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Focusing the Familiar

Focusing the Familiar A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall

University of Hawai‘i Press honolulu

© 2001 University of Hawai‘i Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 06 05 04 03 02 01 65 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Zhongyong. English. Focusing the familiar : a translation and philosophical interpretation of the Zhongyong / Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall. p. cm. English and Chinese. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–8248–2478–4 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0–8248–2460–1 (pbk. : alk. paper) I. Title: Translation and philosophical interpretation of the Zhongyong. II. Ames, Roger T. III. Hall, David L. IV. Title. PL2473 .N89 2001 181'.112—dc21 200102773

Camera-ready copy for this book was prepared by Daniel Cole.

University of Hawai‘i Press books are printed on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources.

Printed by Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group

For Henry The appearance of character makes the State unnecessary. The wise man is the State. Ralph Waldo Emerson

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

Preface

xi

Introduction: A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong 1. The Importance of the Zhongyong 2. Problems of Translation 2.1 Identifying “Philosophical” Texts 2.2 The Language of Focus and Field 2.2.1 Things, Processes, Events 2.2.2 Causality, Power, Creativity 2.2.3 Clarity, Univocity, Linguistic Clustering 3. Qi
and Correlative Cosmology: The Interpretive Context of the Zhongyong 4. The Central Argument of the Zhongyong 4.1 Cheng
and “Creativity” 4.2 “Creativity (cheng
),” “Natural Tendencies (xing
),” and “Emotions (qing
)” 4.3 “Family” as Governing Metaphor 4.4 Ritual Propriety (li
) in the Zhongyong 4.4.1 Ritual Propriety (li) and “Focusing the Familiar (zhongyong
)” 4.4.2 Ritual Propriety (li) and Education (jiao
) as Growth and Extension Notes to the Introduction

1 1 3 3 5 8 11 15

Glossary of Key Terms

19 26 30 35 38 40 43 50 53 61

Focusing the Familiar: A Translation of the Zhongyong Notes to the Translation

89 115

Appendix 1. The Text of the Zhongyong 1.1 The Zhongyong and the “Zisi-Mencius Lineage”

vii

131 131

viii Contents 1.2 Zisi and the “Five Modes of Proper Conduct (wuxing
)” Doctrine 1.3 The Zhongyong: A Composite Document 1.4 Dating the Zhongyong 1.5 Master Zisi: The Person 2. Interpretations of the Zhongyong 2.1 Revisiting the Opening Passage 2.2 Why Zhongyong is not a “Doctrine of the Mean” Notes to the Appendix

137 143 145 146 148 148 150 152

Bibliography of Works Cited

155

Index

161

About the Authors

167

Acknowledgments

Focusing the Familiar had its beginnings in a University of Hawai‘i graduate seminar on “Reading Philosophical Texts.” We gladly acknowledge the significant contributions of several exceptional students in that seminar, who have since initiated their own professional careers. We have certainly benefited from numerous conversations with sinologists and philosophers aimed at the articulation and defense of our sometimes controversial translations and interpretation. We are also grateful to two anonymous readers solicited by University of Hawai‘i Press, each of whom challenged us to take another look at our interpretation of the Zhongyong. We believe that second look to have materially strengthened our arguments. The Pacific Cultural Foundation in Taipei was most generous along the way in offering its support for the research underlying this project, and our many friends at Peking University and Tsinghua University have kept us apprised of the exciting new finds that are redefining the scholarly world’s understanding of classical China. Professor D. C. Lau and the staff of the chant project for the Institute for Chinese Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong were most kind in allowing us to use their critical edition of the Zhongyong included as a chapter in their concordance to the Liji. Patricia Crosby, Senior Editor at University of Hawai‘i Press, offered her considerable professional abilities to this project from its outset, assisting us at every step along the way. Daniel Cole, from the Center for Chinese Studies, prepared the camera-ready copy for the Press and assisted in producing the Index. His good humor and tireless attention to detail have helped to insure the

ix

x Acknowledgments

production of both a handsome and reader-friendly text.We would also like to express our gratitude to Tsao Hsingyuan who lent her expertise in art history and her aesthetic sensibilities to our efforts to find an appropriate cover for this book. Geir Sigurdsson and Danny Coyle went through the manuscript line by line to trap and punish any stylistic or editorial infelicities. Finally, we offer special thanks to Henry Rosemont, Jr., to whom Focusing the Familiar is affectionately dedicated. Throughout a long and distinguished career, Henry has been a steady champion of comparative philosophy. His selflessness as a mentor and scholar is legendary. As on so many other occasions, Henry read our manuscript and provided us with a searching critique that is perhaps the finest gift an acadmic can give to his colleagues. This is a far better book because of Henry. Roger T. Ames University of Hawai‘i at Manoa David L. Hall University of Texas at El Paso

Preface

In the presentation of the Zhongyong that follows, we have attempted to provide a resource for both the scholar of Chinese thought and teachers and students who may be approaching Chinese philosophical texts for the first time. The latter may initially find the rather elaborate scholarly apparatus accompanying this translation somewhat daunting. We hope, however, that we have provided sufficient guidance to enable those unfamiliar with the Chinese language to gain a productive understanding of the distinctive challenges encountered in the effort to render Chinese thought in Western contexts. This presentation is divided into four parts: First, there is an Introduction aimed at providing a philosophical interpretation of the Zhongyong. The second section presents a Glossary of Key Terms. This glossary should be particularly helpful to those using this work as a classroom text, as it provides in concise form the important senses of the terms that play a key role in the argument of the Zhongyong. Third, there is the translation itself, with sufficient annotation to alert both expert and novice to some of the more difficult of the challenges to translation. Finally, we have offered an Appendix that addresses some of the more technical issues relevant to the understanding of both the history of the text and the history of its English language translations. In the Appendix we have appealed to the recent archaeological finds in China to assist us in locating this work within its own intellectual context.

xi

xii

Preface

We should say something about our expressed intent to provide a distinctly philosophical interpretation of the Zhongyong. Our desire has not been to contrast our interpretation with other possible interpretive perspectives—for example, “literary” or “historical.” We have intended, rather, to highlight our special effort to remain attentive to the semantic and conceptual nuances of this text in order to account for its central place within Classical Chinese literature. As we shall argue at length in our Introduction, until recently, interpretive texts such as the Zhongyong, the Analects of Confucius, the Daodejing, and the Zhuangzi, have not benefited as well as they might have from treatments sensitive to the difficulties of translating their insights into an appropriate Western vocabulary. Thus, our claim to have presented here a philosophical interpretation is tantamount to saying that we have tried to treat the text in a manner we believe most germane to its actual import. In sum, we agree with Wing-tsit Chan’s comment that “the Zhongyong is a philosophical work . . . perhaps the most philosophical work in the whole body of ancient Confucian literature.”1 And we have attempted to present this important philosophical text in such a way as to permit Western philosophers to engage it in a productive manner. We hope that this effort will not only demonstrate that the text is philosophically interesting in its own right, but will provide Western philosophers and other intellectuals access to a set of interpretations and arguments that offer new insights into issues and concerns common to both Chinese and Western thinkers. In the translation itself we have included the romanization and the Chinese characters for the key philosophical terms after their first appearance in each passage. As a pedagogical strategy, we have two goals. First, the inclusion of the romanization and characters alerts readers to the fact that it is these more technical terms that are included in the Glossary of Key Terms which has been provided as part of the Introduction. Readers can return to the Glossary to refresh their memories by reviewing the fuller explanation of these terms. Secondly, a repeated reading of the various passages that constitute the Zhongyong will familiarize read-

Preface

xiii

ers with these specific terms, and in due course, the readers will make the technical philosophical vocabulary their own. An ability to recognize and understand this set number of key terms enables readers to appreciate the philosophical message of the text in a more sophisticated way.

note 1. Wing-tsit Chan (1963): 96.

Introduction A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

1. the importance of the

ZHONGYONG

The Zhongyong
 is attributed to Kong Ji
 (483–402 bce), grandson of Confucius (551–479 bce), born to Confucius’s son Boyu
 who himself appears in the Analects. Kong Ji is best known by his “style” name, Zisizi

or “Master” Zisi. The Zhongyong is certainly the most influential work attributed to Zisi. The text is ascribed to Master Zisi by name in the biography of Confucius in the Records of the Historian (Shiji

) and in some other early sources. We should not, however, put too much credence in the idea that the Zhongyong, or any of the other texts associated with Zisi’s name, were from his own hand. Typically, texts were one element in an ongoing tradition that perpetuated the teachings of earlier generations. Over time, a corpus of curricular materials would accumulate, receiving authority through attribution to a defining figure in the lineage. While we are accustomed to think of such traditions as being transmitted through the written word, there are indications that memorization and oral transmission probably played a major role in establishing a common frame of reference for an academic lineage in early China. This would be similar to the way in which the Bible or Qu’ran would provide a given population with a shared repertoire of cultural heroes, anecdotes, parables, metaphors, and proverbial statements. Texts were written down in part as a means of providing deceased persons of status with reading materials for their journey 1

2

Introduction

to the next world. (The material medium at this juncture was carbon ink on either silk or bamboo strips.) Written texts also seem to have had a role in the construction of court libraries at state academies that would try to attract the best and brightest scholars of their generation and thus bring prestige to their patrons. While there seems to be a certain fluidity to the transmission of these early documents, the recent archaeological finds are uncovering increasingly early versions of relatively standardized texts, suggesting that “canonization” and rote memorization had some force in consolidating the documents and preserving their integrity. Another factor that would have influenced this process of standardization is the relationship between a rich and redundant spoken language, and texts as a corpus of economical aphorisms used to capture the prevailing wisdom. As we now have them, these classical texts are not direct transcriptions of speech. Rather, they would enter the oral language as familiar apothegms that could be used to begin a discussion, with the possibility of further elaboration occurring in the spoken language.1 Along with three other documents associated with Zisi, the Zhongyong was incorporated into the Record of Rites (Liji
), a ritual compendium that emerged initially in several forms in the early Han dynasty (202 bce–220 ce). But the Zhongyong also had a life of its own, appearing as an independent text in the court bibliographies across the centuries with many accrued commentaries. Although regarded down through the tradition as a document of enormous wisdom, the Zhongyong achieved truly canonical preeminence when it became one of the Sishu
 or Four Books (Analects of Confucius, Great Learning, Zhongyong, and Mencius) compiled and annotated by the Southern Song philosopher, Zhu Xi
 (1130–1200). The Four Books are usually arranged chronologically to represent the voices of an evolving classical Confucianism in its formative period, from Confucius himself as “interviewed” in the Analects, to his student, Zengzi
, “author” of the Great Learning, to Zengzi’s student Zisi
, “author” of the Zhongyong, and then to Mengzi
 (known as Mencius) who was tutored by a later student in the direct lineage of Zisi.

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

3

Zhu Xi divided the Zhongyong into its present 33 sections, and wrote a searching and detailed commentary on it. In popular wisdom, the Zhongyong has a special place pedagogically as the “last” of the Four Books in the sense that a student would begin from the short and accessible Great Learning to learn the scope of the tradition, proceed to the Analects to become familiar with its fundamentals, move on to the Mencius to appreciate the early development of the tradition, and then would finally study the Zhongyong as a means of gaining access to its mysteries. The Four Books with Zhu Xi’s commentary became the standard primer for the imperial examination system. From the time of Zhu Xi until the beginning of the twentieth century, the Zhongyong provided a shared vocabulary among Chinese intellectuals. It was not uncommon for an educated person to be able to recite the entire Four Books, including the complete text of the Zhongyong. We might go so far as to claim that the ideas and values espoused in the Four Books constitute a shared vision for the premodern Chinese world.

2. problems of translation 2.1 Identifying “Philosophical” Texts It is one thing to agree with the claim of Wing-tsit Chan, cited in the Preface, that the Zhongyong is a distinctly philosophical work, and quite another to articulate for a Western audience precisely what is philosophical about this text. Most Western philosophers have been notoriously uninterested in any claims on the part of proponents of Chinese thought that there is much of philosophical significance in the texts of ancient China. Fortunately, the recent confluence of several circumstances is promoting a re-evaluation of the classical Chinese corpus. First, a continuing series of truly dramatic archaeological digs in China are providing us with earlier versions of extant texts that have not suffered the distortions unavoidable in some two thousand years of transmission. These finds are also offering us access to textual materials that disappeared from sight long ago. In many cases, these documents are permitting a revision of our previous under-

4

Introduction

standing of the principal received works that have defined the classical period. Secondly, there is a growing recognition within the sinological community of the need for collaboration in translation projects. This development has proceeded perhaps most productively with respect to the translation of so-called philosophical texts. While one of the requisites of a successful translation of a classical Chinese philosophical text into Western languages is expertise in Chinese language and culture, it is equally true that such a translation requires an understanding of the Western philosophical discourse serving as the target language of the translation. Thus, absent the unusual combination of both sinological and philosophical skills in a single individual, the successful translation of texts such as the Analects of Confucius, the Daodejing, and the Zhongyong into Western languages requires collaboration between philological and philosophical specialists. As one among numerous important examples that might be cited, consider the problem encountered in the translation of the term zhi
, prominent in the principal Confucian texts, including the Zhongyong. The term is generally translated into English as “knowledge” or “wisdom” or “to know.” However, were one simply to employ that term without calling attention to the irrelevance to Chinese thought of representationalist theories of knowledge, and the importance of practical and performative understandings of the activity of knowing, as well as an insistence upon the priority of aesthetic feeling over cognition in any act of knowing, such translations would perpetuate a decidedly inadequate and misleading understanding of the text. Thus, recognizing the need for understanding both the source and target languages in any act of translation promises distinct improvements over previous textual renderings. In identifying texts that require philosophical treatment, we suggest the employment of a pragmatic criterion. Thus, we shall understand by “Chinese philosophical texts” any Chinese works whose translation into Western languages is, by common consent, productively illumined by recourse to recognizably philosophical terminology. On these terms, the Analects is a philosophical text

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

5

because the translation and articulation of terms such as dao
(“proper way”), de
(“particular focus, excellence”), yi
(“appropriateness”), and zhi
(“to know, realize, wisdom”) among others, benefit from the employment of modes of explanation predominantly housed within the Western philosophical tradition. The Daodejing is a philosophical text because in addition to de and dao, the so-called wu-forms—wuwei
 (“nonassertive action”), wuzhi
 (“unprincipled knowing”), and wuyu
 (“objectless desire”), and so on—cannot be understood in Anglo-European language translations without recourse to philosophical explication. And, as we shall see, the Zhongyong is a most fascinating philosophical text because notions such as cheng
(“sincerity, integrity, creativity”), xing
(“natural tendencies”), qing
(“feelings, nascent emotions”) and jiao (“education”) require subtle philosophical exposition. Once one has identified a distinctly philosophical text, it is important to select the most productive among a variety of possible semantic matrices for its translation. For, even when essentially philosophical renderings have been attempted, texts from the classical Chinese period have not always received adequate illumination. This has been due in important measure to the uncritical application of decidedly irrelevant philosophical vocabularies in the translations of these exoteric texts. The consideration of appropriate philosophical vocabularies brings us to the third circumstance promoting a reevaluation of the classical Chinese corpus. This issue is of such crucial importance that we must consider it in significant detail.

2.2 The Language of Focus and Field There is an increasing awareness among Western interpreters of the Chinese tradition that the vocabulary formerly established for the translation of classical Chinese texts into Western languages suffers from serious inadequacies. The rather tendentious motives of Christian missionaries who constituted some of the more influential of the early translators have not served us well. The “Christianization” of Chinese texts is evident in the numerous

6

Introduction

examples of theologically freighted terms that have entered the Chinese/English dictionaries that serve as primary resources for our understanding of Chinese culture: “Heaven (tian),” “righteousness (yi)” “rites (li),” “virtue (te),” and so on. Of late, sinologists involved in the translation of classical Chinese texts are gradually recognizing that a reexamination of such translations is essential in the light of our more complete understanding of classical Chinese world views. A far more serious set of limitations placed upon our translations of Chinese texts has gone unrecognized until quite recently. These limitations are associated with the employment of the default vocabulary of both demotic and philosophical discourse in the West. Our Western languages are substance-oriented and are, therefore, most relevant to the descriptions and interpretations of a world defined by discreteness, objectivity, and permanence. Such languages are ill-disposed to describe and interpret a world, such as that of the Chinese, that is primarily characterized by continuity, process, and becoming. The substance language naïvely presupposed by Western philosophers and sinologists has occasioned some seriously misleading translations. For example, you
and wu
have often been uncritically rendered as “Being” and “Non-being.” Influential translators, until quite recently, have rendered wuxing
 as “The Five Elements.” Xing
is still most often translated as “nature,” and renxing
 as “human nature.” All of these translations promote the fixed and univocal characterizations of objects or essences emergent from a language rooted in a substantialist perspective. Our present circumstances obviously require a fuller inventory of the semantic resources available to us if we are to produce appropriate translations of Chinese texts. Fortunately, recent developments in Anglo-European philosophy have foregrounded interpretative vocabularies more relevant to the articulation of Chinese sensibilities. In place of the traditional language, vocabularies of process and change have increasingly become available to those interested in interpreting Chinese thought for Western audiences.2

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

7

In what follows we have employed a language of process in order to illumine the context and arguments of the Zhongyong. This language we have called “the language of focus and field.” Such language presumes a world constituted by an interactive field of processes and events in which there are no final elements, only shifting “foci” in the phenomenal field, each of which focuses the entire field from its finite perspective. As a consequence of our resort to process language, some of our translations and expositions may seem somewhat unusual to those more accustomed to the substantive language represented by the dominant Western philosophical resources. We make no apology for the seemingly radical nature of our interpretation of the Zhongyong. Having employed this language with some success in a number of previous works, we believe there to be real pragmatic justification for our endeavors.3 Thus, we believe that the apologetic burden most definitely lies with those still married to the mainstream interpretations of Chinese thought. We shall be arguing both explicitly and implicitly throughout this work that the truly radical departures from appropriate understandings of the Zhongyong and other Chinese philosophical texts are in fact represented by those translations that have depended upon the default languages of the West. Our argument is simple and direct: The use of substance language to translate Chinese insights into a world of process and change has led to seriously inappropriate interpretations of the Chinese sensibility. Our rendering of the argument of the Zhongyong into English requires that we select from the inventory of semantic contexts available to us a philosophical language that offers the greatest likelihood of success. We suggest that the language of focus and field possesses the following advantages over traditional substance languages employed in the West: First, it permits the replacement of a referential language of discrete objects by a deferential language of processes and events.4 Second, rather than requiring the language of linear causality that reduces all relations to those of external actions, our focus/field language permits an appreciation of the complex correlative field of

8

Introduction

spontaneous, transactional relationships presumed by the Zhongyong. Third, the language of process eschews the goals of clarity, univocity, and stipulated definition prized by vocabularies of substance, quantity, and discreteness and permits a more adequate understanding of the poetic allusiveness of Chinese philosophical discourse.

2.2.1 Things, Processes, Events From earliest times, Western thinkers have tended to privilege the intuition of being over that of becoming. The ontological tradition of the Greek world is expressed in a number of theoretical manners, but the most pervasive characteristic shared by all varieties of ontology is that Being serves to ground the beings of the world. In its function as ground, Being is the fundamental exemplification of permanence. That is, Being as ground is to be construed as unchanging and as at rest. The Greek preference for rest and permanence can be illustrated by appealing to the development of those mathematical and metaphysical speculations that led to the formalization of the idea of quantity and discreteness. The intuition of Being as unchanging, permanent, and at rest provides a fixed reality that underwrites the construction of concepts, literal definitions, logical essences, and natural kinds. In a world of process and change, however, reality is always outrunning concepts and categories, and classifications must be less formal. Of the four primary semantic contexts emergent in the Western world5—formalism, from Parmenides, Pythagoras, and Plato; materialism, from Leucippus and Democritus; organic naturalism from Aristotle; and volitionalism from the Sophists—each is generated from a question of the following sort: “What kinds of things are there?” The first three of these theoretical contexts express the dominant ontologies of Western thought. The Sophistic tradition is fundamentally disontological. For Plato, there are ideas as mathematical patterns or forms; for Democritus, there are atoms swirling in empty space; for Aristotle, the world is comprised by organisms characterizable with respect to specific aims. For the disontological Sophists, the

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

9

“world” is made up of human beliefs and judgments: “Man is the measure of all things, both of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not.”6 Each of the ontological traditions supports the idea of discreteness. Discreteness is defended by Plato through notions of mathematical pattern and logical definition, and by Aristotle through the functional articulation of distinctive ends defining separate organisms. The most dramatic affirmation of the discreteness of things was forwarded by Leucippus and Democritus in the form of atoms as mathematically divisible, but physically indivisible, “least units.” The dominant Western preference for ontological permanence over the flux and change of the phenomenal world means that the world of ordinary experience cannot be presumed finally real. “Reality” must refer to that which grounds the world of appearances which, as mere appearances, are misleading and/or illusory. There is little recourse to anything like a reality/appearance distinction in classical Chinese thought.7 Classical Chinese thinkers were not interested in the search for an ontological ground for phenomena. Rather, they were preoccupied with the phenomenal world of process and change construed simply as wanwu
— “the ten thousand things.” They were less inclined to ask what makes something real or why things exist, and more interested in negotiating the complex relationships among the changing phenomena themselves. A direct implication of the privileging of an unchanging Reality over the flux of Appearances in the dominant classical Western world view is the tendency to privilege the discrete and quantitative over the qualitative and continuous.8 The priority of discreteness and quantity assures a preference for stasis and permanence, for the substantial over the processive. This in turn disposes toward a concern for the clarity of formally defined terms and the necessity of unchanging truths—both of which are more congenial to the quantitatively discrete and measurable world of the classical Western tradition than to the process orientation of the classical Chinese.

10

Introduction

In the classical traditions of the West, being takes precedence over becoming and thus becoming is ultimately unreal. Whatever becomes is realized by achieving its end—that is, by coming into being. In the Chinese world, becoming takes precedence over being. “Being” is interpreted as a transitory state marked by further transition. This intuition is illustrated in the formulations of yin
and yang
relationships in which yin is always becoming its correlative yang, and vice-versa. It is dramatically advertised in the Book of Changes (Yijing
) that serves as a guide to the always changing situations of existence and experience. The Chinese world is a phenomenal world of continuity, becoming, and transitoriness. In such a world, there is no final discreteness. Things cannot be understood as objects. Without this notion of objectivity, there can only be the flux of passing circumstances in which things dissolve into the flux and flow, the changefulness of their surround. Thus, things are not objects, but foci within a continuous field of changing processes and events. A deobjectified, defactualized discourse is the language of process, and to speak and hear that language is to experience the flow of things. A processive language precludes the assumption that objects serve as references of linguistic expressions. The precise referential language of denotation and description is to be replaced by a language of “deference” in which meanings both allude to and defer to one another in a shifting field of significances. Referential language characterizes an event, object, or state of affairs either through an act of naming meant to indicate a particular individual (“The author of the Cratylus is Plato”), or by appeal to class membership meant to identify an individual as one of a type or kind (“Plato is a philosopher”). On the other hand, the language of deference does not employ proper names simply as indicators of particular individuals or members of classes, but invokes hints, suggestions, or allusions to indicate foci in a field of meanings. “Confucius” is a corporate self, and as such, his name in a particular context calls forth a range of associations— persons, historical events, ideas—out of which the meaning of this invocation emerges for this particular audience.

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

11

The language of focus and field that we shall be employing in our interpretation of the Zhongyong is readily contrasted with the substance language dominant in the West. The latter is expressive of a world characterized by “wholes” and “parts”—a world patterned by discreteness and permanence in which change is primarily the rearrangement of that which is unchanging. The language of focus and field expresses a world always in a state of flux, a world in which items cannot be fixed as finally this or that, but must be seen as always transitory states passing into other, correlative, states. There is no final whole we call “Cosmos” or “World.” The world is an interactive field. It is wanwu—“the ten thousand things.” Just as there is no final whole, so there are no ultimate “parts.” The world is a field of many things and the “things” are not discrete objects but are themselves states of becoming; they are happenings. Thus the locution, “the ten thousand things,” must be glossed as “the ten thousand processes or events.” Processes are continuous happenings; events are happenings that have achieved some (always transitory) culmination.

2.2.2 Causality, Power, Creativity One of the implications of the shift from a part/whole to a focus/ field model involves the manner in which one characterizes the interactive dynamics of the ten thousand processes and events. Notions of action and reaction based upon things as externally related are no longer relevant. Instead, all such dynamics are to be understood in terms of interdependent, transactional processes. Ordinary understandings of causality in the Western philosophical tradition depend upon some notion of external relations in which objects may act upon another object or objects, in an efficacious, determinative, manner. In a world characterized by the ubiquitous interactions of continuous processes and events, there are, effectively, no external relationships. Therefore, there is no basis for appealing to the notion of efficient causality as an explanatory model. In a comprehensively processive world, all

12

Introduction

relations are transactional in the sense that they are reciprocal and mutually determinative. The dominance of external relations is easily reconciled with appeals to efficient causality. In such a world, however, relations are primarily power relations in the sense that objects impose their influence upon other objects. In a transactional world such as that of the Chinese, power relations of this unilateral sort are not altogether explicable. One way of understanding the meaning of such transactional processes is by distinguishing the notions of “power” and “creativity.” “Creativity” is a notion that can be characterized only in terms of self-actualization. Unlike power relationships that require that tensions among component elements be resolved in favor of one of the components, in relations defined by creativity there is no otherness, no separation or distancing, nothing to be overcome.9

Such a characterization of creativity cannot be reconciled with notions of external causation that appeal to determination by external agency. In fact, there is a persistent confusion that has attended all but the most recent thinking about the creatio ex nihilo doctrine familiar to the Western religious culture: Creatio ex nihilo, as it is normally understood, is in fact the paradigm of all power relationships since the “creative” element of the relation is completely in control of its “other,” which is in itself literally nothing.10

The traditional Western all-powerful God determines things, makes things. God, as Omnipotent Other who commands the world into being, is Maker of the world, not its Creator. Further, all subsequent acts of making are secondary and derivative exercises of power. Power relationships reduce creativity to modes of external causation, and in so doing, preclude any interpretation of creative processes in terms of self-actualization. Creativity can only make sense in a world with ontological parity. Either everything shares in creativity, or the world is sharply divided into creators and created—that is, makers and made. In the latter world, the ele-

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

13

ments of novelty and spontaneity are preempted. And these elements are absolutely essential to the process understanding of creativity. Power is to be construed as the production of intended effects determined by external causation. Creativity, on the other hand, is the spontaneous production of novelty, irreducible through causal analysis. Power is exercised with respect to and over others. Creativity is always reflexive and is exercised over and with respect to “self.” And since self in a processive world is always social, creativity is transactional and multi-dimensional. Thus creativity is both self-creativity and co-creativity. It is this transactional, cocreative character of all creative processes that renders self-cultivation as self-creation nonegoistic. This “power/creativity” distinction is what is at stake for Steve Owen in his reluctance to use the English word “poem” to translate shi
: If we translate shih [shi] as “poem,” it is merely for the sake of convenience. Shih is not a “poem”; shih is not a “thing made” like in the same way one makes a bed or a painting or a shoe. A shih can be worked on, polished, and crafted; but that has nothing to do with what a shih fundamentally “is.” . . . Shih is not the “object” of its writer; it is the writer, the outside of an inside.11

Owen’s point, as we understand him, is that a shi is not an externally crafted product; rather, it is a creative process of spontane12 ous self-actualization through the realization of novelty. This is far more than a merely semantic issue. Were we to insist upon a wholesale introduction of creativity as “the spontaneous production of novelty” into the mainstream Western tradition, chaos would ensure. Without a faith in rational order underwritten by a Principle of Sufficient Reason that guarantees the efficacy of causal analysis, much of what we in the West consider as reason and rationality would vanish. For us, the problem is how to make room within our causally ordered world for the possibility of true novelty, thus making creativity possible. This problem is, of course, irresolvable on traditional theological assumptions that require a transcendent, omnipotent God who could never be altogether surprised by emergent novelties of His world.

14

Introduction

It is equally irresolvable on the rationalist assumptions of a causally ordered world, open in principle to explication in terms of a sequence or sequences of causes and effects. The virtue of the work of A. N. Whitehead and other representatives of the process tradition is that they have attempted to introduce ontological understandings that would allow for the appreciation of the role of true creativity in shaping the processes and events that comprise the world around us. In so doing, they have demonstrated how classical theological and philosophical assumptions implicit within Western visions of the way of things have to be seriously reconstructed if such an appreciation is to be possible. For obvious reasons, process philosophies have been highly controversial in the West. Increased interest on the part of Westerners in understanding Chinese sensibilities has, however, led to renewed interest in process thought as a tool for comparative philosophy. Of course, the Zhongyong stress upon creativity presents a problem of its own. Rather than trying to make room for creativity as the spontaneous production of novelty, the question is how would one account for the order of the world were such creativity made central to one’s philosophical understandings? We need now briefly to address this problem. The Zhongyong language of focus and field permits the articulation of a world of transactional processes in which spontaneity and self-actualization are fundamental possibilities—at least for individuals firmly dedicated to acts of self-realization. Creativity in its fullest sense is then a goal of self-actualizing behaviors. Thus, the centrality of creativity to the Zhongyong is not to be romanticized so as to mean “unfettered originality” or “unbounded spontaneity.” A processive, transactional world is one of mutuality. Creativity as self-actualization requires a co-creative world characterized by a field of actualized selves, each a focus of transactional realization. The point of substituting the transactional notion of “creativity” for the causal notion of “power” is not to celebrate aberrant or idiosyncratic novelty, but to recognize that in a world characterized by transactional processes, there is the absence of linear causality or of singular determination, and the

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

15

presence of an unanalyzable spontaneity that is ultimately beyond comprehension.

