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• Rean Raphaelle Gonzales

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THE VARIETY OF LAWS From H.L.A. Hart’s “The Concept of Law” A Summary by Rean Raphaelle Gonzales Professor Hart dissects further one of his forwarded pieces in the puzzle that is “what is law?”. Previously, he forwarded a model that illustrates law as coercive orders. Now, he adds that this model, on its face, has its own share of insufficiencies that require clarification. And these clarifications he so provides in this chapter. The model of law as coercive orders is lacking since obviously, not all varieties of law suit the said. The first insufficiency pointed out by Professor Hart is that the coercive model provides a limited range of application. The notion of law as coercive orders is seemingly not always true. Laws, for example, could provide for what types of trials a judge may handle or may lay down the rules on how land disputes could be solved. The examples in no way present themselves as orders. Less so are they orders backed by threats. Next, Professor Hart saw that some laws do not give orders but rather, they confer powers to certain people. For instance, people in general may contract with others. Laws would lay down guidelines for such an act. If a person fails to meet the said guidelines, he would not, in most cases, be punished (unlike what is elaborated in the coercive model of law). The person would usually only met with a nullity of his failure to adhere to the said guidelines. Lastly, Professor Hart identified customs as further counter-examples to the coercive model. While it is true that some customs have been successful subjects of legislation, there exists customs which do not derive their legal status from any lawcreating act and are thus not supplemented by penalty. Nonetheless, these non-legislated customs are preserved as law in the sense that they are substantially followed despite legal recognition. How then can one adhere to the coercive model in light of the said insufficiencies? To this, Professor Hart answers that the notion of law could be contextualized to accommodate these specific nuances. For one, we could consider the nullity of a legal act as, in itself, a sanction. Also, we must exclude rules that confer legal powers from our definition of law. More so, customs must be strictly construed to be law only upon legislation or through judicial pronouncement.

Through these means, the

abovementioned insufficiencies are addressed and are put in place to further the discussion on the matter. These devices, as Professor Hart puts them, enhance the coercive model of the law. They stretch the definition of what the law is in such a way that the said model is unrecognizably transformed. He admits the necessity of such a transformation since attempting a single definition would so obscure the definition of law by disregarding its elements.