• Author / Uploaded
• Giulio Verrecchia

• Categories
• Propaganda
• Militar
• Opinión pública
• Esfera pública
• Ciencia militar

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PSBCHOLOGICRL UURRFRRE BRRnCH

I I4&jkl!i 4B T h i s book was p r o d u c e d in i t s e n t i r e t y on t h e m o b i l e e q u i p m e n t of t h e 5 t h M o b i l e R a d i o B r o a d c a s t i n g Company.

•

# #>

In these pages an o u t l i n e is p r e ­ sented of the f u n c t i o n s of t h e Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies as part of a PWB Combat Team. The d e s c r i p t i o n of operations,methods and t h e o r i e s o f f e r s a key t o t h e c u r r e n t A l l i e d propaganda concept and technique in the e n t i r e f i e l d of psychological warfare.

giilla

M a t e r i a l is drawn l a r g e l y f r o m lectures received by the Fourth and Ftfthi Mob i Te compan fes dur ing t h e i r t r a i n i n g course. This is augmented by p r i n c i p l e s a r r i v e d a t on t h e basis of d i s c u s s i o n s , and, in the technical s e c t i o n s , by i n t e r v i e w s with o f f i c e r s of the companies. The b o o k l e t i s i n t e n d e d as a guide f o r o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d men who have received t r a i n i n g in com­ bat probaQandia. I t ^ i s not a manual f^^n&^^i ^ ^ n ^ ^ i u|ej u|ej, i^anid i^anid isis r restricted estricted "to te'ifibirf's^;;:of W o ' b f i e R a d i o B r o a d ­ casti ng Compan ies.

Page

INTR ODUCTI ON DEFINITIONS

6

RULES OF PROPAGANDA

7

PWB TABOOS

10

PWB ORDERS

I ¥

MORALE OF THE GERMAN SOLDIER

17

GERMAN PROPAGANDA

20

COMBAT TEAM IN THE FIELD (CHART)

23

THE D-SECTION

25

PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERROGATION

27

THE PWB POLL

30

A REA INVEST I GAT I ON

t tiH'WM

I

31

MONITORING

35

RADIO NEWS AND FEATURES

41

THE FRONTPOST

51

LEAFLETS

59

POSTERS

66

L OUDSPEAKERS

71

THE LIAISON TEAM

73

THE PWB SHOP

75

THE RADIO SECTION

80

THE PRINTING SECTION

84

APPEND IX

89

inTROoucTion The goal of psychological w a r f a r e is the same as t h a t of any other branch of the armed f o r c e s : t o b r i n g about the destruction of the enemy. This new type of warfare - waged on an unprecedented s c a l e by both s i d e s in the present c o n f l i c t - a c t u a l l y is an a s s a u l t on the mind of the enemy. I t s weapons are the c o n t r o l l e d dissemination of news, f a c t s , and ideas. The struggle under way in t h i s domain between the United Nations and t h e i r enemies is g a i n i n g in i n t e n s i t y hourly w i t h thousands of s k i l l e d w r i t e r s , a r t i s t s , p l a y ­ w r i g h t s , and t e c h n i c i a n s involved on both s i d e s . Aided by r a d i o , a i r p l a n e s , v a s t press f a c i l i t i e s , motion p i c t u r e s , and other media of propaganda d i s s e m i n a t i o n , the impact of t h i s warfare today is f e l t throughout the w o r l d . This p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t r u g g l e f a l l s g e n e r a l l y i n t o two categories: s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l . They can be respectively compared to d i f f u s e d and concentrated f i r e . In g e n e r a l , s t r a ­ t e g i c propaganda is intended f o r l a r g e groups of p e o p l e , disseminated over wide t e r r i t o r i e s , b r a c k e t i n g m i l i t a r y personnel, the enemy's home f r o n t , populations under his and our c o n t r o l , and neutral c o u n t r i e s . Most of t h i s propaganda is directed from the c a p i t a l s of the w o r l d . Tactical propaganda is customarily aimed a t s p e c i f i c units in the actual f i e l d of operations and d i r e c t e d from the com­ bat zone. Although the media used a r e l a r g e l y the same ­ r a d i o , press, l e a f l e t s , and posters - i t s e f f o r t is beamed on the enemy s o l d i e r in the f r o n t l i n e . I t s immediate pur­ pose, at present, is to make the s o l d i e r lay down h i s arms and surre.n.d£rJpdiyjd^ua 11 y• ! . t s . j j I t i m a t e aim is t o d i s r u p t the o r ^ i t ^ a i l Q h ^frithe^f\em|^aVS"|' T n ' s is t h e t y p e of p s y c h o l j ) | i c ^ i ^ r | | | e ; % p e ^ ^ i ( f ^ | l a g e d by the PWB Combat Teams, ^WQ*^'w^'r^'1sfe^'S^ F l^d.*iik:5i^ f o l l o w i n g pages. Equipped w i t h mobile r a d i o t r a n s m i t t i n g and r e c e i v i n g equipment, p r i n t i n g t r u c k s , l o u d s p e a k e r s , and o t h e r ma­

t e r i a l , these teams are able t o move ai)o r a p i d l y in the ; f i e l d . They are in a p o s i t i o n d | ;£akey | i a t e advantage of informat ion|g|^fle^ t>^ tt$eiti in i t o r s and p r i s ­ oner of war \w gHe. 1 A>n%;>* *;l} Candidates vigorous prosecution of t h e war must be r e i t e r a t e d .

are t o (floods affirm­ on the

In p a r t i c u l a r , a 11 r e f e r e n c e d t o h o l l y w o o d and g a n g s t e r s a r e t o be o m i t t e d . T h i s w o u l d c o n f i r m t h e German p r o p a g a n d a l i n e c o n c e r n i n g American d e g e n e r a c y . A e r i a l A c e s : Do n o t use s t o r i e s s h o w i n g s c o r e s o f a c e s . German a c e s , a r e c r e d i t e d w i t h a much a r e a t e r of " k i l l s " .