2.2.3 Clarity, Univocity, Linguistic Clustering When even a William James defined philosophy as “the uncommonly stubborn attempt to think clearly,” he was underscoring the value invested in clarity in mainstream Western philosophical discourse. In the West, logical and semantic clarity are among the most celebrated of the ideals of Reason. These ideals are associated with univocal definition guaranteeing unambiguous usage. In this sense, the opposite of clarity is confusion—a state of unarticulated ideas or feelings. In classical Chinese philosophical texts, on the other hand, allusive and connotatively rich language is more highly prized than clarity, precision, and argumentative rigor. This rather dramatic contrast between Chinese and Western languages with respect to the issue of clarity presents the translator of Chinese philosophical texts with a peculiar burden. For the Chinese, the opposite of clarity is not confusion, but something like vagueness. Vague ideas are richly determinable in the sense that a variety of meanings are associated with them. Each important Chinese term constitutes a field of meanings which may be focused by any of a number of its senses. In the translation of Chinese texts we must attempt to avoid what A. N. Whitehead called “the Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary.” This is the assumption that there already exists a complete semantic repository in terms of which we may adequately characterize the variety and depth of our experiences and that, ideally, one may seek a one-to-one correspondence between word and meaning. Applied within a single culture, this fallacy presumes that there are no novel experiences calling for resort to neologism. Applied transculturally, it may presume that the inventory of ideas dominant within our Western culture is sufficient to permit translations of putatively philosophical texts that belong to another tradition. The Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary is largely a consequence of our analytical bias toward univocity. We would suggest that

16

Introduction

this bias does not serve us well when approaching Chinese texts. Not only is there the continued possibility of novel experiences requiring appeal to novel terminologies, but also there is seldom, if ever, a simple one-to-one translation of Chinese terms into Western languages. The allusiveness of the classical Chinese language is hardly conducive to univocal translation. We would contend that, in translating Chinese texts into Western languages, it is most unproductive to seek a single equivalent for a Chinese character. In fact, rather than trying to avoid ambiguity by a dogged use of formally stipulated terms, the translator might have to concede that characters often require a cluster of words to do justice to their range of meanings—all of which are suggested in any given rendering of the character. In fact, any attempt to employ univocal translations of Chinese terms justified by appeal to the criteria of clarity or univocity often reduces philosophical insight to nonsense, and poetry to doggerel. Such an approach to translation serves only to numb Western readers to the provocative significances harbored within the richly vague and allusive language of the Chinese texts. In the present translation, the term zhong
found in the locution zhongyong
 will sometimes be translated “focus” or “focusing,” and sometimes “equilibrium.” On occasion, we have also employed the terms “center” and “impartiality” as appropriate equivalents. The equally important term cheng
carries the associations of “sincerity” and “integrity,” as well as the sense we have foregrounded as most central to the text—namely, “creativity.” The appeal to translation clusters is in part a function of the process interpretation of the world dominating the classical Chinese cultural sensibility. The Chinese language is not logocentric. Words do not name essences. Rather, they indicate always-transitory processes and events. It is important, therefore, to stress the gerundative character of the language. The language of process is vague, allusive, and suggestive. In order to be consistent with the nature of the Chinese language, we must appeal to the notion of linguistic clusters.13 Another way of making this same point is to argue that the cluster of philosophical expressions that frame the Zhongyong

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

17

world view may be best understood paronomastically—that is, in terms of the semantic and phonic web of allusive relationships that obtain among them. Rather than asking “What does tian
mean?,” we do better to ask “When the Shuowen lexicon defines tian
with the rhyming dian
(“the crown, forehead, top”), what semantic associations are suggested in the play between these two characters?” and “How are we to understand the relationships that obtain among the character tian
, and frequently related characters such as ming
and xing
?” and “Are there any seminal passages in the Book of Songs that we can invoke to illustrate and elaborate upon our insights?” Typical of these paronomastic definitions is that in defining a character, what we are inclined to understand as a “thing” will revert to an “event,” and a “noun” will be expressed as a “gerund,” suggesting the primacy of process in the tradition upon which this mode of definition reports. For example, “the way (dao
)” is defined as “treading (dao
),” “exemplary person (jun
)” is defined as “gathering (qun
),” “excellence (de
)” is defined as “getting (de
),” and so on.14 Another manner in which the press toward univocity can easily frustrate one’s understanding of Chinese texts involves the penchant among Chinese authors for the repetition of formulaic expressions. In the Zhongyong, for example, there is frequent repetition of the expression “focusing the familiar affairs of the day (zhongyong).” It would be both naïve and uncharitable to believe that the Chinese employed repetitive formulae simply through a lack of adequate imagination, or solely for the purpose of easy memorization and the heuristic reenforcement of rules of moral practice. With respect to the employment of repetitive formulae in the Zhongyong, and other such texts, the analogy is closer to the language of poetry and song than to that of rational discourse. Consider the simple use of repetition at the end of Robert Frost’s wellknown Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening: The woods are lovely, dark and deep, But I have promises to keep, And miles to go before I sleep, And miles to go before I sleep.

18

Introduction

Also, note the refrain at the end of the two stanzas of Wallace Steven’s The Emperor of Ice Cream: Let be be finale of seem The only emperor is the emperor of ice cream ..................... Let the lamp affix its beam The only emperor is the emperor of ice cream

In both cases, the phrase repeated at the end of the poem or stanza serves to reiterate the entire stanza or poem. Repetitions, as refrains of poems or songs, are non-discursive and distinctly focal elements that sum the field of significances carried by the song or poem. We would argue that it is in this sense that the repetitive formulae of the Zhongyong are primarily to be understood. For, what is true of poetry and song in every language, is pre-eminently true of the poetic and allusive language of the Chinese: With each use of the putatively same word or phrase, there is the offer of a field of significances for potential focusing. As is the case with the principal terms employed in a given Chinese text, so with respect to the relationship of texts themselves within the Chinese tradition. Thus, as we shall see, the Zhongyong is to be allusively engaged with other texts attributed to Zisizi, as well as with the Analects, Mencius, the Book of Songs, and other classical sources. The classical culture of China is focused by a small number of texts that foster a complex set of ritual patterns as the principal modes of social interaction. In place of dialectical and analytic arguments, there is appeal to allusive discourse that promotes affective networks of meaning and behavior. The language of these shared texts functions like poetic or musical sounds and lyrics: Strung musically, poetically, ritualistically, words have a symphonic effect that both justifies and enhances the bonds through which the intersubjective identities of individuals are articulated. This sort of intertextuality is fundamental to the Chinese intellectual tradition and precludes any expectation that one might understand a text in abstraction from continuous reference to the texts of the tradition of which it is a part. In the Appendix we

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

19

have gone to some lengths to demonstrate the salience of some of the more productive intertextual allusions.

3. QI
and correlative cosmology: the interpretive context of the ZHONGYONG Above we have attempted to provide a pragmatic criterion for identifying Chinese philosophical texts. We have further attempted to justify our use of the language of focus and field as the best medium into which such texts may be translated. We have argued that this language is far better than the substance-oriented language of the West to account for the Chinese world in which objects are to be seen as processes and events, linear relations of causality and power are envisioned as transactional relations of co-creativity, and the desire for clarity and univocity must yield to an appreciation of linguistic allusiveness and intertextuality. This discussion of the language of focus and field has prepared us to consider the interpretive context that grounds the most fundamental dispositions and articulations of the classical Chinese milieu. In the following discussion of the notion of qi
, we will articulate the general sensibility that, though only implicit in the vision of the Zhongyong, nonetheless serves as a tacit presupposition of the correlative world view articulated by that text. Important work has been done in recent years on the evolution of correlative cosmological schemes between the fall of the Western Zhou in c. 770 bce. and the emergence of a systematic cosmology in the third century bce. A survey of the more important contributions in both China and the West is available in Wang Aihe’s Cosmology and Political Culture in Early China that emphasizes the reciprocal relationship between evolving cosmological sensibilities and changes in the political order of the day.15 Wang appeals to scholars such as Li Ling (1991, 1993), Robin Yates (1994), and Mark Lewis (1990) who argue that these correlative cosmologies, far from being of esoteric interest to a few court adepts, constituted a shared symbolic discourse through which “both intellectuals and ordinary people spoke and thought.”16 Certainly, recent Warring States archaeological discoveries rein-

20

Introduction

force this judgment, demonstrating as they do the pervasiveness of correlative cosmological presuppositions entailed in the mantic practices that directed the daily lives of the people. It is the assumption of our study of the Zhongyong that the correlative qi cosmology that pervaded the cultural practices and the philosophical literature of Warring States China was evolving pari passu with the philosophical themes of the Zhongyong. We further assume that elucidating the central argument of this text by appeal to the processional concept of qi provides a ready access to its philosophical riches. Stated conversely, a failure to relate the themes of the Zhongyong to this evolving cosmology threatens the entire project of interpretive understanding with cultural reductionism. In distinction from the classical West, the classical Chinese offered a phasal rather than an elemental perspective on things. The yinyang
 and “five phases (wuxing
: metal, wood, water, fire, and earth
 !")” doctrines serve as the functional equivalent of Ancient Greek elemental theories. However, the Chinese phasal explanations describe phases and functions within ongoing processes rather than quantitative or measurable elements.17 Given the fundamental difference between Greek elemental theories and the Chinese “five phases” cosmology, scholars such as Angus Graham, Nathan Sivin, and John Major have sought to correct what had been a misleading translation of the wuxing cosmology in subsequent interpretive literature: “five elements” as a translation of wuxing is gone, and the processional “five phases” has taken its place. According to Major: The problem with “five elements” is that the Chinese concept of wu-hsing [wuxing] . . . has none of the sense of “basic ingredient” or “irreducible essence” of the Latin elementum nor of that term’s various Greek conceptual ancestors. . . . In contrast, the translation Five Phases, which now is rapidly gaining acceptance, clearly has connotations of change consistent with the Chinese concept of cyclical transformation.18

Recent elucidations of wuxing as “five phases” have permitted a much more productive approach to the important and pervasive

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

21

notion of qi that becomes explicit among cosmologists in the late fourth and early third centuries bce. Summarizing cosmological speculations from a significantly earlier period, the second-century bce “cosmogonical” sections of the Huainanzi contain these words: When the heavens and the earth had yet to take shape, There was soaring, gliding, plunging, sinking. It is thus known as the Great Fetal Beginning. Dao was born out of the blank and transparent, The blank and transparent gave rise to space-time, And space-time gave rise to qi.19

In classical China, qi is conceptualized in terms of what today we might call a “vital energy field.” This field not only pervades all things, but is also the medium through which all things are constituted. As the medical anthropologist Judith Farquhar observes, Qi is both structural and functional, a unification of material and temporal forms that loses all coherence when reduced to one or the other “aspect.”20

Most of the classical Western interpretations of the vital and spiritual character of things appeal to a physical/spiritual dichotomy, requiring that the animating principle is distinguishable from the things it animates. But with respect to the notion of qi, there are no separable things to be animated. There is only the field and its focal manifestations. Qi as energizing field precludes the existence of fixed and unchanging forms or ideas or categories or principles that allow for “natural kinds.” Thus, discriminations in the field of qi are made in terms of observed and conventionalized classifications associated with diurnal and seasonal changes, directions, colors, body parts and so forth. Such discriminations, far from being final in any sense, are processive and diffusive. The diremption of the world into correlative “yinyang
 ” categories, while arguably implicit in the natural cosmology of a proto-Chinese world that can be documented at least as far back as the Shang dynasty,21 was in the course of time formalized, systematized, and made explicit in

22

Introduction

the complex Han dynasty cosmological charts and the “five phases (wuxing
)” doctrine.22 In Daodejing 42 we read: The myriad events shouldering yin and embracing yang, Blend the qi together to effect harmony.23

Qi is an image that defies categorizations into separate “things,” “actions,” “attributes,” and “modalities” (nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs) of the sort that discipline our thought and language. That is, qi is at once one and many. When distinguished as “things (that is, ‘events’),” it has an always contextualized formal coherence that is both persistent and changing. Axiologically, qi is again both noble and base. It is conceived as being like water, where water can be a thing (“water”), a process (“watering”), an attribute (“watery”), and a modality (“torrentially”). The Zhuangzi contains perhaps the most radical statement of this process in its discussions of what it terms “transforming events (wuhua
),” in which erstwhile things dissolve into the flux as porous, interpenetrating processes. For Zhuangzi, in this flux of experience, the human being has no place of privilege. Like everything else, the human form is processive, and must yield deferentially to the ongoing, ineluctable propensity of transformation: Ziyu fell ill, and Zisi went to ask after him. “Extraordinary!” said Ziyu. “That which transforms events continues to make me all gnarly and bent. It hunches me up so badly that my vital organs are above my head while my chin is buried in my bellybutton. My shoulders are higher than my crown, and my hunchback points to the heavens. Something has really gone haywire with the yin and yang vapors!” . . . “Do you resent this?” asked Zisi. “Indeed no,” replied Ziyu, “What’s to resent? If in the course of things it transforms my left arm into a cock, I’ll use it to tell the time of day. If it goes on to transform my right arm into a crossbow bolt, I’ll use it to shoot me an owl for roasting. If it then transforms my buttocks into wheels and my spirit into a horse, I will ride about on them without need of further transportation. . . . What’s to resent?”

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

23

Before long, Master Lai fell ill. Wheezing and panting, he was on the brink of death. His wife and children gathered about him and wept. Master Li, having gone to inquire after him, scolded them, saying “Get away! Don’t impede his transformations!” Leaning against the door, Master Li talked with him, saying: “Extraordinary, these transformations! What are you going to be made into next? Where are you going to be sent? Will you be made into a rat’s liver? Or will you be made into an insect’s arm?” Master Lai replied, “ . . . Now if a great ironsmith were in the process of casting metal, and the metal leapt about saying, ‘I must be forged into a Mo Ye sword!’ the great ironsmith would certainly consider it to be an inauspicious bit of metal. If once having been cast in the human form, I were to whine: ‘Make me into a human being! Make me into a human being!’ that which transforms events would certainly take me to be an inauspicious person. Once we take the heavens and earth to be a giant forge and transformation to be the great ironsmith, where ever I go is just fine. Relaxed I nod off and happily I awake.”24

The Zhuangzi envisions the possibility of assuming a human form as an arbitrary and not especially welcome perturbation within the larger processes of transformation. Zhuangzi’s response to the misgivings one might have about death is that there is real comfort and indeed even a religious awe in the recognition that assuming the form of one kind of thing gives way to the ceaseless adventure of becoming other things. Also, death celebrates the uniqueness of each person by punctuating and consummating the ongoing process in such a way as to produce distinct intimate events 25 defined in terms of our unique relations with someone else. Such a recognition of continuity and intimacy presumably stimulates empathetic feelings for other creatures in a shared environment. This transformational perspective is not just Daoistic; it is pervasive in the tradition, and is the background against which the mainstream Confucian thinkers must also be understood. Even the practical Confucius has a speculative moment in which he muses about the flux and flow of life: The Master was standing on the riverbank, and observed, “Isn’t life’s passing just like this, never ceasing day or night!”26

24

Introduction

Kwong-loi Shun, in the preamble to his discussion of the references to qi in the Mencius, rehearses passages from the Zuozhuan and Guoyu that expound upon qi as the vital energies making up 27 and activating the natural world around us. In the discourses in which Mencius invokes qi, he is not, as some have claimed, wax28 ing mystical. On the contrary, he is making explicit the commonsense of classical China. Indeed, the qi world view might be considered the classical Chinese alternative to the largely unconscious quantitative and atomistic assumptions that began for Western culture in classical Greece, and continue to shape our own commonsense. Mencius himself interprets the field of qi in terms of moral energy and offers advice on the attainment of human excellence. He speaks of his ability to nourish his “flood-like qi (haoran zhi qi
 !),” describing this qi as that which is “most vast (zhida
)” and “most firm (zhigang
)”(2a2). Restated in the language of focus and field, Mencius is saying that his “flood-like qi” has the greatest “extensive” and “intensive” magnitudes. This language of extensive field and intensive focus suggests that one nourishes one’s qi most successfully by making of oneself the most integral focus of the most extensive field of qi. In this manner, one gains greatest virtue (excellence, potency) in relation to the most far-reaching elements of one’s environs. Everything is here in me. There is no joy greater than to discover creativity (cheng
) in one’s person and nothing easier in striving to be authoritative in one’s conduct (ren
) than committing oneself to treating others as one oneself would be treated. (7a4)

Cheng
is conventionally translated as “sincerity” or “integrity.” In a processional world, however, “integrity” is a creative process. It is a many becoming one. This inseparability of integration and creativity is reinforced explicitly in this Mencius passage by appeal to the ren
notion of a relational “self” in which the realizations of self and other are mutually entailing. The Analects defines the project of becoming ren in precisely these terms:

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

25

Authoritative persons establish others in seeking to establish themselves and promote others in seeking to get there themselves. Correlating one’s conduct with those near at hand can be said to be the method of becoming an authoritative person (ren).29

Further, recalling the meaning of qi as a continuous field, a clearer rendition of “everything is here in me” in the Mencius passage cited above might be: “The field of qi is focused by me, and thus all qi is here in me.” Contextualized by the pervasive notion of qi, the phenomenal world as it is humanly encountered is understood as the way things are. It is a world of process and becoming. In such a world, human experience is a field both focused by and focusing the myriad items comprising it. In addition to the extensive field of qi, the Mencius passage places equal emphasis upon the intensive “me”—this particular focus. There is no external vantage point outside the flow of qi. The world is necessarily entertained from some particular perspective from which this insistently particular field of qi is construed. Further, each particular perspective is holographic in the sense that it contains within its own intensive focus the entire extensive field. The interpretation of a world of processes and events eschews any notion of discreteness. It is for this reason that qi requires the use of a focus/field rather than a part/whole model of explanation. One of the implications of the shift from a part/whole to a focus/ field model involves the manner in which one characterizes the interactive dynamics of the ten thousand processes and events. Notions of action and reaction based upon things as externally related are no longer relevant. Instead, all such dynamics are to be understood in terms of interdependent, transactional processes. In the following section we shall attempt to show how interpreting the Zhongyong through the lenses afforded by our discussion of qi will illumine most dramatically its importance as a distinctly philosophical text.

26

Introduction

4. the central argument of the

ZHONGYONG

The Zhongyong opens with an oft-cited apothegm that we would argue belongs to a collection of pre-Mencian textual materials 30 associated with the name of Confucius’s grandson, Zisi: What tian
commands (ming
) is called natural tendencies (xing
F; drawing out these natural tendencies is called the proper way (dao
); improving upon this way is called education (jiao
).

Zhu Xi uncritically takes the entire Zhongyong text, including this passage, to be from the hand of Zisi himself. He contends that there is a “major cord (gangling
)” running through this text that makes it both profound and coherent. Although Zhu Xi’s characterization of the Zhongyong as a coherent whole has reigned as established scholarly wisdom from the Song dynasty onward, some critics contemporary with Zhu Xi proffered a dissenting opinion, arguing that the text is a composite of divided and often conflicting statements. This scholarly dispute over the coherence of the Zhongyong has continued down to our present 31 moment. In what follows, we will appeal to both sinological and philosophical arguments to defend a thesis that differs importantly from both sides of the debate. It is our considered opinion that the Zhongyong is indeed a coherent text although, contra Zhu Xi, certainly not (with the possible exception of the opening passage) authored by Zisi himself. From beginning to end, the Zhongyong is a sustained defense of an interpretation of the key Zisi questions announced in this opening section: First, “How are we to understand the way in which the natural, social, and cultural circumstances (tian) have a shaping effect (ming) on both the initial human tendencies (xing) and the overall trajectory of human development (dao)?” Second, “What is the role of education (jiao) in this process?” In its advocacy of a symbiotic relationship between the propensities of things (tian) and the human experience (ren), between the field and its foci, the Zhongyong attempts to discourage any reading of Zisi in which human beings endowed by nature and determined by its circumstances are relatively passive participants

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

27

in the world around them.32 In fact, the Zhongyong introduces a particularistic, historicist, and pragmatic interpretation of this opening Zisi passage, insisting that the ritualization of human experience not only inspires the human community, but also has a powerful meliorative role in the unfolding of cosmic order. The ritualization of human experience is particularistic in that ritual propriety by definition entails personalization as well as enculturation; it is historicist in that it is resolutely biographical and genealogical without appeal to transcendental ideals; it is pragmatic in its attempt to optimize the creative possibilities of each consummating event, coordinating the productive lives of always unique human beings with the natural, social, and cultural conditions (tianming) that provide them context. The contemporary scholar Pang Pu
, in underscoring the human dimension of tian
, defines it as entailing the “social environment
 !,” “social conditions
 !,” and “social forces
 ” that have a determining influence on human development.33 Although he stresses that such forces are ultimately human in their origins, Pang Pu seems to hold that their direction is beyond the control of any particular human being. Perhaps such a view is too extreme, however, for it is clear that, in the Confucian tradition, culturally significant human beings such as the Duke of Zhou and Confucius are “theomorphized” to become tian, and tian itself is thus made living and determinate in their persons. Using the focus-field language, we might say that tian is the environing social, cultural, and natural context that is brought into focus and articulated by sagacious human beings. The central message of the Zhongyong, then, is to encourage the ongoing productive confluence of “the way of tian
” and “the way of human beings
” through human virtuosity. In this way, tian is very much influenced by human beings. Natural tendencies (xing) are allied with the notion often translated as “human nature (renxing).” Such a translation is misleading, however, if it is interpreted as requiring an “essentialist” conception of the human being. Such an interpretation has not only been influential as a cultural dominant in classical Western understandings of “human nature,” but has too often colored our readings

28

Introduction

of those other cultural traditions that we would interpret, including classical China. Angus Graham rejects any essentialistic interpretation of the Mencian understanding of xing.34 And we must assume that this rejection would apply to the “Zisi-Mencius” lineage more broadly. Graham cautions that “the translation of xing
by ‘nature’ predisposes us to mistake it for a transcendent origin, which in Mencian doctrine would also be a transcendent end.” In setting aside this possible misunderstanding, Graham suggests as an alternative reading that “xing is conceived in terms of spontaneous development in a certain direction rather than of its origin or goal,” and that “xing will be spontaneous process with a direction continually modified by the effects on it of deliberate action.” According to the Mencian 7a1 dictum: To make the most of one’s heart-and-mind is to realize one’s xing, and if one realizes one’s xing, one is realizing tian.

Natural tendencies (xing) are shaped by ming. Contrary to the common understanding of “command” as unilateral and deterministic, ming is to be understood in a dispositional sense of “mandate”—namely, “to place into the hands of another;” “to entrust.” To command is to “entrust.” The act of command in this sense sets up a bond between the commander and the recipient of the command. There is a deferential and non-coercive sense of command as well, where one “commands” respect by virtue of one’s character and achievements, eliciting deference from those who would emulate this model. T’ang Chun-i [Tang Junyi] in a survey of the early philosophical literature, makes an important point in this regard: The term “ming” represents the interrelationship or mutual relatedness of Heaven [tian] and man [ren]. . . . [W]e can say that it exists neither externally in Heaven only, nor internally in man only; it exists, rather, in the mutuality of Heaven and man, i.e., in their mutual influence and response, their mutual giving and receiving.35

Mencius 5a6 states:

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

29

That which is done without anyone doing it is tian; that which happens without anyone causing it to happen is ming.

As the causal conditions defining a particular event, ming is both its creative possibilities and its limitations. Ming is a possible future negotiated within the limitations of the sponsoring circumstances, where the situation itself is prior to any derived and isolatable notion of agency. Pang Pu takes advantage of the recent Guodian texts as a means of exploring the correlations that shed light on ming. He identifies several rhymed passages in the Yucong
 1:

!
"
#=K=K=K=

! Where there is tian there are commands (ming); where there are “events” there are names; . . . where there is the earth there is shape.

Tian’s having commands (ming) is analogous to the earth’s having topographical shape, and events having names. In the Chinese tradition, names dispose us toward a proper understanding of things and events, just as shape makes the earth negotiable. It is in this manner that commands bring tian into focus and make it intelligible. Pang Pu suggests that the question of how these commands are made determinate is answered in part by another of the Guodian documents, Natural Tendencies Arise from Ming (

 ). In fact, he cites a passage that can be read as a less succinct variation upon the opening passage of the Zhongyong:
 !" #$% Natural tendencies (xing) arise from ming; And ming descends from tian.

As noted by Tang Junyi above, ming differs from mere “circumstances” or “conditions” in that it invariably entails a human perspective. According to the Zhongyong, it is “commands (ming)” that make tian determinate, and it is “natural human tendencies (xing)” as they are transformed through education (jiao) that articulate and elaborate these commands. The function of education (jiao) is clarified when one realizes that the production of human culture turns inarticulate sounds

30

Introduction

into the magic of music, random markings into sublime poetry, and biological relationships into a spiritually uplifting religiousness, an ongoing process that enchants the world and elevates the human being to become a full partner in its continuous unfolding. It is in this sense that the ongoing achievement of becoming human shapes the context in which this process occurs, just as the context shapes the human achievement.

4.1 Cheng
and “Creativity” The elevation of the human being to co-creative status is one of the truly distinctive features of the Zhongyong. It manifests itself in the employment of “creativity” (cheng
) to suggest the dynamic, novelty-producing activities of the realizing human being in the activities of both self- and world-articulation. In service to this transactional interpretation of the opening Zisi passage, the Zhongyong mounts a sustained argument that appeals first to Confucius through an elaborate exposition of his recondite expression, “focusing the familiar (zhongyong),” then to the models of the historical tradition and the various cultural heroes and legendary sage kings that populate it, next to the more recent Mencius and his idiosyncratic use of the term cheng as “creativity,” and finally to the authority of canonical texts such as the Book of Documents and especially the Book of Songs. The Zhongyong thus appeals to the full authority of the Confucian tradition in its various forms—Confucius himself, the traditional sage exemplars (Shun, kings Wen and Wu, the Duke of Zhou), Mencius, and the Confucian classics—to insist upon the profound, world-shaping effect of human creativity. It is not enough simply to employ the term “creativity” as a neologism, and leave it at that. Because both the term and the concept are effectively novel within Western intellectual culture,36 we must be careful to gather a proper understanding of creativity as the spontaneous production of novelty. As a term of art, “creativity” was effectively introduced by the philosopher A. N. Whitehead as a means of accommodating the process intuitions underlying his rather distinctive form of

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

31

speculative philosophy. The philosophical significance of that term is spelled out in Whitehead’s Process and Reality: In all philosophical theory there is an ultimate which is actual by virtue of its accidents. . . . In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed ‘creativity.’ . . . In monistic philosophies . . . this ultimate is God, who is equivalently termed ‘The Absolute.’ In such monistic schemes, the ultimate is illegitimately allowed a final ‘eminent’ reality, beyond that ascribed to any of its accidents. In this general position the philosophy of organism seems to approximate more to some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European, thought.37

Whitehead characterizes “creativity” as “the principle of novelty”38 and defines the creative process as “the production of novel togetherness.”39 He further insists that his fundamental intuition of creativity cannot be analyzed in terms of more fundamental notions: There is creative process, period. To cite Zhuangzi in support of Whitehead, “Things happen, and none can tell how they come to be so.”40 In the non-cosmogonic traditions of China, Confucian as well as Daoist, the notion of creativity is a familiar if not the defining sensibility. In Daoism, it is captured in the dynamic and radically situated notions of “non-coercive and spontaneous action (wuwei
),” “wandering at ease (xiaoyaoyou
 ),” and “spontaneous arising (ziran
).” Zhuangzi appeals to creative process in his claim that “the way is forged in the walking; things and events become so in the saying (
 !"#$% !&).”41 Confucius, in the social context, makes this same point about human creativity in his claim that “it is persons who are able to extend the way, not the way that extends persons (
 !"#
 ).”42 Indeed, Confucianism has many related expressions, all of which entail the mutual shaping of oneself and one’s communal context: “authoritative person/conduct (ren
),” “exemplary persons (junzi
),” “sage (shengren
),” “spirituality (shen
),” harmony (he
),” and “focusing the familiar (zhongyong
).” In the Zhongyong, cheng
has most often been translated as “sincerity” or at times, as “integrity.” Our rationale for also trans-

32

Introduction

lating the term as “creativity” is as follows: If it may be reasonably claimed that the Chinese world is better characterized in terms of process understandings than in substantive concepts, then one must reckon that in such a world, “things (wu
)” are to be understood as processes (happenings) and events (happenings that have achieved some relative consummation). Construed by appeal to a world of process, both “sincerity,” as the absence of duplicity, and “integrity,” the state of being sound or whole, must involve the process of “becoming one” or “becoming whole.” The dynamic of becoming whole, construed aesthetically, is precisely what is meant by a creative process. It is thus that cheng is to be understood as creativity. Cheng
is process defined by the uniqueness and persistence of the constitutive relationships that define a particular “event (wu
).” Both the terms “process” and “event” may be used in translating wu depending upon context—the former when the dynamic aspect of creative becoming is stressed, the latter when one focuses upon the closure or consummation of a particular process. Zhongyong 25 speaks to this question directly: Creativity (cheng
) is self-consummating (zicheng
), and its way (dao
) is self-directing (zidao
). Creativity is a process (wu
) taken from its beginning to its end, and without this creativity, there are no events (wu
). It is thus that, for exemplary persons (junzi
) it is creativity that is prized. But creativity is not simply the self-consummating of one’s own person; it is what consummates events. Consummating oneself is authoritative conduct (ren
); consummating other events is wisdom (zhi
). This is the excellence (de
) of one’s natural tendencies (xing
) and is the way of integrating what is more internal and what is more external. Thus, whenever one applies this excellence, it is fitting.

Creativity involves both the realization of the focal self and of the field of events, the realization of both particular and context. Selfactualization is a focal process that draws upon an aggregate field of human experience. And the field and focus are reciprocally realized.

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

33

We might appeal to the relationship between personal realization and the flourishing community to make this description of creativity more concrete. The basis of community is not a readymade individual, but rather a “functional” or “instrumental” inchoate heart-mind (xin
) emergent from productive relations. It is through communication that the knowledge, beliefs, and aspirations of the individual are formed. Human realization is achieved not by whole-hearted participation in communal life forms, but by life in community that forms one whole-heartedly. We do not speak because we have minds, but become like-minded by speaking to one another in a communicating community. The emergence of heart-mind out of social transactions and effective communication suggests a further dimension of cheng. The more familiar rendering of cheng as “sincerity” is helpful here. The virtue of the term “sincerity” is that it describes a commitment to one’s creative purposes, a solemn affirmation of one’s process of self-actualization. This commitment or resolve, as the unremitting attention to task, is itself an abiding condition in the process of self- and world-enlargement that culminates in the sagacity (sheng
) of the sage (shengren
).43 Cheng like “sagacity (sheng)” is another term that expresses the dynamic process of fostering “true relations” through effective communication, the character itself being etymologically constituted by “to speak (yan
)” and “to consummate (cheng
).” “Integrity” is more than being true to oneself. Since all selves are constituted by relationships, integrity means being trustworthy and true in one’s associations. It is effectively integrating oneself in one’s social, natural, and cultural contexts. At a cosmological level, integrity is the ground from which self and other arise together to maximum benefit. It is not what things are, but how well and how productively they are able to fare in their synergistic alliances. This sense of “abundance” or “plenty” is evident in cheng’s cognate, sheng
which means “ample,” “to prosper,” “to flourish.” The contribution of cheng in its senses of “integrity,” “sincerity,” and, most importantly, “creativity” to the argument of the Zhongyong cannot be overestimated. Its primary value, as we have

34

Introduction

said, is in insuring that fully functioning human beings are more than merely reactive agents overwhelmed by their overall environing conditions (tian) or, more specifically, by their natural tendencies (xing). They are, on the contrary, co-creative beings that have a central role in realizing both individual selves and the eventful worlds around them. The translation of cheng as “creativity” can certainly be justified philosophically as we have tried to do here. It can also be argued for historically. That is, far from offering the reader an idiosyncratic interpretation of cheng, we are only making more explicit an understanding of this term that is already present in the early and more recent commentarial tradition. First, it should not be surprising that the early human-centered Confucians would single out and extend a specifically human value and project it onto the cosmos as a model of order. Xunzi, of course, did this by interpreting the cadence of the firmament as a cosmic instantiation of ritual propriety (li
). This Confucian posture stands in contrast to the Daoists who would conversely encourage proper order in the human experience through a modeling of the structures of the natural environment. Further, succeeding generations of commentators in offering their singularly novel definitions for cheng were acknowledging that cheng is being used in the Zhongyong in a way that extends its range of meaning. We have made the argument that the Zhongyong can only be properly evaluated by locating it within its own processual sensibility. The Song scholar Xu Zhongche

 underscores this dynamic aspect of cheng by alluding to a phrase in Zhongyong 26—“the utmost creativity is ceaseless (zhicheng wuxi
 !)”—in defining cheng as “ceaseless (buxi
).” Along the same lines, the twentieth century philosopher, Tang Junyi, understands the Zhongyong’s use of cheng as “continuity itself (jixu benshen
 !).”44 Zhu Xi defines this cosmological application of cheng in his commentary on the Zhongyong as what is “genuine and real (zhenshi
).” More recently, when the Zhongyong is translated for a Western audience by Wing-tsit Chan, he insists that cheng “is not just a state of mind, but an active force that is al-

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

35

ways transforming things and completing things, and drawing man and Heaven together in the same current.”45 When these three insights into the meaning of cheng are combined, what is “genuine and real” is in fact a continuing and ceaseless transformative process. Tu Wei-ming takes these reflections further in observing that the term cheng as it appears in Zhongyong “has been somewhat unjustifiably translated as ‘sincerity’” because “the last thirteen chapters deal mainly with the metaphysical concept of ch’eng [cheng] (sincerity, reality, and truth).”46 In his monograph length study of this text, Tu Wei-ming collates earlier commentarial exegesis and goes so far as to insist that cheng must be understood as “creativity.” In his own words, cheng . . . can be conceived as a form of creativity. . . . it is that which brings about the transforming and nourishing processes of heaven and earth. As creativity, ch’eng [cheng] is “ceaseless” (pu-hsi [buxi
]). Because of its ceaselessness it does not create in a single act beyond the spatiotemporal sequence. Rather, it creates in a continuous and unending process in time and space. . . . it is simultaneously a self-subsistent and self-fulfilling process of creation that produces life unceasingly.47

4.2 “Creativity (cheng
),” “Natural Tendencies (xing
),” and “Emotions (qing
)” Zhongyong 1 defines harmony itself as the achievement of proper measure in one’s feelings that enables one to sustain equilibrium and advance one’s way in the world: The moment at which joy and anger, grief and pleasure, have yet to arise is called a nascent equilibrium (zhong
); once the emotions have arisen, that they are all brought into proper focus (zhong) is called harmony (he
). This notion of equilibrium and focus (zhong) is the great root of the world; harmony then is the advancing of the proper way (dadao
) in the world. When equilibrium and focus are sustained and harmony is fully realized, the heavens and earth maintain their proper places and all things flourish in the world.

