position. This can be seen in the instances of Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek in 1986, Gen.Surayud Chulanond in 2002, and Gen. Somdhat Attanond in 2003. Only when the military is perceived in a negative light by the public at large, does the clout of civilian PMs enable the latter to dismiss the former. For example, during the second Anand Panyarachun government, the appointed civilian PM declared that any coup was “treason against the country and the throne.”167He thereupon fired Air Chief Marshall Kaset Rojanin, Army Commander-in-Chief Gen. Issarapong Noonpakdi, and Gen.Chainarong Noonpakdi, First Army regional commander, from their posts. Little has changed in Thai military retirement system. 77

Given the heightened influence of the military in the post-2006 coup climate, civilians must today tread carefully in terms of offending the armed forces. Perhaps that is why the Abhisit Vechachiwa government opted not to fire Pol.Gen.Patcharawat Wongsawat following government dissatisfaction in his performance as head of the Royal Thai Police—Patcharawat is the brother of Defense Minister Gen.Prawit Wongsawat who is very close to Army Commander Gen.Anupong Paochinda. authority

regarding

force

and

Ultimately, in terms of military organization—

structure

size,

military

budget,

and

military

appointments/retirements, the armed forces have gained enormous autonomy in such decisions vis-à-vis civilian elected governments.

As such, civilian control of military

organization just barely approaches a level of medium. From the examination of the aforementioned five decision-making areas, this study concludes that civilian control over Thailand’s military is on the wane—relative the 19922006 period. Civilian rule over internal security is especially minimal, compared to other areas, while the brightest area is national defense.

The table below synopsizes this

investigation’s findings. Table 13: Concentration of Civilian Control over the Military Civilian Control Decision-making Areas

Pre-1992 May”

“Black

1992-2006 Military Trumped by Civilians

2006-2008 Surayudh and CNS Military Government

2008-Present Fragile Democratic Facade over Strengthened Military

Elite Recruitment Public Policy Internal Security National Defense Military Organization = lower

= higher

= medium

= medium/higher

Authority over Decision-making: Thai Civil-Military Relations over Time

78

Since 1932, Thailand’s armed forces have experienced differing levels of influence visà-vis Thai society. Using our five-area combined framework, this study distinguishes varying levels of civilian control over the military.

Indeed, 20 eras can be discerned, in which

civilian authority vis-à-vis the armed forces alternated on a continuum between low, lowmedium, medium, medium-high, and high. Chronologically, civilian influence commenced at a level of low, given that the military acted as a tool of the absolute monarchy to maintain control over the Thai populace. After the 1932 coup against the absolute monarchy, military influence over civilians grew precipitously but plunged to its lowest levels in 1944. Yet a debilitated military was not to last. In 1947, with support from royalists, the influence of the armed forces ascended once again, resulting in a low-medium level of civilian control—a situation which lasted until 1948 when the armed forces (in the form of Field Marshall Plaek Pibul Songkram) took the post of Prime Minister for himself. This marked an ascent of military prowess to even higher levels.

The coup by Army Commander-in-Chief Sarit

Thanarat and the holding of elections narrowly expanded political space, expanding civilian breathing room to a low-middle level.

Sarit’s 1958 auto-coup boosted armed forces’

influence to its furthest apex. Thereupon, Sarit and the monarchy entered into a symbiotic relationship which augmented the political influence of each. In 1969, military-sanctioned elections helped to legitimate the armed forces’ continuing grip on power but PM Thanom Kittikachorn’s auto-coup of 1971 brought explicit military authoritarianism back to the fore. From 1973-6, during a brief respite of multi-party pluralism, civilians possessed a medium level of influence over soldiers. This owed to the expanding clout of the army faction headed by Minister of Defense Gen. Krit Sivara—against a backdrop of a post-1973 fractured military. His untimely death in 1976 amidst political maneuvering by rightists, monarchists, and military factions contributed to the October 1976 coup which again brought to power military elites.

They ushered into office ultra-right-wing royalist and prime ministerial

appointee Thanin Kravichien. Under Thanin, an appointed civilian PM, civilian control 79

dropped to a low-medium level. But growing armed forces dissatisfaction with Thanin (e.g. his inability to make progress against the communist insurgency) led to the PM’s ouster in 1977. Thereupon, civilian influence plummeted to even lower levels. In 1979, elections were held under Gen. Kriangsak Chomanan, who helped usher in a semi-democracy in which an unelected prime minister could serve alongside an elected lower house. Such a system offered the bare trappings of democracy while guaranteeing military supremacy in non-regal elite positions of power. The influence of civilians now stood at lowmedium.

This state of affairs continued under unelected Prime Minister Gen. Prem

Tinsulanonda. In 1988, the military finally allowed an elected PM (Chatchai Chunhavan) to take his post though the Class Five military faction under Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon ensured that civilian control stood at only a medium level of influence during this time.

Gen.

Suchinda’s coup and military government again heightened levels of military control over civilians. The fall of this government, in the aftermath of the “Black May”1992 massacre and the loss of support for Suchinda from Thailand’s king (which weakened military legitimacy in the public’s eyes) contributed to a further emergence of Thai democracy. As such, from 1992 until 2006, the Thai armed forces’ societal influence vis-à-vis civilians seemed to be at its nadir. But the 2006 coup crushed any hope that the Thai military’s role in politics was at an end. Indeed, its clout was institutionally boosted thanks partly to the 2007 constitution which weakened civilian governance vis-à-vis the armed forces. The return to a nationally-elected government in 2008 did force soldiers back to their barracks but at a cost to civilians of institutionally enhanced prowess by the armed forces. As such, civilian control diminished to a medium level given that the military now exercised authority somewhat autonomous from Thailand’s elected Lower House and partly-elected Senate. Indeed, some in the armed forces reportedly even helped to manipulate the accession to office of PM Abhisit Vechachiwa in December 2008. Today the sway of the military is on the upswing. The table below reflects and elaborates upon the ebb and flow of military prowess since the pre-1932 period. 80

Table 14: Twenty Periods of Military Influence (Pre-1932-Present) Period

Level of Civilian Control

Method Initiated

Pre-1932

Low

1932-44

Low

1944-47

High

1947-48

Low-Medium

1948-51

Low-Medium

1951-57

Low

1957-58

Low-Medium

1958-69

Low

1969-71

Low-Medium

1971-73

Low

1973-76

Medium

1976-77

Low-Medium

Formation of Corps under Absolute Monarchy Military Coup/Bahon Yothin “Promoters”; later dominated by Phibul Songkram Forced Resignation of Military Prime Minister Military Coup/Phibul Songkram faction returns PM Kuang Apaiyavong pressured to step aside by Phibul Military “Radio” AutoCoup/Phibul Strengthens Grip Military Coup (Sarit Thanarat faction) followed by Election of Military Prime Minister and his party Military Auto-Coup/Sarit Strengthens Grip; later controlled by Thanon Kittikachorn and Prapas Charusatien Military Prime Minister and his party win election/PM Thanon Kittikachorn and Prapas Charusatien Military Auto-Coup/Thanom and Prapas Strengthen Grip Military Coup/Krit Sivara faction Military Coup/Class Seven