Allied number

Refugees and J e w s : Do n o t g i v e news o f German r e f u g e e s Jews as i n d i v i d u a l s or g r o u p s .

or

A t r o c i t y S t o r i e s : No a t r o c i t y s t o r y may be used w i t h o u t s p e c i a l r e l e a s e f r o m t h e C h i e f of S t a f f of t h e Army c o n c e r n ­ e d . I n t e r r o g a t i o n s about a t r o c i t i e s must be a u t h o r i z e d by t h e t h e a t r e commander.

13

In May 1944, PWB headquarters issued the f o l l o w i n g set of o r d e r s . Just as previous o r d e r s , issued more or less f r e ­ quently according t o need, these are designed t o meet spe­ c i f i c propaganda s i t u a t i o n s on s p e c i f i c f r o n t s . Sometimes these orders e s t a b l i s h new p r i n c i p l e s or simply emphasize old p r i n c i p l e s in a d e f i n i t e a r e a . More o f t e n , however, these orders have a s h o r t e r d u r a t i o n of a p p l i c a t i o n . According t o the immediacy of the news and the progress of our f o r c e s , they may s h o r t l y be n u l l i f i e d or replaced.

RECENT PWB ORDERS (May 1944) A . GERMANY I . HITLER. H i t l e r is 'taboo' in t a c t i c a l propaganda, out may now be attacked on the s t r a t e g i c level . 2. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS Stress the d i f f i c u l t i e s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f a c i n g the German High Command and leaders. The job is beyond c a p a c i t i e s . Because t h e A l l i e s have the i n i t i a t i v e , German d e f e n s e s must be prepared on a l l p o s s i b l e

fronts. 3 . GERMAN PROPH^ClEY. Re­ c a l l German prophecies in T u n i s i a , t h a t in f u t u r e o p e r a t i o n s inner l i n e s of communications w i l l be enjoyed.

•+. QUOTATIONS. Quote Ger­ mans on Al 1 ied s u p e r i o r i t i e s 5. GERMAN AIR STRENGTH. Point out t h a t German a i r s t r e n g t h in t h e East is s m a l l . Also point out t h a t German communiques o m i t t h e i r f i g h t e r losses. 6. STATEMENTS, Rommel said, "We do not want t o t a k e c o v e r i n t h e * A t l a n t ic W a l l ' . " Lt^Gen.Dittmar, •j.the German Commentator, \ s a i d f "N © Qferman s h o u l d use t h e t e r m ' F e s t u n g Europa 1 . " We w i l l t h e r e ­ fore emphasize these terms. 7. HATRED. Stress tne hatred of the people of occ­ up ied c o u n t r i es

8 . WAR man p o l i c e are war c r i m i n a l s . However, l e t them believe that t h i s pertains to t h e i r future actions o n l y , but never s t a t e t h i s def i n i t e l y .

«. WfOMEN. Women work as %ms "f o r e ' 9 n w o r k e r s . P a r t i c u l a r l y peasant women a r e e x p l o i t e d and r e s e n t i t . They f e e l t h a t t h e w e i g h t of t h e war i s on their shoulders.

9. 'STRENGTH THROUGH FEAR' ' S t r e n g t h through fear cont i n u e s t o be t h e German l i n e of propaganda. Russian communiques on German f o r c ed labor t o be o m i t t e d .

I I . FORTIFICATIONS. Do not say t h a t German f o r t i f i c ­ a t i o n s do not mean much. We w i l l want t o have a c h i e v e d something.

B.

C.

AUSTRIA

I . GENERAL. A u s t r ia t o be stressed more s t r o n g l y than ever (up t o 89% a n t i - N a z i ) . Increasing signs of r e v o l t . A l s o s t r e s s A u s t r i a ' s capa c i t y t o l i v e as an indep­ endent s t a t e . We w i l l say t h a t A u s t r i a is not s e l f ­ s u f f i c i e n t , b u t t h a t does not mean t h a t i t c a n n o t e x i s t as a s t a t e . O t h e r s t a t e s w i l l be in a s i m i l a r (complementary) p o s i t i o n .

ITALY

1 . GOVERNMENT. Our p o l i c y towards the B a d o g l i o g o v ­ ernment remains unchanged. The B a d o g l i o g o v e r n m e n t w i l l be judged by r e s u l t s . 2 . F I G H T I N G U N I T S . No large I t a l i a n u n i t s ( o v e r 200 men) have, a t any t i m e , appeared a t t h e f r o n t on the German s i d e . The I t a l ­ ian 1st D i v i s i o n i s t r a v ­ e l l i n g through Germany on a tour !

D. RUSSIA I . FURTHER ACTION. Do not r e f e r t o f u t u r e a c t i o n on the Russian f r o n t . 2 .\ SEVASTOPOL. Stress t h a t Sevastopol should have been evacuated. ("Useless sac­ r i f i c e " 1ine).