36

Introduction

One term that has particular prominence in the Zisizi

Confucian documents recently found at the 1973 Mawangdui and 48 1993 Guodian archaeological sites is “emotions (qing
).” In fact, these recovered texts have not only reinstated the “emotions” as an important factor in self-actualization, but may help to resolve a longstanding dispute over the meaning of this obscure term itself. A. C. Graham has defined qing as “fact,” or “essentials”: “how things and situations are in themselves, independently of how we name or describe them.” He further contends that it is Xunzi who first uses this term in an affective sense as “the passions.”49 In the early corpus, qing often appears with xing
: “natural tendencies,” and it is in this context that, for Graham, it seems to mean “how things are in themselves.” The problem has been, however: How can the same term mean both the facts of a situation and the feelings or emotions that attend it—both fact and value? Graham’s suggestion that, chronologically, qing first meant “how things are” and only later came to mean “emotions” has been criticized on the grounds that these two meanings are apparently so disparate that the semantic transition is altogether arbitrary. If we rethink Graham’s claim in the light of our previous discussions, however, we might discern a real insight in his suggestion. There is in classical Confucianism an unwillingness to separate description and prescription, reality and its interpretation. Everything is always experienced from one perspective or another, where both experiencer and experienced context are implicated in the event. There is no design beyond how the non-additive sum of these particular perspectives construe their worlds. The prescriptive feature of the tradition is immediately apparent in the use of shifei
 which means both “this/not-this” (fact), and “approve/disapprove” (value). It may indeed be said that qing is “how things are in themselves” if we recognize that “how things are” always involves a perspectival claim. Further, this perspective is not a narrowly perceptual or noetic one, but an affective one that shapes the emotional character of the situation and one’s role in it. One may

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

37

recall here the claim of the neo-Confucian Wang Yangming (1472– 1529) that to see is to love already. That is, recognition or perceptual entertainment already assumes a degree of interest. Such interest is manifest as emotional tone. Each experience, each focal perspective, has both objective content and subjective form of feeling, neither of which may be productively abstracted from the other. The emotional tone fundamental to any perspectival situation contributes meaning as certainly as does the objective content. “That’s just wonderful!” uttered sarcastically means something quite different from the same locution spoken with reverence. It is important to stress that the relationship between xing and qing suggests that “natural tendencies” as indicated by xing are themselves not firmly fixed but are, as potentialities, significantly negotiable. Both natural tendencies and emotions are not simply a response to something other. When natural tendencies and emotions are transactional events comprised by both doing and undergoing, one is fully co-creator and is giving the most and getting the most out of experience. This understanding of xing and qing recalls discussions of Nietzsche’s doctrine of amor fati—the unconditional affirmation of the facts of one’s existence as they are.50 Nietzsche calls amor fati “my innermost nature” and “a bird’s eye view in observation.”51 The perspectival character of reality requires an affirmation of one’s own perspective and of the “bird’s eye view” presuming the non-additive sum of all perspectives. Creativity (cheng
) as a transactional, processive, and cooperative endeavor, has the element of affirming things as they are and participating in the process of drawing out novel possibilities from the circumstances. Individuals do not simply recast old situations. As Zhongyong 27 indicates: Exemplary persons . . . revise the old in order to realize the new, and with real solemnity celebrate the rites and ceremonies (li ).

Further, novelty emerges cooperatively, and transactionally. And, 52 as with ziran
, “none can tell how things come to be so.” To love one’s fate is to affirm the richness and complexity of pro-

38

Introduction

cesses and events, with all of the myriad possibilities entailed by that complexity. One’s fate, then is always co-determined, cocreated. It should be said that, in comparison with the other earlier Zisizi documents, the Zhongyong makes infrequent references to the “emotions” and does not even use the character qing explicitly. This might, in fact, lead one to question whether the Zhongyong belongs to the same Zisizi lineage. We would suggest that one important reason for the absence of explicit reference to qing is the fact that cheng
carries an important emotional connotation (suggested by its frequent translation as “sincerity”) and is thus doing the work of qing. That is, cheng translated as “creativity” underscores the integrative process itself, while its translation as “integrity” denotes the culmination of any such integrating process. Cheng as “sincerity” underscores the emotional tone—the subjective form of feeling—that makes this creative process uniquely perspectival. As we have suggested, the cluster of translations is present as a seamless range of meaning in each occurrence of the term cheng.

4.3 “Family” as Governing Metaphor In the Politics, Aristotle distinguishes between the aims of the oikos, the household, and those of the polis, the public forum. For Aristotle, the oikos is a realm of natural necessity and inequality. To be condemned to this private life is thus “privation.” By contrast, the polis is the overcoming of unequal familial relations in the public realm of equals. The private and the public spheres are not seen as intrinsically connected. That is, the polis is not seen as a natural radial extension of the oikos any more than the freeman is seen as a natural development of the slave. They have different ends. This view contrasts starkly with classical China in which family (jia
) serves as a pervasive metaphor for social, political, and even religious relations. In classical Confucianism, then, we must allow that the locus for observing ritual propriety in the familiar affairs of the day lies first with the family, and by extension, the community and the

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

39

state. Zhongyong 20 highlights the radial relationship between family and its extension as the ground of social and political order: In general there are nine guidelines in administering the world, the state, and the family, yet the way of implementing them is one and the same.

The Analects 1.2 states explicitly that the way of conducting oneself as a human being emerges out of the achievement of robust filial relations: Exemplary persons (junzi
) concentrate their efforts on the root, for the root having taken hold, the proper way (dao
) will grow therefrom. As for filial and fraternal responsibility, it is, I suspect, the root of authoritative conduct (ren
).

The underlying assumption is that persons are more likely to give themselves utterly and unconditionally to their families than to any other human institution. Thus, the family as an institution provides the model for the process of making one’s way by allowing the persons who constitute it both to invest in and to get the most out of the human experience. Promoting the centrality of family relations is an attempt to assure that entire persons, without remainder, are invested in each of their actions. The power of the family to function as the radial locus for human growth is much enhanced when natural family and communal relations are not perceived as being a distraction from, in competition with, or dependent upon any more fundamental relations. It is from the family expanding outward that persons emerge as objects of profound communal, cultural, and religious deference. Beyond the achievement of an intense religious quality felt in the everyday experience of their lives, these exemplary persons emerge as contributors to the ancestral legacy (tian
) that defines Chinese culture as a tradition. It is such cultural heroes that make tian as the ancestral legacy passed down from generation to generation determinate and meaningful. For classical Confucianism, spirituality in its most fundamental sense refers to a person’s attainment of a focused appreciation

40

Introduction

of the complex meaning and value of the total field of existing things through a reflexive awakening to the tremendum of one’s own creative role as one among other interdependent centers of creativity. Speaking generally, it is the patterns of deference that make up the family itself and the appropriate transactions among its members that give rise to, define, and authorize the specific ritualized roles and relationships (li
) through which the process of refinement is pursued. As Zhongyong 20 explains: The degree of devotion due different kin and the degree of esteem accorded those who are different in character is what gives rise to ritual propriety (li
).

4.4 Ritual Propriety (li
) in the Zhongyong Adherence to the notion of an “Oriental despotism” in which all authority lies with the emperor has prevented some prominent Western interpreters of the Chinese tradition from appreciating the extent to which informal social mechanisms such as “ritual propriety (li)” and the cultivation of a shame culture are conduits through which the community participates in effecting order. This is precisely the point of Analects 2.3: Lead the people with administrative injunctions (zheng
) and keep them orderly with penal law (xing
), and they will avoid punishments but will be without a sense of shame. Lead them with excellence (de
) and keep them orderly through ritual propriety (li
) and they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover, will order themselves.

This passage gives us an aspirational Confucian version of full “non-coercive” participation in a self-ordering, ritually constituted community. Henry Rosemont captures the primacy of familial order and the centrality of li in his claim that “for Confucius the regulating of society was too important to be left to governments: better would it be to have tradition (the li) serve as the binding 53 force of the people.”

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41

The Shuowen lexicon defines li
paronomastically as lü
: “treading a path.”54 This understanding of li as processional and eventful is a signature of the classical Confucian sensibility. In reading the Analects, we have a tendency to give short shrift to the middle books 9–11 that are primarily a series of intimate snapshots depicting the events in the life of the historical person, Confucius. Yet it is precisely these passages that are most revealing of the extent to which the appropriate behaviors of a scholarofficial participating in the daily life of the court were choreographed in and through the slightest gesture, the cut of one’s clothes, the cadence of one’s stride, one’s posture and facial expression, one’s tone of voice, even the rhythm of one’s breathing: On passing through the entrance way to the Duke’s court, he would bow forward from the waist, as though the gateway were not high enough. While in attendance, he would not stand in the middle of the entranceway; on passing through, he would not step on the raised threshold. On passing by the empty throne, his countenance would change visibly, his legs would bend, and in his speech he would seem to be breathless. He would lift the hem of his skirts in ascending the hall, bow forward from the waist, and hold in his breath as though ceasing to breathe. On leaving and descending the first steps, he would relax his expression and regain his composure. He would glide briskly from the bottom of the steps, and returning to his place, he would resume a reverent posture.55

Such care in one’s conduct begins in the intimacy of one’s home environment: In Confucius’ home village he was most deferential, as though at a loss for words, and yet in the ancestral temple and at court, he spoke articulately, though with deliberation.56

The Analects does not provide us with a catechism of prescribed formal conducts, but rather with the image of a particular historical person striving with imagination to exhibit the sensitivity to ritualized living that would ultimately make him the teacher of an entire civilization. Take, for example, the following passage:

42

Introduction

When ill, and his lord came to see him, he would recline with his head facing east, and would have his court dress draped over him with his sash drawn.57

This is an image of Confucius. It does not say that in all instances of being visited by a lord, one must behave in a particular way. Rather, it describes how Confucius found a gesture to communicate the appropriate deference and loyalty required of a relationship, even under the most trying of circumstances. From these passages and many others like them, it should be clear that li do not reduce merely to formally prescribed rituals performed at stipulated times to announce relative status, or to punctuate the seasons of one’s life. The performance of li must be understood in light of the uniqueness of each participant and the profoundly creative project of becoming a person. Li involve an ongoing process of personal investment that, with persistence and effort, refines the quality of one’s communal transactions. This process is dispositional and productive of identity-in-action. In the classical Chinese world, discrete “things” give way to unique and always underdetermined “events (wu
).” These events realize novelty through the emergence of particularized and personalized patterns. Within the classical Confucian tradition, ritual propriety (li) organizes the human experience around these unique patterns of conduct. In Zhongyong 26 we read: The way of heaven and earth can be captured in one phrase: Since events are never duplicated, their production is unfathomable.

To the extent that the term “propriety,” entailing the cognate range of meaning of its root, L. proprius—“proper, appropriate, property”—is understood as “a making one’s own,” it is a felicitous translation of li that emphasizes the process of personalization. Li is thus a resolutely personal performance revealing one’s worth to oneself and to one’s community, a personal and a public discourse through which one constitutes and reveals oneself qualitatively as a unique individual, a whole person. Li are learned patterns of deference performed individually and elegantly. They are value-revealing life forms that attract

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

43

emulation and inspire religious devotion, fostering the likemindedness necessary for a flourishing community. Li are at once cognitive and aesthetic, moral and religious, physical and spiritual. They are plural and distinct when seen as the many consummatory events that make up the business of one’s day. When seen as the continuous narrative of a specific individual’s meaningful actions, however, they are most singular.

4.4.1 Ritual Propriety (li
) and Focusing the Familiar (zhongyong
) The expression zhongyong
 that the Zhongyong takes as its title, has received numerous translations. The most familiar—“The Doctrine of Mean”—is, so we would claim, a most unfortunate 58 rendering. We shall argue that a more comprehensive and coherent translation of the expression is captured in the phrase “focusing the familiar affairs of the day.” The term “familiar” shares the same root as, and thus evokes the notion of, “family” that, as we have just argued, is at the center of the Confucian socio-religious experience. The connection between the family and the familiar affairs of the day in the Zhongyong is primarily a function of the ritualization of both familial and familiar affairs. That is to say, li
as ritual conduct is the primary means whereby one realizes the meaning and efficacy of these fundamental contexts. Zhongyong 3 states: The Master said, “Focusing (zhong
) the familiar affairs of the day is a task of the highest order. It is rare among the common people to be able to sustain it for long.”

This Zhongyong version is reminiscent of Analects 12.1 in which the self-discipline (keji
) of full personal participation in li (fuli
) produces authoritative conduct (ren
): If for the space of a day one were able to accomplish this, the whole empire would defer to this authoritative model. Becoming authoritative in one’s conduct is self-originating—how could it originate with others?

44

Introduction

It is incumbent upon the person who would flourish in the world that appropriate adjustments be made along the way. In fact, it is the sustained attention to achieving “equilibrium (zhong
)” by staying centered in the familiar affairs of one’s life that leads ultimately to the most focused and intense of spiritual experiences. Equilibrium, as the ability to remain centered within the natural, social, and cultural environments that both contextualize and constitute one, is productive of a thriving “harmony (he
)” achieved through patterns of deference. And as one becomes increasingly extended in the world through these patterns of deference, this centeredness ultimately enables one to contribute to the creative promotion and extension of the nurturing processes of the heavens and earth : When equilibrium and focus (zhong
) are sustained and harmony (he
) is fully realized, the heavens and earth maintain their proper places and all things flourish in the world. . . . Only those in the world of the utmost creativity are able to separate out and braid together the many threads on the great loom of the world. Only they set the great root of the world and realize the transforming and nourishing processes of heaven and earth.59

It is the sustained attention to li in every moment of the day that defines a person as a communal exemplar, a junzi
: Wherein do exemplary persons who would abandon their authoritative conduct warrant that name? Exemplary persons do not take leave of their authoritative conduct even for the space of a meal.60

As with authoritative conduct (ren
), unremitting awareness in the performance of ritual propriety is both the easiest and the most difficult thing to accomplish: Are there people who, for the space of a single day, have given their full strength to authoritative conduct? I have yet to meet them. As for lacking the strength to do so, I doubt that there are such people—at least I have yet to meet them.61

For Confucius it was the degree of attentiveness to focusing oneself in familiar affairs that distinguishes his favorite student Yan Hui from the others:

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

45

With my disciple, Yan Hui, he could go for several months without departing from authoritative thoughts and feelings; as for the others, only every once in a long while might authoritative thoughts and feelings make an appearance.62

The centrality of “filial responsibility (xiao
)” to ritual propriety and the extent to which this demand lies in the very embodiment of appropriate feelings is made abundantly clear: Zixia asked about being filial (xiao
). The Master replied: “It all lies in showing the proper countenance. As for the young contributing their energies when there is work to be done, and deferring to their elders when there is wine and food to be had—how can merely doing this be considered being filial?”63

A human being in classical Confucianism is ultimately an aggregate of experience, and li is the medium that insures that this cumulative experience is constantly refined and meaningful. Personalization is a sine qua non of the appropriate performance of ritual propriety. Personalization is a process of growth, requiring a persistent focus upon the contexts that constitute one’s circumstance and shape one’s life. That is to say, the term zhongyong refers not only to the process of “focusing the familiar,” but equally to the necessity of “remaining focused in the familiar affairs of the day.” The importance of attentiveness and responsiveness required in the appropriate exercise of ritual propriety must not be read as a concession to anything like a radical subjectivity. Such a suggestion has often been read into the Zhongyong 1 phrase, shen qi du
 : “to be ever concerned about one’s uniqueness.” It is for this reason that exemplary persons (junzi
) are so concerned about what is not seen, and so anxious about what is not heard. It is because there is nothing more present than what is hidden, and nothing more manifest than what is inchoate. Thus, exemplary persons are ever concerned about their uniqueness.

This expression shendu also occurs in a section of Xunzi that not only uses the vocabulary of the Zhongyong but seems to be an elaboration upon it:

46

Introduction

This is because according with the propensity of things (ming
) one is ever concerned about one’s uniqueness. As for those persons who are effective in constructing the proper way, if they are not creative (cheng
), they are not unique; if they are not unique, the way will not take shape; if it does not take shape, although they initiate something within their hearts-and-minds, manifest it in their countenance, and express it in what they say, the common people will still not follow them, and even if they do follow them, they are certain to have misgivings.64

Another example of this expression is in the Daxue which uses a vocabulary reminiscent of Xunzi: This is what is meant by the saying: “What is authentic within will shape one without.” Thus, exemplary persons must be ever circumspect in their uniqueness.65

The insistent particularity associated with uniqueness must be understood both relationally and as a dynamic process. Considered synchronically, it is irreducibly relational, entailing what one does for this specific community as well as the personal enrichment one derives from participating in this communal life. Viewed diachronically, such particularity must also be understood as an ongoing awareness that attends every gesture and thought, and is expressed as a refined disposition in all of one’s activities. Ritualized awareness (li) so understood focuses one’s aggregated habits as they are expressed in the events of the day. To use the word “habits” to characterize li might seem initially somewhat disenchanting, reducing intense and elegant ritualized experience to the ordinary and routine. But the Confucian claim is precisely that it is not in the ephemeral “momentous” events that the profound meanings of life are to be realized. It is through the routine and ordinary that life becomes enchanted. And, properly understood, habits are essential to this process of enchantment. We are accustomed to think of habit in a negative manner as mere routine, or as compulsively repetitive behavior that we would alter if only we had the will power. That is, we place habit within the sphere of determined behavior. Indeed, habit as acquired dis-

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

47

position is of no great categoreal significance if one understands the order of the world to be the result of a transcendent Creator, or as the outworking of transcendent Laws of Nature. For in such cases, habitual actions merely replicate the necessities of things. It is only if the world is truly processive and changing in character that acquired dispositions may become constitutive of the way of things. Understanding li as habitual behavior will be of benefit only if we rethink our own accepted senses of habit. Hexis was used initially by Aristotle as a neologism. The Greek word means “having” or “being in possession of.” Early on, hexis also had the suggestion of both “condition” and “state.” It was also used dispositionally to mean the natural or conditioned tendencies of things—as the “habit” of a vine. Aristotle himself sometimes used hexis to refer to the innate behavior of creatures. If we combine the senses of “habit” as that which is had, as a state or condition, and as a tendency, we arrive at the sense of the term that is found most prominently in the American pragmatic tradition. Habit is disposition. It is certainly not counterintuitive to understand habit in a creative sense. Most individuals would recognize the peculiar contribution of technique to artistic endeavor. Without the ability to mentally parse and physically play musical notes and chords in a stylized fashion, neither composition nor performance would be possible. Technique, as pre-reflective and dispositional, frees the artist to perform and to create. This same relationship to spontaneity is realized throughout one’s experience. The immediacy of the aesthetic experience—that is, its unmediated character—does not permit the development of rules or procedures characterizing how to create or to experience novelties. What is permitted is the construal of the conditions under which an unmediated experience may be provoked, varied, nuanced, and continually transformed. Habits are the structures that make possible the experience of the immediate. In the Chinese world, things do not have habits, they are habits. Habit is a mode of being. Thus li as habitual behavior establishes a relationship between having and being that encapsulates the

48

Introduction

manner in which the aesthetic sensibility dominates classical Chinese society. Scholars of Chinese thought, for example, have persistently noted that the Chinese lack a copulative sense of “to be” as “to exist.” Rather, you
means “to have,” “to be present.” The distinction between the copulative sense of being as existing and the Chinese sense of being (you) as having turns out to be a difference between two modes of being present—the mediated and the unmediated. Mediated experience entails the fact that Being, in the mode of this or that essence, is made manifest through the particular beings of the world. Such experience is characteristic of substantialist ontologies and cosmologies that make substance and form fundamental. Substances are known through forms or concepts. The knowledge of substances is mediated knowledge. Immediate experience requires that the particulars themselves are the objects of knowledge. Such particulars are grasped immediately in the sense that the experience of them is simply had. The structures that permit the having of experience are habits that dispose one toward that experience. The Western notion of being as involving a contrast between essence and existence privileges mediation and, therefore, conceptual, generic, and essential knowledge. An aesthetic perspective, as opposed to a rational or logical one, involves experiencing in a relatively unmediated fashion. Mediated experience requires one to grasp the essence of a thing. Aesthetic experience is simply had. Understanding you as having allows us to see the intimate relationship between you
and li
in a Confucian society. Both are modes of having—that is, both are habits. You and li are dispositional,66 and both manifest the way of things in a process world by privileging the unmediated. The comparison with Western languages is important here. Rather than a language of mediation in which the essences of things are mediated through concepts, the Chinese language is a ritualistic, dispositional language that promotes the “having” of the unmediated through a focusing of the affairs of the day. As we have seen, focusing the familiar is an attempt to optimize the creative possibilities of the human community, and to

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49

transform the patterns of everyday living into profoundly socioreligious practices. It is in this sense that li
is frequently described as an abbreviation for the binomial liyue
 “propriety and the making of music.” Yue
, and cognate expressions such as “enjoyment (le
)” and “medicine (yao
),” reveal how li is to be understood. Li defined relationally and processionally with the focus on the familiar is a strategy for orchestrating the “communicating community” into its fullest consonance, with appropriately disposed members resonating productively in their social transactions. To the extent that the community is symphonic, with minimal dissonance, it is not only therapeutic (yao
), but productive of enjoyment (le
) for all who reside within. To the extent that persons pursue virtuosity in the various discourses that dispose them one to another, they generate a mutually interdependent harmony in which everyone has his or her unique voice in a chorus that is at once one and many. In fact, Master Zeng elaborates upon Confucius’s claim that his way is bound together on one continuous strand by saying: The way of the Master is doing one’s utmost (zhong
) and putting oneself in the other’s place (shu
), nothing more.67

Shu is more than a disposition to consider the feelings, needs, and aspirations of those around one in all of one’s transactional activities. It involves an empathic taking up of the focus of another. Communication here is not the transference of mediated concepts resulting in a sharing of ideas. It is, rather, a response to the ritualistic structures of experience and behavior in a manner that allows one to enjoy the putatively same unmediated experience entertained by another. The central argument of the Zhongyong moves from the functions of ritual activity (li) in promoting acts of focusing the familiar, through vigilant attention to one’s unique focus, and, finally to the recognition of the circumstantial field so focused. In the last section of this introduction, we shall consider the final phase of that argument through a discussion of the extensive dimension of the focused field articulated in terms of the role of education (jiao) in the Zhongyong.

50

Introduction

4.4.2 Ritual Propriety (li) and Education (jiao
) as Growth and Extension The life of li is a process of continuing growth and extension. One amplifies the scope and intensity of one’s experience through sustaining a steady equilibrium in the process of advancing one’s way throughout a life dispositionally performed within the interstices of li
. Most of the terms invoked to describe Confucian religious experience connote this process of growth and extension explicitly. As we have seen, productive familial relations are the “root (ben
)” whence one’s way (dao
) advances.68 The repeated contrast between the exemplary person (junzi
) and the petty person (xiaoren
), the inclusiveness of appropriateness (yi
) as opposed to the exclusiveness of personal benefit (li
), and the emergence of the authoritative person (ren
) from individuated persons (ren
) and from the common masses (min
) all entail growth and extension through patterns of deference. Even the term “spirituality” (shen
) crosses the divide between “human spirituality” and “divinity.”69 Further, shen
is cognate with the terms “to extend, to prolong (shen
and
).” The metaphors used to describe those ancestors and cultural heroes who have become “god-like” are frequently celestial—“the sun and moon,” “the heavens,” “the north star,” and so on, expressing in a figurative way the familiar assumption that there is a “continuity between the human being and the ancestral realm (tianren heyi
 !).” For example, in Zhongyong 30, Zhongni (Confucius) . . . is comparable to the heavens and the earth, sheltering and supporting everything that is. He is comparable to the progress of the four seasons, and the alternating brightness of the sun and moon.70

The intensity of such experience is the measure of one’s personal growth. The source of that experience is the creative elaboration of oneself within one’s unique narrative. The growth and extension of this experience is a product of jiao (“education”). The etymology of the English word “education” is helpful in articulating the Confucian notion of jiao. “Education” has two

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51

principal roots—educere and educare. The first means “to evoke, lead forth, draw out”; the second “to cultivate, rear, bring up.” Educare resonates with the sense of education as rationally ordered guidance; it is the logical and rationally ordered mode of education. On the other hand, educere suggests the creative side of education that is complicit with aesthetic understanding. Education construed primarily as educere suggests that one “extends” one’s inner tendencies through a mode of self-cultivation that is, in fact, self-creation. In striving to be authoritative in your conduct, do not yield even to your teacher.71

Education so construed is a transactional process that entails both continuity and creativity as the growth of both this able teacher and that able student. It is this sense of education that is captured in the Zhongyong’s expression, “an advancing pathway (dadao 72
).” Let us once more rehearse the important first lines of the Zhongyong: What tian
commands is called natural tendencies (xing
); drawing out these natural tendencies is called the proper way (dao
); improving upon this way is called education (jiao
).

By identifying education primarily with improving upon and extending the proper way forward, the Zhongyong highlights the creative aspect of education. To say, however, that the function of education is not primarily that of transmission and training but of evocation would be misleading. Granted, the purpose of education is to promote growth and extension. But to do this involves the elaboration of those personal, social, and institutional contexts constituting one’s ritual life that can evoke a particular unmediated experience. For example, the immediate meaning of a ritual form as enacted is an aesthetic experience that is simply had. But without the ritual forms, all such immediacies would be both accidental and ephemeral. The necessary balance between the educere and educare functions of education is captured in Zhongyong 21:

52

Introduction

Understanding born of creativity (cheng
) is a gift of our natural tendencies (xing
); creativity born of understanding is a gift of education (jiao
). Where there is creativity, there is understanding; where understanding, creativity.

Grasping the intent of this passage requires some sensitivity to the complexity of the central terms and of their relationships. Creativity (the spontaneous emergence of novelty immediately, aesthetically entertained) is a natural (unforced, uncaused) process leading to understanding. In this context, “understanding” means primarily logical, rational understanding (educare) as “what is learned.” The cyclical process continues, however, as creativity emerges again from understanding. “Understanding” in this new context is the aesthetic entertainment of experienced content acquired through education. Education now becomes educere—a process that allows for the spontaneous production of novelty. Classical Confucianism evolves with the Zhongyong to celebrate the way in which this educative process of human growth and extension is both shaped by, and contributes to, the meaning of the totality. In exploring this dimension of Confucianism, we must allow that it is at once non-theistic, and profoundly religious. It is a tradition without a God that offers instead a li-centered religiousness affirming the cumulative human experience itself. Understandings of religion in terms of the creaturely dependence upon an ultimate Creator have no resonances in the Confucian world. Confucian religious experience is a product of the interdependencies of the members of a community where the quality of the religious life is a direct consequence of the quality of communal living. Religion is not the foundation upon which a flourishing community is built; it is its finest flower. Further, Confucian religiousness is neither salvific nor eschatological. While it does entail a kind of transformation, it is a transformation of the quality of living in and through the ordinary affairs of the day. The definition of this non-theistic, li-centered religiousness, adumbrated in the Analects and receiving more explicit articulation in the Zhongyong, challenges both the familiar Christianized interpretation of classical Confucianism, and the default claim that Confucianism is merely a secular humanism.

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53

For classical Confucianism, religiousness is discovering and investing in the connections among things. It is becoming aware of and augmenting the meaning of things. Standing together with all things is effected through an achieved equilibrium in the familiar experiences of our everyday lives that, in the absence of any coercion that would detract from their possibilities, allows for optimum creativity in every act. We have suggested that the central argument of the Zhongyong addresses the issue of the relationships obtaining among human tendencies (xing) promoted by tian as specified through ming, the way of becoming human (dao), and the growth and extension of that way through ritual education (jiao). In elaborating upon this argument, we have attempted to highlight the importance of cheng as creative process to the purposes of the Zhongyong. The novel contributions of the creative human being through the interactions of xing, tian, ming, and the elaboration of dao, are the fundamental consequences of the process of personalization that is the primary gift of ritual education (jiao). Those still convinced of the staid, conservative, dry-as-dust readings of Confucian texts as representative of a numbingly conservative tradition will doubtless believe that we have gone to rather lengthy extremes to import spontaneity and novelty into this Confucian classic. We would only caution that a lack of an appreciation for the creative character of the Confucian tradition so well advertised by the Zhongyong might well lie in an inadequate understanding of the manner in which patterned conduct—whether termed habit, disposition, technique, or ritual (li)—is the sine qua non of both the sustained production and the enjoyment of the significantly new.

notes to the INTRODUCTION 1. For a detailed argument to support the claim for a difference between the spoken and written language in classical China, see the Introduction to Ames and Rosemont (1998), and especially Appendix II.

54

Introduction

2. The availability of a language of process is largely due to the articulation of process philosophies associated with the works of A. N. Whitehead (1861–1947) and Charles Hartshorne (1897–2001). The school of “process philosophy” emergent from these figures has produced important constructive and critical work aimed at demonstrating the relevance of process understandings to a variety of issues and problems in contemporary thought. In addition, the early work of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), particularly Sein und Zeit, has influenced the articulation of vocabularies more conducive to the expression of process insights. In our use of the language of focus and field we have been largely inspired by the works of Whitehead cited in the Bibliography. We have, however, made no attempt to employ Whiteheadian categories in a comprehensive manner. Indeed, the strictly systematic elements of Whitehead’s philosophy are largely irrelevant to the interpretation of Chinese sensibilities. One of the most interesting ramifications of the increasing popularity of process language, from the perspective of our present project, is that the stimulation offered by the need to better understand Asian sensibilities, is in fact recursive. While process vocabularies are leading to increasingly productive interpretations of the classical Chinese world, these process interpretations of Chinese texts in turn provide us with new lenses through which to see our own Western sensibilities. Previously ignored or misconstrued elements within our own cultural selfunderstanding are beginning to receive new and decidedly more coherent interpretations. For example, elements of mainstream American pragmatism heretofore understood in substantialist and analytic terms, are presently receiving important new interpretations by appeal to process vocabularies enlivened and articulated through classical Chinese texts. The recent work of Joe Grange (1997, 1999), Steve Odin (1996), Robert Neville (2000), Tom Kasulis (1997), and Warren Frisina (2000) comes to mind. David Hall is currently producing a work on American philosophy, the interpretation of which has been profoundly influenced by his rather lengthy exposure to Chinese thought and culture. The happy conclusion that may be anticipated from these recent developments is that the epoch in which philosophy and philosophical thought have been considered essentially Western monopolies is drawing to a close. Because of its content and character, we believe that the Zhongyong will likely receive significant benefit from this less provincial understanding of philosophy.

