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PARECIDOS DE FAMILIA Propuestas actuales en Filosofía para Niños

FAMILY RESEMBLANCES Current Trends in Philosophy for Children

Editado por/Edited by ELLEN DUTHIE FÉLIX GARCÍA MORIYÓN RAFAEL ROBLES LORO

© Del texto: Ellen Duthie, Félix García Moriyón, Rafael Robles Loro, 2018. © Del conjunto de esta edición: GRUPO ANAYA, S.A., 2018 - C/ Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena, 15 - 28027 Madrid ISBN: 978-84-667-9094-9 - Depósito Legal: M-20323-2018 - Printed in Spain. Reservados todos los derechos. El contenido de esta obra está protegido por la Ley, que establece penas de prisión y/o multas, además de las correspondientes indemnizaciones por daños y perjuicios, para quienes reprodujeren, plagiaren, distribuyeren o comunicaren públicamente, en todo o en parte, una obra literaria, artística o científica, o su transformación, interpretación o ejecución artística fijada en cualquier tipo de soporte o comunicada a través de cualquier medio, sin la preceptiva autorización.

Parecidos de familia. Propuestas actuales en Filosofía para Niños Family Resemblances. Current Trends in Philosophy for Children

Ellen Duthie. Félix García Moriyón. Rafael Robles Loro (eds.) Madrid. Anaya, 2018

COMITÉ EVALUADOR/EVALUATION COMMITTEE Alina Reznitskaya. Department: Educational Foundations. Montclair State University. USA Arie Kizel. University of Haifa, Israel Aristidis Galatis. Academic Teaching, Melbourne Graduate School of Education. Australia Claire Cassidy. University of Strathclyde. Glasgow. Scotland Edwige Chirouter. Université de Nantes. France Ellen Duthie. The Wonder Ponder Visual Philosophy for Children Project. Spain George Ghanotakis. Institut Philos. International Center of Education for Philosophy and Citizenship. Montreal, Canada Joe Oyler. Maynooth University. Ireland Larisa Retyunskikh. Moscow State University named after Lomonosov. Russia Laurance Splitter. The Education University of Hong Kong. China Magda Costa. Universidade dos Açores. Portugal María daVenza Tillmanns. Davenza Academy of Philosophy. San Diego, CA. USA Megan Laverty. Teachers College. Columbia University. New York. USA Nadia Stonayova Kennedy. City University of New York.USA Pat Hannam. Hampshire County Council, Hampshire, UK Roger Sutclife. Sapere. United Kingdom / France Stefano Oliverio. University of Naples Federico II. Italy Susan Lyle. University of Wales, Trinity St David. UK Thomas Wartenberg. Mount Holyoke College. Massachusetts, USA Ylva Backman. Luleå University of Technology. Luleå, Sweden

Adolfo Agúndez. Université de Sherbrooke. Québec, Canada Ana María Vicuña Navarro. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Chile Carla Carreras Planas. Universitat de Girona. España Elena Morilla. Colegio Europeo de Madrid. España Eugenio Echeverría y Elena Morilla. Centro Latinoamericano de Filosofía para Niños en San Cristóbal de Las Casas, Chiapas. México Félix García Moriyón. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. España Gloria Arbonés Villaverde. GrupIREF. Barcelona. España Jorge Sánchez Manjavacas. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada “HASER”. España Juan Carlos Lago Bornstein y Jorge Sánchez Manjavacas. Universidad de Alcalá. Alcalá de Henares. España Julia Molero Azaya. Ruhr-Universität Bochum. Alemania Luis Alberto Prieto. Centro de Filosofía para Niños. España Nelson Bedoya. Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios – UNIMINUTO. Colombia María Teresa De la Garza. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la UNAM. México Myriam García Rodríguez. Centro de Filosofía para Niños. Asturias. Principado de Asturias. España Rafael Robles Loro. IES Nuestra Señora de la Victoria. Málaga. España Sara Elizabeth Pérez Morales. Universidad de Guadalajara. México Tomás Miranda Alonso. Centro de Filosofía para Niños. Albacete. España Walter Omar Kohan. Universidad del Estado de Río de Janeiro (UERJ). Brasil