If* >t

E. I . UNDERGROUND. The Under­ ground in France are not t o be t r e a t e d as v o l u n t e e r s , but as s o l d i e r s . They have t h e r i g h t t o r e c r u i t new members. N a t i o n a l insur­ r e c t i o n d o e s n o t have t o b r e a k o u t in a l l p a r t s o f t h e c o u n t r y a t t h e same t ime. 2. ALLIED FRIENDSHIP. Stress A l l i e d f r iendship w : t h F r a n c e . Emphasize t h e c o o p e r a t i o n between France and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s in A f r i c a n and I t a l i a n campa igns . 3. PEOPLE OF FRANCE. Urge the p e o p l e of France t o leave the towns f o r the country. 1 . PASSIVE RESISTANCE. En­ courage p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e in f a c t o r i e s , e t c . 5. HOARDING. Encourage t h e s t o r a g e of n o n - p e r i s h a b l e foods. 6. FIGHT OF UNDERGROUND. We r e c o g n i z e t h e f i g h t o f t h e U n d e r g r o u n d and t h e y have our c o n f i d e n c e . 7 . SHELLING OF TOWNS. R e ­ c a l l t o t h e m how French towns were s h e l l e d by t h e French a r t i l l e r y in the 1st World War as an a b s o l u t e tactical necessity.

16

FRANCE 8. CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES. E f f e c t i v e c l a n d e s t i n e ac­ t i v i t i e s a r e p o s s i b l e as i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s . We do want s a b o t a g e and h e r o i s m S t r e s s the p r a c t i c a l bene­ f i t s r e s u l t ing from heroism. 9. FORCED LABOR. R e g i s t r a ­ t i o n of men over ^5 y e a r s ! of age in France i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e y t o o may be used f o r f o r c e d l a b o r . Germans need a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , bank clerks, etc. 10. FRENCH M I L I T I A . French m i l i t i a (ca 1 led pol i c e , garde m o b i l e , e t c . ) w i l l be t r e a t e d as w a r - c r i m i n a l s ( a l l except t r a f f i c c o n t r o l p e r s o n n e l ) . Vichy govern­ ment is p r i m a r i l y h e l d r e ­ s p o n s i b l e , but i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r crimes c o m m i t t e d under orders. I I . SABOTEURS. B u i I d up s a b o t e u r s and show i m p o r ­ t a n c e o f s u p p l y l i n e s by t h e N o r t h A f r i c a n example, where s u p p l y l i n e s were also cut although by o t h e r means. ..,, i

LE OF THE GERmfln SOLDIER

fijf knowledge of German morale and the conditions a f f e c t i n g jjit provide the foundations for PWB r u l i n g s and d i r e c t i v e s on ; our propaganda. More d i r e c t l y , they provide the basis for our a t t a c k s on enemy morale through l e a f l e t s , p o s t e r s , and pam­ p h l e t s , as well as through the Frontpost and our broadcasts. GENERAL

I t has been found that 75% of German PW's think that Germany has lost the war. Reasons:

interrogated

1. Large number of military reverses, in direct contra­ diction to the prophecies and promises 6f German leaders.

2. Length of the war.

3 . American production found) .

(admiration for

Technik

is p r o ­

%. Local numerical s u p e r i o r i t i e s of the A l l i e s , t i l l e r y , Air Force.

i.e.,Ar­

Nevertheless German f i g h t i n g morale is high. Reasons: 1. Fear of A l l i e d r e t a l i a t i o n . Memories of I 9 ! 8 , r e i n ­ forced by German propaganda successes in c r e a t i n g widespread f e a r of A l l i e d p r o j e c t s of mass s t e r i l i z a t i o n and f o r c e d labor in the jungles of B r a z i l . 2. t.

Fear of^the subjugated populations, "Bad conscience." :

iB

-.

* •'

3 . Hope t o d i v i d e the A l 1 i e s ; based on "Anglo-American s u s p i c i o n of the USSR," " B r i t i s h f e a r s of American postwaf d o m i n a t i o n , " "American d i s t a s t e f o r c o l o n i a l imperialism,* 1 ate. ^. F a i t h in German " s e c r e t weapons." 5 . Disc i p l i n e .

IT

These gene^r&M 4| i m p o r t a n c e To" u s . they are the b a s i s of propaganda and also of our own.

are

°^

c u r r e n t German

CONDITIONS AFFECTING GERMAN MORALE

a . FOOD. S t i l l good and p l e n t i f u l , yet often served cold and a t n i g h t , due to a badly b a t t e r e d t r a n s p o r t ­ a t i o n system. b . EQ U I PMENT.

L a c k of

transport f a c i l i t i e s p r o ­ duces local shortages even where goods are st i 11 a v a i l ­ a b l e ; general shortage of soapand l e a t h e r ; radios are i n f e r i o r ; boots a r e d i s ­ a p p e a r i n g e x c e p t on t h e Russian f r o n t . c. MA I L . Ma i1 is handled y/ery e f f i c i e n t l y ; has t r a n s ­ port p r i o r i t y over food and is p r a c t i c a l l y uncensored. d. FURLOUGHS. Regular f u r ­ loughs, every s i x months, are being maintained a t a l l costs. In add i t i o n , "Bomben­ beschaedigten Urlaub" are g iven o u t . e . WOUNDED . E x c e l l e n t t r e a t ­ ment i n t h e f i e l d h o s p i t a l s , but s h o r t a g e of d o c t o r s and good b a n d a g e s . S u f f i c i e n t m e d i c i n e , b u t l a c k of b i s ­ muth (used i n t h e t r e a t m e n t of d y s e n t e r y ) . ».­

v i c e than t h e i r own, which

t h e y r e s e n t b i t t e r l y .

g . GREEN TROOPS. Setbacks

have r e s u l t e d f r o m m i x i n g

green and ex per ienced t r o o p s .