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55

3. A list of these works is to be found in the Hall and Ames entries in the Bibliography. 4. For a comparison of the languages of “reference” and “deference,” see Hall (2001a). 5. These Primary Semantic Contexts are discussed in some detail in Hall (1982): passim, and Hall and Ames (1995): 102–4. 6. The Protagorean Principle. 7. For further discussion of this issue, see Hall and Ames (1998); 126–27 and passim. Nathan Sivin, a most cautious interpreter of the classical Chinese world, has recently affirmed that the “fundamental claim, which we usually refer to as appearance vs. reality, has no counterpart in China.” See Sivin (1995):3. 8. Redding (1998): passim. See also Sivin (1995) I:2–3 and Hall (2000). 9. See Hall (1982):249. See a more recent discussion of these ideas in Hall and Ames (1998). 10. Hall (1982):249. 11. Owen (1992):27. 12. The only problem with Owen’s reflection on shi is his seeming inclination to limit this insight to poetry alone as opposed to other art forms. 13. The press toward univocity is an implication of the particular philosophical and scientific dispositions of Anglo-European sensibilities in which the quantitative, and therefore definable and measurable, characters of things came to be of greater interest. It is not at all surprising that the Chinese preference for qualitative processes ought to require a more allusive vocabulary. It should be said, of course, that the notion of linguistic clusters is not all that unusual in Western languages, considered historically. A half-hour spent consulting the Oxford English Dictionary would suffice to teach one the connotative richness of the English language. Indeed, it is the exceptional term whose semantic permutations are not so complex as to include among its variants the very opposite of the received meaning of the word. The greater commonalities between the primitive associations of English (and other Western languages) and those of classical Chinese is doubtless a result of the fact that the archaic world views underlying each are both qualitative and processive. In a world of qualitative change, putative opposites such as “day” and “night” are experienced as a qualitative continuum of daybecoming-night and vice-versa. Thus, it should not in the least be sur-

56

Introduction

prising that a word might connote the opposite of its principal received meaning. 14. If we were to identify paronomastic associations in modern English, we might point to the way in which light (“illuminating”) and light (“levity”) can inform each other, or note the semantic interplay of “so,” “sew,” and “sow.” Doubtless, the most dramatic resort to paranomasia in our modern tradition is that of James Joyce found in the pun-structure of Finnegan’s Wake. Recall the words of Stephan Daedelus that close Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: “And so I go for the millioneth time to confront the reality of experience, and to forge in the smithy of my soul, the uncreated conscience of my race.” The paronomastic deconstruction of the oppressive English tongue in Finnegan’s Wake is for Joyce the prelude to forging that Irish conscience. 15. Wang Aihe (2000). 16. Wang Aihe (2000):76. 17. Though there is some superficial resemblance to the Empedoclean doctrine of the “four roots” (Earth, Air, Fire, and Water), the most comparable theory among the Greeks is that of Anaxagoras, a champion of continuity over discreteness. In no case may one legitimately interpret words translated from the Chinese as “metal” and “wood” in substantive terms. These are the names of phases that constitute a series of processes, and would require an interpretation of the seasons, for example, as continuous and porous—as we in fact commonsensically experience them. 18. Major (1976):1–2. We would, however, disassociate ourselves from Major’s claim that “the Chinese concept wu-hsing is one of function rather than constituent matter,” where Major (1977):69 in a subsequent exchange with Richard Kunst then clarifies what he means by “function” as “categories of relations.” Our understanding would be that wuxing, like qi or dao or yinyang, would resist any severe function/ structure distinction. See Judith Farquhar (1994), cited below, who makes this same point. See also Graham (1989):325f. 19. Huainanzi 3/18/18; compare Major (1993):62. The “blank (xu
)” is to be understood as an absence of shaped things. As such it has often been compared to the primordial Chaos as a gaping emptiness, a dark formless void, familiar in Western cosmogonies. However, there is no real void in the classical Chinese tradition and, thus, no final emptiness. Both shaped and unshaped things have, by default, only a phenomenological reference. This fact helps to account for the absence of anything

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

57

like “Not-Being,” as the absence of existing things, in the Chinese tradition. 20. Farquhar (1994):34. 21. Keightley (1988). 22. Major (1993). 23. See also Daodejing 10 and 55. 24. Zhuangzi 17/6/53; compare Graham (1981):88 and Watson (1968): 83–85. 25. See Zhuangzi 46/18/15–9; compare Watson (1968):191–92 and Graham (1981):123–24. 26. Analects 9.17. The translations of the Analects throughout are taken from Ames and Rosemont (1998). 27. Shun (1997):67–68. 28. Chad Hansen (1992):175 is not alone among commentators who would describe Mencius on qi as a “moral mysticism.” 29. Analects 6.30. 30. Not only is this opening passage distinctive in using the tian, ming, xing, dao, and jiao cluster of terms that, on the basis of the Guodian archaeological find, scholars have come to identify as the key vocabulary of Zisi thinking, but further, an elaboration of this same passage begins HNZ 11 (HNZ 11/93/20). See a translation of this HNZ passage in note 5 of the translation. Riegel (1978):208n5 points out that when this same HNZ 11 passage appears in the History of the Later Han (Hou Hanshu) it is ascribed in the commentary specifically to Zisi himself with the formula, “Zisi says:
 .” 31. Chinese exegetes from Wang Bo (1194–1274) down to the late Fung Yu-lan, and Western sinologists from James Legge to Gustav Haloun have all offered their explanations for how these disparate layers came to be edited into a single text. Jeffrey Riegel in rehearsing this history of scholarly opinion concludes that the Zhongyong has only an “ephemeral and contrived” unity. In fact, the co-presense of dissonance and rather tenuous continuity can, according to Riegel, best be accounted for by his hypothesis that the received Zhongyong began as the record of a Han dynasty ritualist debate complete with assertions and rebuttals, propositions and their refutations, containing contending explanations of the terminology and the significance of an earlier and now lost Zisi document called the Zhongyong. This “second” Zhongyong, only the “dimmest reflection” of the original “most difficult and magical text,” was subsequently tailored into its present form through a process of

58

Introduction

editorial expurgation that removed the trappings of disputation from the record. See Riegel (1978):74–109 for a detailed discussion of this ongoing historical debate. 32. This central argument of the Zhongyong is largely restated in different terms in the Xunzi, where the construction of the human heartmind (xin
) through conscious activity (wei
) is a functional equivalent of the human contribution to the creative processes (cheng
) that makes humanity a triad with the heavens and earth. 33. Pang Pu (1998):92–93. 34. 1989b:287–89 35. Tang Junyi (1962):195. 36. In fact, creativity construed as spontaneously emerging novelty is such a recent development in Western philosophical thinking that it is not until the 1971 “Dictionary Supplement” to the Oxford English Dictionary that this hallowed record of Western civilization includes this new entry, with two of its three illustrations directing the curious reader explicitly to Whitehead’s Religion in the Making (1926). 37. Whitehead (1929):10–11. 38. Whitehead (1929):31. 39. Whitehead (1929):32. 40. Zhuangzi 5/2/37; compare Graham (1981):54 and Watson (1968): 41. 41. Zhuangzi 4/2/33; compare Graham (1981):53 and Watson (1968): 40. 42. Analects 15.29. 43. See both the Glossary and the Appendix for a discussion of the role of “sagacity” in the Zhongyong and in allied documents attributed to Zisi. 44. Tang Junyi (1988):386. 45. Chan (1963):96. 46. Tu Wei-ming (1989):16–17. 47. Tu Wei-ming (1989):81–82. 48. See the Appendix for a discussion of these documents and their relevance to our understanding of the Zhongyong. 49. See Graham (1989):97–100 and 242–45. 50. For a compelling discussion of amor fati, see Keiji Nishitani (1990):45–68. 51. Will to Power 1004 and Nietzsche contra Wagner translated by Graham Parkes cited in Nishitani (1990):50–51. 52. Zhuangzi 5/2/37.

A Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong

59

53. Rosemont (1976):441. 54. According to Karlgren (1957), these two terms would be perfect homophones in the classical pronunciation. 55. Analects 10.4. 56. Analects 10.1. 57. Analects 10.19. 58. James Legge is responsible for the translation “Doctrine of the Mean” (though he later abandoned this rendering). Arguments as to the inappropriateness of this influential translation are presented in our Appendix below. 59. Zhongyong 1 and 32. 60. Analects 4.5. 61. Analects 4.6. 62. Analects 6.7. 63. Analects 2.8. 64. Xunzi 7/3/30. Compare Knoblock (1988):178. 65. Compare James Legge (1960) Vol. I:367. 66. See François Jullien (1995). Jullien’s use of the terms disposition and dispositif in his discussion of the contributions of the Chinese notion of shi
(“position,” “circumstance,” “potential”) to Chinese intellectual history is relevant to our understanding of habit. Shi is dispositional—involving both manner of arrangement and the potentialities and efficacies of things so arranged. It is this sense of disposition, not the more familiar psychological one, that is entailed by our use of the term “habit” to illumine the Confucian notion of li. 67. Analects 4.15. 68. Analects 1.2; see also Zhongyong 1, 29, 32, and especially 17. 69. There are several definitions of shen proffered in classical corpus that preclude any severe distinction between humanity and divinity. For example, the Fayan says
 ! “The sage is called shen.” The Yijing 41/
 /5 says
 !"#$ “That which cannot be fathomed through discrimination is called shen.” Huainanzi 1/9/15 defines shen as
 ! “that which regulates life,” 15/152/29
 !
"#$ “knowing what others do not is called shen,” 2/16/8
 ! “the abysmal source of wisdom.” 70. See also Analects 2.1; 19.21, 23, 24, 25. 71. Analects 15.36. 72. See Zhongyong 1 and 20. The character da
means “to break through,” as growing grain breaking through the ground.

Glossary of Key Terms

We have attempted to provide an explanation of the following key philosophical terms and some justification for our specific translations as a means of making the text more philosophically accessible. We have included some terms (for example, qi
, and qing
) not explicitly found in the text itself since they are in fact presupposed by the central argument of the Zhongyong. In accordance with our discussion of “linguistic clustering” in the Introduction, we have cross-referenced terms as a means of highlighting what we take to be their interdependent resonances. We hope thereby to encourage the reader to pursue an understanding of these philosophical terms that is dynamic, allusive, and relational rather than simply referential. Cross-references are indicated in brackets at the end of each entry. This glossary is informed by the previous works of Hall and Ames, and of Ames and Rosemont, cited in the Bibliography.
cheng. This term is most commonly translated in the early literature as either “integrity” or “sincerity.” In our translation, we have introduced the term “creativity” as the most important meaning of cheng within the Zhongyong. The appropriateness of “creativity” as a translation for cheng lies in the process assumptions underlying the world view of the Zhongyong. In a world of changing events, “integrity” suggests an active process of bringing circumstances together in a meaningful way to achieve the coherence that meaningfulness implies. As such, “integrity” suggests a creative process. “Sincerity” connotes the subjective form of feeling with which that creative pro-

61

62 Glossary of Key Terms

cess proceeds. That is, it suggests the mood or emotional tone that promotes successful integration. This cluster of three alternative translations receives support etymologically from the fact that the “creative” sense of the graph cheng
is reflected in the cognate cheng
—“to consummate, complete, finish, bring to fruition”—that together with the “speech” classifier yan
makes up the character. Thus “sincerity” as “the absence of duplicity,” “integrity” as “wholeness,” and “creativity” as the process leading to the achievement of such wholeness, can within different contexts all be viable translations. The parsing of cheng principally as “creativity” rather than “sincerity” or “integrity” brings attention to the centrality of cosmic creativity as the main theme of the Zhongyong. The vital role of distinctly human creativity within its large cosmic context is described in Zhongyong 20: Creativity is the way of tian (
 ); creating is the proper way of becoming human (
 ).

Building on a semantic extrapolation seemingly borrowed directly from the Mencius 4a12 (see Appendix p. 135), this process of cosmic co-creativity is then elaborated upon and described perhaps most clearly and powerfully in Zhongyong 25. The meaning of cheng is extended from an attitude of human integrity to describe the process of world-making in which the sage (shengren) plays a key role as co-creator. Since all creativity occurs within a relational context, the qualifier “co-” is dropped, and cheng can be translated here simply as “creativity.” Creativity (cheng
) is self-consummating (zicheng
), and its way is self-directing (zidao
). Creativity is a process taken from its beginning to its end, and without this creativity, there are no events. It is thus that, for exemplary persons, it is creativity that is prized. But creativity is not simply the self-consummating of one’s own person; it is what consummates events. Consummating oneself is authoritative conduct; consummating other events is wisdom. This is the excellence of one’s natural tendencies and is the way of integrating what is more internal and what is more external. Thus, whenever one applies this excellence, it is fitting.

Glossary of Key Terms

63

The speech element of cheng mentioned above suggests that creativity involves a dynamic partnership between the living human world and its natural, social, and cultural contexts, achieving consummation through effective communication in family and community. As discussed in the Introduction, cosmic creativity is influenced dramatically by the virtuosic contributions of the sage (shengren). [See also wu, qi]
dao. Dao occurs pervasively in the Zhongyong, and is of central importance for interpreting the thinking not only of this document, but all other early Chinese texts as well. To understand what dao means to any particular philosophical lineage is to have a most crucial insight into that philosophy. Etymologically, the character dao
is constructed out of two elements: ya
“foot,” and hence, “to pass over,” “to go over,” “to lead through (on foot),” and shou
meaning “head”—hair and eye together—and therefore “foremost.” The shou “head” component has the suggestion of “to lead” in the sense of “to give a heading.” Dao is used frequently as a loan character for its verbal cognate, dao
, “to lead forth.” Thus the character is primarily gerundive, processional, and dynamic: “a leading forth.” The earliest appearance of dao is in the Book of Documents in the context of cutting a channel and “leading” a river to prevent the overflowing of its banks. Taking the verbal dao as primary, its several derived meanings emerge rather naturally: “to lead through,” and hence, “road, path, way, method, art, teachings; to explain, to tell, doctrines.” At its most fundamental level, dao seems to denote the active project of “moving ahead in the world,” of “forging a way forward,” of “road building” and, by extension, to connote a pathway that has been made, and hence can be traveled. It is because of this connotation that dao is often, somewhat problematically, nominalized by translating it “the Way.” We must distinguish between simply traveling on a road, and making the journey one’s own. To realize dao is to experience, to

64 Glossary of Key Terms

interpret, and to influence the world in such a way as to reinforce and extend a way of life inherited from one’s cultural precursors. Dao is “truth” in the sense that it entails being true to those who have come before, and living in the world in a way that can be trusted by those yet to come. It is for this reason that we translate dao usually as “the proper way.” For Confucius, early on in the tradition, dao is primarily rendao
, that is, “a way of becoming consummately and authoritatively human.” The Zhongyong elaborates upon this Confucian way of becoming authoritatively human with many allusions to the Analects as canonical authority and to Confucius himself as a model worthy of emulation. But, perhaps influenced by Daoistic and certainly Mencian sensibilities, the Zhongyong emphasizes the profoundly transformative effect that consummate human beings have on the world around them. Sages such as Confucius, through their creative participation in the transforming and nourishing activities of the world, achieve a truly cosmic stature, becoming full partners with heaven and earth. The cultivated moral, aesthetic, and religious sensibilities that define the flourishing community, inspired by and fully integrated into the rhythms of the natural environment, have an elevating spiritual effect that adds significance and value to the world. In the Zhongyong, as in much of the classical corpus, a distinction is made between “the way of tian (tian zhi dao
 )” and “the proper way of human beings (ren zhi dao
 ).” These categories, far from resolving themselves into an exclusive “nature/nurture” dichotomy, are symbiotic and mutually entailing, converging most productively in “the proper way of the exemplary person (junzi zhi dao
 !),” and ultimately, “the proper way of the sage (shengren zhi dao
 !).” The project, then, is not to integrate two aspects of our experience that are originally independent of each other, but rather to optimize the possibilities of their correlativity and interdependence. [See also de, jiao]
de. In the early philosophical literature, de has a strong cosmological sense, connoting the insistent particularity of things. It is

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65

for this reason that de is conventionally translated as “virtue,” or “power,” defining the particular as a focus of potency within its own field of experience. Given the intrinsic relatedness of particulars in a process conception of existence, de can be described as any particular disposition of the unsummed totality. The central issue of the Daodejing—literally, “the classic of de and its dao”— is how the particular brings its field most productively and effectively into focus. The earliest Confucian literature tended to limit its concerns to human experience, where this qualitative dimension of de more nearly suggests both “excellence” and “efficacy” as what we can truly be and do if we “realize (zhi)” the most from our personal careers as members of a specific community. The cultivation of de is pursued through full participation in the ritualized community, where achieved excellence in the roles and relationships that constitute one’s person makes one an object of the deference of others. When located within the political realm, de describes the most appropriate relationship between a ruler and the people. In this context, de has a range of meaning that reflects the priority of situation over agency, characterizing both giving and getting. That is, de is both the “beneficence” extended to the people from the ruler, and the “gratitude” expressed in response to such largesse. The Zhongyong, recognizing the meaning-creating and meaning-disclosing power of the cultivated human being, emphasizes the way in which this personal articulation extends beyond the human community to the cosmos itself. The sage (shengren), as the paragon of achieved excellence (de), has cosmological significance in maximizing the symbiotic relationship between the human experience and the environment within which that relationship is contextualized. [See also dao, shengren]
he. He is conventionally translated “harmony,” and we follow that rendering. The etymology of the term is culinary. Harmony is the art of combining and blending two or more foodstuffs so that they mutually enhance one another without losing their distinctive flavors. Throughout the early corpus, the preparation of

66 Glossary of Key Terms

food is appealed to as a gloss on this sense of elegant harmony. Harmony so considered entails both the integrity of the particular ingredient and its ease of integration into some larger whole. Signatory of this harmony is the endurance of the particular ingredients and the aesthetic nature of the harmony. Such harmony is an elegant order that emerges out of the collaboration of intrinsically related details to embellish the contribution of each one. In the Analects, this sense of harmony is celebrated as the highest cultural achievement. Here, harmony is distinguished from mere agreement by defining it in terms of eliciting the optimum contribution of each particular to its context. The family metaphor pervades this text, encouraged by the intuition that this is the institution in which the members give themselves most fully and unreservedly to the group nexus, through interactions that are governed by those observances (li) most appropriate (yi) to the occasion. Such a commitment to family requires the full expression of personal integrity and thus becomes the context in which one can most effectively pursue personal realization. In the Zhongyong, this Confucian sense of harmony (he) is further stipulated with the introduction of “focus” or “equilibrium” (zhong
) as in “focusing (zhong) the familiar in the affairs of the day (yong
).” When Zilu asks Confucius about strength in Zhongyong 10, for example, a distinction is made between the tolerance and flexibility of the southerners, and the indefatigable tenacity of the northerners. It is bringing these two different senses of strength into harmony (he) and then sustaining this focus (zhong) that defines the conduct of exemplary persons and distinguishes them from the mean and petty. [See also zhong, zhongyong]
jiao. The etymology of the Chinese term most often translated as “education” or “teaching,” jiao
, argues for the placement of the process of education squarely within the family context. According to the Shuowen lexicon, “education (jiao)” “is what the elders dispense and what the juniors model,” with the two elements of the character itself being explained as “those above pro-

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viding culture (wen
) with those below responding with filiality (xiao
).” The role of education (jiao) in the ongoing creative transformation of both “human nature” and the world sets the main theme of the Zhongyong in its opening passage: What tian commands is called natural tendencies (xing); drawing out these natural tendencies is called the proper way (dao); improving upon this way is called education (jiao).

As noted in our Introduction, the two meanings of the etymology of the English word “education” are most relevant to the discussions of the Zhongyong. The first sense, deriving from educere means “to evoke, lead forth, draw out;” the second, from educare, “to cultivate, rear, bring up.” The customary, habitual, and ritualistic aspect of education as educare leans toward cultivation and enculturation. The creative and evocative sense of educere resonates with the extension of one’s inner tendencies (xing) through novel elaborations of one’s mode of self-cultivation that is itself the process self-creation. [See also dao]
 junzi. We render junzi as “exemplary person.” Junzi are frequently contrasted with xiaoren
—literally “small,” and thus “petty and mean” persons. This contrast would suggest that becoming exemplary in one’s personal character is the result of continuing articulation and growth. This term junzi, like ren (“authoritative person”), is a category redefined and made popular in the earliest literature associated closely with Confucius himself. The Shuowen lexicon defines jun
paronomastically with the rhyming zun
meaning first “of high rank,” and then derivatively “to honor” or “to hold in high esteem.” In other early sources collected in the Shuowen commentaries, jun is also defined by its cognate, qun
meaning “to gather,” with the implication that the junzi is the person to whom the crowd repairs. The Shuowen further identifies jun
as a “combined meaning (huiyi
)” graph, isolating the etymonic elements of yin
, “to

68 Glossary of Key Terms

manage, order, regulate,” and kou
, “the mouth.” Thus, the junzi is an agent that brings about sociopolitical order through effective communication. It is because the conduct of the junzi is most often described socially as a model for other persons to emulate that we translate the term “exemplary person.” It is often suggested that in the literature prior to Confucius, the expression junzi, a diminutive form of jun meaning “child of jun,” denoted nobility of birth, blood, and rank, with no discernable reference to nobility of character. It is demonstrably the case that with Confucius, this political category was appropriated and used to express the correlative relationship between political responsibility and personal moral growth. That is, the cultivation of one’s person necessarily entails active participation both in the family and in the sociopolitical order, not simply in service to others, but as the locus in which the compassion and concern that leads to one’s own personal refinement is expressed. Said another way, one does not first become a junzi and then enter the arena of political life; rather, one can only become a junzi through responsiveness to the social and political obligations that emerge in communal living. Junzi have a prominent role in the Zhongyong and are in fact defined as those who are able to “zhongyong
”—that is, able “to focus the familiar affairs of the day.” They know many rituals and much music, and perform all of their communal functions not only with felicity (shan
), but also with grace, dignity, and beauty. Though they are still filial toward their parents and elders at home, they take “all under tian” as their provenance. They are resolutely proper in the conduct of their roles and relationships. Further, their conduct is not forced, but effortless, spontaneous, and creative. There is, in sum, a very strong aesthetic and ethical dimension to the lives of the junzi. They have re-authorized ritual propriety (li
) and music (yue
) for their own time and place, and are therefore the respected authors of the dao of humankind. The way of the junzi is described in Zhongyong 12 as “both broad and hidden,” a correlative pairing of seemingly contradictory terms reminiscent of the Daodejing. This way is broad in the sense that, having its beginnings in the routine lives of ordinary

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people, there is much about it that is apparent to even the dullest of men and women. It is obvious and easy. On the other hand, in its subtlety and complexity it is so lofty and demanding that at its furthest limits even the sages cannot fathom it. Thus, were exemplary persons to discourse on the profundity of their way, there is nothing in the empire that could take its weight; were they to discourse on its subtlety, there is nothing in the empire that could further refine it.

Zhongyong 33, the final section of the text, appeals to a series of passages taken from the Book of Songs in explanation of a seemingly paradoxical claim made in the opening passage of the Zhongyong: . . . exemplary persons are so concerned about what is not seen, and so anxious about what is not heard. There is nothing more present than what is imminent, and nothing more manifest that what is inchoate.

The Book of Songs, appealing again to correlative pairings, describes the way of exemplary persons as near yet distant, subtle yet conspicuous, awesome yet unintimidating. It is in this sense that the model of the junzi, the middle ground between the ordinary and the extraordinary, anticipates and is entailed in the emergence of the most exalted category of personal cultivation, the sage. [See also ren, shengren]
li. Li has been conventionally translated as “ritual,” “rites,” “customs,” “etiquette,” “propriety,” “morals,” “rules of proper behavior,” and “worship.” Properly contextualized, each of these English terms can render li on occasion. In classical Chinese, however, the character carries all of these meanings on every occasion of its use. The compound character is an ideograph connoting the presentation (shi
) of sacrifices to the primarily ancestral spirits at an altar to them (li
), suggesting the profound religious significance that this term entails. It is defined in the Shuowen paronomastically as lü
, meaning “to tread a path,” and hence “conduct, behavior”—that is, “how to serve the spirits to bring about good fortune.”

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We have chosen to translate li as “ritual propriety.” Again, this rendering is a considered choice. On the formal side, li are those meaning-invested roles, relationships, and institutions that facilitate communication and foster a sense of community. All formal conduct constitutes li—including table manners, patterns of greeting and leave taking, graduations, weddings, funerals, gestures of deference, ancestral sacrifices, and so on. Li are a social grammar that provides each member with a defined place and status within the family, community, and polity. Li are life forms transmitted from generation to generation as repositories of meaning, enabling individuals to appropriate persisting values and to make them appropriate to their own situations. On the informal and uniquely personal side, full participation in a ritually-constituted community requires the personalization of prevailing customs, institutions, and values. What makes ritual profoundly different from law or rule is this process of making the tradition one’s own. The Latin proprius, “making something one’s own,” gives us a series of cognate expressions that are useful in translating key philosophical terms to capture this sense of participation. Yi
is not “righteousness” but “appropriateness,” “a sense of what is fitting”; zheng
is not “rectification” or “correct conduct,” but “proper conduct”; zheng
is not “government” but “governing properly”; li (“ritual propriety”) is not just “what is appropriate,” but “doing what is appropriate.” Ritual propriety, like most things Confucian, begins at home. Zhongyong 20 is explicit in identifying the familial source of li: The degree of devotion due different kin and the degree of esteem accorded those who are different in character is what gives rise to ritual propriety.

Li thus understood accumulates within the human community, defining the appropriate relationships between the present population and its forebearers (Zhongyong 19), and the proper relationships between political authority and those who would be governed by it (Zhongyong 20). Perhaps the greatest obstacle to understanding what li means in the world of Confucius is thinking that “ritual” is a familiar

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dimension of our own world, and that we fully understand what it entails. “Ritual” in English is often pejorative, suggesting compliance with hollow and meaningless social conventions. A careful reading of the Confucian literature, however, uncovers a way of life carefully choreographed down to appropriate facial expressions and physical gestures, a world in which a life is a performance requiring enormous attention to detail. Importantly, this li-constituted performance begins from the insight that personal refinement is only possible through the discipline provided by formalized roles and behaviors. Form without creative personalization is coercive and dehumanizing; creative personal expression without form is randomness at best, and license at worst. It is only with the appropriate combination of form and personalization that family and community can be self-regulating and refined. [See also yi, ren]
ming. Ming is conventionally translated as “to command, to order,” and hence, a “command” or “mandate.” Etymologically, the Shuowen lexicon analyzes the graph into its two components, ling
, “to command,” and kou
, “mouth,” defining it as shi
, “to cause to happen.” There are numerous examples in the early literature of ling and ming being used interchangeably, suggesting that the fundamental idea represented by ming is “to command,” “to cause to happen.” The “mouth (kou)” component of the character is significant, linking ming to effective communication, an association shared with many of the other core concepts in the Confucian vocabulary: zhi
“to know, to realize,” junzi
 “exemplary person,” he
“harmony,” shu
“deference,” xin
“making good on one’s word,” cheng
“sincerity/creativity,” and so on. Perhaps most significantly, ming
is homophonous with ming
“to name,” and is on occasion used interchangeably with this character. Hence, the basic idea is “to realize through effective communication.” At some point, ming came to designate those specific conditions that define existence in the world such as one’s lifespan, one’s social and economic status, one’s physical health—not only one’s

72 Glossary of Key Terms

“lot” in life, but one’s life itself. Applied politically at least as early as the Zhou dynasty, the concept tianming
 “the command of tian,” emerged as a condition for the ruler’s continuance in office. Importantly, in the early corpus, this “command” of tian is not arbitrary or unilateral, but is rather described as contingent upon and responsive to the particular character of the ruling authority. This allows us to understand tianming in a transactional sense: Tian and the ruler both “command” in the sense that tian confers its continuing support on the ruler and the ruler commands tian’s trust. Certainly one of the most important contributions of the Zhongyong is its elaboration upon the term cheng
, making it clear that real creativity entails the spontaneous emergence of novelty, and cannot, therefore, be reducible to a calculus of prior causes of some determining agent. This significantly qualifies the more deterministic interpretations of ming. [See also cheng, tian]
qi. This character qi, translated variously as “hylozoistic vapors,” “psychophysical stuff,” and “vital energizing field,” first appears on the Shang oracle bones and on the Zhou bronze inscriptions as three horizontal lines, similar to the modern character for “three (san
),” except the three lines are usually shorter and somewhat more fluid. The Shuowen lexicon explains this graph as a pictographic character representing rising mists, and defines it as “cloud vapors (yunqi
).” It depicts multiple layers of ascending and descending vapors. Although the systematized and elaborate yinyang wuxing cosmology does not appear until Han dynasty sources, the idea that the world and its phenomena emerge out of and fold back into a vital energizing field called qi was already widely held in the late fourth century and early third century bce, attested to in the Zhuangzi, the Daodejing, and the Mencius, as well as other early texts.

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Qi has to be distinguished from either “basic matter” or “animating vapors” in that it will not be resolved into any kind of spiritual-material dichotomy. Qi is both the animating energy and what is animated. There are no things to be animated; there is only the vital energizing field and its focal manifestations. The energy of transformation resides within the world itself, and is expressed in what Zhuangzi calls the perpetual “transforming of processes and events (wuhua
).” It is this understanding of a focus-field process of cosmic change that is implicitly assumed in the Zhongyong as commonsense. [See also cheng, wu]
qing. Qing is most frequently translated as “emotions,” “passions,” or sometimes as “feelings,” and is often found in the philosophical literature in tandem with “natural tendencies (xing
).” The Shuowen lexicon defines qing as “desires.” Although the character qing does not appear explicitly in the Zhongyong, it is implicit in the discussion that we find in Zhongyong 1 of bringing “joy and anger, grief and pleasure” into focus, appealing as it does to the same vocabulary used to define qing in the early Zisi documents. Since feelings define the quality of one’s interactions, the proper expression of such feelings is a singularly important element in the early Confucian conception of person. Qing is “what something really is” in the sense that the unmediated experience itself resides in affective transactions that become selective and abstract when reduced to the cognitive structures of language. It is to the concreteness of affective experience that A. N. Whitehead nods when he observes that “. . . mothers can ponder many things in their hearts that words cannot express.” Qing is important in the Zhongyong because of the dramatic role that properly focused human affect is assumed to have on cosmic order. As the Zhongyong 1 discussion of emotions concludes: “When equilibrium and focus is sustained and harmony is fully realized, the heavens and earth maintain their proper places and all things flourish in the world.”