1977-79

Low

1979-88

Low-Medium

1988-91

Medium

1991-92

Low

1992-2001

High

Military Coup/Kriangsak Chomanand faction and Class Seven Military Prime Minister leads elected government Elected civilian government alongside autonomous military Military Coup/Class Five Election of government

civilian

81

2001-2006

High

2006-2008

Low

2008-Present

Medium

Election of civilian government Military Coup/Sondhi Boonyaratklin faction Coalition Shift with Military Support/1st Army, Regiment 21

These 20 phases, revealing various alternating degrees of armed forces authority, also demonstrate that Thailand’s military has long played a vigorous role in Thailand’s polity. This occurred despite the embedded political supremacy of the monarchy, strong traditions of authoritarianism by various bureaucracies (not only the military), and the 1980s emergence of business associations as well as democratization efforts. Today the role of soldiers in Thai politics (even under an elected government) is proving to be the most extensive in two decades.

Thailand’s Military: Perpetually Political, Forever Factionalized, Again Ascendant The Thai armed forces have been major players in Thai politics since the 1932 coup which terminated absolute monarchy. There have, however, been but three brief respites from dominant military clout: 1944-47; 1973-76; 1992-95. During the 1990s, some suggested that Thai soldiers were increasingly being by-passed by new societal forces, making the armed forces less relevant political players.168Others pointed to the disgrace suffered by the military following the 1992 Black May massacre as a watershed event finally compelling the armed forces back to the barracks.169 This study agrees with McCargo and Ukrist (2005) that during the 1990s, the Thai military was never depoliticized. Instead, it was “willing to pretend to accept limits and controls, on condition that it remain unreformed….”170 Yet there has also been a contention that a “re-politicization” of the Thai military did occur with the election of the Thaksin Shinawatra government in 2001 since Thaksin brought to office with him a large team of persons with senior military backgrounds.171Thereupon, he appointed relatives,

82

cronies, and pre-cadet academy classmates to high positions of military power. But by placing responsibility for such re-politicization at the door of Thaksin, one can indirectly fault him for the 2006 coup—in which the armed forces once again took direct political power into their hands.

Following this reasoning, Thaksin himself is ultimately to blame for the

heightened role of the armed forces in contemporary Thai politics. There is an alternative way to analyze the political role of the Thai armed forces: examining the competition for power and prestige among military cliques even after the retirement of faction leaders.

The mandatory age of retirement at age 60 (with some

exceptions) has often been viewed as the end of influence for a senior Thai military official given that his/her seniority as an active duty soldier terminates with retirement. And yet in Thailand we have witnessed retired armed forces personnel forming political parties, serving in cabinets (including Minister of Defense), and taking seats in Parliament. While in the military, these soldiers have often established close-knit clusters of personalist and classbased comradeship. Meanwhile, shared service experiences, where an older infantryman commanded a younger one, produces cohesive patron-client linkages. Such connections tend to survive beyond retirement age. Factional competition thus links among active duty soldiers with retired officers. Examples of retired soldiers who have managed to exert enormous influence on the military corps beyond the age of retirement have included Gen.Praman Adireksan, Gen.Kriangsak Chamanand, Gen.Arthit Kamlang-ek, Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, and Gen.Prem Tinsulanond. Gen.Prem is a special case—he has long been recognized as being intimate with the palace. Not since the dictatorship of Gen.Sarit Thanarat (1958-63) has such a close relationship existed between a military personage and Thai royalty. Prem’s pull on Thai politics began in 1979 when he was elevated to the concurrent positions of Defense Minister and Army Commander. He ascended to the premiership in 1980 but was required to retire as a soldier in 1981. Retirement would have considerably diminished Prem’s clout 83

among active duty officers but it did not. This is because, when he served as PM (1980-88), “royal support…elevated Prem above the factional struggles and power games in the military.”172After stepping down as PM, Prem was appointed to be a Privy Councillor and acting Council President, given that Chief Privy Councillor Sanya Dharmasakdi was, in his last few years, in extremely poor health.173 In 1991, the military successfully carried out a coup against PM Chatchai Chunhavan.

Prem did not negatively react to the takeover,

possibly because PM Chatchai had initiated a policy of sharply reducing the power of the military in national politics.174 Fallout from Black May 1992 represented a massive discrediting of the armed forces in Thai society. Only two military personages and their entourages of supporters remained powerful. These were Gen.Prem Tinsulanond and Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyud, both retired. Yet Chavalit had once served under Prem and was seen on many issues to be loyal to him. Moreover, Prem could trump Chavalit because Chavalit had called for a “presidium” form of government in the late 1980s, words which to many (apparently the palace included) smacked of communism.175Thus, the 1992 political vacuum of active-duty or retired military leaders allowed retired Gen.Prem Tinsulanond to fill the void. Prem continued serving as the King’s de facto Chief advisor until 1998, when he was appointed as Privy Council Chair.

This final appointment cemented his penultimate

ascendancy (save for the palace) over the Thai armed forces. In terms of factional struggles in the military, the early-mid 1990s reflected competition between promotions of soldiers closer to either Prem or Chavalit. Some may have thought that Prem’s retirement and advancing age would obstruct his influence in the military. Yet his immeasurable prowess as the king’s top advisor, as an exmilitary man having influence with reshuffles and not bound by retirement restrictions, helped to elevate the Privy Council to become an institution to be reckon with. And Prem ensured that his clients were rewarded handsomely. 84

As for senior military reshuffles, Prem’s loyalists have been very successful. His clique has included Gen. Wimol Wongwanich (Army Commander 1992-95), Mongkol Ampornpiset (Supreme Commander 1996-2000) and Surayud Chulanond (Army Commander 1998-2002, Supreme Commander 2002-03). The election of Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyud as PM in 1995 allowed Big Jiew more leeway in the choice of senior military staff. For example, in Chavalit’s capacity as both Minister of Defense and PM, he was able to elevate Gen.Chettha Thanajaro (a Chavalit loyalist to the post of Army Commander). However, the 1997 financial crisis put a dent in Chavalit’s luster. By Fall 1997, his star had waned considerably and he was pressured to resign from office in November. It seemed now that there was no military personality or group which could challenge the dominance of Prem over the armed forces. But Prem seemed to face gargantuan challenges with the election of popular PM Thaksin Shinawatra.