N e w s o l d i e r s have less t r a i n ­ i n g , and now r e c e i v e t h e i r

basic t r a i n i n g d i r e c t l y b e ­ h ind t h e f r o n t 1 i n e e .

h . PAY. Pay is l o w . The

German p r i v a t e earns $ 0 . 1 7

d a i l y . His f a m i l y r e c e i v e s

$ 1 0 . 0 0 a month plus 1-5% o f

h i s f o r m e r c i v i l i a n s a l a r y

paid by h i s c i v i l i a n employ­ e r . However, c e r t a i n E l i t e

t r o o p s r e c e i v e h i g h e r p a y .

For e x a m p l e , t h e SS t r o o p s

e a r n f r o m $ 2 5 . 0 0 t o $30.00

a month. 15% a d d i t i o n a l pay

on t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t .

i . "PX" ITEMS. s i t u a t i o n bad:

C i g a r e t t e

{Sultana)

I 940: 8 c i g a r e t t e s d a i l y 1942: 5 cigarettes daily 1944: 3 cigarettes daily 1 b o t t l e of beer a day 1 p i e c e of soap and 1 c o n ­ t a iner of t o o t h p a s t e a month. k. six

PROMOTIONS. Only a f t e r

months o f f r o n t - l i n e

d ut y: "Frontbewaehrungsze i t."

f . STRENGTH. ^ strength is common. Notice­ a b l e man-power s h o r t a g e f o r c e s t r o o p s t o serve in another branch of the s e r ­ 18

" 1. MEDALS. Not always award­ ed f o r a c t u a l m e r i t . O f f ­ i c e r s ' e f f o r t s t o get the Ritterkreuz o f t e n at the e x p e n s e o f e n l i s t e d men.

are being s a c r i f i c e d . A l ­ ways d i s t i n g u i s h between

m. BOMBINGS. R e s e n t m e n t a g a i n s t bombings l e s s e n e d by e d u c a t i o n f o r a d m i r a t i o n of f o r c e . Bombings impaired soldiers' relations with the home f r o n t . "Heroes" a t the f r o n t are no longer im­ pressive, since c i v i l i a n s f e e l t h e y c a r r y an e q u a l burden.

Reichsdeutsche and Volks­ deutsche. r.

s . P.W.CAMPS. F r e n c h and Russian camps a r e d r e a d e d .

t.

"Tiere

V

und Untermenschen. "

F e e l i n g t h a t "we must keep f i g h t i n g . " There is hope t o d i v i d e the A l l i e s and p e r ­ haps e n l i s t Anglo-Americans in the f i g h t a g a i n s t R u s s i a . S t r e s s our s o l i d a r i t y w i t h R u s s i a and emphasize t h a t we a r e p o w e r s o f o r d e r .

p. OFFICERS-NONCOMS. Non­ commissioned o f f i c e r s o f t e n p e r f o r m t h e d u t i e s of o f f ­ icers at the f r o n t , only t o be r e l i e v e d a f t e r t h e b a t t l e . R e s u l t , resentment by n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d o f f ­ icers . q. FOREIGN SOLDIERS. Poles are d e s p i s e d . I t a l i a n s are despised and a l s o f e a r e d as potential snipers, eto. i a n s | f e e 1 t h a t they; ;/ dig •­

OF MEN.

u. SOVIET RUSSIA. There is great f e a r of Soviet R u s s i a .

o . LUFTWAFFE. N o t i c e a b l e antagonism towards the once f a m e d German a i r f o r c e . Increased h a t r e d of Goering f ( c a l l e d "Meyer" or " T i n g e l ­ mann").

. IS'

EXPENDITURE

"Die Allierten opfern Ma­ terial urn Soldaten zu retten. Die Deutschen Opfern Soldaten urn Material zu ret ten. "

n . FORE IGNERS . German soldiers resent foreign workers a t home, and t h e i r love a f f a i r s w i t h wives and s w e e t h e a r t s , w h i l e the s o l ­ diers die at the f r ont. " W e ' l l have enemies a t home in case of c o l l a p s e . " Num­ ber o f i m p o r t e d w o r k e r s increasing s t e a d i l y .

**i

SN I PERS a r e f e a r e d .

v . UNKEPT PROMISES. German leaders made many promises, most u n k e p t . A letdown r e ­ s u l t e d . Hatred of Goebbels i ntens i f i e d . w. TRANSPORTATION. V e ­ h i c l e s a r e good b u t t o o f e w , o f v a r i o u s makes and n a r d t o r e p l a c e . Gas i s g e n e r a l l y a v a i l a b l e , but o n l y a f t e r much r e d - t a p l e x . AGE. Number of s o l d i e r s under 18 and over 35 years of age is i n c r e a s i n g .

j

19

CERfllRn P R O P R G R R D R . . .