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Again, qing is important in understanding the radically contextualized and perspectival nature of creativity itself. Because persons are constituted by their relationships, and because these relationships are valorized in the process of bringing their fields of experience into focus, the creative interactions among persons discloses their feelings for one another, and for their environs. The subjective form of feeling originates the perspectival locus of the creative process (cheng
). It is for this reason that we have suggested that the “sincerity” dimension of cheng is doing much of the work of qing in the Zhongyong. [See also xing, cheng]
ren. Ren is a fairly simple graph, and according to the Shuowen lexicon, is made up of the elements ren
“person”, and er
, the number “two.” This etymological analysis underscores the Confucian assumption that one cannot become a person by oneself. We are, from our inchoate beginnings, irreducibly social. Ren is most commonly translated as “benevolence,” “goodness,” and “humanity,” and occasionally as “humanheartedness.” While “benevolence” and “humanity” might be more comfortable choices for translating ren into English, our decision to use the less elegant nominal “authoritative person” or verbal “authoritative conduct” is a considered one. First, in the processual world of classical China, the distinction between persons and their conduct is moot, and we must worry that, in reifying what is in fact ultimately an event, we are privileging physical persons over their changing behavioral patterns. Ren is the most crucial term taken up by Confucius, occurring over one hundred times in the Analects. Confucius’s presentation of the person of ren as a model of both self-realization and of effective action is the foundation upon which the entire Confucian philosophical edifice is constructed. It is important that, in our reading of the Zhongyong, we begin from an understanding of the terms “authoritative person (ren)” and also “exemplary person (junzi
)” as they appear in the Analects, because by the time of the compilation of the Zhongyong, they had become

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central to the Confucian vocabulary. The strategy of the Zhongyong then is to extend the early Confucian emphasis on personal and communal cultivation captured in these two terms as a way of emphasizing the dramatic impact that the “sages (shengren
),” the ultimate products of such cultivation, have on the world around them. Ren is the entire person including one’s cultivated cognitive, aesthetic, moral, and religious sensibilities as they are expressed in the living of one’s ritualized roles and relationships. This is precisely the import of Zhongyong 20: “Authoritative conduct means behaving like a human being (ren
), wherein devotion to one’s kin is most important.” Ren thus understood is one’s “field of selves,” the sum of significant relationships that constitute one as a social person. Ren is both mental and physical as well. It is one’s posture and comportment, gestures, and bodily communication. Hence, translating ren as “benevolence” is to psychologize the notion of person in a tradition that does not define the human experience psychologically. Such a translation is to impoverish ren by isolating one out of many dispositions at the expense of the many other aspects that contribute to the complexity of becoming human. Again, “humanity” suggests a shared, essential, condition of being equally human owned by all members of a natural kind. But ren is not an endowed potential. It is, rather, what particular persons are able to make of themselves in the interface between their initial conditions and their always unique, natural, social, and cultural environments. And ren does not come so easily. It is not a “given,” but an aesthetic project. It is a unique accomplishment, something one does. Human beings are not what we are but what we do—and become. Perhaps “human becoming” might best capture the emergent character of what it means to be human. [See also li, yi]
shan. The character shan, conventionally translated “good,” is composed of two elements. The “sheep (yang
)” radical is associated with “sacrifice,” and, as in other similarly constructed char-

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acters such as “appropriate (yi
)” and “beautiful (mei
),” suggests “auspiciousness.” The second element on the bottom is the “mouth (kou
)” that, according to the Shuowen lexicon, in an archaic version of the character, was originally two “speech (yan
)” radicals. Like many of the classical Chinese philosophical terms that contain the “mouth” and “speech” elements, it would seem that auspiciousness is the product of effective communication. Although shan is most frequently translated as “good,” such a rendering has the disadvantage of essentializing what is fundamentally relational. Shan is radically contextual. It is first and foremost “felicity” or “efficacy.” It is to be “good to” or “good for” or “good with” or “good in” or “good at.” In the translation, we have struggled to retain this relational sense of shan, translating it as “felicity” or “efficacy.” This understanding of shan, like “appropriateness (yi
),” highlights the fundamentally aesthetic nature of classical Confucianism, wherein the common good is achieved in the productive relationships of a thriving community. The character or ethos of person or community is an ongoing aesthetic achievement. [See also yi]
sheng. The sage (shengren
) is the highest exemplification of the process of self-consummation celebrated in the Zhongyong, and sagacity (sheng
) is the primary quality of the sage. As a mode of conduct, sagacity is the principal expression of that cosmic creativity that serves as the central theme of the Zhongyong. Zhongyong 31 elevates those of the utmost sagacity to being the counterparts of tian
: Only the most sagacious in the world: . . . So broad, expansive, and profoundly deep, in a timely way they express these virtues. So broad and expansive like the heavens themselves; so profoundly deep like a bottomless abyss: They appear and all defer to them; they speak and all have confidence in what they say; they act and all find pleasure in what they do. It is for this reason that their fame spreads out over the Central States, extending to the Man and Mo barbarians in the south and

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north. Everywhere that boats and carriages ply, everywhere that human strength penetrates, everywhere that is sheltered by the heavens and is borne up by the earth, everywhere that is illumined by the sun and moon, everywhere that the frosts and dew settle—all creatures that have breath and blood revere and love them. Thus it is said that they are the complement of tian
.

Sagacity is well-nigh synonymous with cheng
, which might well be the most precise rendering of that term. It is a mode of conduct that is efficacious even in its interactions with tian. Thus, it is the sagacious person, as “complement of tian,” who qualifies most dramatically the apparent inexorability of tian. The sagacious are “broad, expansive, and profoundly deep”— and are thus the most intensive foci of the most extensive fields of cultural significance. Further, by expressing their virtues “in a timely way,” they always constitute appropriate foci of those inclusive fields.
 shengren (shengzhe
). What the category of shengren, or “sage,” shares with the exemplary person (junzi
) is that both entail effective communication. For classical Confucianism, the flourishing community is a communicating community. As noted above, the junzi
 is one who “oversees (yin
)” community through effective “communication (kou
).” The shengren, then, is a virtuoso of communication. The graph suggests that the sages “hear (er
)” what is valuable to hear, and on that basis communicate or “present (cheng
)” their vision of what will be. Their effectiveness is measured by their success in drawing the hands and hearts of the people together to realize a shared project that refines what it means to be human. The sage as virtuoso sings the songs that enchant the world. Shengren have risen above the level of junzi who stand in awe of the words of the shengren (see Analects 16.8). The centrality of effective communication in elevating the human experience is captured in the Confucian doctrine of “the proper use of names (zhengming
)” that asserts that “naming (ming
)” things properly “commands (ming
)” a proper world into being.

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Much is to be learned from the frequent references to shengren in the Analects. In one passage Confucius dares not rank himself a shengren (7.33) and in another laments that he never has, and probably never will, meet one (7.25). Indeed, according to Zhongyong 29, the sage appears only once in a hundred generations. Yet the model is there. In using Confucius to define what it means to be a sage, Mencius is picking up on a tradition that begins earlier in the Analects when the ever modest Confucius gently chastises Zigong for likening him to a shengren (9.6). It is not only this explicit use of shengren to describe Confucius that celebrates his status as a sage. In the last five books of the Analects that primarily record the observations of his now mature protégées, the metaphors used to celebrate Confucius are positively celestial. For example, Analects 19.24: Shusun Wushu spoke disparagingly of Confucius. Zigong responded, “Do not do this! Confucius cannot be disparaged. The superior character of other people is like a mound or a hill, which can still be scaled, but Confucius is the sun and moon, which no one can climb beyond. When people cut themselves off from the sun and moon, what damage would this do to the sun and moon? It would only demonstrate that such people do not know their own limits.”

This passage is representative of a number to be found in the Analects that pay tribute to the cosmic stature of the sage in general, and Confucius in particular. In Zhongyong 30 it is the person of Confucius who is singled out in an unqualified celebration of the continuing human contribution to cosmic meaning: Zhongni (Confucius) revered Yao and Shun as his ancestors and carried on their ways; he emulated and made illustrious the ways of Kings Wen and Wu. He modeled himself above on the rhythm of the turning seasons, and below he was attuned to the patterns of water and earth. He is comparable to the heavens and the earth, sheltering and supporting everything that is. He is comparable to the progress of the four seasons, and the alternating brightnesses of the sun and moon.

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In addition to possessing all of the qualities of the junzi, the shengren appear to see and feel custom, rituals, and traditions holistically, as focusing and integrating the present human community, as well as the communities of the past and future. This seeing and feeling of the shengren can be described as an awareness that gives one the capacity to go beyond the particular time and place in which we live, effecting a continuity not only with our contemporaries, but with those who have preceded us and who will follow behind. The metaphors used to describe the shengren are cosmic and celestial. The culture that finds its focus in this rare person elevates the human experience to heights of profound aesthetic and religious refinement, making the human being a worthy partner with the heavens and the earth. The model of the shengren extends across generations and geographical boundaries serving as a means of stabilizing and securing the human world, and as a continual source of cultural nourishment and inspiration. [See also junzi]
tian. Tian is a term we choose not to translate. Its conventional English rendering as “Heaven” cannot but conjure up misleading associations drawn from our Judeo-Christian tradition. These theological associations are largely irrelevant to the Chinese experience but, nonetheless, have often overwritten Chinese cultural practices with presuppositions that are alien to them. In any case, we must extricate the term from these unfortunate associations if we are to develop an understanding of tian. In the first place, tian is often used as an abbreviation for tiandi
 —“the heavens and the earth”—suggesting that tian is not independent of this world. Denoting the world as it turns around us, it is bottomless, ever advancing, and always novel. As described in Zhongyong 26: The way of heaven and earth can be captured in one phrase: Since events are never duplicated, their production is unfathomable. The way of heaven and earth is broad, is thick, is high, is brilliant, is far-reaching, is enduring.

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The God of the Bible, often referred to metonymically as “Heaven,” created the world, but tian in classical Chinese is the world. Tian is both what our world is and how it is. The “ten thousand processes and events (wanwu
)” are not the creatures of a tian that is independent of what is ordered; rather, they are constitutive of it. Tian is both one and many. It is both the single source from which processes and events emerge, and the multivalent field constituted by them. On this basis, tian can be described as the emergent orders negotiated out of the dispositions of the many particulars that are presently constitutive of it. Moreover, tian is not just the natural world, independent of human artifice. Rather, tian is a living, cumulative artifact, inclusive of nature and nurture that is not only inseparable from the human experience but is in an important degree expressive of it. It is created and transmitted within a particular human community. Tian is often anthropomorphized, suggesting its intimate relationship with a distinctly Chinese version of euhemerization that grounds ancestor reverence. It is probably this common foundation in ancestor reverence that allowed for the conflation of the culturally sophisticated Shang dynasty’s di
(ancestral spirits) with the notion of tian associated with the Zhou federation of tribes who conquered the Yellow River valley at the turn of the first millennium bce. There are good reasons to assume that tian is not an exception to the claim that Chinese gods are, by and large, dead people. In the absence of some transcendent creator, tian would seem to stand for a cumulative and continuing cultural legacy focused by the spirits of those who have come before. Tian does not speak but communicates effectively, although not always clearly, through human-generated oracles, through perturbations in the climate, and through alterations in the natural conditions that contextualize the human world. Tian participates in a discourse shared by the most worthy persons in the human community. Given the interrelatedness and interdependency of the orders defining the Confucian world, what affects one affects all. It is assumed that a failure of order in the human world will be reflected in the natural environment. [See also ming, xing]

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wu. Wu is most frequently translated as “things.” We follow that translation, with the following important proviso: In the Zhongyong cosmology, process is privileged over substance and continuity over discreteness. Thus, wu is more appropriately understood not as static things, but as processes and the conventional and transitory punctuation of these processes in the terms of “events.” Thus we must understand “things (wu
)” as both processes (happenings) and events (happenings that have achieved some relative completion). It is the punctuation of the ongoing fluid process into particular events that makes the world determinate and intelligible. The expression wanwu
 or “ten thousand processes and events” refers to the unsummed totality of all particular processes and/or events as they transactionally constitute this world. Zhuangzi’s expression wuhua
 —“the transforming of processes and events”—suggests the mutuality and interpenetration of all forms of process as one “thing” transforms to become another. [See also qi, cheng]
xiao. Xiao means rather straightforwardly “filial piety” or “filial responsibility.” Given the central place of the family in Confucianism, appropriate family feelings are that resource from which a pathway through life emerges (Analects 1.2). It is important to note that in promoting the family as the pervasive model of order, the Confucian world view does not accept that hierarchical social institutions are necessarily pernicious, or that simple egalitarianism should be an uncritical value. Having said this, an obstacle to understanding xiao can arise from a simplistic equation between filial responsibility and obedience. At times being truly filial within the family, like being a loyal minister within the court, requires remonstrance rather than automatic compliance. Yet such a responsibility to question authority has its limits and is not a warrant to pit one’s own opinions against one’s elders. Zhongyong 19 defines xiao explicitly: Filial piety means being good at continuing the purposes of one’s predecessors and at maintaining their ways.

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The mustering of historical figures and cultural heroes in Zhongyong 15–19 to support this text’s emphasis upon the transformative power of education exploits the cognate relationship between “education (jiao
)” and “filial responsibility (xiao
).” Indeed, just as family is the pervasive metaphor in the Confucian world view, filial piety is the heart of Confucian learning. [See also jiao]
xin. The character xin is a stylized pictograph of the aorta, associating it quite immediately with the “heart” and the emotional connotations that attend it. The fact that the character
that we translate as “emotions” or “feelings” is a combination of this xin
and a phonetic element, qing
, justifies this understanding. In fact, many if not most of the characters that entail “feeling” have xin as a component element. Xin has as often been rendered as “mind.” Many if not most of the characters that refer to different modalities of “thinking” are also constructed with xin as a component. Indeed, there are many passages in these classical texts that would not make sense in English unless xin thinks, as well as feels. The point, of course, is that in this classical Chinese world view, the mind cannot be divorced from the heart. The cognitive is inseparable from the affective. To avoid such a dichotomy, we have translated xin rather inelegantly as “heart-and-mind” with the intention of reminding the reader that there are no rational thoughts devoid of feeling, nor any raw feelings altogether lacking in cognitive content. In the classical Chinese world view, process and change have priority over substance and permanence. Thus, it is frequently observed that, with respect to the human body, physiology has priority over anatomy. This being the case, it might well be argued that xin means “thinking and feeling,” and then derivatively and metaphorically, the organ with which these experiences are to be associated. [See also qing]

Glossary of Key Terms

83


xing. Xing, or more specifically, renxing
, is conventionally translated as “human nature.” Like the translation “Heaven” for tian
, much can be learned about xing by disassociating it from the common assumptions that attend this formulaic translation. In English, “human nature” is no less a conceptually laden expression than “Heaven.” Specifically with regard to renxing

, if we fail to make clear that we are not ascribing an essentialist understanding of “human nature” to the expression, it is likely that many, if not most, of our readers will tacitly default to this understanding. The idea of an invariant human nature leaves no room for the kind of creative social intelligence that we are able to find in a close reading of early Confucianism. It is better to think of xing as a spontaneous process that is continually altered through changing patterns of growth and extension. Such an understanding locates renxing within a process or event cosmology that is far more relevant to classical Confucianism than any essentialist reading. Given this processional understanding of xing, the relationship between renxing, tian, and ming must not be construed in an altogether deterministic manner. As the source of xing, tian
is not to be construed as precluding self-determination. It is better to think of tian and ren as we think of yin and yang—namely, as correlative functions that articulate the changing patterns of processes and events. We have discussed the correlativity of tian and ming in their respective entries in this glossary. The correlative status of tian and renxing is suggested by the oft-cited defining feature of classical Chinese religiousness as tianren heyi
 ! —“the continuity of tian and the human experience.” If the human being, while being endowed by tian, contributes to the content of tian, then in some degree at least (certainly in the persons of sages and exemplary models), the human being has a role in continually renegotiating what it means to be human. [See also ming, qing, tian]

84 Glossary of Key Terms


yi. Yi etymologically is an adumbrated picture of a sheep (yang
) over a first-person pronoun (wo
) “I,” “we,” “me,” “us,” the origins of which are unknown. It is revealing that in a tradition in which person is irreducibly social, the distinction between the singular “I” and the plural “we” is not indicated in the language. The “I” and the social context are reflexive and mutually entailing. In many of its early representations, attested in the Shuowen lexicon, the pronoun wo is a picture of a human hand holding a dagger-axe (ge
). Remembering that sheep were periodically sacrificed at large communal gatherings, we may gloss yi as the stance one takes when preparing the lamb for the ritual slaughter. This deferential stance not only makes one a sacred representative of the community, but also purifies and makes appropriately sacred the sacrificial animal. If this be so, then yi should not be rendered as “righteous” or “moral.” “Appropriate” or “fitting” are perhaps closer English equivalents for yi, and that is how the term is translated herein. Yi, then, is one’s sense of appropriateness that enables one to act in a proper and fitting manner, given the specific situation. It is a recognition of meaning as it resides in personal character and conduct. In fact, Zhongyong 20 defines yi paronomastically in precisely these terms: Appropriateness (yi
) means doing what is fitting (yi
), wherein esteeming those of superior character is most important.

By extension, it is also the meaning invested by a cumulative tradition in the forms of ritual propriety that define it. This import can be appropriated by a person in the performance of these roles and rituals. It is because yi is the sense of appropriateness that makes relationships truly meaningful in a community of credibility and mutual trust that Confucius in Analects 1.13 says “making good on one’s word (xin
) gets one close to appropriateness.” [See also ren, li] zhi. Zhi (
), with or without the “to speak” radical
beneath it, is usually translated as “knowledge,” “wisdom,” and “to know.”

Glossary of Key Terms

85

We often translate it as “to realize.” “To realize” has the same strong epistemic connotations as the original associations of “to know” or “knowledge” in English. You may say you believe whatever you like, but you can only know or realize something in the truest sense, if that something is or becomes the case. In addition, “realize” underscores the performative meaning of zhi—the need to author a situation and “make it real.” Furthermore, by translating zhi as to realize, we believe we are paying proper attention to the Confucian precept generally described as “the continuity of knowledge and action (zhixing heyi
 !)”—that is, “to know is to authenticate in action.” This practical entailment of the classical Chinese zhi precludes the familiar distinction between knowledge and wisdom that we find in English. When zhi appears nominally as “wisdom” or “the wise,” the Zhongyong continues a semantic association that is richly exploited in the Analects. Zhi occurs repeatedly in the Confucian literature in juxtaposition with “authoritative person/conduct (ren
),” precluding any fact/value distinction. To know a world and thus be wise in it is to recommend it in this as opposed to that way. Thus, knowing has very real normative implications. In defining this creative process, Zhongyong 25 observes: But creativity is not simply the self-consummating of one’s own person; it is what consummates events. Consummating oneself is authoritative conduct (ren
); consummating other events is wisdom (zhi
).

This passage is reminiscent of Analects 6.23 in which “wisdom” and “authoritative conduct” are also presented as symbiotic achievements in world-making: The Master said, “The wise (zhi
) enjoy water; those authoritative in their conduct (ren
) enjoy mountains. The wise are active; the authoritative are still. The wise find enjoyment; the authoritative are long-enduring.”

Wisdom always entails appropriateness to context (see Analects 6.22). Thus, in realizing oneself, one at the same time brings realization to one’s situation. [See also shengren]

86 Glossary of Key Terms


zhong. Zhong appears frequently in the Zhongyong, and has been translated as both “focus” and “equilibrium.” Zhongyong 1, for example, explains the relationship between the ongoing negotiation of a productive harmony (he), and the anchoring of this harmony that focus (zhong) provides: The moment at which joy and anger, grief and pleasure, have yet to arise is called a nascent equilibrium (zhong); once the emotions have arisen, that they are all brought into proper focus (zhong) is called harmony (he). This notion of equilibrium and focus (zhong) is the great root of the world; harmony then is the advancing of the proper way in the world. When equilibrium and focus are sustained and harmony is fully realized, the heavens and earth maintain their proper places and all things flourish in the world.

It is the human participation in bringing the world into meaningful focus and the human contribution to sustaining this equilibrium that establishes the human being as a full partner with the other forces shaping the natural, social, and cultural environments. Because a state of equilibrium and balance (zhong) precludes coercion, it is an essential condition for maximizing the creative possibilities in the pattern of relationships that constitute any particular situation. And real novelty as an indeterminate element is potentially destabilizing. Thus, the quality of creativity itself is dependent upon the capacity of the sage to orchestrate harmony in the world, and to modulate it in accordance with changing circumstances. Zhongyong 20 explains creativity in these terms: Creativity is the way of tian; creating is the proper way of becoming human. Creativity is achieving equilibrium and focus without coercion; it is succeeding without reflection. Freely and easily traveling the center of the way—this is the sage. Creating is selecting what is efficacious and holding on to it firmly.

[See also zhongyong]
 zhongyong. The expression zhongyong suggests that the locus for achieving harmony and equilibrium is yong—the ordinary business of the day. This project of ritualizing the human experience and enchanting the common, the routine, the concrete, and

Glossary of Key Terms

87

immediate, requires an unremitting attentiveness to disciplining and exploiting productively what is spontaneously novel as it emerges in our everyday experience. Ritualizing the human experience requires both an appreciation of persistent life forms, and the full exercise of our imagination in authorizing them for our own time and place. [See also zhong, li, he]

Focusing the Familiar A Translation of the Zhongyong1

1.


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What tian
commands (ming
) is called natural tendencies 3 4 (xing
); drawing out these natural tendencies is called the 5 6 proper way (dao
); improving upon this way is called educa7 tion (jiao
). As for this proper way, we cannot quit it even for an instant. Were it even possible to quit it, it would not be the 8 proper way. It is for this reason that exemplary persons (junzi
) are so concerned about what is not seen, and so anxious about what is not heard. There is nothing more present than what is imminent, and nothing more manifest than what is 9 inchoate. Thus, exemplary persons are ever concerned about 10 their uniqueness. The moment at which joy and anger, grief and pleasure, have yet to arise is called a nascent equilibrium (zhong
); once the emotions have arisen, that they are all brought into proper focus (zhong) is called harmony (he
). This notion of equilibrium and focus (zhong) is the great root of the world; harmony then is 11 the advancing of the proper way (dadao
) in the world. 89

90 Focusing the Familiar

When equilibrium and focus are sustained and harmony is fully realized, the heavens and earth maintain their proper places and all things flourish in the world. 2.




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Confucius said, “Exemplary persons (junzi
) focus (zhong
) the familiar affairs of the day; petty persons distort them. Exemplary persons are able to focus the affairs of the day because, being exemplary, they themselves constantly abide in equilibrium (zhong). Petty persons are a source of distortion in the affairs of the day because, being petty persons, they lack the requisite caution and concern.” 3.







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The Master said, “Focusing (zhong
) the familiar affairs of the day is a task of the highest order. It is rare among the common 12 people to be able to sustain it for long.” 4.






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The Master said, “I know why this proper way (dao
) is not traveled: The wise stray beyond it while the simple-minded cannot reach it. I know why this proper way is not evident: Those of superior character stray beyond it while those who are unworthy cannot reach it. Everyone eats and drinks, but those with real discrimination are rare indeed.” 5.







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A Translation of the Zhongyong

91

The Master said, “This man, Shun, was a person of the greatest wisdom. Shun loved to ask questions and loved to examine fa13 miliar words, passing over what was unhelpful to expand upon those ideas that had merit. Grasping these ideas at both ends, he would exercise impartiality (zhong
) in governing his people.14 It was this that made him a Shun.” 7.






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The Master said, “Everyone is saying, ‘I am wise (zhi
),’ but being driven forward they run headlong into nets, traps, and pit15 falls without any of them knowing how to avoid them. Everyone is saying, ‘I am wise,’ but having chosen to focus the familiar affairs of the day (zhongyong
), they are not able to sustain this for even the duration of a month.” 8.






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The Master said, “Yan Hui chose the path of focusing the familiar affairs of the day (zhongyong
), and on gaining something worthwhile from doing so, would clasp it tightly to his breast and not lose it—such was the likes of Yan Hui.” 9.










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The Master said, “Even the world, its states, and its clans can be 16 pacified, even ranks and emoluments can be declined, and even flashing blades can be trodden underfoot, but focusing the familiar affairs of the day (zhongyong
)—this is no easy matter.” 10.


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92 Focusing the Familiar 17

Zilu asked about proper strength. The Master replied, “Are you asking about the strength of the southerners, the strength of the northerners, or what you yourself would consider strength? Tolerance and flexibility in the education (jiao
) of others and not retaliating against those who have lost the proper way (dao
) is the strength of the southerners. Exemplary persons (junzi
) certainly live by this. Sleeping on one’s shield and sword and meeting one’s death without remorse is the strength of the northerners. And the strong certainly live by this. Thus, exemplary persons in bringing these different senses of ‘strength’ into harmony (he
) are not moved by the common flow. Such is their tenacity. Having established their focus (zhong
) they do not waver from it. Such is their tenacity. When the proper way prevails in the state, they do not change from what they are; when it does not, they remain themselves to the death. Such is 18 their tenacity.” 11.

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The Master said, “There are those who hide themselves away 19 and practice their esoteric arts to win a reputation from later ages. I am not willing to do this. There are exemplary persons (junzi
) who set out to live by walking the proper way (dao 20
), but who quit it halfway. I am not able to stop. And then there are exemplary persons who are given to focusing the familiar affairs of the day (zhongyong
), and who withdraw21 from the world to live out their lives in obscurity without the least regret—only the sages (shengzhe
) are able to do this.” 12.




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A Translation of the Zhongyong

93


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The proper way (dao
) of exemplary persons (junzi
) is 22 both broad and hidden. The dullest of ordinary men and women can know something of it, and yet even the sages (shengren
) in trying to penetrate to its furthest limits do not know it all. The most unworthy of common men and women are able to travel a distance along it, yet even the sages in trying to penetrate to its furthest limits are not able to travel it all. As grand as the world is, people are still never completely satisfied. Thus, were exemplary persons to discourse on the profundity of their way, there is nothing in the empire that could take its weight; were they to discourse on its subtlety, there is nothing in the empire that could further refine it. The Book of Songs says: The hawks soar to the limits of the heavens; 23 The fishes plunge to the furthest depths. This passage gives expression to its height and its depth. The proper way of exemplary persons has at its start the simple lives of ordinary men and women, and at its furthest limits sheds light upon the entire world. 13.

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94 Focusing the Familiar

The Master said, “The proper way (dao
) is not at all remote from people. If someone takes as the way that which distances 24 them from others, it should not be considered the proper way. In the Book of Songs it says: In hewing an axe handle, in hewing an axe handle— 25 The model is not far away. But in grasping one axe handle to hew another, if one never looks directly at the axe handle in one’s hand,26 the handles still seem far apart. Thus, the exemplary person (junzi
) uses one person to mold others properly, and having thus improved upon them, goes no further. Putting oneself in the place of others (shu
) and doing one’s best on their behalf (zhong
) does not stray far from the proper way.27 ‘Do not treat others as you yourself would not wish to be 28 treated.’ Of the four requirements of the exemplary person’s proper path, I am not yet able to satisfy even one. I am not yet able to serve my father as I would expect a son to serve me. I am not yet able to serve my lord as I would expect a minister to serve me. I 29 am not yet able to serve my elder brother as I would expect a younger brother to serve me. I am not yet able to first treat my 30 friends as I myself would wish them to treat me. Where in everyday moral conduct and in everyday attention to proper speech I am lacking in some respect, I must make every effort to attend to this; where there is excess in some respect, I must make every effort to constrain myself. In speech pay attention to what is done, and in conduct pay attention to what is said. How could the exemplary person not but earnestly aspire to behave in such a manner?” 14.




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95


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Exemplary persons (junzi
) conduct themselves according to 31 their station, and do not venture beyond it. Dwelling amidst wealth and honor, they act accordingly; dwelling amidst poverty and commonness, they act accordingly; dwelling among the Yi and Di tribes, they act accordingly; enduring grief and hardship, 32 they act accordingly. Wherever they go, they are self-possessed. When occupying a high station, they are not abusive; when in a low station, they do not cling to those above them. Adjusting their own conduct and not making demands on others, they do 33 not incur ill will. They do not hold any ill will against tian
34 above, nor do they blame other people below. Thus, exemplary persons stay on level ground in awaiting what is to come, while petty persons walk along the precipice hoping to get lucky. The Master said, “As in archery, so in the conduct of the exemplary person: In failing to hit the bull’s-eye, look for the reason 35 within oneself.” 15.




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) of exemplary persons (junzi
). The Book of Songs says: The loving relationship with wife and children, Is like the strumming of the zither and the lute; In the harmonious relationship between older and younger brothers There is an abundance of enjoyment and pleasure.

96 Focusing the Familiar

Be appropriate in your house and home And bring joy to your wife and progeny.37 The Master said, “And how happy the parents will be.” 16.




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The Master said, “The efficacy (de
) of the gods and spirits is profound. Looking, we do not see them; listening, we do not hear them. And yet they inform events (wu
) to the extent that 38 nothing can be what it is without them. Because of them, the people of the world fast, purify themselves, and put on their finest clothes in carrying out the sacrifices to them. It is as though the air above our heads is suffused with them, and as though they are all around. The Book of Songs says: The descent of the gods Cannot be fathomed— 39 How much less can it be ignored. Such is the way that the inchoate becomes manifest and creativ40 ity (cheng
) is irrepressible.” 17.

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The Master said, “Now Shun—there was person of great filiality (xiao
)! His excellence (de
) was that of a sage (shengren

), he was venerated as the Son of tian (tianzi
), and his wealth encompassed everything in the world. In the ancestral hall he received sacrifices, and generation after generation of progeny preserved his name. Thus, those of the greatest excel-

A Translation of the Zhongyong

97

lence (dade
) are certain to gain status, emoluments, reputation, and longevity. For the generosity of tian
in engendering and nurturing things is certain to be in response to the 41 quality of things themselves. It is thus those trees that are planted properly are given nourishment while those that are not 42 are uprooted. The Book of Songs says: So good and happy is the ruler (junzi): Such an abundant display of illustrious excellence (de
). He treats the common people appropriately; He treats his clansmen appropriately. He receives his emoluments from tian; Tian protects him in office and bestows on him its charge (ming
). It is from tian that all of this is redoubled.43 Those of the greatest excellence are thus certain to receive tian’s charge.” 18.




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The Master said, “It was only King Wen who suffered no grief. He had King Ji for a father and King Wu for a son. His father forged the path, and his son continued along the proper way.44 King Wu continued the endeavors of King Tai, King Ji, and King Wen. Even in slaying the great Yin and taking control of the empire, he did not personally lose the illustrious reputation 45 of his lineage throughout the world. He was venerated as the

98 Focusing the Familiar

Son of tian (tianzi
) and his wealth encompassed everything in the world. In the ancestral hall he received sacrifices, and generation after generation of progeny preserved his name. King Wu received the mandate late in life, and the Duke of Zhou carried on the excellent ways of Kings Wen and Wu. He revered as kings Kings Tai and Ji, and from his lower station used the rites of the Son of tian to sacrifice to their noble ancestors. He then extended the use of these same rites to the various vassals, the high ministers, the scholar-officials, and the common people. If the father was a high minister and the son a scholar-official, the father would be buried as a high minister but would receive sacrifices according to the rites appropriate for a scholar-official. But if the father was only a scholar-official and the son a high minister, the father would be buried as a scholarofficial, but would receive sacrifices according to the rites appropriate to a high minister. The one-year mourning period of blood relatives was extended to the high ministers, and the three-year mourning period was extended to the Son of tian. The mourning period for parents was the same, regardless of noble or common 46 status.” 19.