Thaksin brought Chavalit back with him as Defense

Minister and used Chavalit’s own military support base to carve out a source of his own authority in the armed forces.176Thaksin saw to it that Chavalit-confidante Gen.Somdhat Attanand was reshuffled as Army Commander (2002-3) and then Supreme Commander (2003-04). Thereupon, Thaksin managed to position his minions (who were either relatives or pre-cadet school class 10 schoolmates) in top positions of power. Indeed, Thaksin’s cousin Chaisit served as Army Commander (2003-04) and Supreme Commander (2004-05).

It

seemed as though Prem’s monopoly of influence over the armed forces had all but vanished. 2004 saw the promotion of Gen.Prawit Wongsawan as Army Commander. Prawit had served in the 21st battalion of the Royal Guards (the Queen’s Guard). Though he was loyal to Prime Minister Thaksin, he had long been an arch-royalist and was loyal to Prem. Prawit was from Pre-cadet Class 6 and Army Cadet School Class 17.

His successor as Army

Commander—Gen.Sonthi Bunyaratklin—was from these same classes. In 2005, Prem saw to it that Sonthi, who had previously served under Prem-loyalist Surayud, was appointed to become Army Commander (despite the wishes of Thaksin).177The two army generals who 85

spearheaded the 2006 coup under Sonthi were Gen.Saprang Kallayamitr of the Third Army and Gen.Anupong Paochinda of the all-important First Army headquartered in Bangkok. Sonthi could count on their backing because Saprang had long criticized Thaksin publicly. On the other hand, Anupong, though he had graduated with Thaksin from pre-cadet Class 10, had served, like Prawit, in the Queen’s Guard. There have been rumors that the coup was endorsed by Gen.Prem.178Though it is difficult to ascertain the certainty of such reports, what is true is that in the post-coup environment, Prem has returned to the apex of control over the military.

Today, the pro-Prem Gen.Anupong Paochinda continues to serve as Army

Commander while retired Gen.Prawit Wongsawat acts as Minister of Defense. Their control over the military reflects the continuing dominance of former Queen’s Guard officers and, by implication, Prem. Ultimately, the Thai armed forces have never been de-politicized. As such, the three-decade period of 1979 to 2009 represents the gradual assertion of political control by the Prem military faction over the armed forces. This era encompasses Prem’s own retirement from the armed forces and ascension to the Privy Council. Indeed, patronage from the palace has been a crucial factor which has enabled Prem to monopolize authority even after the age of retirement. Though sub-factions within his network of military clientele abound, the group remains united only under Prem himself. The failure of Thaksin Shinawatra to effectively challenge Prem has represented the end of a final threat to the Privy Council Chair. Though the elections of December 2007 appeared to revitalize Thailand’s process of democratization, 2008 marked a grim watershed for democracy in Thailand. The post-2006 coup military leadership was clearly unhappy with the electoral results—which brought a proThaksin government back to office. But they did not dare stage the conventional coup d’etat. The coup and military government that followed it had been mostly unpopular both domestically and internationally. At the same time, damaging events which occurred under the CNS regime (it failed to solve any political or economic problems) caused the armed 86

forces to be seen in an increasingly negative light. Thus, as Thitinan Ponsudhirak says, the 2006 coup was a “botched” coup.179 The military’s alternative to outright takeover in January 2008 was thus to take a back seat to those opposed to Samak Sundaravej and indirectly influence the dis-assembling of the People’s Power party administration. This it did in on three occasions. First, the armed forces put little effort into protecting Samak’s government (and later that of PM Somchai Wongsawat) from unruly crowds which took over Government House, attempted to capture Parliament, and hijacked two international airports. In essence, the Army under Gen.Anupong Paochinda was refusing to protect Thailand’s chief of government—the Prime Minister, though the Army Commander also refused to launch a coup against the government. Secondly, the military at least twice called on PM Somchai to resign. This happened once on October 16, when Gen.Anupong, at the head of a contingent of Thailand’s top brass, appeared on Thai television to call for PM Somchai Wongsawat’s resignation to take responsibility for bloodshed on October 7.180 In late November Anupong again called on Somchai to either dissolve the Lower House or resign to avert the political storm, rather than face down the PAD demonstrators. Though the Constitution Court managed to finish off the Somchai government, forcing the dissolution of Palang Prachachon, pro-Thaksin MPs clearly had the numbers to reconstitute a new ruling coalition. Here the armed forces again entered the fray. Thirdly, in mid-December 2008, the military indirectly helped to usher in the antiThaksin coalition government of Democrat Abhisit Vechachiwa.

A troika of pro-Prem

soldiers was apparently instrumental in this oblique intervention: Army Chief Anupong Paochinda, retired Gen. Prawit Wongsawat, and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Prayuth Chanucha. These three “Queen’s Musketeers” had served together in the 21st Infantry Regiment of the Royal Guards—the Queen’s Guards. In early December, on the heels of the court verdict, talks began between these soldiers and members of several political parties, including the 87

Democrat, Chart Thai, Puea Paendin, Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana, as well as several members of the new pro-Thaksin Puea Thai party to set up an anti-Thaksin ruling coalition. The three soldiers also contacted apparent Thaksin loyalist and long-time politico Newin Chidchob—who proved to be less than loyal.181 Newin’s support was crucial for a coalitional realignment to transpire.

Born in

Buriram province, in northeastern Thailand, he could perhaps carve into Thaksin’s assumed Isaan constituency.

His father Chai served as Parliament President while Interim PM

Chaovarat Chanvirakul, a key member of Newin’s faction, was caretaker Prime Minister. The two men could ensure that dissolution of parliament would never occur—and they did.182 Meanwhile, Newin could sway scores of former Palang Prachachon MPs to defect to the antiThaksin ruling coalition—something which the Buriram bigwig proved he could easily accomplish. Meanwhile, the importance of the military was not lost on Thai politicians. Against the recent backdrop of the Army’s refusal to protect ex-PM Somchai, MPs were keenly aware of the armed forces’ resurgent relevance to coalition formation and longevity. As such, “the troika of the 21st” was perceived as central to a new ruling coalition. In this way, Thailand’s military became the indirect arbiter in the formation of a new civilian government. The Democrats’ Secretary-General Suthep Thaugsuban was the key civilian gobetween between his party and Thailand’s armed forces. In an interview, he discussed how these conversations bore fruit for the formation of a Democrat-led coalition: I had good ties with senior figures in the Military and I particularly admired Gen.Prawit [Wongsawan]. He could be reliable and was respected by younger military officers. So I got in touch with him. He said the military was ready to follow orders if they were lawful and legitimate…He wished me good luck. [After meeting potential coalition partners], I told them that I had someone apart from me who could give them assurances.183

The military triumvirate’s success in building a civilian government military succeeded in ousting Thaksin’s elected nominee government from office without resorting to a coup. However it triggered broad repercussions regarding Thailand’s entire process of

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democratization. Since 1992, the country had followed a trajectory toward greater pluralism and political space. Though it is true that Thaksin stifled parts of the rule of law, the 2006 coup put an end to democratization (except at the local level). The election of December 2007 seemed to breathe new life into pluralism but democratic roots proved shallow. 2008 witnessed a military willing and able to involve itself in unconventional, indirect political intrusions—to the point of re-stacking the coalition.