ÍNDICE/CONTENTS PRÓLOGO/PROLOGUE ................................................................................................................................. 9 1. METODOLOGÍA /METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................... 13 Anna Maria Carpentieri: Situated Relatedness as an Education Choice and Formative Structure in Philosophical Inquiry ......................................................................................................................... 14 Antonio Cosentino: P4C as Philosophical Practice of Community ........................................................... 30 Dina Mendonça and Magda Costa: The Community of Philosophical Inquiry as a Regulative Ideal ....... 36 Gilbert Burgh, Simone Thornton, Lyz Fines: ‘Do Not Block the Way of Inquiry’: Cultivating Collective Doubt Through Sustained Deep Reflective Thinking ..................................... 47 Gloria Arbonés Villaverde y Sara Silvestre Anglés: Filosofía para Niños y Niñas en la formación del profesorado de Secundaria: un cambio irreversible de la mirada ................................................... 62 Jessica Ching-Sze Wang: Philosophy for Children and Dewey’s Aesthetics: A Teacher Educator’s SelfStudy Through Narrative Inquiry ....................................................................................................... 70 Kerstin Michalik: The Philosophical Conversation as a Method of Examining Children’s Perceptions, Mindsets, and Interpretations of the World ....................................................................................... 82 Marina Santi: La Filosofía con niños como jazz: un camino de improvisación para una nueva pedagogía ............................................................................................................................. 93 Rhiannon Love: Taking it Slow: Enhancing Wellbeing through Philosophy for Children ...................... 105 Riku Välitalo: Becoming a Philosophical-Teacher: The Role of the Teacher and the Nature of Teaching in Philosophy for Children ........................................................................................... 118 2. FUNDAMENTACIÓN FILOSÓFICA / PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND ..................................... 129 Elaine Englehardt and Michael S. Pritchard: 18th Century Scottish Moral Philosophers and Children .................................................................................................................................... 130 Emmanuel Skoutas: The Limits of Constructivism and the Possibility of Facilitating Ethical Dialogue in a Community of Inquiry: Avoiding the Temptations of the Ring of Gyges .......................................... 139 Félix García Moriyón: De los pensamientos al destino ........................................................................... 151 Gert Biesta: ¿Tocando el alma? Explorando una perspectiva alternativa para el trabajo filosófico con niñas, niños y jóvenes ............................................................................................... 163 Peter Worley: Dissonance: Disagreement and Critical Thinking in P4/wC ............................................ 178 Stefano Oliverio and Alessandro Volpone: P4C’s Rediscovery of the ‘Other Side’ of Aristotle’s Logic. An Interpretative Hypothesis ................................................................................................................. 188 Walter Omar Kohan: Un ¿diálogo? acerca del trabajo filosófico con niñas y niños. A propósito de la intervención de Gert Biesta en la Conferencia del ICPIC ............................................................... 204

3. DIFERENTES TEMAS / DIFFERENT TOPICS .................................................................................... 213 Andrea Beatriz Pac: Filosofía con niños y Literatura: una alianza potente para la reflexión ................ 214 Cristina Rossi and Stefano Manildo: Staying Doubtful: How Can Philosophical Inquiry in Science at Secondary School Promote Interdisciplinary Reflection and Epistemological Awareness? ............ 227 Jelle

de Schrijver, John De Poorter, Eef Cornelissen and Richard Anthone: Can a Rabbit be a Scientist? ............................................................................................................. 239