German propaganda is g e n e r a l l y d i r e c t e d to us or to t h e i r own"home f r o n t ."We do not answer the propaganda d i r e c t e d to us, t h a t i s , c a r r y on the "war cf monitors." We do, however, attempt t o show t h a i Goebbels is s p i t t i n g into the wind, t o r e f u t e his promises and prophecies made to the German people and t o German s o l d i e r s . Moreover, we use"home f r o n t " prop­ aganda as a key t o German morale g e n e r a l l y and along s p e c i ­ fic fronts.

PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA 1. German propagandists do not consider i t expedient t o a d ­ here to the t r u t h . They have always favored the sharper short term e f f e c t of l i e s , and in t h e i r present position they can­ not a f f o r d t o t e l l the t r u t h . 2. T h e i r i n f o r m a t i o n s e r v i c e s c o n s i s t e n t l y underestimate the enemy. Reports r e f l e c t wishful t h i n k i n g , since o f f i c e r s fear t o t e l l t h e i r superiors unpleasant t r u t h s . 3. German propaganda l i n e s change, irrespective of c o n s i s t ­ ency, e . g . , no invasion—unsuccessful i n v a s i o n — p a r t l y suc­ eessful i n v a s i o n . M i l i t a r y objectives always become unimpor­ t a n t when they f a l l into A l l i e d hands. There was no Gustav 1ine, no H i t l e r 1 i n e . 4. Slogans and c l i c h e s are widely used. 5. German leaders r e a d i l y prophesy. This turned out t o be one of t h e i r outstanding psychological f a i l u r e s . 6 . Hatred is the foundation of "German propaganc|a.

DA LINES.

ANALYSIS OF PR

WAR A I M S . . . A. "Germany is f i g h t i ng f o r her n a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e . No war aims are o f f e r e d by the A l l i e s s i n c e they have none. ' U n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n ­ d e r 1 means extinction of Germany." INVASION... A. "Germany i s l o o k i n g f o r w a r d t o t h e i n v a s i o n . " I t w i l l give them a chance f o r dec is ive act i o n . B. "The A l l i e s are f o r c e d t o invade the c o n t i n e n t . " Roosev e 1 t n e e d s it personally, for p o l i t i c a l reasons. C h u r c h i l l needs it personally, for p o l i t i c a l reasons. " S t a l i n asks f o r i t . " Morale in t h e democra­ c i e s is so l o w , t h a t some­ t h i n g has t o be done. "The War in the P a c i f i c is going b a d l y . " C. "The 1 and ing w i11 be s u c c e s s f u l , but w i l l not g a i n d e p t h . " The t h e o r y of

defense 1 ic ized D. The prepared "Festung

in depth

is pub­

home f r o n t is being by lose of the term: Deutschland. "Festr

ung Europa'l s t i l l exists^ f o r the t r o o p s which are expected t o defend i t .

(MAY I9UU)

AERIAL WARFARE... A . "A 11ied o b j e c t i v e is to t e r r o r i z e civilians (women and c h i l d r e n ) . I f i t is not m a l i c e , i t is c r i m ­ i n a l i n e f f ic i e n c y . I t i s done t o avoid the i n v a s i o n . B. The L u f t w a f f e is played down. A i r power is n o t so i m p o r t a n t a f t e r a l l . The importance o f I n f a n t r y is is b u i l t u p . The " k l e i n e Landser" is i d o l i z e d . C. "Revenge w i l l be t a k e n . " (Rache ist suess.J "Only ^ out of 80 m i l l i o n Germans l i v e in B e r l i n . 8 out of HO m i 1 1 i on B r i t i s h e r s 1 i v e in London." RUSSIA AND I T A L Y . . . "Defensive v i c t o r i e s " are b e i n g a c h i e v e d t h e r e . "The mere g a i n of t e r r i t o r y is of no a d v a n t a g e t o t h e A l l i e s . " The importance of c i t i e s about t o f a l l is a l ­ ways c a r e f u l l y p l a y e d down ( S e v a s t o p o l ) . The t a c t i c a l value of f o r t i f i c a t i o n s is played down, s i n c e we a r e a b o u t t o c o n q u e r some o f them. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e iWesjtwalJ i s a " 1 i v i n g " j f o r t i f i c a t i o n , as c o n ­ i t r a s t e d w i t h t h e Magi n o t L i n e , wh ich was dead. "German Armies are

with­

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drawing i n t a c t , but i n f l i c t heavy losses on the a t t a c k ­ e r s . " Thereby t h e ma j e c t i v e of w a r f a r e destr uct ion of t h e enemy a r m y , i s ach i e v e d Corn­ manders of d e f e a t e d troops are d e c o r a t e d f o r the ir "defensive v i c t o r i e s

SECRET WEAPONS

"Dreadful s u r p r i s e s are in s t o r e f o r t h e A l l i e s . " Only r e c e n t l y , and f o r the the f i r s t t i m e , German s o l ­ diers expressed doubt as t o t h e i r e x i s t e n c e and e f f i ­ cacy. PACIFIC WAR... The war i n t h e Pac i f ic is not popular, since Ger­ mans believe the U.S. would not be a t war i f t h e J a p ­ anese had not a t t a c k e d . ALLIED UNITY... Nothing is l e f t u n t r i e d to divide the Un i ted Nations. World b o l s h e v i s m , postwar domination of E u r o p e , un­ defined war aims. "The U.S. was made to f i g h t f o r B r i t ­ ish I m p e r i a l i s m . " " G r e a t B r i t a i n w i l l lose t h e war whether the A l l i e s win or not, since England w i l l be crushed between the super ior manpower o f t h e U n i t e d States and Russ i a . " UNITED STATES... "Gangsters r u l e America" (Murder, I n c . , the Chicago Piano, e t c . ) .