Conclusion Recently, Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak shrewdly stressed that “the Thai military sees itself as the self-entitled defender and guardian of Thailand’s political future.”184The armed forces is indeed a guardian of the future in terms of preserving nation and monarchy. However, it is increasingly proving less interested in maintaining democracy and civilian control. Thailand today is living under military tutelage. As such, democracy is on the wane. One could even say that Thailand has sunk under the status of faulty or defective democracy.185 Given that the military (in cooperation with the Privy Council) is exerting growing, unhindered power over Thailand’s weak civilian governments, one could specify that Thailand is a domain (or tutelary) defective democracy.186 2009 has been the year of military autonomy from civilian control. Gen. Prawit Wongsawan was given the position of Defense Minister—a posting welcomed by Thailand’s arch-royalist top brass. Prawit graduated in the same Pre-Cadet class (Class 6) and Army Cadet School class (Class 17) as 2006 coup instigators Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratklin and Gen.Winai Phattiyakul.187 Moreover, as mentioned above, he has long-standing ties with Army Chief Anupong, Army Chief of Staff Prayuth, and meets the approval of the Privy Council. Under Prem’s guidance, Prawit, along with Army Chief Gen. Anupong and Army Chief of Staff Prayuth have been the chief guarantors of army loyalty to the current 89

government. Such support has permitted the government to survive in office. In early March, pro-Thaksin riots in Bangkok and Pattaya were met with meek resistance by the police. Given doubts as to police loyalty, Abhisit has now entrusted his safety to Army Chief of Staff Prayuth.188 Continuing anti-government demonstrations by pro-Thaksin Red-Shirts in midMarch 2009 were only halted as a result of decisions to take action by this military troika. In addition, the military has worked to censure transmissions by pro-Thaksin media against the ruling coalition. Furthermore, the military has used a policy of carrots (projects) and sticks (selective repression) to quell potential anti-government demonstrations in various parts of the country. Finally, ISOC ensured that the government would not lose face, by ensuring that no demonstrations would occur in Phuket during the ASEAN summit.

Clearly, the Abhisit

administration needs the military to stay alive.189 But does the military need or even want the Democrats to remain in office? On April 17, there occurred an assassination attempt on the life of PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul. Sondhi survived but immediately told reporters that he believed those responsible were Anupong, Prayuth, and Prawit, who he said were keen on seizing power from the Abhisit government. For months prior to the attack, Sondhi had accused various political players of (including persons of enormous clout) of not doing enough against the Thaksin movement (or being in cahoots with it). The targets of his verbal attacks included Anupong, Prawit, Police Chief Patcharawat, Surayud, and even “influential palace insiders.”190 Though Anupong denied any knowledge of such a plot, the bullets fired were traced back to the Army itself.191The incident also brought into question the desire of Police Chief Patcharawat Wongsawan, the brother of Prawit, to protect the government, given the limp performance of the police in maintaining law and order. Indeed, both Prawit and Patcharawat were seen as closer to Newin Chidchob and Bhumjai Thai Party than to Abhisit and the Democrats. The anti-Thaksin PAD has now called for a massive reform of the army and security forces system. The Yellow Shirts’ growing anti-military message mirrors that of 90

the Red Shirts, who have alleged that the armed forces led a December 2008 disguised coup which brought Abhisit to office.192 Should the military become the common enemy of both the pro-Thaksin UDD (United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship) and PAD, this will not augur well for the Thai military establishment. Each movement, reflecting diverse though powerful regions and political parties in parliament, could agree that their primary enemy is the military itself. This could result in a diminished popular opinion of soldiers, diminished credibility of the military (a la 1973, 1992), both of which might lead to military budget cutbacks in parliament. History shows that when the Thai armed forces come to office, they invariably create political parties to help perpetuate their political interests. The coup of 1991 propagated the Samakkhitham party.

Is this what the armed forces might be currently cooking up for

Thailand’s future. There have been rumors that former coup leader Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratklin or current Defense Minister Gen.Prawit Wongsawan might in future lead a political party. Indeed, Prawit has been closely linked to Newin Chidchob and the Bhumjai Thai Party. Could Bhumjai Thai be the Samakkhitham party of the next election? The future looks stark indeed for democratic civilian control in Thailand. Thaksin is alive, well, and ever-present in Thai politics.

Meanwhile, Privy Council Chair Prem

Tinsulanonda is aging rapidly. As such, pro- and anti-Thaksinism (in terms of proxy conflict) could well intensify. There may thus develop a high level of internal instability. The higher the degree of threat perception by the military regarding security to the kingdom of Thailand, the more likely a reactionary faction in the Thai armed forces will come to dominate it and launch a military coup, returning Thailand once again to direct governance under the military. Ukrist Pathamanand anticipates that the most likely scenario is the restoration of the half-way democracy of Kriangsak Chomanand and Prem Tinsulanond whereby an unelected military PM towered over an elected Lower House.193 Either alternative represents bad news for Thai democracy—either its destruction or continued dilution. But direct military control or half91

way democracy, should these regimes come about at all, will not last long in Thailand. Thai people have experienced too much pluralism to put up with authoritarianism’s return. International pressure and the military’s own negative experiences in governing may also prevent a resurgence of military control (or half-way control) over the country. What we can most probably expect in terms of the future of civil-military relations in Thailand is more of the same. The armed forces today have found their perfect niche. Counseled by Prem, working behind the scenes with the generally compliant Abhisit government, and strengthened by the 2007 constitution, the military has made a U-Turn back to 1991 to become Thailand’s crucial clandestine political player. But the armed forces have an even better deal than did the soldiers of 30 years ago. They have learned from experience that direct governance will only create negative perceptions of them from society. Instead, indirect domination of civilian governments allows them to augment their autonomy from civilian authority. Weak civilian governments will come and go while a strong military institution will endure. And should the military establish its own party with a proxy as prime minister, then all-the-better for military interests.