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)! Filial piety means being good at continuing the purposes of one’s predecessors and at maintaining their ways. In the proper season, they made repairs to the ancestral temple, laid out the sacrificial ves-

A Translation of the Zhongyong

99

sels of their ancestors, exhibited the robes used in funerary observances, and sacrificed from the newly harvested crops.48 They used ritual proprieties (li
) in the ancestral temple as their way of arranging the tablets of the departed generations appropriately on the left and right sides of the temple; they deferred to the titles of office as their way of recognizing degrees of nobility; they used the sequence of the services as their way of distinguishing those most worthy; 49 they used the drinking pledges in which inferiors toast superiors as their way of reaching down to include the lowliest, and they took into consideration the color of the hair as their way of seating participants according to their seniority. Taking up the places of their forebearers, carrying out their ritual observances (li), playing their music (yue
), showing respect to those whom they esteemed, extending their affections to those of whom they were fond, serving their dead as though they were living, and serving those who are long departed as though they were still here—this then is filial piety at its utmost. The sacrificial observances to tian
at the winter solstice in the southern suburbs of the capital and to the earth (di
) at the summer solstice in the northern suburbs are ways of serving the high ancestors. Ritual observances performed in the ancestral temple are ways of making sacrifices to one’s forebearers. For one who has a clear understanding of the sacrificial observances to tian and the earth, and the various ceremonies such as the Grand di sacrifice and the autumnal chang sacrifice performed in the ancestral temple, the governing of the empire is as easy as 50 51 placing something in the palm of one’s hand.” 20.
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Duke Ai of Lu asked about governing properly. The Master replied, “A record of the governing of Kings Wen and Wu is preserved on the wooden slats and bamboo strips. When they were alive, proper governing prevailed, but when they were gone, it ceased with them. The proper way of human beings (rendao

) encourages proper governing; the way of the earth (didao
52
) encourages planting and growing. Governing properly then, is the silkworm wasp transforming the larva of the silk53 worm into one of its own. Thus, governing properly lies in securing the right people. One gets the right persons with one’s own character, cultivates one’s own character with the proper way (dao
), and cultivates the proper way with authoritative conduct (ren
). Authoritative conduct (ren
) means conducting oneself like a human be54 ing (ren
), wherein devotion to one’s kin is most important. Appropriateness (yi
) means doing what is fitting (yi
), wherein esteeming those of superior character is most important.55 The degree of devotion due different kin and the degree of esteem accorded those who are different in character is what gives rise to ritual propriety (li
).56 (When those in inferior positions do not gain the support of their superiors, they will not be able to bring 57 order to the common people.) Thus, exemplary persons (junzi
) cannot but cultivate their persons. In cultivating their persons, they cannot but serve their kin. In serving their kin, they cannot but realize human conduct. And in realizing human conduct, they cannot but 58 realize tian
.

102

Focusing the Familiar 59

There are five ways forward (dadao
) in the world, and three methods of advancing on them. Ruler and minister, father and son, husband and wife, older and younger brother, friend and mentor—these are the five ways forward in the world. Wisdom (zhi
), authoritative conduct (ren
), and courage (yong
)— these are the three methods of excelling (dade
) in character. 60 How one advances along the way is one and the same. For some, wisdom is acquired through natural propensity, for others, through study, and for others, in response to difficul61 ties encountered. And yet in attaining wisdom, they are one and the same. Some advance along the way with ease, others are in search of personal profit, and others must exert enormous effort in doing so. And yet in their achievement, they are one and the same.” The Master said, “Being fond of learning is close to acting wisely (zhi
); advancing on the way with enthusiasm is close to acting authoritatively (ren
), and having a sense of shame is close to acting with courage (yong
). Those who realize these three realize how to cultivate their persons; those who realize how to cultivate their persons realize how to bring order to others; those who realize how to order others properly realize how to bring order to the world, the state, and the family.” In general there are nine guidelines in administering the empire, the state, and the family: Cultivate one’s person, esteem those of superior character, be devoted to one’s kin, respect the high ministers, be inclusive of the whole assembly of ministers, treat the common people as one’s children, attract the various artisans, be tolerant of those from afar, and cherish the various nobles. If one cultivates one’s person, the way will be established therefrom; if one esteems those of superior character, there will be no confusion; if one treats one’s kin as kin, one’s many uncles and brothers will harbor no ill will; if one respects the high ministers, there will be no deception; if one is inclusive of the whole assembly of ministers, the scholar-officials will repay one’s courtesies twofold; if one treats the common people as one’s children, the various clans will be much encouraged; if one attracts the various artisans, materials and the skills needed to

A Translation of the Zhongyong

103

use them will be sufficient; if one is tolerant of those from afar, people from distant quarters will flock to one; if one cherishes the various nobles, the world will hold one in awe. 62 Fasting, purifying oneself, putting on one’s finest clothes and not making a move that violates ritual propriety is the way to cultivate one’s person; dismissing flatterers and distancing enticing faces, making light of riches and honoring excellence, is the way to encourage those of superior character; esteeming their status, being generous with emoluments, and sharing their likes and dislikes is the way to encourage kinship among kin; providing an abundance of officers to carry out their charges is the way to encourage the high ministers; being generous in emoluments where people do their utmost (zhong
) and live up to their word63 (xin
) is the way to encourage scholar-officials; limiting corvee labor to the appropriate times and keeping taxes to a 64 minimum is the way to encourage the hundred clans; on the basis of daily scrutiny and monthly examinations to give everyone their due is the way to encourage the various artisans; to send off those who are leaving and welcome those who are arriving, to commend the skillful and to show compassion to the incompetent, is the way to be tolerant to those from afar; to continue lineages that have been broken, to revive states that have collapsed, to restore order where there is chaos and to take control where there are crises, to fix the times for vassals to present themselves at court and for court envoys to be dispatched, sending the envoys with generous bounty but expecting only token tribute on the arrival of the vassals—this is the way to cherish the various nobles. In general there are nine guidelines in administering the empire, the state, and the family, yet the way of implementing them is one and the same. Generally speaking, preparation means success, a lack of preparation means failure. To speak only after having determined one’s course will prevent stumbling; to proceed only after having determined one’s course will prevent difficulties; to take action only after having determined one’s course will prevent distress; to make one’s way only after having determined one’s course will prevent coming to a dead end.

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Focusing the Familiar

When those in inferior positions do not gain the support of their superiors, they will not be able to bring order to the com65 mon people. There is a way of gaining the support of one’s superiors: If one does not have the confidence of one’s friends, one will not gain the support of one’s superiors. There is a way of winning the confidence of one’s friends: If one does not get on well with one’s kin, one will not gain the trust of one’s friends. There is a way of getting on well with one’s kin: If on introspection one finds a lack of creativity (cheng
) in one’s person, one will not get on well with one’s kin. There is a way of being creative in one’s person: If one does not understand efficacy (shan
), one will not find creativity in one’s person. Creativity (cheng
) is the way of tian (
 ); creating is the proper way of becoming human (
 ). 66 Creativity is achieving equilibrium and focus (zhong
) without coercion; it is succeeding without reflection. Freely and easily traveling the center of the way—this is the sage (shengren
). Creating is selecting what is efficacious (shan
) and holding on to it firmly. Study the way broadly, ask about it in detail, reflect on it carefully, analyze it clearly, and advance on it with earnestness. Where there is something that one has yet to study or that, having studied it, has yet to master, do not stop; where there is something that one has yet to ask about or that, having asked about it, has yet to understand, do not stop; where there is something that one has yet to reflect upon or that, having reflected on it, has yet to grasp, do not stop; where there is something that one has yet to analyze or that, having analyzed it, is still not clear about, do not stop; where there is the proper way that one has not yet advanced on or that, having advanced on it, has yet to do so with earnestness, do not stop. While others can accomplish this with just a single try, I will try a hundred times; while others can accomplish this with just ten tries, I will try a thousand times. If in the end people are able to advance on this way, even the dull are sure to become bright; even the weak are sure to become strong.

A Translation of the Zhongyong

21.


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Understanding born of creativity (cheng
) is a gift of our natural tendencies (xing
); creativity born of understanding is a gift of education (jiao
). Where there is creativity, there is understanding; where understanding, creativity. 22.


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Only those of utmost creativity (zhicheng
) in the world are able to make the most of their natural tendencies (xing
). Only if one is able to make the most of one’s own natural tendencies is one able to make the most of the natural tendencies of others; only if one is able to make the most of the natural tendencies of others is one able to make the most of the natural tendencies of processes and events (wu
); only if one is able to make the most of the natural tendencies of processes and events can one assist in the transforming and nourishing activities of heaven and earth; and only if one can assist in the transforming and nourishing activities of heaven and earth can human beings take their place as members of this triad. 23.



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Next one cultivates these processes and events with discretion so that each aspect of them is able to realize its own creativity (cheng
). When there is creativity there is something determinate; when there is something determinate, it is manifest; when it is manifest, there is understanding; when there is understanding, others are affected; when others are affected, 70 they change; when they change, they are transformed. And only those of utmost creativity (zhicheng
) in the world are able to effect transformation.

106

24.




Focusing the Familiar

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The way of utmost creativity (zhicheng
) entails foreknowledge. When the state and family are about to flourish, there are bound to be auspicious omens and signs; when they are about to perish, there are bound to be ominous portents and auguries. These will be manifest in the milfoil and turtle plastron 71 divinations, and will affect the movements of the four limbs. When a change in fortune is about to happen, either for good or for bad, it is bound to be known in advance. Thus utmost cre72 ativity is numinous. 25.
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Creativity (cheng
) is self-consummating (zicheng
), and 73 ). Creativity is a its way (dao
) is self-directing (zidao process (wu
) taken from its beginning to its end, and without 74 this creativity, there are no events. It is thus that, for exemplary persons (junzi
), it is creativity that is prized. But creativity is not simply the self-consummating of one’s own person; it is what consummates events. Consummating oneself is authoritative 75 conduct (ren
); consummating other events is wisdom (zhi
). This is the excellence (de
) of one’s natural tendencies (xing
) and is the way of integrating what is more internal and what is 76 more external. Thus, whenever one applies this excellence, it is fitting. 26.



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A Translation of the Zhongyong

107





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Thus, the utmost creativity (zhicheng
) is ceaseless. Unceasing, it is enduring; enduring, it is effective; effective, it reaches far into the distance; reaching far into the distance, it is broad and thick; being broad and thick, it is high and brilliant. Its breadth and thickness enable it to bear up everything; its height and brilliance enable it to envelope everything; reaching far into the distance enables it to realize all events. Broad and thick, it is companion to the earth; high and brilliant, it is companion to the heavens; far-reaching and enduring, it is without limit. This process of utmost creativity is in full display without manifesting itself, changes without moving, and realizes without doing anything. The way of heaven and earth can be captured in one phrase: Since events are never duplicated, their production is unfathomable. The way of heaven and earth is broad, is thick, is high, is brilliant, is far-reaching, is enduring. Now the firmament (tian
) is just an accumulation of light, but given its boundlessness, the sun, moon, stars, and constellations are all woven through it, and all things are covered by it. As for the earth, it is just an accumulation of pinches of dirt, and yet given its expanse and thickness, it bears up the mountains of Hua and Yue without feeling their weight, circulates the

108

Focusing the Familiar

waters of the rivers and seas without any leakage, and bears up all things. As for mountains, they are just an accumulation of handfuls of stone, and yet given their expanse and size, grasses and trees grow on them, birds and beasts find refuge in them, and deposits of precious resources are replete within them. And as for the waters, they are just an accumulation of spoonfuls of water, and yet given their bottomlessness, giant tortoises, alligators, a variety of dragons, fishes, and turtles live in them, and precious goods and commodities are reproduced within them. The Book of Songs says: Ah! What tian promotes— 77 So profound and unceasing. This may describe what makes tian tian. The Book of Songs says: So magnificent!78 The purity of King Wen’s excellence! This may describe what makes King Wen “cultured (wen
).” 79 His purity too was unceasing. 27.



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Great indeed is the sage’s proper path (shengren zhi dao

). So vast and expansive, it propagates and nurtures all things; so towering, it reaches up to the skies. So great indeed! The rites and ceremonies number fully three hundred, the rules of observance fully three thousand, and only the sage can carry them out.

A Translation of the Zhongyong

109

Thus it is said: “If persons are not of the utmost excellence (zhide
), the utmost path (zhidao
) will not take shape under their feet.” Thus exemplary persons (junzi
) prize their natural tendency towards excellence (dexing
) and go the way of study and inquiry. Extending this path to the furthest quarters and exhausting its every detail, they reach to the highest and brightest limits, and make focusing the familiar (zhongyong
) their 80 way. They revise the old in order to realize the new, and with real solemnity celebrate the rites and ceremonies (li
). It is for this reason that in achieving high status they are not arrogant,81 and when in lowly circumstances they are not disloyal. When the proper way (dao
) prevails in the world, their words will enable them to flourish; when it does not, their silence will win 82 them forbearance. The Book of Songs says: Enlightened, and also wise— 83 Thus he guards his person. Is this not what this passage means? 28.






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 !"#$%"
& '( The Master said, “Being foolish and yet insisting on depending upon themselves, being base and yet insisting on taking charge of themselves, being born into the present generation but returning to the ways of old—such people as these will bring down calamities on their own persons.”84 No one but the Son of tian (tianzi
) can preside over rites and ceremonies, make the laws, and determine the written script. Today in the empire our carriages have axles of the same width,

110

Focusing the Familiar

in our writing we use a standard script, and in our conduct we accept the same norms.85 Even if one has ascended the throne, if he has not achieved the necessary excellence (de
), he dare not initiate ceremonies and music (liyue
) for the court. If he has achieved excellence but does not occupy the throne, he also dare not initiate ceremonies and music for the court. The Master said, “I can explain the ritual observances of the Xia dynasty, even though its descendent state, Qi, does not provide adequate evidence. I have studied the ritual observances of the Shang dynasty, and moreover, its descendent state, Song, has preserved them. I have studied the ritual observances of the Zhou 86 dynasty that we presently use. I follow the Zhou.” 29.



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 !"#$%&'(
 !"#$%&'!()*+,
 For the person who would be the true king over the empire, at87 tention to three important matters will minimize errors. With respect to the ritual observances that were practiced by those 88 who came before the Zhou kings, however efficacious (shan
) they might have been, they cannot be corroborated (zheng
), and since they cannot be corroborated, they lack credence (xin
), and lacking credence, the common people will not follow them. As for those ritual observances practiced by those who came later,89 however efficacious they might be, they are not held in high esteem (zun
), and without esteem they lack credence, and lacking credence, the common people will not follow them. Thus, the proper way (dao
) of this ruler (junzi
) is rooted in his own person, is corroborated by the ordinary

A Translation of the Zhongyong

111

people, and is compared with the way of the Three Kings so there is no mistake. Established between the heavens and the earth, this way does not run contrary to their operations. Confirmed before the gods and spirits, no doubts attend it. Having waited one hundred generations for the appearance of the sage 90 (shengren
), there are no second thoughts. Confirming this way before the gods and spirits so there is no doubt about it, is to know tian (
); having waited one hundred generations for the appearance of the sage so there are no second thoughts, is to know the human (ren
). It is for this reason that this ruler moves and generations take his conduct as a way for the world, acts and generations take his actions as a model for the world, speaks and generations take what he says as the norm for the world. Those at a distance look to him in expectation; those close by never weary of him. The Book of Songs says: Over there no one dislikes him, Here no one tires of him; Let’s continue night and day 91 To extend our praises to him. There has never been a ruler who distinguished himself throughout the empire at an early age who was not as good as this. 30.


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Zhongni (Confucius) revered Yao and Shun as his ancestors and carried on their ways; he emulated and made illustrious the ways of Kings Wen and Wu. He modeled himself above on the rhythm of the turning seasons, and below he was attuned to the patterns of water and earth. He is comparable to the heavens and the earth, sheltering and supporting everything that is. He is comparable to the progress of the four seasons, and the alternating brightnesses of the sun and moon.

112

Focusing the Familiar

All things are nurtured together and do not cause injury to one another; the various ways are traveled together and are not conflicted. Their lesser excellences are to be seen as flowing streams; their greater excellences are to be seen as massive transformations. This is why the heavens and the earth are so great. 31.


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%$Only those of utmost sagacity (zhisheng
) in the world: have the perspicacity and quickness of mind needed to oversee the empire; have the tolerance and flexibility needed to win them the forbearance of others; have the energy and fortitude needed to maintain their grasp; have the poise and impeccability needed to command respect; have the culture and discernment needed to be discriminating. So broad, expansive, and profoundly deep, in a timely way they express these virtues. So broad and expansive like the heavens themselves; so profoundly deep like a bottomless abyss: They appear and all defer to them; they speak and all have confidence in what they say; they act and all find pleasure in what they do. It is for this reason that their fame spreads out over the Central States, extending to the Man and Mo barbarians in the south and north. Everywhere that boats and carriages ply, everywhere that human strength penetrates, everywhere that is sheltered by the heavens and is borne up by the earth, everywhere that is illu-

A Translation of the Zhongyong

113

mined by the sun and moon, everywhere that the frosts and dew settle—all creatures that have breath and blood revere and love them. Thus it is said that they are the complement of tian
. 32.




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Only those in the world of utmost creativity (zhicheng
) are able to separate out and braid together the many threads on the great loom of the world. Only they set the great root of the world and realize the transforming and nourishing processes of heaven and earth. How could there be anything on which they depend? So earnest, they are authoritative (ren
); So profound, they are a bottomless abyss (yuan
); So pervasive, they are tian
. Only those whose own capacities of discernment and sagely wisdom extend to the powers of tian could possibly understand them.92 33.




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Focusing the Familiar




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%$The Book of Songs says: Over her brocade skirts 93 She wears a plain robe. This means she hates to make a display of her refinement. Thus, the ways of exemplary persons (junzi
) while hidden, day by day become more conspicuous; the ways of petty persons while obvious, day by day disappear. The ways of exemplary persons are plain and not wearisome, Simple and refined, Amicable and coherent. Those who know the nearness of what is distant, The source of what is customary, And the conspicuousness of what is subtle— Such persons can enter the gates of excellence. 94 The Book of Songs says: Although having dived down to lie on the bottom, The fish is still highly visible. Thus exemplary persons on introspection are not dissatisfied, and find no fault in their purposes. It is precisely what is truly exceptional about exemplary persons, that others cannot see. 95 The Book of Songs says: Being seen as you dwell in your own residence, Be without shame even in the most secluded corner. Thus, exemplary persons are respected without lifting a hand, and are credible without having spoken a word. 96 The Book of Songs says:

A Translation of the Zhongyong

115

Approaching and presiding at the sacrifice in silence, 97 At such a time there is no contention. It is for this reason that exemplary persons offer no reward and yet have the best efforts of the common people; show no anger and yet the people stand in awe of their symbols of sovereignty. 98 The Book of Songs says: Without making a show of his excellence, The various vassals model themselves after him. It is for this reason that exemplary persons are earnest and reverential, and the world is at peace. 99 The Book of Songs says: Harboring the highest excellence in your breast, You have no need of loud words or intimidating looks. The Master said, “Loud words and intimidating looks are of little use in transforming the common people.” 100 The Book of Songs says: The influence of excellence is as light as a feather. But even a feather is too heavy in the comparison. The natural world around us goes about its work 101 without using sound or scent. It is indeed superlative.

notes to the translation 1. The title, Zhongyong
, has been translated as “The Doctrine of the Mean” by James Legge, “The Mean-in-Action” by E. R. Hughes, “Central Harmony” by Gu Hongming, “The Unwobbling Pivot” by Ezra Pound, and “Centrality and Commonality” by Tu Weiming. The Han commentator Zheng Xuan defines yong as “practice”— “the practical application of centrality.” Zhu Xi concludes that yong

116

Focusing the Familiar

means “that which is ordinary and common.” Our translation is in the spirit of Zheng Xuan, Zhu Xi, and Tu Wei-ming. What for Zheng Xuan is “the practical application of centrality” we would render as “focusing.” What is focused, we would hold, is as Zhu Xi suggests— namely the ordinary and common, or “the familiar affairs of the day.” 2. As noted in the Introduction, the contemporary scholar, Pang Pu
 (1998):92–93, interprets tian as “social forces
 ” that influence human development. Although underscoring the human content in this ancestral object of reverence, he sees these same influences as beyond the control of any particular human being. Pang Pu’s reading is here allied with Tu Wei-ming’s (1989):9 more familiar notion that this passage affirms “the ancient Chinese belief in a purposive and caring Heaven as the ultimate arbiter of human affairs,” and Jeff Riegel’s (1978):208n3 metaphysical interpretation of xing
as a given human nature: “Because one’s nature is fixed, and fixed by Heaven, one has an obligation to Heaven to cultivate it (208n3).” There is a certain tension in Pang Pu’s reading of tian, however. His argument seems to suggest that tian construed as “social forces” (though beyond the influence of any ordinay individual) is definitely affected by the accumulated actions of individuals focused by exemplary models—that is, by the weight of the accumulated “social forces” of the cultural tradition. See Note 7 below. 3. The Mencius 7B24 uses both ming and xing, introducing an important distinction between them. For Mencius, ming covers the more basic animal conditions of being human, while xing is reserved for the cultivated moral, aesthetic, religious, and cognitive achievements that together make one distinctively human. Given that ming is the relationship between the human world and the propensity of circumstances that provides it context, it is constantly being renegotiated. 4. Shuai
(Karlgren, Grammata Serica Recensa, hereafter GSR, 498) is etymologically the same word as shuai
(GSR 499) that means both “to lead (an army),” and “to follow the lead, to obey.” That is, shuai means both “to follow” and “to lead,” characterizing the situation rather than the agent. 5. There is a parallel passage in HNZ 11/93/20, perhaps even a parody on this Zhongyong text, that uses a similar vocabulary to provide a patently anti-Confucian commentary:
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 !"#$%!&'()*+",-./012+"

A Translation of the Zhongyong

117

Drawing out these natural tendencies and putting them into practice is called the proper way; realizing one’s natural tendencies is called excellence. Authoritative conduct is exalted only when we have lost these natural tendencies; appropriateness is exalted only when we have lost our proper way. For this reason, authoritative conduct and appropriateness having a place means that the proper way and excellence have been dislodged. If ritual propriety and the playing of music adorn our lives, then our pure simplicity has been compromised. 6. Xiu
(GSR 1077) means “adorn, arrange, repair, attend to,” and “elaborate,” as well as “cultivate.” It would seem to refer to “cultivating” in the sense of human cultural activity rather than nurturing the growth of something already predetermined. Zheng Xuan glosses this character as “building and broadening it, the human being extends and beautifies it
 !"#$%!,” perhaps alluding to the Analects 15.29 passage, “It is the person who is able to broaden the way

.” Zheng’s commentary suggests a sense of “trailblazing” rather than simply repairing an existing roadway. 7. As Pang Pu (1998):95 points out, it is significant that the key determining factor in human realization is education—something over which human beings do exercise control, and for which they are responsible. The parallel structure in the Analects 20.3 suggests that the terms ming
, li
, and yan
all be understood as requiring personal participation rather than being regarded as some determinative imposition on human experience. Similarly, xing
, dao
, and jiao
are parallel in this passage, challenging the assumed “givenness” of xing. The expectation that one must contribute to the construction of the road to becoming human is clear from the parallel structure. An ideal passage that illustrates the collaboration between the particular mentor and the particular student is Analects 9.11 in which Yan Hui describes how Confucius “is good at drawing me forward a step at a time.” See the distinction between educare and educere in the Introduction and in the Glossary of Key Terms under jiao. 8. This passage parallels the opening lines of Daodejing 1 in its structure.

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Focusing the Familiar

9. Compare John Dewey (1958):43–44: “The visible is set in the invisible; and in the end the unseen decides what happens in the seen; the tangible rests precariously upon the untouched and ungrasped.” 10. One’s uniqueness must be understood as a transactional achievement, entailing what one does for the context as well as what the context does for one’s person. It refers to the uniqueness of one’s own particular relations as they contribute to a flourishing community. John Dewey’s “individuality” is a similar notion, achieved through associated action. This passage also recalls Whitehead (1960):16, “Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness [italics added].” The expression shendu occurs also in Xunzi 7/3/30:
 !"#$%&'()*+,&-./0.%(.%
 !
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 !"#$ This is because according with the propensity of circumstances they are ever concerned about their uniqueness. For persons effective in advancing the proper way, if they do not have integrity, they are not unique; if they are not unique, they will not take shape; if they do not take shape, even though they initiate something in their hearts-andminds, it is manifest in their countenance, and it is expressed in what they say, still the common people will not follow them, and even if they do follow them, they are certain to be distrustful. This section of Xunzi uses a vocabulary reminiscent of the Zhongyong, and seems to be an elaboration upon it. The other example of this expression is in the Daxue (Legge 1960: 367) which uses a vocabulary similar to Xunzi:
 !"#$!%&'()*+,-.& This is what is meant by the saying: “Integrity within will shape one without.” Thus, exemplary persons are necessarily concerned about their uniqueness. In Zhuangzi 17/6/41 (compare Graham 87, Watson 83) there is the passage:
 !"#$%#$ !"&'() Having attained the brightness of dawn, he was then able to see his own uniqueness; seeing his own uniqueness he was then able to set aside past and present.

A Translation of the Zhongyong

119

The use of du is often glossed as “oneness” (yi
), and is reminiscent of Daodejing 25:
 !"#$% !&' Solitary, it is neither changed by anything nor complete. [Pervading everywhere, it does not pause.] Riegel (1978):209n9 follows Maspero (1927):456 in translating shendu
 as “guards his uniqueness.” 11. Karlgren’s GRS271 defines the term da
in dadao
 as “breaking through (as growing grain).” This notion of the advancing pathway recalls Analects 15.29:
 !"#!
$ It is the person who is able to broaden the way, not the way that broadens the person. 12. This is an abbreviated version of a similar passage in Analects 6.29. The Zhongyong text has introduced the character neng
, altering the reading of this phrase from the Analects version: “That it is rare among the people is an old story.” The sense of unwavering attention in this Zhongyong version is reminiscent of passages in Analects 12.1 “If for the space of a day . . .”; 4.5 “Exemplary persons do not take leave of their authoritative conduct even for the space of a meal”; 4.6 “Are there people who, for the space of a single day, have given their full strength to authoritative conduct?”; and 6.7 “With my disciple, Yan Hui, he could go for several months without departing from authoritative thoughts and feelings; as for the others, only every once in a long while, might authoritative thoughts and feelings make an appearance.” 13. The glosses all explain er
as “near jin
” but the meaning is not clear. The Book of Songs 195 has this expression, that Karlgren (1950):142 translates as “shallow words,” but this would not make sense here. Mencius 7B16 describes how Shun was transformed from a wild man of the mountains to a sage through the influence of good words and conduct. 14. Zheng Xuan reads this passages as alluding to passage 4 above, where liangduan
 would refer to excess and deficiency. The Analects has this same expression, liangduan in 9.8: The Master said, “Do I possess wisdom? No, I do not. But if a simple peasant puts a question to me, and I come up empty, I attack the question from both ends (liangduan) until I have gotten to the bottom of it.”

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Focusing the Familiar

If we follow the Analects, liangduan would mean “comprehensively.” Riegel (1978):212–13 translates this passage as: Others either hid the evil or displayed the good. He held fast to both ends. . . . 15. Reading
as . 16. This is perhaps an allusion to the Great Learning (daxue). 17. Zilu (also known as Zhong You) was another of Confucius’s best known and favorite disciples. It is significant that it is he who asks after “strength (qiang
).” He was a person of courage and action who was sometimes upbraided by Confucius for being too bold and impetuous. When he asked Confucius if courage was indeed the highest virtue, Confucius tried to rein him in by replying that a person who has courage without a sense of appropriateness would be a troublemaker, and a lesser person would be a thief. Confucius’s feelings for Zilu were mixed. On the one hand, he was constantly critical of Zilu’s rashness and immodesty, and impatient with his seeming indifference to book learning. On the other hand, Confucius appreciated Zilu’s unswerving loyalty and directness. Zilu never delayed in fulfilling his commitments. But being nearer Confucius in age and with a military temper, Zilu was not one to take criticism without giving it back. On several occasions, especially in the apocryphal literature, Zilu challenges Confucius’s judgment in associating with political figures of questionable character and immodest reputation—the wife of Duke Ling of Wei, for example. And Confucius is left trying to defend himself. At the end of the day, Confucius seems to have an enormous affection for the irrepressible Zilu. 18. This passage is emblematic of this whole introductory section. There are three positions: tolerant strength (wen
), militant strength (wu
), and the strength needed by Zilu. The point is that a combination of the first two, calibrated according to circumstances, with privilege to wen, is what is needed. In this text (like life itself), there is no right or wrong, but only a productive balance that is flexible enough to accommodate changing circumstances. 19. Analects 7.21 states explicitly that Confucius had nothing to say about the “esoteric (guai
).” Again, in Analects 2.16, Confucius cautions: “To become accomplished in some heterodox doctrine will bring nothing but harm.”

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20. The character zun
(GSR 430) is another expression that means at once “to go along” and “to follow.” 21. The character dun
(GSR 428) means “to withdraw.” At first blush, this seems rather Daoistic, recalling the encounter with recluses in Analects 18.5–8. But then there are also many passages that recommend withdrawing when the dao does not prevail, 5.2, 5.21, and especially 8.13: “Be known when the way prevails in the world, but remain hidden away when it does not.
 !"#$%!"&'” 22. Fei
(GSR 500) means “to expend largely,” “to squander,” suggesting breadth and expanse. This passage could serve as commentary on Analects 9.11 in which the road is both broad and hidden, both apparent and obscure: Yan Hui, with a deep sigh, said, “The more I look up at it, the higher it soars; the more I penetrate into it, the harder it becomes. I am looking at it in front of me, and suddenly it is behind me. The Master is good at drawing me forward a step at a time; he broadens me with culture and disciplines my behavior through the observance of ritual propriety. Even if I wanted to quit, I could not. And when I have exhausted my abilities, it is as though something rises up right in front of me, and even though I want to follow it, there is no road to take.” The idea that everyone has a greater or lesser grasp upon this way is the main theme of Analects 19.22: Gongsun Chao of Wei asked Zigong, “With whom did Confucius study?” Zigong replied, “The way of Kings Wen and Wu has not collapsed utterly—it lives in the people. Those of superior character have grasped the greater part, while those of lesser quality have grasped a bit of it. Everyone has something of Wen and Wu’s way in them. Who then does the Master not learn from? Again, how could there be a single constant teacher for him?” 23. Book of Songs 239; compare Karlgren (1950):191. 24. In Analects 8.7 this metaphor of distance is also used in reference to the way. This passage is reminiscent of Analects 7.30: The Master said, “How could authoritative conduct (ren
) be at all remote? No sooner do I seek it than it has arrived.”

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Focusing the Familiar

25. Book of Songs 158; compare Karlgren (1950):103. This analogy between hewing an axe handle and crafting a human being is reminiscent of Analects 6.30: Correlating one’s conduct with those near at hand can be said to be the method of becoming an authoritative person. This same strategy for becoming an authoritative person is repeated in Analects 12.1: Through self-discipline and observing ritual propriety one becomes authoritative in one’s conduct. The method of becoming authoritative in one’s conduct lies in full participation in those personal relations near at hand. In this example of hewing an axe-handle, the final and efficient causes are one and the same, collapsing the familiar distinction between end and means. 26. Zhu Xi interprets ni
as xieshi
—“sidelong glances,” “askance” (in the sense of looking obliquely or indirectly). 27. See Analects 4.15: Master Zeng said, “The way of the Master is doing one’s best by others (zhong ) and putting oneself in their place (shu
), nothing more.” 28. Here the Zhongyong is citing the Analects 12.2 and 15.24. 29. The expressions “elder” and “younger brother” have broad social applications that go far beyond the restricted sense of siblings. 30. This locution is a positive formulation of the Golden Rule, usually expressed by Confucius as, “Do not treat others as you yourself would not wish to be treated.” Xunzi 20 is devoted to the complexity of these relations, challenging any simple reading of filiality or loyalty as obedience. It provides ready examples of where it is in fact unfilial and disloyal to comply with the demands of one’s superior. 31. Compare Analects 14.26: The Master said, “Do not plan the policies of an office you do not hold.” Master Zeng commented, “The thoughts of exemplary persons do not wander beyond their station.” While this passage seems to offend against freedom of thought and speech, it is consistent with an unwillingness to separate theory and practice, privilege and responsibility.