Laura Kerslake: End-in-Itself or Means to an End? Exploring the Tensions Between Philosophising and Schooling .................................................................................................................................. 252 Manuela Gómez Pérez: Pensamiento multidimensional y práctica filosófica según Matthew Lipman .............................................................................................................................. 266 Maria daVenza Tillmanns: Children, Intuitive Knowledge and Philosophy ............................................ 273 Maughn Rollins Gregory and Stefano Oliverio: Philosophy for/with Children, Religious Education and Education for Spirituality. Steps Toward a Review of the Literature .............................................. 280 Pablo Flores: Las metáforas por las que la infancia habla ...................................................................... 298 4. DIFERENTES CONTEXTOS / DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS ........................................................ 309 Anastasia Anderson, Elizabeth Wilson, Joshua Friesen and Serena Geary: Embracing Plurality: Wisdom and Method in Philosophy for Children Summer Camps ................................................................ 310 Ben Kilby: Philosophy for Children in Primary School Classrooms: The Teacher’s Perspective ........... 322 Fátima Álvarez López y Luis Alberto Pietro Barbero: La escuela de pensamiento libre. Personas con discapacidad .................................................................................................................................... 335 Fiorenzo Ferrari and Chiara Colombo: Skills, Multiple Intelligence and Philosophy with Children in Intercultural Education .................................................................................................................... 343 Janette Poulton and Jill Howells: A Thinking Culture: Philosophy in Public Spaces .............................. 353 Maura Striano: Philosophical Inquiry as a Deweyan way of Teaching Dewey's Philosophy at University ...................................................................................................................................... 371 Nelson Iván Bedoya: El desarrollo del juicio moral en niños involucrados en contextos de maldad sistemática ...................................................................................................................... 382 Vanise Cássia Dutra Gomes, Edna Olimpia da Cunha y Walter Omar Kohan: Abraçar com a alma: uma experiência filosófica na Escola Joaquim da Silva Peçanha, Duque de Caxias, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil ....................................................................................................................... 393 5. DIFERENTES MODELOS DE EVALUACIÓN / DIFFERENT MODELS OF EVALUATION ......... 405 Caroline Ferguson and Marcel Haagsma: The Potential for Philosophy with Children in International Schools ................................................................................................................... 406 Félix García Moriyón, Juan Botella, Diana Centeno-Gutiérrez, and Jara González Lamas: Does Philosophy for Children Make a Difference? ..................................................................................................... 423 Irene de Puig: Modelos de evaluación para Filosofía para niños y niñas ............................................... 435 Ourania Maria Ventista: A Literature Review of Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Philosophy for Children ............................................................................................................... 450

Roberto Colom: ¿Se puede mejorar las capacidades cognitivas? ........................................................... 472 Ylva

Backman, Teodor Gardelli, Viktor Gardelli, Caroline Strömberg and Åsa Gardelli: Research Methods in the Swedish Project Education for Participation – Philosophizing Back a ‘New’ Life After Acquired Brain Injury ............................................................................... 484

6. DIMENSIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PROGRAMA / POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE PROGRAM ..... 493 Angélica Sátiro y Julia Montoya: Ciudadanía creativa y educación ambiental a través del proyecto “El jardín de Juanita” ............................................................................................................................ 494 Arie Kizel: Philosophy with Children and Socio-philosophical Sensitivity ............................................. 506 Carla Carreras Planas: ¿Por qué la democracia necesita FpN? .............................................................. 517 Darcisio Natal Muraro: Social and Political Aspects of Democracy in the Community of Inquiry: Connections Between Lipman and Freire ........................................................................................ 525 Gillen Motherway: Democratic Education and Educating for Democracy: Perspectives on Philosophy with Children Practice in Irish Classrooms ............................................................................................ 534 María A. Lima Piai y Darcisio Natal Muraro: Freire y Lipman: la necesidad del diálogo en el proceso educativo para la afirmación de la sociedad democrática .............................................................. 546 Patricia Hannam: Does it Matter How Freedom is Conceptualised in the Community of Philosophical Inquiry in the Lipman Tradition? ..................................................................................................... 556 7. EL CURRÍCULO / THE CURRICULUM .............................................................................................. 565 Eugenio Echeverría: Biografía narrada de FpN ...................................................................................... 566 George Ghanotakis: Meeting the Needs of 21st Century Learners: Critical Thinking and Game- Based Philosophical Inquiry ....................................................................................................................... 578 Susan Lyle: The Storytelling Curriculum and Philosophy for Children aged 3-5 ................................... 592 Victoria Maclean y Catalina Bertoldi: Filosofar con Natacha: nuevos recursos para el aula de FpN ............................................................................................................................................. 604 ÍNDICE DE CONCEPTOS / INDEX ........................................................................................................... 615