Amidst enhanced military tutelage over

politics and society, Thailand today has fallen off the trajectory toward democratization. Rather, it is increasingly reverting to becoming an intensified defective domain democracy.194 The military has more power today than at any time in recent memory. Its augmented budget, Internal Security Act powers, the Defense Ministry Act, and the Broadcasting Act all attest to the renewed political strength of soldiers.195 But General Prem was right when he insinuated that the military was the horse ridden by civilian “jockey” governments. Given the intensified military prowess, the civilian government jockey can now at any time be bucked.

Post-Script Of late, the Abhisit government has quietly eased Patcharawat Wongsawan out of active office, pressuring him to take a leave of absence until retirement in August 2009.

In 92

Patcharawat’s stead stands acting Police Chief Gen. Wichien Potposri, who appears to be more amenable to working under an anti-Thaksin government as well as perhaps pliable by the military. However Wichien failed to impress the Police Commission in terms of being selected as the next national police chief—perhaps because he lacked seniority and experience. Chairman of the Board PM Abhisit nominated Pol.Gen.Prateep Tanprasert, a favorite of the PAD and a few pro-PAD army elements. But a majority of the 11-member body preferred Pol.Gen.Chumpol Manmai, seen as close to Patcharawat, Prawit, the Bhumjai Thai Party, and pro-Prawit military officers.

The meeting ended inconclusively, though

Abhisit promised to renominate Prateep. The struggle, however, could represent an attempt by the PAD and certain Democrats (including Abhisit) to wrest control of the chief’s position from the current military/police leadership in order to achieve greater control over a police force seen as being generally pro-Thaksin in orientation.196 As for Prawit, the government would most probably like to dismiss him from the post of Defense Minister altogether. This is possibly because of government fears of Prawit’s military influence, given the state’s decision to indirectly sack his brother Patcharawat. At the same time, Prawit seems more loyal to Newin Chidchob’s Bhumjai Thai party than to the Democrats. But Abhisit and Suthep must be careful.

The quartet of Prawit, Patcharawat,

Anupong, and Prayuth has undergirded the Abhisit administration’s survival. Still, should Prawit depart from the post of Defense Minister, the position may go to one of Prawit’s precadet and cadet school classmates (perhaps either Gen. Sonthi or Gen.Boonsrang Niampradit) or possibly confirmed anti-Thaksinista Gen.Saprang Kallayamitr. If any of these men take the post, we will be witnessing the perpetuation of the 2006 coup group in positions of post-coup power and Thailand’s military game will continue to endure.197 At the same time, if Saprang assumes the Defense posting, there could be possible conflict within Thailand’s military

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establishment. Saprang is supported by Sondhi Limthongkul and the PAD who have hurled criticisms upon Anupong over the last six months and continue to do so. Anupong himself is working to secure a stable future for those closest to him. On June 17, 2009, Anupong transferred/promoted 75 mid-level officers as a reward for their involvement in the 2006 coup.

One of these, Lt. Col.Pattanachai Jintakanont (former

Commander of the strategically key 4th Cavalry Battalion in Bangkok) was promoted to colonel and appointed to be the Army Chief’s Aide. His replacement was Lt. Col.Chinsorn Ruengsuk, an aide to Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan.198

With regard to October 2009

military reshuffles, this includes Gen.Prayuth (AFAPS Class 12, Army Cadet School Class 23), who Anupong is keeping on as Army Chief of Staff, in line to be take Anupong’s own position in 2010. At the same time, Anupong will promote another Class 10 army chum, Gen.Teerawat Boonyapradap to become deputy Army Chief.199In Teerawat’s place, Anupong is set to appoint Gen. Piroon Phaeopolsong, deputy Army Chief of Staff, as assistant Army Chief. Piroon graduated with Anupong in pre-cadet school Class 10. Finally, Gen.Wit Thephasadin na Ayutthaya (Class 11) is to be promoted to be another assistant Army Chief.200 The promotions further clinch the ascendancy of Pre-Cadet Class 10 and 12 as well as Army Cadet School Classes 21 and 23 over Thailand’s Armed Forces. At the same time, at least until 2010 the personal supremacy of Generals Anupong and Prayuth is assured. In late August 2009, rumors of a military coup were again resonating. It was said that the supposed takeover would be instigated by Generals Prawit, Anupong, Prayuth, as well as politician Newin Chidchob. The gossip coincided with an August 17 attempt by red-shirts to petition Thailand’s king to pardon Thaksin Shinawatra during which potential violence might provide the necessary springboard for military intervention.201

The rumor has not come to

pass but it underlines the continuing popular perception of an extreme lack of civilian control over Thailand’s military. Such tittle-tattle is not idle chitchat in a country where the army has

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proved time and again that it can and will continue its role as political umpire where it—and the Privy Council—see fit. References 1

Sutichai Yoon, “Thai Talk: Old Soldiers Never Die; They Raise 'Career' Thoroughbreds,” The Nation, July 20 2006. http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 2

“Anupong Reiterates Army's Neutrality, Meets Prem to Brief Him on the Situation, The Nation, October 9, 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 3 Boonradom Chitradon, “Exiled Thaksin Tells 50,000 fans Army Must Stop Meddling in Politics,” Agence France Press (AFP) December 13, 2008, http://www.timesoftheinternet.com/28429.html. 4 Thitinan Pongsudirak, “Thailand Since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy, October 2008, Volume 19, Number 4, p.140. 5 See Yoshifumi Tamada, “Coups in Thailand, 1980-1991: Classmates, Internal Conflicts and Relations with the Government of the Military.” Southeast Asian Studies, 33, 3, December 1995, pp.36-37. 6 For a more extensive discussion of Thai military ideology, see Ockey, James, 2001, in Alagappa, Multiah, editor, 2001, p.201. 7 Defense of Thailand, Ministry of Defense White Paper, 2008, p.33. 8 Personal interview with very senior retired Army official, August 14, 2009. 9 Chai-anan Samudavanija, “The Military, Bureaucracy, and Globalization.” In Hewison, Kevin, editor, Political Change in Thailand, London: Routledge, p.53. 10 This section derives from a manuscript-in-progress headed by Dr. Aurel Croissant of Heidelberg University and funded by DFG. For more information on this project, please contact Paul Chambers, [email protected]. 11 See Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011. 12 See Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011. 13 See also Kemp und Hudlin 1992; Pion-Berlin 1992; Kohn 1997; Bland 2001; Feaver 1996; Feaver 1999; Welch 1976. 14 Dahl, Robert 1989, Democracy and its Critics. New York: 1989, 250. 15 Trinkunas 2005, 8. 16 Kohn 1997, 142. 17 Kemp und Hudlin 1992; Pion-Berlin 1992; Kohn 1997; Bland 2001. 18 Taylor, 2003, p.7. Cited in Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011. 19

Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011. 20 Dye, Thomas, 1992, 2. 21 Hofferbert 1973, 5, See Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011. 22 See also Bigo/Tsoukala 2008, p. 18. 23 Trinkunas 1999:6. 24 See Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011. 25 Trinkunas, 2001, p.164. 26 See Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011. 27 See Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011. 28 Norden, Deborah, in Pion-Berlin, 2001, 111-115 29 Norden, Deborah in Pion-Berlin, 2001, 117. 30 Barros and Coelho, 1986, p.439; Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.84; See Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011. 31 Pasuk Phongpaichit, Baker, Chris, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.354.