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Hollywood

"Am­ ivol ous, ts t o the

r

_ lasT grandmother." Wall S t r e e t . "Money-mad h i g h f i n a n c e and J e w i s h p o l i t i c i a n s r u l e the coun­ try." B l u f f i n g instead of r e a l achievement. "Everything is promised, but promises are not kept." {Die"14 Punkte." ) "Americans have no c u l ­ t u r e " - - the W i I d West. "The U . S . is r idden by cold and heat waves, dev­ astated by f l o o d s . " "American p r o d u c t i o n is no r e a l a c h i e v e m e n t . More must be produced since i t is of i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y . "

("erzeugt Band.")

am

laufenden

"Americans are unable t o solve t h e i r s o c i a l prob­ lems." (Only H i t l e r can do t h a t . ) Therefore continuous labor troubles I s t r i k e s , un­ employment. Racial problems. Work on Negroes through Japs. Ger­ many w i l l l i b e r a t e the two colored peoples. "Germans have created a l l t h a t is good in the U . S . ) (Harrisburg, P a . ) "The American s o l d i e r is soft and c a n ' t l i v e without l u x u r y . " T h e r e f o r e super­ i o r i t y of American e q u i p ­ ment is no a c h i e v e m e n t , s i n c e our s o l d i e r s would not f i g h t without a r t i l l e r y superiority, e t c .

L

1H[ C 0 H I l # # f t f f l # l i r t 4 FIELD

The accompanying c h a r t is designed to g i v e the reader a p i c t u r e of the manner in which the PWB Combat Team operates in the zone of o p e r a t i o n s . In a c t u a l i t y , distances between the v a r i o u s team components, m i l i t a r y h e a d q u a r t e r s , a i r f i e l d s , towns, and the l i k e , vary c o n s i d e r a b l y . The inset chart in the upper left-hand corner gives an approximate idea of what the distances may be. The team's work a l s o includes propaganda addressed to c i v i l i a n s in the rear zone. This can­ not be i l l u s t r a t e d on t h i s c h a r t . 1. Army Headquarters, location of Combat Team H.Q., O-Sec­ t i o n H.Q., Frontpost teams. la. 2 .

Fixed radio s t a t i o n communication. Army prisoner e n c l o s u r e , where team's gather material for D-Section r e p o r t s .

interrogators

3 . M o n i t o r ' s t r u c k of the PWB team. In t h i s l i s t e n i n g post, news from a l l over the world is picked up f o r the use of the team and h i g h - r a n k i n g army o f f i c e r s . 4 . Beachhead a r e a . I n t e r r o g a t o r s of the PWB Combat Team often land with the f i r s t wave t o s t a r t i n t e r r o g a t i o n of war pr isoners. 5. A i r p o r t . Planes are used for dissemination of and other propaganda.

leaflets

6. Motion picture house in town near zone. PWB teams con­ t r o l motion pictures in towns taken from the enemy. 7 . P r i n t i n g shop in the same town. Such p r i n t i n g shops are taken over t o aid in p r i n t i n g work wherever pos­ s i D l e . The team a l s o has a complete p r i n t i n g t r u c k which can function independently. 8. Radio announcers' t r u c k .

9. Radio tower%31 10. RaiIroad'station! 11. Corps Headquarters and prisoner enclosure - interro­ gat ion­ 23

12

D i v i s i o n Headquarters and prisoner enclosure - i n t e r ­ rogation. j! S!

13

Regimental

Headquarters andjpr ison^r

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Regimental a r t i 1 l e r y * f ir TngisKel l s V o n t a i n ing and other propaganda m a t e r i a l .

Frontpost

15

16, 1 7 . Loudspeakers used by PWB Combat Team t o address d i r e c t s u r r e n d e r appeals t o German t r o o p s . U s u a l l y placed about 800 yards from the enemy l i n e s .

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Enemy t e r r i t o r y . Area which is p r i n c i p a l t a r g e t of PWB Combat Team's a c t i v i t y . Special patrols also d i s t r i b u t e "black propaganda", l e a f l e t s and posters in t h i s zone.

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25

The O - S e c t i o n is t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e s e c t i o n of t h e Combat Team, i t c o l l e c t s , e v a l u a t e s , i n t e r p r e t s , and disseminates i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g t o enemy morale and m a i n t a i n s a con­ t i n u o u s check on the e f f e c t of the Team's propaganda. A l l the i n t e l l i g e n c e obtained is incorporated into D-Section r e p o r t s . A r e p o r t i s r e n d e r e d w e e k l y , a c o n s o l i d a t e d one monthly, and s p e c i a l r e p o r t s whenever circumstances w a r r a n t . An o u t l i n e of t h e D-Section r e p o r t w i l l be found in the ap­ pendix. I t presents a convenient arrangement of the contents, and may serve as a check l i s t of the s p e c i f i c subjects which must be c o v e r e d . I t is on these r e p o r t s t h a t the l e a f l e t , p o s t e r , Frontpost, and r a d i o teams are p r i m a r i l y dependent for the m a t e r i a l they use in t h e i r propaganda a c t i v i t i e s . Copies of the r e p o r t s go t o Combat Team Headquarters and t o higher echelons. The D-Section obtains information from the f o l l o w i n g sources: I . P.W. I n t e r r o g a t i o n (page 2 7 ) 2 . P.W. P o l l (page 5 0 ) 3 . Area I n v e s t i g a t i o n ( i n t e r v i e w of C i v i 1 i a n s ) ( page 31 ) 4 . A n a l y s i s of Enemy Mail and Other Documents 5 . Reports from Higher Echelon D-Sections 6 . (r-2 Reports 7 . A-2 Reports 8 . Reports from T a c t i c a l M i l i t a r y Interrogators 9 . Reports from Agents behind the Lines