PRÓLOGO Parecidos de familia. Propuestas actuales en Filosofía para Niños. Madrid. Anaya Uno de los objetivos principales que nos propusimos en la organización de la XVIII Conferencia Internacional de Filosofía para Niños fue que todo el proceso de la celebración de dicha conferencia estuviera inspirado por el modelo de comunidad de investigación filosófica que constituye uno de los rasgos fundamentales y claramente diferenciadores de un enfoque de la educación que pone la práctica de la reflexión filosófica en el aula, convertida en comunidad de investigación, como núcleo de su propuesta. Ese esfuerzo estuvo claro, con mayor o menor acierto, en todas y cada una de las actividades que precedieron a la celebración y también en los tres días de la conferencia. Las personas que participaron enviaron extensos resúmenes de sus propuestas, que fueron evaluadas y seleccionadas por el comité de publicaciones. Las propuestas aceptadas, reunidas en un único documento, se enviaron a todas las personas inscritas en la conferencia con antelación a su celebración. En las sesiones de la conferencia insistimos en la necesidad de dejar tiempo para dialogar con la audiencia, de tal modo que la comunidad pudiera aportar sus sugerencias y observaciones y la sesión pudiera llegar a ser una genuina comunidad de investigación. Desde el primer momento tuvimos la intención de publicar un libro con las ponencias presentadas en la conferencia, pero más que publicar las habituales “Actas Conferencia”, queríamos publicar un libro específico que fuera el resultado final de todo el proceso de organización y celebración de la conferencia. Es decir, un libro en el que debía quedar recogida la reflexión filosófica que la conferencia había propiciado y facilitado. Por eso mismo, una vez terminada la conferencia, hicimos una convocatoria a todas las personas que habían presentado una comunicación para que enviaran el texto completo de su ponencia, en el que debían hacerse eco de las aportaciones que habían recibido durante su presentación y de otras aportaciones recibidas durante la conferencia. Como es usual en este tipo de publicaciones, formamos una comisión de evaluación, en la que han participado 38 personas, familiarizadas con el ámbito de la Filosofía para Niños. En los plazos fijados recibimos 61 comunicaciones, una parte de las 149 presentadas en la conferencia. Por razones diversas, 86 personas consideraron que no era oportuno enviar las suyas para su publicación en el libro. Todos los trabajos fueron revisados siguiendo el procedimiento de doble evaluación ciega, en algunos casos con una tercera lectura para dirimir divergencias entre los evaluadores y tomar una decisión. A final, solo 50 fueron aceptadas. En algún caso específico, a petición de la persona que evaluaba, pusimos en contacto al evaluador y la autora para que pudieran dialogar sobre el texto y las observaciones que había suscitado. En ese momento pasamos a la siguiente fase. Solamente seis trabajos habían sido aprobados sin ningún tipo de observación, mientras que los otros 44 trabajos habían recibido observaciones de mayor o menor calado. Enviamos el informe de evaluación a los autores y las autoras y les pedimos que tuvieran en cuenta las observaciones que allí se hacían; en algunos casos, considerábamos que eran necesaria esas modificaciones y en otros casos lo planteamos como sugerencias que podían aceptar o rechazar. Se inició así un amplio mucho