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Author’s calculations. Pasuk Phongpaichit, Baker, Chris, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.354. 34 Handley, Paul, The King Never Smiles, New Haven: Yale University Press, p.336. 35 Author’s own calculations. 36 Murray, David, Angels and Demons, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.5. 37 Murray, David, Angels and Demons, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.193. 38 Murray, David, Angels and Demons, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.13; Phongpaichit, Baker, Chris, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp-357-8. 39 Murray, David, Angels and Devils. Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.39. 40 Murray, David, Angels and Devils. Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, pp.190-94. 41 McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2004, p.133. 42 Chai-anan Samudavanija, “The Military, Bureaucracy, and Globalization.” In Hewison, Kevin, Political Change in Thailand, London: Routledge, 1997, p.56. 43 Surachart Bamrungsuk, „Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads,“p.77. 44 Author’s own calculations. 45 Author’s own calculations. 46 “It’s Nearing that Time,”Bangkok Post, August 5, 1999, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 47 McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.133. 48 McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.133. 49 Author’s own calculations. 50 McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.134-5. 51 McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.151. 52 McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.137. 53 Ukrist Pathmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1, February 2008, p.126. 54 Ukrist Patthmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat?”Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1, February 2008, p.129.. 55 Author’s own calculations. 56 “Junta’s Media War a Big Mistake,” The Nation, October 26, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 57 “People Power Party Uncovers another Military Plot, The Nation, November 3, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 58 Ukrist Patthmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat?”Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1, February 2008, p.137. 59 Author’s own calculations. 60 See Government of Thailand, http://www.cabinet.thaigov.go.th/. 61 See Wassana Nanuam, “Government Hopefuls Rendezvous with Anupong ‘the Manager,’”Bangkok Post, December 11, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 62 Wassana Nanuam, „The Coup that Never Was“ Bangkok Post, October 31, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 63 Article 24, section 2 of the 1946 Constitution stated that Senators could not be government officials. 64 Under the 1947 and 1949 constitutions, the ban on soldiers sitting as Senators continued (Article 93, Section 5 of the 1949 Constitution). Article 33 empowered the King to appoint all Senators who were nominated by a five-person Privy Council, an institution then dominated by the Army. See Thak, 2007: 32. 65 15.3% of the entire 76 directly elected/74 appointed Senate was composed of retired military officials to make this an indirect reserved domain. Among the 74 appointed Senators , 14 were ex-soldiers for 9.3% military reserved domain. 66 These Prime Ministers and their prime ministerial terms were as follows: Sanya Dammasakdi (1973-75); Tanin Kravichien (1976-77); Gen. Surayudh Chulanond (2006-08). 67 Surachart Bamrungsuk, United States Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule, 1947-1997. Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 1988, pp.171.180. 68 Pasuk Pongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics. London:Oxford University Press, 2000, p.304. 69 Wright, Joseph, The Balancing Act. Bangkok: Asia Books, 1991, pp.236-7. 70 Suchit Boonbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, Singapore: ISEAS, 1987, p.61 71 Ockey, James, 2001, p.203. 33

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Pasuk Pongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics. London:Oxford University Press, 2000, p.350. 73 Pasuk Pongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics. London:Oxford University Press, 2000, p.354. 74 Murray, David, Angels and Demons, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.6. 75 Murray, David, Angels and Demons, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.194. 76 Ockey, James, 2001, p.203. 77 See Chambers, Paul, “US-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26, 2004. 78 Channel Five, http://portal.tv5.co.th, http://www.ch7.com. 79 Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, Thailand Media Profile, 2002, p.10. 80 US State Department, 2008 Human Rights Report: Thailand, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119058.htm. 81 Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2008. 82 US State Department, 2008 Human Rights Report: Thailand, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119058.htm) 83 Chang Noi, „Military Biggest Winner in Political Conflict,“ The Nation, February 2, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 84 “Cambodia Warned to ‘Back Off’”, Bangkok Post, August 5, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 85 “Bt1 billion fund for Isoc projects in rural areas”, The Nation, March 25, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 86 “Anupong Deploys Solders to Explain to People About Thaksin Pardon Petition.” The Nation, August 2, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 87 Senate of Thailand, http://www.senate.go.th/th_senate/English/listofstandingcommittee.pdf. 88 Parliament of Thailand, http://www.parliament.go.th/parcy/committee.php?group_id=15. 89 Surachart Bamrungsuk, United States Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule: 1947-1977. Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 1988, p.95-103. 90 Pasuk Pongpaichit, Baker, Chris, Thailand: Economy and Politics, London: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.307-8. 91 Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, Singapore: ISEAS, 1990, p.51. 92 Chai-anan Sanudavanija, Kusuma Snitwongse, Suchit Bunbongkarn, From Armed Suppression to Political Offensive. Bangkok: ISIS, 1990 p.112. 93 Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, Singapore: ISEAS, 1990, p.52. 94 Chai-anan Sanudavanija, Kusuma Snitwongse, Suchit Bunbongkarn, From Armed Suppression to Political Offensive. Bangkok: ISIS, 1990 p.112. 95 Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, Singapore: ISEAS, 1990, p.58-59. 96 Murray, David, Angels and Devils, Bangkok:White Orchid Press, 1996, pp.190-191; Surachart Bamrungsuk “Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations and Thailand’s Regional Outlook.” In Mares, David, editor, Civil-Military Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westeview Press, 1998, p.196. 97 Surachart Bamrungsuk “Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations and Thailand’s Regional Outlook.” In Mares, David, editor, Civil-Military Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westeview Press, 1998, p.196 98 Surachart Bamrungsuk, “Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations and Thailand’s Regional Outlook, ” In Mares, David, editor, Civil-Military Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998, p.196-7. 99 Surachart Bamrungsuk, “Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations and Thailand’s Regional Outlook, In Mares, David, editor, Civil-Military Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998, p.196-7. 100 The Defense of Thailand (White Paper). Ministry of Defense, 1994, p.68. 101 The Defense of Thailand (White Paper). Ministry of Defense, 1994, p.45. 102 The Defense of Thailand (White Paper). Ministry of Defense, 1994, pp.68-69. 103 The Defense of Thailand (White Paper). Ministry of Defense, 1994, p.20. 104 “Reform ‘will Hinder Force,’”The Nation, July 13, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 105 Reform ‘will Hinder Force,’”The Nation, July 13, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 106 Avudh Panananda “Thailand’s Dept. Of Homeland Security,” The Nation, Decembe 12, 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 107 Piyanart Srivalo, “Bill Would Put ISOC Under Army, Not PM.”The Nation, June 17, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 108 Criticisms by Chulalongkorn professor Surachart Bamrungsuk and former dean of Thammasat University's Law Faculty, Kamchai Chongchakphan. See “Law Would be a ‘Coup by Stealth.’”The Nation, July 15, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 109 “NLA passes controversial Internal Security Act”, The Nation, November 8, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