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32. Although the outward conduct of exemplary persons might change under differing circumstances, their character remains constant. Riegel (1978):221n62 associates such conduct with the “village worthy” in Analects 17.13; it is further elaborated upon in Mencius 7B37. In fact, Confucius and Mencius both condemn the village worthy precisely because, lacking integrity, he not only acts according to the demands of external circumstances, but is wholly determined by them. The point made here is that exemplary persons having integrity are not compromised by external circumstances. This is the thrust of Analects 14.24: The Master said, “Scholars of old would study for their own sake, while those of today do so to impress others.” 33. This passage recalls Analects 15.15: The Master said, “To demand much from oneself personally, and not overmuch from others, will keep ill will at a distance.” and also 15.21: The Master said, “Exemplary persons make demands on themselves, while petty persons make demands on others.” Note that the subject of yuan
, translated here as “ill will,” shifts, illustrating the priority of situation over agency. In the first instance exemplary persons are the putative object of ill will, and then subsequently the subject of ill will. See also sections 2 and 10 above that have similar import. 34. Compare Analects 14.35: The Master said, “I neither hold any ill will against tian nor blame other people.” 35. Compare Mencius 2A7:
 !"#$%$"&'%&()!%*+,!"!
 The archer adjusts himself and then lets the arrow fly. When it fails to hit its mark, he does not bear ill will against the winner, but looks for the reason within himself. 36. Mencius 4A11 has a similar phrase, encouraging the reader to seek the proper way in what is close at hand. 37. Book of Songs 164; compare Karlgren (1950):108. Takeuchi Yoshio (1979):36 thinks that this citation from the Book of Songs has nothing to do with the passage, and is a later interpolation.

124

Focusing the Familiar

38. Zheng Xuan reads
as
and
as
, so that “all things are born and live from the energies of the gods and spirits.” 39. Book of Songs 256; compare Karlgren (1950):218. 40. Takeuchi Yoshio (1979):37 relocates this passage, arguing that 15 and 17 are continuous, and the overt reference to gods and spirits is not consistent with the Confucius of the Analects. In relocating it, he is able to attribute it to Zisi who, unlike Confucius, makes frequent use of cheng
. There is an allusion in this passage to a similar notion of “the inchoate being manifest” in Zhongyong 1. 41. This passage would suggest that the natural conditions made available to things for their growth is a response to their own continuing worth that, rather than being simply some initial endowment from tian, is a productive collaboration with tian over their lifetime. 42. The analogy here would seem to be between tian responding to the growth of the ruler, and the gardener responding to the growth of the trees under his charge. Takeuchi Yoshio (1979):37 suggests that this passage from “Thus, those of the highest excellence . . .” is commentary that has been introduced into the original text. 43. Book of Songs 249; compare Karlgren (1950):205. 44. The language in this passage is an allusion to Analects 7.1:
 ! Following the proper way, I do not forge new paths. . . . 45. It is not King Wu’s own reputation, but that of his family that is at issue here; hence the use of shen
: “he personally.” 46. The conventions of filial piety around which the court was organized are, in the early Zhou period, extended to the people broadly. Takeuchi Yoshio suggests that this passage from “He then extended the use of the same rites . . .” on, is later commentary. 47. The Zhu Xi commentary suggests that
 means “acknowledged by everyone.” 48. The expression jian
refers explicitly to sacrifices of the new crop of fruits and vegetables. 49. The parallel structure of this entire passage would suggest that the expression “and unworthy
” in this particular phrase has been inadvertently omitted. 50. Following Zheng Xuan in reading “displaying (shi
)” as “placing (zhi
).” 51. Here the observance of ritual propriety (li) becomes a way of knowing the world.

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52. Shu
is verbal, meaning “to plant and grow.” 53. Following Zheng Xuan who reads
 as a kind of wasp that takes the larva of the silkworm, feeds it, and transforms it into its own kind. Zhu Xi reads it as “fast-growing cattail rushes.” Kongzi jiayu 17.1/34/14 elaborates upon this same passage:
 !" The way of tian encourages proper living, the proper way of human beings encourages proper governing, and the way of earth encourages planting and growing. Governing properly then, is like the silkworm wasp that is formed through a process of transformation. Takeuchi Yoshio (1979):39 suggests that these two lines from “The proper way of human beings . . .” are interpolated commentary. 54. Compare Mencius 7B16:
 !"#$%#&'()*+,#& Mencius said, “Authoritative conduct is conducting oneself like a human being. When these two are spoken of together, they mean the proper way.” This would seem to mean that when there is no qualitative discrepancy between these two senses of acting like a person, the proper way prevails. Perhaps Analects 3.3 can be used as gloss in understanding this Mencius passage:
 !"#$%&
 !"#'%& What has a person who is not authoritative got to do with observing ritual propriety? What has a person who is not authoritative got to do with the playing of music? 55. Note the paronomastic definitions for ren and yi. 56. We have amended this passage on the basis of the Kongzi jiayu 17.1/34/14 passage:

 !"#$!%&'()*%+,-)* The lessons of loving kin and the degree of esteem accorded those who are different in character is what gives rise to ritual propriety. The observance of ritual propriety is the root of proper governing. 57. This sentence appears later in this same passage, and is out of place here. Zheng Xuan suggests that it is duplicated here and should be omitted. The parallel passage in Kongzi jiayu does not have it.

126

Focusing the Familiar

58. This passage rhymes
,
,
, and
. The character
is a particle used in rhymed verse. The idea here is reminiscent of Mencius 7A1:
 !"#$%"#&"'(% To make the most of one’s heart-and-mind is to realize one’s natural tendencies, and if one realizes one’s natural tendencies, one is realizing tian. 59. This expression “the path forward
” also occurs in passage 1. 60. Zhu Xi suggests that “one (yi
)” refers to “creativity (cheng
).” See Analects 15.29 and 6.23. 61. Compare Analects 16.9: Confucius said, “Knowledge acquired through a natural propensity for it is its highest level; knowledge acquired through study is the next highest; something learned in response to difficulties encountered is again the next highest. But those common people who do not learn even when vexed with difficulties—they are at the bottom of the heap.” 62. This same language is used in passage 16. 63. Several interpreters take
 as conduct on the part of those in authority. But this is not an appropriate vocabulary for describing the ruler’s behavior. 64. This is the same vocabulary found in Mencius 1A5. 65. This entire passage is paralleled in Mencius 4A12. See Hall and Ames (1998):162–63. 66. In Mencius 4A12, it has “reflecting on creativity is the proper way of becoming human
 !"#$.” 67. See Whitehead’s definitions of “understanding” in Modes of Thought 57–58. See also our discussion of this chapter in the Introduction. 68. We use the phrase “is a gift of” to translate the expression wei zhi
 (literally, “is called”) in order to avoid the causal connotations entailed by Wing-tsit Chan’s “results from,” while nonetheless accounting for the intimate connection of the termini a quo translated as “natural tendencies” and “education” on the one hand, with the termini ad quem rendered “understanding born of creativity” and “creativity born of understanding” on the other. The suggestion of direct causal connection is inappropriate since creative processes are creative precisely to the degree that they are “gifts” (talents, endowments)—

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that is, they are essentially uncaused. James Legge’s language of ascription, although still largely causal, is slightly more nuanced than Chan’s “results from.” Legge’s translation of this passage is “When we have intelligence resulting from sincerity, this condition is to be ascribed to nature; when we have sincerity resulting from intelligence, this condition is to be ascribed to instruction.” 69. With qu
meaning “one side” or “one aspect,” many of the commentators argue that this passage describes a lower level of cultivation when compared with the one articulated in passage 22 that precedes it. But this passage 23 also concludes with the claim to “utmost creativity.” Considering the more general propositions of the preceding passage, this would seem to bring the discussion back to the more concrete and specific level of particulars. Compare Xunzi 7/3/27 (Knoblock 1988:177) that has a parallel passage that describes the person of “utmost creativity.” 70. This notion of affecting others is the conclusion of Mencius 4A12:
 !"#$%&'!(#)"*&' There has never yet been a case in which those of utmost creativity have failed to influence things, while those lacking in creativity have never been able to do anything all. 71. The commentaries provide several explanations for this expression, “four limbs (siti
):” the four feet of the turtle, the limbs of the human body, and the entire body itself. The expression also appears in Analects 18.7 and Mencius 4A3 and 7A21, where it seems to mean the four limbs, the extremities. 72. The locus classicus for this relationship betwen numinosity and clairvoyance is the Great Commentary (Dazhuan) appendix to the Yijing. 73. There is no nominalizing zhe
here, so the subject continues from the preceding phrase. 74. Again, no nominalizing zhe, so the subject continues from the preceding phrase. 75. This passage is reminiscent of Analects 6.23: The Master said, “The wise (zhi
) enjoy water; those authoritative in their conduct (ren
) enjoy mountains. The wise are active; the authoritative are still. The wise find enjoyment; the authoritative are long-enduring.”

128

Focusing the Familiar

Wisdom entails appropriateness to context (see Analects 6.22). Thus, in realizing oneself, one necessarily brings realization to one’s situation. 76. A person is an event among other events. The consummation of one’s self refers to the development of character; contributing to the consummation of other events concerns conduct. The integration of character and conduct is an example of the correlation of the internal and the external. Importantly, the internal/external neiwai distinction is a correlative notion like yinyang, and hence both mean “more or less.” Character and conduct cannot be treated as exclusive demarcations. 77. Book of Songs 267; compare Karlgren (1950):239–40. 78. The character bu
in this passage means da
; see Karlgren (1950):239. 79. These quotations from the Book of Songs continue the more theoretical, if not cosmological, discussion of “creativity (cheng
)” above with concrete natural and historical examples. 80. See Analects 2.11: Revising the old as a means of realizing the new—such a person can be considered a teacher. 81. Compare Analects 13.26. 82. This is a familiar theme in the Analects. Compare 5.2, 5.21, 8.13, 14.1, 14.3, and 15.7. 83. Book of Songs 260; compare Karlgren (1950):229. 84. Zhu Xi suggests that only the first sentence is Confucius’s. The rest is Zisizi. But Zheng Xuan takes the entire passage to be the words of Confucius. This passage challenges those commentators who would ascribe a rigid conservatism (fagu
) to Confucius. 85. The standardization of currency, weights and measures, axle widths, and so on, is a persistent theme in the description of the First Emperor of the Qin’s (Qin Shi Huangdi) reign in the Records of the Historian (Shiji) 6. 86. Compare Analects 3.9, that is contradicted by this passage: I am able to speak on the ritual observances during the Xia dynasty, but its descendent state, Qi, does not provide adequate evidence. I am able to speak on the ritual observances during the Yin (Shang) dynasty, but its descendent state, Song, does not provide adequate evidence. It is because these states have inadequate documentation and few

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men of letters. If they were adequate in these respects, I would be able to give the evidence for what I say. The contradiction might reflect the fact that Zisizi himself was a native of Song. Compare the ending of this passage with the language of Analects 3.14: The Zhou dynasty looked back to the Xia and Shang dynasties. Such a wealth of culture! I follow the Zhou. 87. Commentators suggest that this passage refers to the three privileges of the ruler listed in the preceding passage: No one but the Son of tian can preside over rites and ceremonies, make the laws, and determine the written script. Alternatively, it might refer to “efficacy (shan
),” “corroboration (zheng
),” and “credibility (xin
),” and to “efficacy (shan),” “esteem (zun
),” and “credibility (xin)” in this passage itself. 88. Following Zhu Xi’s commentary. 89. The shang/xia
 in this passage would seem to refer to either chronology or status. But mixing them, as many of the commentators choose to do, seems anomalous. 90. Compare Mencius 2A2, that describes Confucius in these terms: Zigong said, “In seeing the ritual he can identify the government; in hearing the music he can identify its excellence. If a hundred generations hence we were to critique the kings of these hundred generations, none would be able to abandon the way of Confucius. From the dawn of humankind, there has yet to be his equal.” 91. Book of Songs 278; compare Karlgren (1950):244. 92. In this human-centered religious sensibility, it is the cultural heroes and distinguished historical personages that make tian determinate and meaningful. 93. This passage is a revised version of Book of Songs 88; compare Karlgren (1950):58. 94. Book of Songs 198; compare Karlgren (1950):137. 95. Book of Songs 256; compare Karlgren (1950):218. 96. Book of Songs 302; compare Karlgren (1950):262. 97. This describes a sacrifice being made by Tang, founder of the Shang dynasty.

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Focusing the Familiar

98. Book of Songs 269; compare Karlgren (1950):241. 99. Book of Songs 241; compare Karlgren (1950):196. 100. Book of Songs 260; compare Karlgren (1950):229. 101. Book of Songs 235; compare Karlgren (1950):186. Compare Analects 17.19: The Master said, “I think I will leave off speaking.” “If you do not speak,” Zigong replied, “how will we your followers find the proper way?” The Master responded, “Does tian
speak? And yet the four seasons turn and the myriad things are born and grow within it. Does tian speak?”

Appendix

1. the text of the

ZHONGYONG

1.1 The Zhongyong and the “Zisi-Mencius Lineage” Kong Ji
 (483–402 bce), was the grandson of Confucius (551– 479 bce), born to Confucius’s son Boyu
 who appears twice in the Analects. Kong Ji is best known by his “style” name Zisizi

or “Master” Zisi. In the early record, his name is associated with the Zhongyong and with three other documents that, along with the Zhongyong, found their way as chapters into the Han dynasty compilation, the Record of Rites: “A Record of the Gnomon (biaoji ),” “The Black Robes (ziyi
),” and “A Record of the Dike (fangji
).” Master Zisi, the putative author of the Zhongyong, is becoming an increasingly important philosopher in our present historical moment. Because of documents recovered in recent archaeological finds, he is emerging out of the mists of history as one of the missing links between the teachings of Confucius captured in the Analects, and the early evolution of classical Confucianism found in the Mencius and Xunzi. He is but one of the missing links, because in these finds there are appearing texts associated with several familiar names in the early Confucian tradition. Besides the abundance of new textual materials that contemporary scholars want to ascribe to Zisi, we now have other documents with titles such as the Zengzi
, the Zilu
, and the Yan Yuan
, all texts named for these close personal protégées of Confucius who appear prominently in the Analects. Zisi was not only a grandson of Confucius, but was also a student of Zengzi
, one of the major figures in the later books 131

132 Appendix

of the Analects, and one of the eight most prominent proponents of Confucianism after the death of Confucius. The Records of the Historian also tells us that one of Zisi’s later disciples was the teacher of Mencius. It is because of this direct historical association between Zisi and Mencius that the school coming down from Zengzi is often called the “Si-Meng lineage
 ,” or “the lineage of Zisi and Mencius.” This relationship is further corroborated by philosophical resonances between the Mencius and the newly recovered Zisi materials. In the later tradition, it was this lineage that was celebrated as the orthodox Confucian transmission. The Mencius and the Zhongyong overlap in their deference to the Analects and in their use of a standard Confucian vocabulary, as well as in their shared reference to a cast of early cultural heroes provided as models for emulation. Another commonality of early Confucian texts such as the Analects, the newly recovered Zisi materials, the Mencius, and the Zhongyong is the extensive use of verses from the Book of Songs as a source of canonical authority that both explains and is explained by the philosophical points under discussion. In fact, the Zhongyong, like the Analects, the Mencius, and the Xunzi, appeals to the Book of Songs more than any other source as an authority for its precepts.1 It is interesting to reflect on how the Songs functioned to promote the philosophical message of this text. David Schaberg explores the way in which uncanonical songs underwent a process of historical framing during the Warring States and Qin dynasties.2 It was felt by the commentators that a song, often enigmatic and sometimes even incomprehensible, is an encoded means of communication that could only be understood and appreciated by fitting it with and within a particular historical anecdote of some interesting individual or event. It is only when the singer and the audience are properly astute that the song will yield up its coded message. A similar kind of process seems to be at work in the Zhongyong and other philosophical literature of this period in which the ca-

Appendix

133

nonical songs such as those collected in the Book of Songs, presumably even more widely remembered and sung by the population, are decoded by using them to punctuate a particular philosophical point. The songs as a shared repository of ancient meaning are thus clarified in a process that then allows the author to claim the prestige of the tradition for the assertion at hand. The song is a particularly effective addition to the argument for several reasons. It is persuasive by virtue of being widely known among the audience of the philosophical text. Again, the original source of the unauthored song is the daily life of the people, where song itself is what Schaberg describes as “a manifestation of complete and uncontrollable genuineness.”3 The spontaneity and sincerity in the act of singing lies in the fact that songs are most often either of blame or praise—an irrepressible protest against oppression of some kind, or a public outpouring of approbation for virtuous conduct. When a philosophical text bursts into song, it is taking full advantage of the reader’s assumption that songs do not lie. Thus, invoking a song not only clarifies an argument, but celebrates its veracity. The song also dramatizes the argument and charges it emotionally by bringing the more general and abstract assertions of the text down to earth, locating them in seemingly specific historical situations. Thus, a well-placed song not only lends veridical force to the philosopher’s claims, but also invests it with passion. In addition to the pervasive appeal to the Book of Songs, there is another immediate connection between the Analects, the Mencius, and the Zhongyong that must not go unnoticed. We can make the argument that the discussion of the rather obscure expression, “focusing the familiar (zhongyong
)” that gives the Zhongyong its title and occupies much of the first eleven passages of the text, is an elaboration of this rather opaque philosophical term found nowhere else in the extant literature except in Analects 6.29:


 !"#$%&'()*+,'-. The Master said, “The excellence required to focus the familiar is of the highest order. That it is rare among the people is an old story.”

134 Appendix

The fact that this Analects passage is repeated almost verbatim in Zhongyong 3 strengthens this hypothesis. The connection between the Zhongyong and the Mencius is a bit more complex. One of the most original and remarkable ideas that is developed extensively in the Zhongyong is the extension and elaboration of the familiar notion of cheng
that conventionally meant “integrity” or “sincerity” to express human participation in the ongoing process of “cosmic creativity.” Zhongyong 25 is explicit in eliding the cognates cheng
“to consummate, to complete, to finish” and cheng
“creativity/integrity/ sincerity”:
 !"#$
%
&'&"()*!+"# Creativity is self-consummating. . . . But creativity is not simply the self-consummating of one’s own person; it is what consummates events.

The term cheng
appears in the Analects but is not used in this extended sense of “cosmic creativity.” There is a document that was recovered in the 1993 Guodian
 archaeological find that has been tentatively entitled Chengzhi wenzhi . This text as revised by the contemporary scholar, Guo Yi (1999), contains the phrase:
 !"#$% It is for this reason that exemplary persons prize creativity.

Guo Yi finds considerable resonance between this document and the Zhongyong, and an immediate association between the expression “creativity” (chengzhi
) in Chengzhi wenzhi, and the unusual applications of cheng
and chengzhi
 as they appear in Zhongyong 20–26. Underscoring this purported relationship between the two texts, there is a parallel allusion to the notion of “prizing creativity” in Zhongyong 25:
 !"#$%& It is thus that, for exemplary persons, it is creativity that is prized.

On the basis of both semantic and linguistic resonances, Guo Yi argues that Chengzhi wenzhi is in fact the product of Zisi’s later adherents who came to have some direct influence on Mencius.

Appendix

135

As we shall see, this notion of “creativity” expressed in the Mencius as cheng
might be a link between the two. Direct resonances between the Mencius and Zhongyong are minimal, yet important where they do occur. For example, Zhongyong 20 does have some rather overt linguistic and conceptual overlap with the sociopolitical ideas found in Mencius 4A12 in which persons cultivate themselves through unrelenting attention to the nexus of roles and relationships that locate them within family and community. Again, the earliest occurrence of cheng
in the extended sense of “cosmic creativity” in the extant literature that uses the character cheng
(“creativity”) rather than cheng
(“complete”) is in this same Mencius 4A12 passage. This Mencius passage introduces a theme central to the Zhongyong: It is in the process of “creativity (cheng)” that the ways of tian and human beings come together most efficaciously. The Mencius observes:
 !"#$%&"#
'()*+
,-.!"/
,01
 !"#$%&'()*#!')+$%* There is a way of being creative in one’s person. Persons who do not understand efficacy are not creative in their persons. For this reason, creativity is the way of tian, and reflecting on creativity is the proper way of becoming human. There has never been a case in which those of utmost creativity have failed to influence things, while those lacking in creativity have never been able to do anything at all.

Compare this passage with the language of Zhongyong 20:
 !"#$%&'()'
 *#(&!")'+,)'
 !"
#$%&'(
%#)%&'" There is a way of getting on with one’s kin: If on introspection one finds a lack of creativity in one’s person, one will not get on well with one’s kin. There is a way of being creative in one’s person: If one does not understand efficacy, one will not find creativity in one’s person. Creativity is the way of tian; creating is the proper way of becoming human.

In fact, Zhongyong 21–26 seems to be an extended elaboration upon this Mencian sense of “creativity (cheng),” using the same

136 Appendix

expression with some frequency. There is thus the interesting possibility that Zhongyong 20–26 is a gloss on Mencius 4A12, just as the opening passages of Zhongyong are an attempt to disambiguate the term “focusing the familiar (zhongyong)” found in Analects 6.29. The motivation, of course, would be to claim a direct continuity between these two early Confucian texts and the Zhongyong’s understanding of the human role in the creative processes. Another interesting echo between Mencius and Zhongyong is 7A1 in which Mencius says:
 !"#$%&#$"'#(&) "*$"+,
 To make the most of one’s heart-and-mind is to realize one’s natural tendencies, and if one realizes one’s natural tendencies, one is realizing tian. Sustaining one’s heart-and-mind and nourishing one’s natural tendencies is how one serves tian.

This portion of the Mencius might be the inspiration for Zhongyong 22 that shares a similar vocabulary and grammatical structure, and expands upon the same philosophical point:
 !"#$%&'($%&'()$%*+'($%*+'(
 !"#$ !"#$
%&'()"*+$%&'()"
 !"#$%&'() Only those of utmost creativity in the world are able to make the most out of their natural tendencies. Only if one is able to make the most of one’s own natural tendencies is one able to make the most of the natural tendencies of others; only if one is able to make the most of the natural tendencies of others is one able to make the most of the natural tendencies of processes and events; only if one is able to make the most of the natural tendencies of processes and events can one assist in the transforming and nourishing activities of heaven and earth; and only if one can assist in the transforming and nourishing activities of heaven and earth can human beings take their place as members of this triad.

While the Zhongyong does seem to elaborate upon rather obscure ideas that appear first in the Analects and the Mencius, its relationship with the newly recovered and decidedly earlier Zisi materials such as the Five Modes of Proper Conduct (wuxingpian

Appendix

137


 ) and Human Tendencies Emerge from the Propensity of Circumstances (xing zi ming chu ) would seem to be one of complementarity rather than direct overlap. For example, that the thought processes must be clear and sustained is the main message in both Zongyong 8 and 9, and in Five Modes of Proper Conduct 4–6. And again, both texts reflect rather deeply on the correlative relationship between the “inner” and the “outer.” Still, given the profoundly cosmological import of the Zhongyong that contrasts with the richly human-centered concern for the development of character in these Zisi documents, we might think of these two extremes in the Zisi corpus as being a kind of Confucian version of daodejing
 in which the symbiotic relationship between the “focused” productivity of particular human beings (de) and the flourishing of their extended “fields” of experience (dao) is celebrated.

1.2 Zisi and the “Five Modes of Proper Conduct (wuxing
)” Doctrine The Xunzi
 associates the names of both Zisi and Mencius with the doctrine of “five modes of proper conduct (wuxing

),” a prescription for moral behavior that is initially separate from, but perhaps is developed into or is elided with, the later cosmological theories attributed to Zou Yan
 (305–240? bce) that go by the same name. The fact that we have an earlier moral doctrine and a later, seemingly unrelated cosmological theory, both called wuxing
, has generated two explanations for Xunzi’s rather severe condemnation of wuxing. We begin from the language of Xunzi’s indictment:
 !"#$%&'()*+,-./01,23456789
 !"#
$%&'
(%)*+,
-./01234
 !"#$% #&'( #)* +,-.//0123
 !"#$%&'()* There are those who, only superficially emulating the way of the former kings, do not understand its real substance. . . . What they have seen and learned is indeed extensive and varied. Basing their

138 Appendix ideas on ancient lore, they concoct their new theory and call it wuxing. In fact, this theory is perverse and bizarre. It is a lot of obscure and impenetrable nonsense. They dress it up in eloquent language, and with great reverence say: “These are truly the words of the exemplary persons of old.” Zisi sang this song, and Mencius chimed in with it. The deluded and foolish Confucians of our present day are thrilled with this theory and are wholly oblivious to where it goes wrong. . . . This then is the crime of Zisi and Mencius.4

One possible explanation is that the ever practical Xunzi takes exception to a perceived connection between the moral doctrine “five modes of proper conduct (wuxing
)” of Zisi and Mencius, and the increasingly popular “five phases (wuxing)” speculations about cosmic operations that he believes ought not concern the human world. According with Confucius’s refusal to 5 pronounce on speculative questions, Xunzi is adamant that human beings should invest their efforts in personal and communal cultivation, and not waste their time conjecturing about things they cannot and should not hope to understand. It has been claimed that this passage in the Xunzi is somewhat ambiguous in that it is not immediately clear from the language whether Xunzi is criticizing Zisi and Mencius themselves or rather the inappropriate co-opting and contaminating of their “five modes of proper conduct” doctrine by those later day Confucians who are given to speculating on cosmic mysteries. In an attempt to resolve this ambiguity, John Knoblock points out that Xunzi himself applies the expression “five modes of proper conduct (wuxing)” to appropriate human deportment elsewhere in his writings in a positive sense, albeit with a content clearly different from the specific five moral excellences of Zisi and Mencius. On the other hand, it might be argued that the almost total absence of the term wuxing from the Xunzi broadly would suggest that Xunzi wants to avoid any association with the term, whatever its reference. In any case, on this reading it is most probable that Xunzi’s complaint was directed at the misappropriation of the term wuxing as a cosmological theory by his contemporaries and, even more harshly, was aimed at the complicity of his fellow Confucians in promoting this distortion.

Appendix

139

There is an alternative explanation of Xunzi’s complaint against the wuxing doctrine associated with Zisi and Mencius that might be more plausible. To begin with, we have no corroborating evidence that the wuxing cosmological theory that emerges in the Han dynasty was current as early as Xunzi. Given Xunzi’s antipathy to such speculations and his willingness to speak out against heterodox philosophical ideas, the absence of any clear reference to this development would suggest that the target of Xunzi’s ire is probably the moral doctrine associated with Zisi and Mencius. Secondly, in other contexts, Xunzi is anything but shy about voicing loud and sustained objections to the ideas of Mencius, especially Mencius’s attempt to define the natural human tendencies (xing
) as the “four shoots of moral conduct (siduan
).” And, as we shall see, the recovery of the Five Modes of Proper Conduct in recent archaeological finds establishes an immediate and incontrovertible link between the wuxing moral doctrine and Mencius’s “four shoots,” where the “four shoots” are nothing other than the first four of the five modes of proper conduct. Thirdly, given Xunzi’s practical turn, the fifth of the five modes of proper conduct—the celebration of the role of human “sagacity (sheng
)” as a profoundly creative cosmic force—would indeed be received by him as “a lot of obscure and impenetrable nonsense.” Finally, the passage from Xunzi condemning Zisi and Mencius is anything but ambiguous. It describes the wuxing doctrine as a gross distortion of historical antecedents, denounces the hyperbolic language in which it is presented, deplores the popularity it has garnered among contemporary Confucians, and blames Zisi and Mencius by name and in unequivocal terms, for their role in promoting what he takes to be a heretical Confucianism. Xunzi’s rejection of the wuxing moral doctrine would appear to be an opening volley in what becomes a contest between two importantly distinct interpretations of Confucian philosophy: the Xunzi lineage that had some prominence in the early Han dynasty, and the Mencian lineage that in the course of time was to supersede it. The connection between Mencius and Zisi and this wuxing doctrine has become somewhat clearer with the recent recovery

140 Appendix

of two versions of a Five Modes of Proper Conduct text attributed to Zisi. Mencius’s well-known list of the “four shoots of moral conduct (siduan
)”—“authoritative conduct (ren
),” “appropriateness (yi
),” “the observance of ritual propriety (li
),” and “wisdom (zhi
)” in this specific order—is in fact an abbreviated version of the “five modes of proper conduct,” with the fifth mode of proper conduct, sagacity (sheng
), being the fruit of growing these four shoots.6 In 1973, in the archaeological find at Mawangdui
 , Changsha, documents buried in c. 168 bce were discovered that have been attributed to the school of Zisi, if not Zisi himself. Specifically, there are two silk manuscripts. One is an untitled text, and the second is the Dexing
 or Acting on Character. In fact, the untitled text is one of the most substantial documents recovered at Mawangdui. The contemporary scholar, Pang Pu

, on first analyzing it, suggested that it is the long lost Wuxingpian
 or Five Modes of Proper Conduct. In the more recent find at Guodian
 in Hubei province in October 1993, new texts recovered in a tomb of “the tutor to the eastern palace,” probably the teacher of the crown prince of Chu, have also been attributed to the Zisi lineage. This tomb dates to around 300 bce, some century and a half earlier than Mawangdui. The 13,000 characters on some 800 pieces of bamboo strips have been tentatively reconstructed into sixteen documents including two Daoist texts: a version of the Daodejing and another Daoist text previously unknown called The Great One Produces Water
 !. Also recovered was another version of Wuxingpian

 similar to the untitled one found earlier at Mawangdui, and a text of the Black Robes (ziyi
) that is attributed to Zisi in the tradition, and exists as a chapter in the Record of Rites. The remaining twelve of these sixteen documents are entirely new, and shed important light on the development of classical Confucianism in the century and a half between the death of Confucius and the emergence of Mencius as a spokesperson for the lineage. What can we learn from these new texts that enable us better to locate the Zhongyong within the classical tradition? One general observation is that in both the Mawangdui and the Guodian

Appendix

141

finds, versions of the Daodejing and other Daoist documents were recovered along with these largely Zisi materials. A marked feature of the Guodian Daodejing is the absence of some of the antiConfucian polemic found in the received version of the text, suggesting a more positive, even complementary, relationship between the ideas of early Daoism and this particular branch of Confucianism. That the range of texts includes both Daoist and Zisizi materials suggests that at least the scholars associated with the tombs did not see the contents of these works as exclusive or irreconcilable. It is noteworthy that, although the Zhongyong is clearly a Confucian text, as recently as the nineteen-fifties a scholar of Qian Mu’s
 stature provoked a sustained debate with Xu Fuguan
 and others by suggesting that Zhongyong is largely a Daoist document.7 The version of the Wuxingpian found at Guodian with the two characters “Wuxing
” as a title on the first bamboo strip corroborates Pang Pu’s speculation that the version of the same text found at Mawangdui is indeed the lost Wuxingpian. The fact that two almost identical versions of Wuxingpian have been recovered along with versions of the Daodejing would indicate a certain canonical status of this text within the tradition. Also, the pervasive use of differing loan characters in these texts—representing sounds first and then by context and inference, ideas— might imply that they are part of an oral tradition that was written down from memory for the specific purpose of providing reading for the tomb occupant in the journey to the nebulous world beyond. In addition, rather direct linguistic and conceptual resonances between the Wuxingpian and the Mencius suggest that whoever produced the Mencius was aware of a version of this earlier text. What is the relationship between the Zhongyong translated here, and these other documents associated with Zisi? First, the documents found at Mawangdui and Guodian (except where they overlap in the Wuxingpian) differ from one another in language and style, suggesting that they are neither by one person nor date from one specific period. Several contemporary scholars including Li Xueqin and Pang Pu have suggested, quite plausibly, that

142 Appendix

there was a composite collection of writings under the name of Zisi (perhaps similar in structure to the Daoist classic, the Zhuangzi) that evolved during the period between Confucius and Mencius, and that some of the materials recovered at Guodian and Mawangdui are remnants of it. This composite nature, reflecting many different contexts and authors, has a real bearing on what kind of coherence we should expect from these documents, as well as what kind of comparisons we can make among them. We ought to anticipate that, as these additional Zisi materials come to light, they will cover a rather diverse range of ideas. The five modes of proper conduct—ren
, yi
, li
, zhi
, and sheng
—all have a prominent role in the Analects, appearing separately and occasionally in pairs. “Authoritative conduct (ren
)” and “wisdom (zhi
),” for example, are frequently found together in the Analects. However, it is only with the Five Modes of Proper Conduct ascribed to Zisi that they are organized into a formal, sequential cluster and identified as wuxing. As we have observed above, the Mencian “four shoots (siduan)” theory seems to be derived from the wuxing. It is simply another name for the “four modes of proper conduct (sixing)” formula, the same as the wuxing cluster minus “sagacity (sheng
),” that also appears in this text. “Sagacity (sheng
)” certainly appears elsewhere in the Mencius, but on its own. The “five modes of proper conduct” does not appear as a formal cluster in the Zhongyong, and in fact these five terms are not all that prominent in the text as a whole. Interestingly enough, when these five terms do occur in Zhongyong 20, the same chapter that links Mencius 4A12 and the Zhongyong, they emerge in the discussion in precisely the same formulaic wuxing order, beginning from “authoritative conduct (ren
)” and ending with “sagacity (sheng
).” Although the curious and much discussed phrase “thus, exemplary persons are ever concerned about their uniqueness (

 !)” occurs twice in Five Modes of Proper Conduct 7 and also in Zhongyong 1, it appears in the Great Learning and in the Xunzi as well, suggesting that it was a familiar expression in the early Confucian literature.8

Appendix

143

Perhaps the strongest connection between the Zhongyong and the other Zisi documents is the pervasive theme of coordinating the way of human beings and the way of tian to become partners in the creative processes of the heavens and the earth. In this literature, optimizing the continuity between tian and the human being (tianren heyi
 !) is an accomplishment, not a given. As we shall see below, this creative contribution of the human being becomes particularly relevant in determining how we are to read the opening passage of the Zhongyong.