más largo de lo previsto intercambio de correos hasta llegar a una redacción final que fuera considerada correcta por los editores y los autores. El último paso ha sido editar y preparar los textos para su publicación, trabajo especialmente importante en los textos escritos en inglés por personas no nativas. Nuestro compromiso como editores fue que las deficiencias en el idioma no fueran por sí mismas una razón suficiente de un rechazo. Más de dos mil correos electrónicos dan testimonio del tiempo y esfuerzo dedicado a la corrección, edición, revisión y corrección de pruebas. La distribución de los artículos corresponde a los mismos temas que se propusieron para la Conferencia, conscientes de que hay varios artículos que bien podrían estar en más de un apartado. El resultado final es un libro que cumple lo que anuncia el título. Por un lado, consideramos que queda claro que existe un aire de familia. Las personas que han escrito estos trabajos comparten sin duda un núcleo de tesis y convicciones relacionadas con una concepción de la infancia y de la educación, del profesorado y de los objetivos fundamentales que deben orientar las relaciones educativas en los distintos ámbitos en que estas se dan. Ahora bien, los parecidos familiares no implican ni imponen ningún tipo de uniformidad. Las variaciones sobre un mismo tema son diversas hasta el punto de que los limites y las fronteras pueden resultar algo borrosas. Utilizando palabras tomadas de tres de las ponencias invitadas, el alma educativa del movimiento de Filosofía para y con niños tiene algo del espíritu del jazz: cada interpretación del diálogo de investigación filosófica requiere capacidad de improvisación creativa sin alejarse nunca del todo de esos rasgos compartidos desde los años iniciales de creación del movimiento. La variedad de experiencias y propuestas que aquí se presentan dejan claro lo que acabamos de decir. Por otro lado, este libro permite hacerse una idea de cuáles son las tendencias actuales que muestran la vitalidad de la práctica de la reflexión filosófica, sin agotar ni mucho menos el campo. Junto con otros libros recientes, pretende contribuir a ampliar nuestra visión del ámbito de la Filosofía para Niños: son sin duda valiosos para ampliar nuestra visión del ámbito de FpN. Aquí hay trabajos que se centran en aspectos básicos del programa, en un nivel casi introductorio; otros artículos exploran en profundidad temas que quizá dábamos por suficientemente claros, pero que merecían nuevas reflexiones. Podemos encontrar experiencias en ámbitos tan distantes como la literatura o la ciencia, o con grupos de personas especialmente vulnerables, como discapacitados cognitivos o personas que se recuperan de daños cerebrales. Por último, en rápido y breve repaso del contenido del libro, nuevas investigaciones sobre el impacto del programa ratifican que el profesorado y el alumnado lo valoran bien y que ejerce un impacto positivo en el crecimiento cognitivo y afectivo de los niños y las niñas. En definitiva, este proyecto, como cualquier otro, es mejorable. Echamos en falta algunas ponencias que se presentaron en la conferencia, cuyos autores y autoras han optado por no enviarlas, otras que sí están podrían haber mejorado un poco más si el tiempo lo hubiera permitido. Lo que, en todo caso, está claro es que el esfuerzo de todas las personas implicadas ha dado como resultado un libro valioso, que ofrece un buen reflejo de lo que ha sido un vivo proceso de investigación. Damos las gracias a todas las personas que lo han hecho posible, y también a la editorial Anaya que ha costeado su publicación.