! 0 . Reports Report s from OSS and OWI

0 . 8 . Reports 12. Voluntary Reports from C i v i l i a n s

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i|lERRQ6ATI-QN|0F ENLISTED MEN of the information used^in'ffc^rcal psychological warfare is d e r i v e d from the i n t e r r o g a t i o n of prisoners of war. The primary o b j e c t i v e of such i n t e r r o g a t i o n s is to determine the present s t a t e of mind (morale) of the enemy. Hence the i n d i ­ vidual i n t e r r o g a t i o n must aim t o discover what the prisoner thought BEFORE his capture or surrender.

TECHNIQUE OF INTERROGATION T I M E . . . For the purpose of psychological i n t e r r o g a t i o n , i t has been found most expedient to i n t e r v i e w p r i s o n e r s on the d i v i s i o n l e v e l . G e n e r a l l y , prisoners of war are shipped from d i v i s i o n t o army cage 12 - 2M- hours a f t e r c a p t u r e . Experience has shown t h a t the best time for interrogation is 5 - 10 hours a f t e r capture. The prisoner then r e f l e c t s most a c c u r a t e l y the morale of his not yet captured comrades. Later on he develops a P. W. morale. PLACE... The place of i n t e r r o g a t i o n should be made t o look as impressive as p o s s i b l e . Every e f f o r t should be made to create at least the semblance of an o f f i c e , by the appropriate use of a desk or t a b l e , c h a i r s , maps, c h a r t s , and p i c t u r e s . Cigarettes should be kept at hand (see below). INTERROGATOR... The i n t e r r o g a t o r must command r e s p e c t . He should be clean-shaven and n e a t l y dressed. Headgear w i l l be worn when the prisoner enters and leaves. (The German s o l d i e r is not f a m i l i a r with salutes rendered while uncovered.) PROCEDURE... The taking of notes during i n t e r r o g a t i o n depends on the i n d i v i d u a l P.W.'s psychology. Some w i l l f e e l more im­ p o r t a n t when t h e i r statements are r e c o r d e d ; o t h e r s w i l l be suspicious. In any event, the basic d a t a , name, r a n k , s e r i a l number, and u n i t , w i l l be r e c o r d e d on a c a r d as soon as obtained. " D i v e r s i o n s " , e . g . , o f f e r i n g the p r i s o n e r a c h a i r or a c i g a r e t t e in o r d e r t o put him a t ease or t o c o n c e a l the i n t e r r o g a t o r ' s i n t e r e s t in a v i t a l q u e s t i o n w i l l be used sparingly and without prejudice to the i n t e r r o g a t o r ' s d i g n i t y . These " f a v o r s " must be TIMED c o r r e c t l y and should never be extended art the beginning^ot^an interview. •

'

*

•

?

•

•

.

*

.

.

•

Interrogate t h e "easiest" prisoners f i r s t , i . e . , Poles, Yugoslavs," then Germans; e n l i s t e d men, noncommissioned o f f i ­ c e r s , then o f f i c e r s . The knowledge gained w i l l f a c i l i t a t e

27

ft

•fa

the questioning of further ;pr.isQnerj& from fhe same units.

Members of the Waffen-SS are to be treated 1 ike any other

soldiers. Pretend you do not know the difference.

The form of address is Gefreiter Mueller, Herr Feldwebel

(from Feldwebel up, the Herr followed by the rank must defi­ nitely be used) . All German P.W.'s are addressed in the Sie

form.

Be patient. No prisoner is uninteresting. We must know the

attitude of the average German soldier. Moreover, the dullest

prisoner may reveal a choice item of information at the end of

a long interview.

Make no promises. Do not "propagandize" the prisoner. We do

not want to distort his answers.

In evaluating the information obtained from a P.W., excessive

caution is not called for. The German army, in its spirit of

aggressiveness, has neglected to make its soldiers security-

conscious. As a rule, German prisoners will talk rather freely

and, by and large, will tell the truth. Statements involving

the prisoner's own judgement, of course, should be more care­ fully weighed. German prisoners tend to overestimate the

morale in their own ranks.

First ask for the Soldbuch. If you have already obtained

the Soldbuch, you may use the information contained therein

to impress the P.W. with your knowledge. Be careful to get

the right book. Next, ask for name, rank, and serial number

(even if you have these data from the Soldbuch or other

source). If you already know, you may, instead of asking, tell

him casua'ly while writing the information down on the card.