1.3 The Zhongyong: A Composite Document There are good reasons to believe that the Zhongyong is itself a composite document. Even Tu Wei-ming, who argues for the overall integrity of the text, suggests that it falls rather clearly into three distinct sections, reflecting its cummulative origins and its com9 posite authorship: (1) passages 1–19 that deal with the character of the exemplary person (junzi
), (2) passage 20 that deals mainly with proper governing (zheng
), and (3) the remaining thirteen passages that explain cheng
—a term we translate as “creativity.” The late Takeuchi Yoshio, in his important work on the Zhongyong, goes over the various discontinuities in the text in detail, and evaluates the different theories that have been prof10 fered by scholars late and soon. Some of these proposals have more merit than others. For example, Takeuchi introduces one contemporary scholar who has speculated that Zhongyong 1 is an add-on remnant of the lost Classic of Music. In this case, we would have to side with Zhu Xi who in his commentary insists that this first passage is not only integral to the text, but is in fact the central axis of the entire work. Indeed, in recently recovered texts such as Human Tendencies Emerge from the Propensity of Circumstances
 !, the relationship among several of the key terms of Zhongyong 1— “human tendencies (xing
),” “tian
,” and “the propensity of circumstances (ming
)”—are taken together with “the human heart-and-mind (xin
)” and “emotions (qing
)” to be the defining vocabulary of Zisi thinking. A major theme of the Zisi ma-

144 Appendix

terials generally and the Zhongyong specifically is how human beings can coordinate their conduct to make themselves a triad with the heavens and the earth. Although we believe that this opening passage is indeed integral to the Zhongyong, it has provoked some interesting debate that we will want to examine. While we shall argue for the important function Zhongyong 1 serves in some detail below, there are other parts of the text that really do seem anomalous. Zhongyong 16, for example, assumes a doctrine of gods and spirits that is not at all consistent with early Confucian thinking on this subject: The Master said, “The efficacy of the gods and spirits is profound. Looking, we do not see them; listening, we do not hear them. And yet they inform events to the extent that nothing can be without them. Because of them, the people of the world fast, purify themselves, and put on their finest clothes in carrying out the sacrifices to them. It is as though the air above our heads is suffused with them, and as though they are all around. The Book of Songs says: The descent of the gods Cannot be fathomed— How much less can it be ignored. Such is the way that the inchoate becomes manifest and creativity is irrepressible.

This passage neither follows from passage 15 nor anticipates passage 17, but in fact interrupts the otherwise continuous flow of thought. Its overt appeal to the efficacy of gods and spirits without reference to the moral responsibility of the human community would not sit well with Confucius as portrayed in the Analects. In reassigning this passage to the later portions of the text on the basis of its specific reference to “creativity (cheng
),” Takeuchi is able to place it in the mouth of the putative author, Zisi, who, unlike Confucius, is assumed to make frequent use of this term. We must certainly allow that the Zhongyong’s sustained discussion of cosmology is a radical departure from the human-centered concerns of Confucius and early Confucianism. But even so, for Takeuchi’s argument to be persuasive, we would have to discover a Zisi sympathy with gods and spirits that does not occur in the existing materials. An alternative explanation might be this passage has

Appendix

145

been included in the text because of its concluding references to “the way that the inchoate becomes manifest (
 !)” that resonates immediately with Zhongyong 1: “there is nothing . . . more manifest than what is inchoate (
 !).”

1.4 Dating the Zhongyong Perhaps the most troubling problem in trying to determine the date at which the Zhongyong was compiled is passage 28: No one but the Son of tian (tianzi
) can preside over rites and ceremonies, make the laws, and determine the written script. Today in the empire our carriages have axles of the same width, in our writing we use a standard script, and in our conduct we accept the same norms.

The standardization of currency, weights and measures, axle widths, and so on, mentioned here is a persistent theme in the description of the First Emperor of Qin’s reign in the second half of the third century bce, appearing in sources such as the Records of the Historian (Shiji) 6. Many commentators, beginning from uncritical assumptions about the integrity of the Zhongyong as a whole, have concluded on the basis of this one passage that the Zhongyong in its entirety is a Qin or early Han product. Alternatively, we might allow that this portion of what is a composite document is relatively late, while other portions of it might be of earlier vintage. In the court bibliography, “Yiwenzhi ,” transmitted in the History of the Han (Hanshu
) under the heading “Confucians” (rujia
), there is a record of a “Zisizi in 23 bundles
.” The Kong Congzi
 , a text that covers some 650 years of the Kong family history that Yoav Ariel has argued dates from the third century ce,11 observes that there is a “Zisi text in 49 bundles
 !"#.” There has in the past been some scholarly debate about the dating of the materials associated with Zisi, with many learned doctors arguing that such texts belong to the early Han dynasty. However, the recent archaeological finds have proven that at least some of the Zisi materials that were later to be included in the Record

146 Appendix

of Rites such as The Black Robes (ziyi
) date from earlier than 300 bce.

1.5 Master Zisi: The Person From stories recorded in the Mencius and the Record of Rites, we learn that Zisi was much respected as a person of outstanding character by Duke Mu of Lu
 (r. 415–383 bce), but was wholly frustrated by the Duke’s repeated presentation of gifts and his claims to enduring friendship, without promoting Zisi to high 12 office. This same concern is voiced in the Five Modes of Proper Conduct: Suolu Can in mastering the way of the exemplary person was said to be of superior character.13 When exemplary persons recognize such people and promote them, they are said to esteem those of superior character. When exemplary persons recognize them and put them into service, they are said to esteem those of superior character.14 This was the former kings and dukes esteeming those of superior character, and later scholars esteeming them, too.

In Mencius 5B6, discussing Zisi’s rejection of gifts from Duke Mu that were not attended by the offer of a position, Mencius says, “If in claiming that one delights in persons of superior character one is neither able to promote them nor take care of them, can they really be said to delight in persons of superior character?” This same passage ends with what might be a direct allusion to this Five Modes of Proper Conduct text: Therefore it is said: “This was the former dukes and kings esteeming those of superior character.”

Mencius 5B3 makes a distinction that uses precisely the same vocabulary as this Five Modes of Proper Conduct passage: This is a case of the scholar esteeming those of superior character; it is not the kings and dukes esteeming those of superior character.

Mencius 5B3 again seems to echo this specific passage from the Five Modes of Proper Conduct:

Appendix

147

For the inferior to show respect for the superior is called revering the worthy; for the superior to show respect for the inferior is called honoring those of superior character. In their appropriateness they are the same.

The failure of rulers to appoint persons of superior character is also a major theme in the account of Zisi in the Kong Congzi. The persistence of this complaint about not being given office, together with the report in the Hanfeizi that Zisi was the patron of one of the eight schools of early Confucianism, would suggest that Zisi suffered the same fate as his grandfather, Confucius, in being condemned to the political sidelines as just a friend to the powerful, and the mere teacher of statesmen. There is another way in which Zisi is similar in profile to his grandfather, Confucius. In Book 3 of the Analects, much is made of Confucius’s detailed knowledge of ritual performance. For example 3.15: The Master on entering the Grand Ancestral Hall asked questions about everything. Someone remarked: “Who said this son of a man from the Zou village knows about observing ritual propriety? On entering the Grand Ancestral Hall he asks questions about everything.” When Confucius heard of this, he said: “To do so is itself observing ritual propriety.”

Like Confucius, Zisi was renowned for his expertise on the rites. This association is borne out by the fact that several of the documents ascribed to Zisi, including the Zhongyong itself, were later to be incorporated into the Record of Rites. Many of the anecdotes in which Zisi appears in these chapters of the Record of Rites lend detail to the profile of a classical scholar deferred to by his community as an authority on the subtleties of ritual propriety. There are stories related in the Record of Rites that have the ascetic Zisi, as poor as Confucius’s favorite disciple, Yan Hui, actually criticizing the asceticism of his teacher, Zengzi. These stories about Zisi and his relations with others present us with a person of courage and character, unafraid to express his strong feelings about the ritualization of the human experience.

148 Appendix

There are many anecdotes concerning Zisi in other classical sources as well. In public life, Zisi was at the courts of Wei, Song, Lu, and Bi. There is one story in the Kong Congzi about a lifethreatening incident when he was sixteen. Arriving in the state of Song, Zisi managed to insult a high-ranking counselor by comparing the observations of the counselor to those of “a commoner in the narrow lanes of Lu.” Having been rescued from a certain beating at the hands of the counselor’s entourage, Zisi decides that he will follow the examples of King Wen and Confucius who, having similarly escaped from peril, compiled the Book of Changes and the Spring and Autumn Annals respectively. Inspired by their examples, he wrote the Zhongyong in forty-nine chapters.15 This claim is, not unexpectedly, disputed in other sources. The ongoing recovery of the Zisizi as a lost classical text will continue to shed new light on the formative period of Chinese philosophy and culture, adding an important new voice to the early philosophical conversation. For example, a point of contention has centered on the meaning of a central idea in the Zisi corpus—namely, qing
. Many scholars, including A. C. Graham, have gone on record as denying the direct association of qing
with the “emotions” in the early literature, insisting instead that it is closely related to xing
as some essential feature of the human endowment. The recovered texts have demonstrated beyond question that qing defined explicitly as emotions played a central role in the earliest records of this tradition. The difficulty becomes one of distinguishing “emotions” within the classical Chinese world, from modern Western assumptions about them.16 We have discussed the importance of qing to the Zhongyong in some detail in our Introduction.

2. interpretations of the

ZHONGYONG

2.1 Revisiting the Opening Passage The standard English rendering of the opening passage of the Zhongyong is the 1861 translation by the British missionary, James Legge. It references the earlier Jesuit translations, and has had a

Appendix

149

profound influence on most subsequent European-language interpretations of this text. For Legge, the opening passage is a familiar account of cosmic order: What Heaven has conferred is called the nature; an accordance with this nature is called the path of duty; the regulation of this path is called instruction.

Unfortunately, on Legge’s reading, this wholly credible beginning gives way to a rambling, and indeed, blasphemous exaltation of human creativity that undermines the very ground of Christian worship. Legge counterbalances the high estimate that the Chinese tradition itself has lavished on the Zhongyong as one of its Four Books, with his own pious reservations about it: It begins sufficiently well, but the author has hardly enunciated his preliminary apophthegms, when he conducts into an obscurity where we can hardly grope our way, and when we emerge from that, it is to be bewildered by his gorgeous but unsubstantial pictures of sagely perfection. He has eminently contributed to nourish the pride of his countrymen. He has exalted their sages above all that is called God or is worshipped, and taught the masses of the people that with them they have need of nothing from without. In the meantime it is antagonistic to Christianity. By-and-by, when Christianity has prevailed in China, men will refer to it as a striking proof how their fathers by their wisdom knew neither God nor themselves.17

What is particularly telling about Legge’s evaluation here is that he is entirely aware of the incongruency between his theistic interpretation of the opening passage and the human-centered thrust of the ideas conveyed in the remainder of the text. Legge’s interpretation of the Zhongyong, while wishing that it were otherwise, is that human beings not only have everything necessary to achieve realization without reference to some transcendent deity, but further, the world itself is sufficiently served by human creativity and it need not appeal beyond itself for divine intervention. The persistent, uncritical understanding of key philosophical terms such as tian
, dao
, and xing
, conventionally translated as “Heaven,” “the Way,” and “inborn nature,” continues to un-

150 Appendix

derwrite a construal of these ideas as fixed and determinative principles. Such an interpretation vitiates precisely that notion of creativity-in-context that is a basic feature of classical Chinese philosophy. In many ways, what is at issue in pursing an interpretation of the Zhongyong as a seminal text is the pressing need to redefine the key philosophical vocabulary that is used to articulate this classical Chinese world view. But the interpretive problem is not simply this relatively recent Christianization of the Zhongyong. As we have noted above, many Chinese commentators on this text have, over the centuries, cited a seeming discontinuity between the opening passage and the main body of this text as the basis for questioning its overall integrity. This traditional assessment should alert us to the larger issue. There is a very real tension in the pre-Qin formative period of Chinese philosophy between a naturalistic understanding of the human experience in which human beings are perceived as the relatively passive product of their circumstances, and a much more existential understanding of the profound contribution that human creativity can have in enchanting the world around us. We have claimed that the central argument of the Zhongyong is to provide an understanding of this opening passage and its cluster of philosophical terms. This illuminating text includes a sustained elaboration on the expression, zhongyong
, as the creative process of “focusing the familiar” in the ritualization of the human experience, a protracted discussion of human participation in the “creativity (cheng
)” that defines the world around us, a celebration of the virtuosic role that human sagacity (sheng
) has in the emerging cosmic order, and an appeal to historical and canonical authority to support this interpretation.

2.2 Why Zhongyong is not a “Doctrine of the Mean” A particularly unfortunate example of inappropriate translation is the common rendering of Zhongyong as “The Doctrine of the Mean.” This rendering was made popular by James Legge in his initial translation of the text. But even Legge himself abandoned

Appendix

151

this title when he went on to retranslate “Zhongyong” as a chapter in the Record of Rites (Liji). In this 1885 publication, he revised the title as “The State of Equilibrium and Harmony,” a far 18 better indication of its content. The locution “Doctrine of the Mean,” of course, recalls Aristotle’s account of virtues as means located between the two extremes of defect and excess. For example, “courage” is a mean between “cowardice” (defect) and “foolhardiness” (excess). This interpretation of the expression, zhongyong, leads to a misconstrual of what the Zhongyong itself purports to say. Recourse to a process ontology modeled in terms of focus and field will hardly yield itself to a mean/extremes vocabulary. The understanding of the relationship of distinctive “emotions” (courage, generosity, and so on) and “actions” (acting generously, courageously) to the construction of “character” articulated by Aristotle contrasts dramatically with the Zhongyong’s treatment of a more vectoral and dispositional sense of emotions as constituting a sensibility field that is to be focused (zhong
) and brought into a sustained harmony (he ) in the routine events of our lives (yong
). Aristotle provides a strategy that enables individual agents to make choices disciplined by character and rational deliberation. The Zhongyong, by contrast, advocates optimizing the creative possibilities of the ever-changing circumstances in which the human experience takes place. The shifting equilibrium that underlies this optimizing process is both embedded within and consistently promotes communal life forms (li). Practice is resolutely communal, and is not governed by individual choices, but by those interpersonal dispositions created by coordinating roles and relationships effectively. It is not reason, but li-informed affect, that directs experience. Unstinting attention to proper roles and relationships produces not only appropriate dispositions, but ultimately a profound religious sensibility that comes to characterize a flourishing community. In such circumstances, the terms of “extremes” and “mean” must be translated into the language of field and focus. The act of focusing a field, and of remaining focused in the familiar affairs

152 Appendix

of the day, is accomplished through dispositional adjustments in communal li-living rather than through individual choice.19

notes to the appendix 1. Mark Lewis (1999): 163–76 goes to some pains to show how there is a progression in this early literature in the way in which these different philosophical texts use the Book of Songs. 2. Schaberg (1999). 3. Schaberg (1999):337. 4. See Xunzi 16/6/10. Compare the Knoblock (1988):224 translation of this passage in the “Contra Twelve Philosophers” chapter of the Xunzi where he discusses its import (1988):214–19. 5. See Analects 9.4: There were four things the Master abstained from entirely: He would not conjecture, he did not claim or demand certainty, he was not inflexible, and he was not self-absorbed. See also Analects 9.1 and 11.12. 6. Prior to this archaeological find, other candidates for the fifth mode of conduct, taken from the “five constants (wuchang
),” were “making good on one’s word (xin
)” and “sincerity, integrity, creativity (cheng
).” 7. For a discussion of this debate, see Tu Wei-ming (1989):14–18. 8. See Note 10 to the translation of Zhongyong 1 for a discussion of this phrase. 9. Tu Wei-ming (1989):17. 10. Takeuchi (1979):32–40. 11. See Ariel (1989):56–59. 12. See Mencius 2B11, 4B31, 5B3, 6, 7, and 6B6. 13. In Lushiqunqiu 183: “ . . . Suolu Can was a well-known hustler from the eastern regions who studied with Qin Guli [perhaps a disciple of Mozi]. These six men were the kind of persons who were bound for the executioner’s block and a disgraceful death, but not only did they avoid such a death, but went on to live out their long lives as famous scholars and persons of distinction. Kings, dukes, and high officials sought them out as teachers and treated them with proper ritual proprieties. This is what they got from education.” 14. Following the original punctuation in the Mawangdui reconstruction, “exemplary persons” is topicalized. This would then read:

Appendix

153

Recognizing and promoting exemplary persons is called esteeming those of superior character. Recognizing and putting exemplary persons into service is called esteeming those of superior character. 15. See Ariel (1989):111–12. 16. An examination of classical Chinese reflections on the role of emotions in the constitution and expression of human nature will add important stimulation to the recent studies of early Chinese “psychology” pioneered in the work of scholars such as Hal Roth (1999). 17. Legge (1960):55. 18. Tu Wei-ming’s rather similar translation of zhongyong as “centrality and commonality” is also far closer to the original sense of these terms than is “doctrine of the mean.” From our perspective, the principal deficiency in Tu’s rendition is found in his glosses on zhongyong which do not seem to detach sufficiently from substance assumptions, and so do not exploit the resources that a full recognition of the pervasiveness of the processional ontology underlying the philosophical speculations of the Zhongyong would allow. Still, his commentary on this text is sensitive and penetrating, and reflects a very real appreciation of its religious import. 19. See Fingarette (1972) for a discussion of the inappropriateness of the language of decision and choice in Confucianism. See also Hall and Ames (1987) and (1995).

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Index

(Occurrences within the translation are indicated by bold numbers.) aesthetic experience, 47–48 Aihe, Wang, 19 amor fati, 37 Analects of Confucius, xii, 2–3, 4, 18, 24–25, 39, 40, 43, 52, 64, 66, 74, 81, 84, 85, 117, 119– 132, 136, 142, 144, 152 sage in the, 77–78 Anaxagoras, 56 archaeological finds, 2–4, 29, 36, 131–132, 134, 137 argument, central, 25–30 Aristotle, 8, 9, 38, 47, 151 authoritative conduct, 121, 122 Book of Changes (Yijing
), 10, 127, 148 Book of Documents (Shujing
), 30, 63 Book of Songs (Shijing
), 17, 18, 30, 69, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 108, 109, 111, 114–115, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 128, 129, 130, 132–133, 144, 152 causality, 11–15 Chan, Wing-tsit, 34–35, 126 cheng
(sincerity, integrity, creativity), 5, 34–35, 61–63, 72–73, 74, 77, 96, 104, 105, 106, 107, 113, 124, 134

as creative process, 24 as creativity, 30–35, 35–38 Mencius on, 135–137 see also creativity, 16 Chengzhi wenzhi, 134 Christianity, 5–6, 79, 149 clarity, 15–19 Classic of Music (Yuejing
), 143 clusters, linguistic, 15–19, 61–63 communication, 77–78 Confucius, 1, 10, 23, 27, 30, 31, 40, 41, 42, 44, 49, 50, 64, 68, 74, 84, 90, 111, 117, 120, 122, 123, 124, 126, 128, 129, 131, 138, 144, 145, 147, 148 cosmology correlative process, 6–8, 19–25, 81 five phases (wuxing
), 20– 24, 138–139 and Greek elemental theories, 20–21 qi
, 19–25, 72–73 creatio ex nihilo, 12 creativity (see also cheng
), 11–15, 86–87 as co-creativity, 13 distinguished from “unfettered originality,” 15

161

162 Index distinguished from power, 12– 15 as process, 12–15 as self-actualization, 13–14 dao
(proper way), 5, 63–64, 68– 69, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 101, 102, 104, 106, 108–109, 110, 117 Daodejing
 , xii, 4, 5, 22, 68, 72, 117, 119, 137, 140, 141 Daxue
, see Great Learning de (particular focus, excellence), 5, 64–65, 96, 97, 102, 106, 109, 110, 112, 114–115 Democritus, 8, 9 Dewey, John, 118 Doctrine of the Mean, why Zhongyong is not a, 151–152 Duke of Zhou
, 27, 30, 98 events, “things” as, 9–11 exemplary persons, see junzi family, 66, 95–96, 98–99, 101–104 as governing metaphor, 38–40 Farquhar, Judith, 21, 56 field and focus, 10–11, 19–26, 32– 33, 137 language of, 5–8, 11, 14–15 Fingarette, Herbert, 153 Five Modes of Proper Conduct (wuxingpian
 ), 136–142, 147 Four Books (Sishu
), 2–3, 149 Frisina, Warren, 54 Frost, Robert, 17 Fung, Yu-lan, 57 God, 12, 13, 31, 80 gods and spirits, 96, 111, 144 Graham, A. C., 20, 28, 148 on qing
(emotions, feelings), 36–37 Grange, Joe, 54

Great Learning, 2–3, 46, 118, 120, 142 Gu, Hongming, 115 Guo, Yi, 134 Guoyu
, 24 Haloun, Gustav, 57 Hanfeizi
 ,147 Hansen, Chad, 57 Hartshorne, Charles, 54 he
(harmony), 65–66, 89–90 Heidegger, Martin, 54 Huainanzi
 , 21, 116–117 Hughes, E. R., 115 James, William, 15 jia
, see family jiao
(education), 5, 29–30, 49–53, 66–67, 82, 89, 92, 117 Joyce, James, 56 Jullien, François, 59 junzi
 (exemplary persons), 67– 69, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 101, 106, 109, 115, 119, 123 Kasulis, Tom, 54 Kong Congzi
 , 145, 147, 148 Kong Ji
, 1, 131 Kongzi jiayu
 !, 125 Kunst, Richard, 56 Language allusive, 15–19 of deference, 10–11 of reference, 10–11 Legge, James, 57, 59, 115, 127 criticism of Zhongyong, 149– 150 Leucippus, 8, 9 Lewis, Mark, 19, 152 li
(ritual propriety), 40–53, 68, 69–71, 86, 99, 101, 108–109, 110, 117, 124 and education, 50–53

Index as “habits”, 46–49 and music, 49 and personalization, 45, 70–71 and you
(to have), 48 Li, Ling
, 19 Li, Xueqin
 , 141 Major, John, 20, 56 Mencius, 2–3, 18, 24, 25, 28–29, 30, 62, 64, 72, 78, 116, 119, 123, 125, 126, 127, 129, 131, 132, 146, 147 on cheng
(creativity), 135– 137 ming
(to command, command), 28–29, 71–72, 89, 97, 116, 117 Neville, Robert, 54 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 37 objectivity, 10 Odin, Steve, 13, 54 ontology Greek, 8–11 substance, 6–8, 11, 48 Owen, Steve, 55 Pang, Pu (
), 27, 29, 116, 117, 140, 141, 142 Parmenides, 8 paronomasia, 16–17, 67, 69 Plato, 8, 9, 10 Pound, Ezra, 115 power, 11–15 Principle of Sufficient Reason, 13 process, 6–8, 19–25, 81 Pythagoras, 8 qi
cosmology, 19–25, 72–73 Qian, Mu
, 141 Qin, Shi Huangdi (First Emperor of the Qin), 128, 145 qing
(emotions, feelings), 5, 35– 38, 73–74, 82, 148 reality/appearance distinction, 8–11

163 Record of Rites (Liji
), 2, 131, 140, 146 Zisi in the, 147 Records of the Historian (Shiji
), 1, 132, 145 religiousness, Confucian, 39–40, 50– 53, 83 ren
(authoritative person/conduct), 24–25, 43–44, 74, 101, 102, 106, 113, 122, 127–128 renxing
 (natural human tendencies), 6, see xing
Riegel, Jeffrey, 57, 116, 119, 120, 123 ritualization, 27, 86–87 Rosemont, Henry, Jr, 40, 53, 57, 61 Schaberg, David, 132–133 shan
(efficacy), 75–76, 104, 110 shen
(spirituality), 59 shen du
 (concern for one’s uniqueness), 45–46, 89, 118 sheng
(sagacity), 33, 76–77, 112– 113 shengren
 (sage), 62–63, 65, 75, 76–79, 92, 93, 96, 104, 108– 109, 111, 139–140 shu
(putting oneself in the other’s place), 49, 94 Shun
, 30, 78, 91, 96, 111, 119 Shun, Kwong-loi
 , 24 Shuowen
, 17, 41, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 84 Si-Meng Lineage, 131 Sivin, Nathan, 20, 55 Sophists, 8 Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu
), 148 Stevens, Wallace, 18 Takeuchi, Yoshio
 !, 123, 124, 125, 143, 144

164 Index Tang Junyi [T’ang Chun-i]
 , 28–29, 34 texts, “philosophical,” xii, 3–5 theomorphisis, 27, 64 tian
(ancestral spirit, “Heaven”), 17, 72, 76–77, 79–80, 83, 89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 107, 108, 111, 113, 116, 124 as environing conditions, 34 as “social forces”, 27 tianzi
 (Son of tian), 96, 98 translation, problems of, 3–5 Tu, Wei-ming
 , 35, 115, 116, 143, 153 Wang, Bo
, 57 Wang, Yangming
 , 37 Wen and Wu, kings, 30, 78, 97–98, 108, 111, 121 Whitehead, A. N., 14, 54, 73, 118, 126 and creativity, 30–31 and the Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary, 15–16 wisdom, 119 wu
(not having, “Non-being”), 6 wu
(processes, events, “things”), 42, 81, 96, 105 as process, 32–35 wu
-forms wuwei
 (nonassertive action), 5, 31 wuyu
 (objectless desire), 5 wuzhi (unprincipled knowing), 5 wuhua
 (transforming events), 22, 73, 81 wuxing
 (five phases, “five elements”), 6 Wuxingpian, see Five Modes of Proper Conduct

xiao
(filial responsibility), 45, 81– 82, 96, 98–99, 122 xin
(heart-mind), 82 as the product of communication, 33 xin
(living up to one’s word), 103 xing
(natural tendencies), 5, 6, 27– 28, 34, 35–38, 73, 83, 89, 105, 106, 116, 117, 148 and Mencius, 139–140, 142 Xu, Fuguan
 , 141 Xu, Zhongche
 , 34 Xunzi
, 34, 36 and his criticism of Zisi and Mencius, 137–143 Xunzi
, 45, 46, 57, 118, 122, 127, 131, 142 Yan, Hui
, 44–45, 91, 117, 119, 121, 131, 148 Yao
, 78, 111 Yates, Robin, 19 yi
(appropriateness), 5, 76, 84, 101 Yijing, see Book of Changes yinyang
, 10, 20, 21, 72 yong
(courage), 102 you
(to have, having, “Being”), 6, 48 yue
(music), 49, 99, 110 Zengzi
, 2, 131, 147 zheng
(proper governing), 99, 101 Zheng, Xuan
, 116, 117, 119, 124, 125, 128 zhi
(to know, to realize, wisdom), 4–5, 84–85, 91, 102, 106, 113, 127–128 zhong
(focus, equilibrium, center), 16, 44, 86–87, 89–90, 104 zhong
(doing one’s best), 94, 103

Index zhongyong
 (focusing the familiar), 90, 91, 92, 109, 115–116, 133 Zhongyong
 and the Analects, 132–134 authorship, 1–2, 131 as a composite text, 143–145 dating, 145–146 distinguished from a Doctrine of the Mean, 151–152 importance of, 1–3 and the Mencius, 134–143 opening passage of the, 26–30, 149–150

165 Zhu, Xi
, 2–3, 26, 34, 116, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 143 Zhuangzi
, xii, 22, 23, 31, 72, 81, 118 Zilu
, 92, 120, 131 Zisizi

, 1, 18, 26, 124, 128, 129, 131, 134 and the Five Modes of Proper Conduct, 137–143 the person, 146 as a text, 142 vocabulary of, 36, 144 Zou, Yan
, 137 Zuozhuan
, 24

About the Authors

Roger T. Ames is professor of philosophy at the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa and editor of the journal Philosophy East & West. His recent publications include translations of Chinese classics: Sun-tzu: The Art of Warfare (1993); Sun Pin: The Art of Warfare (1996) and Tracing Dao to its Source (1997) (both with D. C. Lau); the Confucian Analects (with H. Rosemont) (1988); and Daodejing: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation (forthcoming) (with D. L. Hall). He has also authored many interpretative studies of Chinese philosophy and culture: Thinking Through Confucius (1987); Anticipating China; Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture (1995); and Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (1997) (all with D. L. Hall). Recently he has undertaken several projects that entail the intersection of contemporary issues and cultural understanding. His Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China (with D. L. Hall) (1999) is a product of this effort. David L. Hall is presently professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Texas Western College, a Bachelor of Divinity (summa cum laude) from The Chicago Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Yale University. His books include Eros and Irony: A Prelude to Philosophical Anarchism; Richard Rorty—Poet and Prophet of the New Pragmatism; and a philosophical novel entitled The Arimaspian Eye. With Roger T. Ames, Hall has published Thinking Through Confucius, Anticipating China, and Thinking from the Han. In 1999 he published with Roger Ames The Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China. His current projects include a book on American intellecual history entitled Peace in Action—America’s Broken Promise and, again in collaboration with Roger Ames, a translation and philosophical interpretation of the popular Chinese classic, the Daodejing.

167