PROLOGUE Family Resemblances. Current Trends in Philosophy for Children. Madrid. Anaya One of the main goals we set ourselves in the organization of the XVIII ICPIC International Conference was to model the entire process of the Conference —before, during and after— as a community of philosophical inquiry, one of the fundamental and differentiating traits of an educational approach that proposes the practice of philosophical reflection in the classroom, transformed into a community of inquiry, as the core of its proposal. This effort was evident, and achieved to a greater or lesser extent, in each and every activity preceding the celebration as well as during the three days of the conference. Attendants sent lengthy summaries of their papers, which were then evaluated and selected by the publication committee. All the summaries of the accepted papers, gathered in a single document, were sent to everyone registered for the conference in advance. During the sessions, we insisted that time for dialogue with the audience was a requirement, in such a way that the community could offer suggestions and comments and the session could become a community of philosophical inquiry. From the very beginning, our intention was to publish a book with the papers submitted to the conference, but rather than publishing the usual ʽConference Proceedingsʼ, we wished to produce a specific book that was the final result of the entire process of organization and celebration of the Conference: a book that would collect a significant part of the philosophical reflection provoked and facilitated by the Conference. Thus, once the conference was over, we called for all those who had given a presentation, to send the full text of their papers, incorporating any input they had been given during their presentation and any other contributions they had received during the conference. As usual in this kind of book, we formed an evaluation committee, made up of 38 people familiar with the field of P4C. Out of the 149 presentations accepted for the conference, we received 61 papers for publication. For different reasons, 86 people did not submit their papers for the book. All the papers were reviewed following a double-blind peer review procedure; some papers required a third review to resolve discrepancies between the two reviewers and make a final decision. Finally, only 50 papers were accepted. In some cases, at the request of the reviewer, we put them in contact with the author so that they could discuss the text and the comments it had raised. We then started the second part of the process. Only six papers were approved without any comment or suggestion, while the remaining 44 papers received comments and suggestions from the referees for the authors to consider. We sent the evaluation reports to the authors and asked them to take into account those comments; in some cases, we told them that the proposed modifications were a requirement, but in other cases, we told the authors that it was up to them to decide whether to incorporate any changes. This triggered a lengthy —much longer than expected— exchange of emails back and forth in order to arrive at a final text that both editors and authors could agree upon. The last step of the process was editing and preparing the texts for publication, a task

that was particularly substantial in the case of papers written in English by non-native speakers. Our commitment as editors was that language deficiencies alone would not be a sufficient reason for rejecting a paper. More than two thousand emails give testimony to the time and effort devoted to correcting, editing, revising and proofreading. We have organised the book in sections, corresponding to the themes proposed for the Conference, in full awareness that some papers could well be included in more than one section. The final result is a book that fits its title. On the one hand, we think it is clear that there exists a family resemblance. There is little doubt that the authors of the papers in this book share a core of theses and principles related with a concept of childhood and education, of teaching and of the fundamental aims that should guide educational practices in all those environments where education takes place. Nevertheless, these resemblances do not assume or impose any kind of uniformity. Variations on a theme are different to the extent that borders and limits become a little fuzzy. Borrowing words from three of the keynote speakers, the educational soul of the Philosophy for and with Children movement shares some common traits with jazz: each performance of the dialogue in a philosophical inquiry requires a capacity of creative improvisation without straying too far from the characteristics we share from the beginning of the movement. The variety of experiences and proposals included in this book is clear evidence of this. On the other hand, this book gives us a by no means exhaustive but certainly varied glimpse into some of the current trends in the field, showing the vitality of the practice of philosophical reflection. Together with other recent books, it aims to contribute to broadening our vision of the Philosophy for children field. In this book you can read papers that focus on basic topics of the program, at an almost introductory level; other papers provide an in-depth exploration of themes which we might take for granted but are worthy of new reflection. We find experiences in fields as distant as literature and science, or with especially vulnerable groups, such as cognitively disabled people or people recovering from brain injury. Lastly, in this quick and brief overview of the content of the book, research on the impact of the program confirms that teachers and students offer a good appraisal of it and that there is a positive impact on the cognitive and affective development of children. To be sure, as with any project, there is room for improvement. We would have welcomed some of the papers that were presented at the conference, but whose authors chose not to submit them for publication; others that were submitted could have been improved even further, if time had allowed. What is clear, in any case, is that the effort made by everyone involved has resulted in a valuable book that is a good reflection of what has been a lively process of inquiry. We would like to thank all the people who have made it possible, as well as the publisher Anaya, for financing publication of this book.