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Defense of Thailand, Ministry of Defense White Paper, 2008, P.35. “Thailand: Internal Security Act Threatens Democracy and Human Rights-- Government Proposes Draconian Steps to Institutionalize Military Control, Human Rights Watch November 4, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/04/thailand-internal-security-act-threatens-democracyand-human-rights 112 Wassana Nanuam, “ISOC to Tackle Political Conflict as a Security Threat,” Bangkok Post, November 13, 2008,http://www.bangkokpost.com. 113 “Thai Insurgency” June 11, 2009, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13834203. 114 Wassana Nanuam, “ISOC to Tackle Political Conflict as a Security Threat,” Bangkok Post, November 13, 2008,http://www.bangkokpost.com. 115 Wassana Nanuam, “ISOC to Tackle Political Conflict as a Security Threat,” Bangkok Post, November 13, 2008,http://www.bangkokpost.com. 116 Wassana Nanuam, “ISOC to Tackle Political Conflict as a Security Threat,” Bangkok Post, November 13, 2008,http://www.bangkokpost.com. 117 “Thailand: Internal Security Act Threatens Democracy and Human Rights-- Government Proposes Draconian Steps to Institutionalize Military Control, Human Rights Watch November 4, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/04/thailand-internal-security-act-threatens-democracyand-human-rights 118 “Thailand: Internal Security Act Threatens Democracy and Human Rights-- Government Proposes Draconian Steps to Institutionalize Military Control, Human Rights Watch November 4, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/04/thailand-internal-security-act-threatens-democracyand-human-rights 119 “Thailand: Internal Security Act Threatens Democracy and Human Rights-- Government Proposes Draconian Steps to Institutionalize Military Control, Human Rights Watch November 4, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/04/thailand-internal-security-act-threatens-democracyand-human-rights 120 Don Pathan, “ISOC Must Evolve to Tackle Rising Security Challenges,”The Nation, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 121 “Thailand: Internal Security Act Threatens Democracy and Human Rights-- Government Proposes Draconian Steps to Institutionalize Military Control, Human Rights Watch November 4, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/04/thailand-internal-security-act-threatens-democracyand-human-rights 122 “Cabinet Approves Police-Revamp Bill,” The Nation, July 4, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 123 “Cabinet Approves Police-Revamp Bill,” The Nation, July 4, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 124 “Patcharawat Fact File,”The Nation, March 1, 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 125 “Thai Rath Analysis,”Bangkok Post, August 3, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 126 “Wichien Takes Top Police Job,” Bangkok Post, August 5, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 127 It is rumored that Prawit maintains close ties with active and retired military officials, including Generals Prem Tinsulanond, Sonthi Boonyaratklin, Winai Phattiyakul, Anupong Paochinda, Prayuth Chan-ocha, , Surayudh Chulanond, Chettha Thanajaro, and Kowit Wattana. At the same time, Prawit has reportedly long been close to Sanoh Tienthong, given that Prawit served as a soldier for a time in Sanoh’s province of Sa Kaew. See Siam Report, “Prawit Wongsawan,” http://www.siamreport.com. 128 Some army officers even ordered their subordinates to vote for the Democrat Party in the 2007 election. One promised that, in return, they would be treated to chicken curry noodles. See Wassana Nanuam, “Anupong Rewards his Coup Allies,” Bangkok Post, June 19, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com; Wassana Nanuam, ISOC Ordered to Promoted Democracy,”Bangkok Post, December 20, 2007, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 129 Don Pathan, “ISOC Must Evolve to Tackle Rising Security Challenges,”The Nation, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 130 Piyanart Srivalo, “Draft Law Would Wean SBPAC Off Military for Funding,” The Nation, August 15, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 131 “Bt1 billion fund for Isoc projects in rural areas”, The Nation, March 25, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 132 “Blue Shirts Return,” Siam Report, July 2009, http://www.siamreport.blogspot.com/2009/07/blue-shirtsreturn.html. 133 “Thai Army Begins Crackdown on Anti-government Demonstrators,” Thailand News.Net, April 13, 2009, http//www.thailandnews.net/story/488936. 134 Examples of formal or informal National Defense missions abroad have included the sending of Thai troops to participate in the First World War (1917-18); the Franco-Thai War (1940-41); the Korean War (1950-51); the 111