At this point it i s well to determine whether the prisoner

is "tough" or "easy" in order to conduct the further question­ ing accordingly. A good question to this end is: "How long do

you think you are going to be a P.W.?" A "tough" prisoner will

usually give a defiant answer, such a s , "Until the war is

over". If he answers, "I don't know", he is likely to prove an

"easy" prisoner, and you may follow by asking: "Do you think

you will be sent back to Germany right after the war?" If his

answer is yes, h ^ b e l ieves in German victory; if no, he has

admitted by impl feat ion his belief that Germany will lose, the

war. A good metho4 of "warming up" a "tough" prisoner is to

ask him how he wa§ captured because it affords him an oppor­ tunity for self-just ification. For an "easy" prisoner, simple

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"warming up" q u e s t i o n s such as "What p a r t o f Germany a r e you from?" or "How o l d a r e you?" a r e a d e q u a t e .

PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERROGATION OF OFFICERS l . / e r r o g a t i o n of o f f i c e r s o b v i o u s l y r e q u i r e s g r e a t e r c a r e and s u b t l e t y than t h a t of e n l i s t e d men. P e r s o n a l q u e s t i o n s and "chumminess" s h o u l d be s t r i c t l y a v o i d e d . O f f i c e r s s h o u l d be i n t e r r o g a t e d in t h e p r e s e n c e of an American o f f i c e r . They a r e o f f e r e d a seat a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e i n t e r v i e w . The non-commissioned i n t e r r o g a t o r i s r e ­ q u i r e d t o s a l u t e t h e enemy o f f i c e r f i r s t . O f f i c e r s a r e s e c u r i t y - c o n s c i o u s t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t they w i l l not g i v e up s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y i n f o r m a t i o n . A good a p p r o a c h , t h e r e f o r e , is f i r s t t o ask a few m i l i t a r y q u e s t i o n s t o which you know t h e a n s w e r s . T h i s w i l l g i v e t h e p r i s o n e r t h e s a t i s ­ f a c t i o n of r e f u s a l . You w i l l then supply t h e answers y o u r s e l f , t h e r e b y showing your knowledge and e a s i n g h i s mind on t h e p o i n t o f m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y . (By t h e same t o k e n , m i l i t a r y questions t o which you do not know t h e answer must be a v o i d e d . Even a f t e r r e f u s i n g t o answer, t h e o f f i c e r w i l l f e e l t h a t t h i s m i l i t a r y i n f o r m a t i o n is t h e r e a l o b j e c t i v e o f your i n t e r r o ­ g a t i o n , and he w i l l remain r e c a l c i t r a n t t h r o u g h o u t t h e i n t e r ­ v i e w . ) From t h i s p o i n t o n , t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n may t u r n t o t h e not s t r i c t l y " m i l i t a r y " s u b j e c t s you a r e r e a l l y i n t e r e s t e d in and t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f which German o f f i c e r s r a r e l y a p p ­ reciate.

SUGGESTED APPROACHES 1 . " A r e you g o i n g t o w i n t h e w a r ? " A n s w e r : " Y e s . " ( T h i s is one q u e s t i o n he wants t o a n s w e r . ) "Then can you e x p l a i n why 75% o f your men t e l l me you have a l r e a d y l o s t ? " A n s w e r : " I know n o t h i n g a b o u t t h a t . " T h e n : " I t h o u g h t t h e German Array c o n s i d e r e d morale i m p o r t a n t . You, as an o f f i c e r , . . . " 2 . "Are *r U BerufsoffizierV 3 . Men with one or two medals like to talk about them.

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THE PUIB Regular sampiing of opinion among prisoners-of-war is a task of t h e D-Section f which makes a monthly " G a l l u p P o l l " a t p r i s o n ^ages on Army l e v e l . The p o l l is a m o r a l e - t e s t i n g d e v i c e a u k . l i a r y t o other r e p o r t s . The morale estimate can­ not be based upon i t s f i n d i n g s a l o n e . Because, in g e n e r a l , prisoners a t the Army l e v e l cage are not as occupied as p r i s o n e r s in permanent p r i s o n e r - o f - w a r camps, they cooperate w e l l . The monotony of cage l i f e can be r e l i e v e d by a we 11-presented poll of t h i s t y p e .

PROCEDURE Prisoners should be separated into groups of about f i f t y . Each group should then be given a s h o r t pep t a l k —"you are going t o have a l i t t l e fun—you are going t o be allowed t o v o t e " . While they a r e being handed i n d i v i d u a l "yes-no" ques­ t i o n n a i r e s , t h e y should be t o l d t h a t they are not r e q u i r e d t o r e v e a l t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s . Prisoners are not t o be allowed t o compare or discuss answers. (VoLksdeutsche must be excluded from p a r t i c i p a t i o n , unless t h e i r opinions are p a r t i c u l a r l y des i r e d . ) Upon completion of the X " t e s t " , the prisoners should drop t h e i r papers i n t o a " b a l l o t " box. I f they b e l i e v e t h a t any d e v i c e e x i s t s t o check t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t i e s , they should be convinced t h a t such is not the case. A l i s t of t y p i c a l questions used in previous P o l l s and a s u g g e s t e d f o r m o f t h e P.W. P o l l r e p o r t w i l l be found in the Appendix.

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31

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. . . . .PWB's |)|rfF»|sehh area i n v e s t i g a t ion? is (I ) t o d e t e r ­ mine t h e g e n e r a ^ ^ t i t i ^ d e o f ; t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f o c c u p i e d or l i b e r a t e d t e r r feSm fei?