Parecidos de familia Propuestas actuales en Filosofía para niños

Family Resemblances Current Trends in Philosophy for Children

1. METODOLOGÍA / METHODOLOGY Desde el planteamiento inicial desarrollado por Lipman, Sharp y sus colaboradores en el IAPC han surgido diferentes prácticas. En algún momento, algunas personas han hablado de prácticas ortodoxas y prácticas heterodoxas, implicando la existencia de un posible canon metodológico, algo que otros niegan enérgicamente. Y otros colaboradores han distinguido entre una primera y una segunda generación. Preferimos superar estas distinciones, sin olvidarnos de ellas, y centrarnos en lo que compartimos y, al mismo tiempo, siendo receptivos a la innovación y la diferencia. En este sentido, uno de los objetivos del XVIII Congreso ICPIC celebrado en Madrid en junio de 2017 fue la apertura del encuentro a las diferentes opciones que, a pesar de venir de unas corrientes teóricas y prácticas distintas, y con una tradición específica, están conectados con FpN por su interés común en el desarrollo del pensamiento complejo (crítico, creativo y cuidadoso). Queremos abrir una reflexión sobre la idoneidad de estos otros modelos para el desarrollo del pensamiento y de la práctica filosófica, y

sobre su posible convergencia con Filosofía para Niños. Different practices have emerged from the initial approach developed by Lipman, Sharp and their colleagues at the IAPC. A while ago, some began to speak of orthodox and heterodox practices, implying the possible existence of a methodological canon - something that has been adamantly denied by others. Still other colleagues have distinguished between a first and second generation. We prefer to put these distinctions aside while remaining aware of them, choosing instead to focus on what we share and being sensitive to innovation and difference. With this in mind, one of the goals of the 18th ICPIC Conference held in Madrid in June 2017 was to open the meeting to different approaches that, although working from a distinct theoretical and practical background and/or a specific tradition, are related to P4C through their common interest in the development of high order, multidimensional or complex thinking (critical, creative and caring...). The idea was to open a conversation focused on the adequacy of these other models of thinking development and philosophical practice, looking at their possible convergence with Philosophy for Children.

Parecidos de familia Propuestas actuales en Filosofía para niños

Family Resemblances Current Trends in Philosophy for Children

Situated Relatedness as an Education Choice and Formative Structure in Philosophical Inquiry Anna Maria Carpentieri [email protected] C.R.I.F. (Rome); C.d.R.F. (Brescia); Liceo Anco Marzio, Rome, Italy. Translator: Antonino Principato CV Anna Maria Carpentieri is a permanent teacher of Philosophy and History at Liceo Anco Marzio, Ostia, Rome. She is also a Teacher Educator in P4C. She has been teaching in all grades and types of the Italian school system, from Kindergarten to Senior High School. She has been planning and running Philosophical Practice Laboratories with children and teenagers since 1995. She has also written essays that have been published in Italian journals and international journals and books. ABSTRACT The present paper is an analysis of Situated Relatedness as a prospective educational platform and formative tool. It results from a meta-theoretical investigation of the basic tenets of Lipman’s theory and makes constant reference to the philosophical practice performed with children and teenagers in P4C-based CoPIs. Situated Relatedness leads to a metarelational dimension of thinking which, if activated and practiced in situational formative contexts, acquires considerable educational potential for the individual and the group. In order to achieve the above objectives, the paper explores a possible relationship between Complex Thinking and Meta-Relational Situated Thinking (MRST) and its potential influence in the growth and development of a community in dialogue. Furthermore, the awareness, knowledge and practice of Situated Relatedness will be inquired as to their possible impact on an educator’s training route. KEYWORDS Situated Relatedness, Meta-Relational Situated Thinking, Philosophical novel, Educational platform, Formative tool. RESUMEN El presente trabajo es un análisis de la Relación Situada como una plataforma educativa prospectiva y herramienta formativa. Es resultado de una investigación metateórica de los principios básicos de la teoría de Lipman y hace referencia constante a la práctica filosófica realizada con niños y adolescentes en CoPI basados en FpN. La Relación Situada lleva a una dimensión meta-relacional del pensamiento que, si se activa y se practica en contextos formativos situacionales, adquiere un considerable potencial educativo para el individuo y el grupo. Con el fin de lograr los objetivos anteriores, el documento explora una posible relación entre el pensamiento complejo y el pensamiento meta-relacional situado (MRST) y su posible influencia en el crecimiento y desarrollo de una comunidad de diálogo. Además, se 14