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Vietnam War and Secret War in Laos (1964-75); border raids between Thailand and Cambodia (1979-88); the Thai-Lao border war (1987-88); East Timor Peace-Keeping (1999-2002); bolstering of US troops in Afghanistan (2001-2); participation in the Iraq War (2003-4); and border conflict along the Thai-Cambodian border (2008Present). 135 Interview with Dr. Mark Tamthai, October 10, 2008. 136 Section 47, Ministry of Defense Administration Act (2008), cited in Defense of Thailand, Ministry of Defense White Paper, 2008, p.32. 137 Ministry of Defense of Thailand website, http://www.mod.go.th/eng_mod/index.html. 138 Wassana Nanuam,“Thawil Firms as NSC Candidate,” Bangkok Post, July 2, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 139 Surachart Bamrungsuk, From Dominance to Power Sharing: the Military and Politics in Thailand, 19731992, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University, 1999, p.155. 140 The Defense of Thailand (White Paper). Ministry of Defense, 1994, Message from the Supreme Commander, p.i. 141 http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetF.htm. 142 http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/thailand/ U.S. Central Command. 143 Royal Thai Armed Forces website, 2009, http://www.schq.mi.th/EN/vision_mission.htm. 144 Royal Thai Armed Forces website, 2009, http://www.schq.mi.th/EN/vision_mission.htm. 145 Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy website, www.crma.ac.th/. 146 Handley, Paul, “Princes, Politicians, Bureaucrats, Generals: The Evolution of the Privy Council Under the Constitutional Monarchy,”A paper presented at the 10th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University, 9-11 January 2008, p.15. 147 Murray, David, Angels and Devils. Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.10. 148 The Defense of Thailand (White Paper). Ministry of Defense, 1994, Message from the Supreme Commander, p.58. 149 “Surayud Guns for Reforms,”Bangkok Post, February 19, 1999, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 150 Hänggi, Heiner, “Democratization and Security Governance in Southeast Asia,” Paper presented for the International Workshop-Conference “Challenges and Prospects of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia,” Heidelberg, Germany, 15-17 January 2009, p.11. 151 Wassana Nanuam, “Reform at the Top of the Command Pyramid,”Bangkok Post, July 10, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 152 Suchit Bunbongkarn, State of the Nation, Singapore, ISEAS, 1996, p.65. 153 Perapong Manakit, Role of Parliament in Defence Budgeting in Thailand (2007?). 154 Murray, David, Angels and Devils. Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.9. 155 In 1997 the Thai defense budget was reduced by 25 percent, the highest decline in years. See Thailand’s Office of the Prime Minister for statistics. 156 Hänggi, Heiner, “Democratization and Security Governance in Southeast Asia,” Paper presented for the International Workshop-Conference “Challenges and Prospects of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia,” Heidelberg, Germany, 15-17 January 2009, p.10-11. 157 Ockey, James, Thailand: “The Struggle to Define Civil-MilitaryRelations,” in Alagappa, Multiah, Transition to Democratic Civilian Control, 1999, p.201. 158 McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.132. 159 McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.137. 160 Personal interview with very senior retired Army official, August 14, 2009. 161 “Military Must be Accountable,” Bangkok Post, July 2, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 162 The importance of this was demonstrated in July 2006 when Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratklin suddenly made 129 transfers of mid-ranking officers, at least half of which were said to be under the command of Class 10 generals loyal to Thaksin. See “Military Transfers: Sonthi Stuns by Shifting PM’s Allies.”The Nation, July 20, 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 163 The mid-year reshuffle, which began under the Chatchai government, allows more soldiers more chances at promotion. 164 “It has not been uncommon for reshuffle lists to be upheld until Privy Council head Prem is satisified with them. See “Thailand in 2006: Retreat to Military Rule,” Asian Survey47, 1, January/February 2007, p.137. 165 Suchit Bunbongkarn, State of the Nation, Singapore, ISEAS, 1996, pp.64-65. 166 “PM Loses Army Reshuffle Powers,” Bangkok Post, February 2, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 167 Murray, David, Angels and Devils. Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.192 168 Chai-anan Samudavanija, “The Military, Bureaucracy, and Globalization,” In Hewison, Kevin, editor, Political Change in Thailand, London: Routledge, pp.54-55.

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Surachart Bamrungsuk, „Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads,“p.77. McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.129. 171 McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.134. 172 Pasuk Pongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.346. 173 Handley, Paul, „Princes, Politicians, Generals: The Evolution oft he Privy Council Under the Constitutional Monarchy. Paper presented at the 10th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University, Thailand, 9-11 January 2008, p.15. 174 Handley, Paul, „Princes, Politicians, Generals: The Evolution oft he Privy Council Under the Constitutional Monarchy. Paper presented at the 10th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University, Thailand, 9-11 January 2008, p.15. 175 Handley, Paul, The King Never Smiles, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p.470. 176 See McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen, NIAS Press, 2004, p.137. 177 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Where Will Sonthi Lead “Army of the Land?” The Nation, March 24, 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 178 Interview with Jakrapop Penkair, March 3, 2009. 179 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Paper Presented at the 10th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University, Thailand, 9- 11 January 2008. 180 Wassana Nanuam, „The Coup that Never Was“ Bangkok Post, October 31, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 181 Wassana Nanuam, “Government Hopefuls Rendezvous with Anupong, ‘the Manager,’”Bangkok Post, December 11, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 182 Chai’s occupying the post of Parliament President also gave him the power to call a Special Session of Parliament to officially select a new Prime Minister (which he did on December 15) following Abhisit’s apparent success in garnering enough votes to become Prime Minister. 183 „How Suthep Installed a Democrat-led Government,“ The Nation, May 26, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 184 Thitinan Pongsudirak, “Thailand Since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy, October 2008, Volume 19, Number 4, p.146. 185 Croissant and Merkel (2003) state that “defective democracies are systems of political power that boast the existence of a meaningful and effective universal ‘system of elections.’regulating access to political power. At the same time, however, they significantly limit the functioning of institutions that secure basic political and civic participatory rights and freedoms, restrictions of the horizontal checks and limitations on power, and/or limitations on the effective political power of democratically legitimated authorities (Merkel and Croissant, 2000, 35).” 186 Merkel defines domain (tutelary) democracies as regimes where actors not legitimized by democratic vote (e.g. the military, entrepreneurs, multinational corporations) exert partial or total control over certain political spheres which should be under the control of democratically elected authorities (Merkel 2004). 187 Wassana Nanuam, “Top Brass Welcome Prawit’s Assignment as Defence Minister,” Bangkok Post, December 23, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 188 “My Friend is my Enemy in Thailand,” Asia Times Online, May 7, 2009, http://www.atimes.com. 189 The Abhisit government’s discomposure as to maintaining itself in power has been reflected in Deputy PM Suthep Thuasuban’s regular meetings and currying favor with senior or retired military officials. Appearing at Defense Minister Prawit’s birthday, Suthep claimed that the relationship between the administration and the armed forces remained strong. See Panya Thiewsangwan, “PM Extends Hand of Friendship to Prawit,” The Nation, August 12, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 190 Wassana Nanuam, “Attempt on Sondhi’s Life Puts Military in Dubious Light,”Bangkok Post, April 23, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 191 “My Friend is my Enemy in Thailand,” Asia Times Online, May 7, 2009, http://www.atimes.com. 192 “My Friend is my Enemy in Thailand,” Asia Times Online, May 7, 2009, http://www.atimes.com. 193 Ukrist Pathmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1, February 2008, p .139. 194 See Croissant, Aurel and Merkel, Wolfgang (2003); Merkel, Wolfgang (2004). 195 Chang Noi, „Military Biggest Winner in Political Conflict,“ The Nation, February 2, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 196 Manop Thip-osod, “Scramble to be the Next Top Cop,” Bangkok Post, August 11, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com; Pradit Ruangdit, Manop Thip-osod, “Abhisit Loses Police Vote,” Bangkok Post, August 21, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 170

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Wassana Nanuam, „Prawit Fears Meddling in Lists, Bangkok Post, August 6, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 198 Wassana Nanuam, “Anupong Rewards his Coup Allies,”Bangkok Post, June 19, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 199 Wassana Nanuam, „Prawit Urged to Prevent Meddling in Reshuffle,” Bangkok Post, August 7, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 200 Wassana Nanuam, “Source Says Prayuth to Stay as Chief-of-Staff,” Bangkok Post, August 18, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 201 “Puea Thai Blows Whistle on Silent Coup Plot,” The Nation, August 17, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

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