Parecidos de familia Propuestas actuales en Filosofía para niños

Family Resemblances Current Trends in Philosophy for Children

informará sobre la conciencia, el conocimiento y la práctica de la Relación Situada en cuanto a su posible impacto en la ruta de formación de un educador. PALABRAS CLAVE Relación Situada, pensamiento situado meta-relacional, novela filosófica, plataforma educativa, herramienta formativa.

INTRODUCTION Relatedness and Situatedness connote and specify the essence and existence of the real world. Throughout his/her life, the human being is and becomes in situation and in relation. By interacting with other beings and the world around him/her, he/she expresses his/her own relatedness and situatedness through his/her thinking, language and life experience. The philosophical and educational debate on relation and situation acquires considerable significance in Lipman’s ideas and works. The present study aims at exploring various articulations and connotations of relation and situation in Lipman’s thinking and in the educational and formative canons of P4C. To this end, an analysis of the structure of curriculum novels will be carried out. Moreover, in what manner and to what extent situation and relation can influence an individual’s and a CoPI’s growth and development will also be inquired. The focus of the present research is Situated Relatedness, which will be explored not only per se, but also as an educational platform and formative tool for the growth and development of the individual and the group. The results of the study, along with our observations on the outcome of philosophical practice sessions with children and teenagers (which were carried out according to the formative model of P4C) have enabled us to refer to a specific thinking mode that grows and develops within P4C-based CoPIs. This form of thinking, which is referred to here as Meta-Relational Situated Thinking (MRST), is that kind of thinking whereby the individual and the group experience relational and situational dimensions in a conscious manner. As regards the possible relationship between MRST and Complex Thinking, the inquiry will be followed by a presentation of the correlations between the various spheres of thinking. Some concepts and considerations developed in the present work have been converted into an iconic language, so as to improve and clarify their presentation and description. Moreover, whether or not the awareness and practice of Situated Relatedness on the part of an educator have an impact on his/her style as a facilitator and/or on his/her effectiveness as an educator will also be investigated. More specifically, a detailed inquiry will be conducted as to whether or not MRST within a CoPI acquires value and significance in the co-building of philosophical dialogue. The basic questions of the present study are: 1) What do we mean by Relatedness and Situatedness? 2) What do we mean by Situated Relatedness? 3) Why do we believe that a philosophical narrative text, namely, a P4C curriculum novel, is a functional tool for promoting Situated Relatedness praxis? 4) What do we mean by Meta-Relational Situated Thinking (MRST)? 5) Can we talk of relations between Complex Thinking and MRST?

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6) Will an educator who becomes aware of and practices Situated Relatedness really make a difference in facilitating the growth of the CoPI? 7) Does being and becoming MRST (i.e., its Situatedness and Relatedness) acquire valuable meaning and significance in co-building a philosophical dialogue?

Relationship and relatedness In practicing late Plato’s considerations on a being that is and becomes the possibility of predication, or better still, the possibility of entering into relationship, 11th-grader Davide stated: ‘Every day our being is in relationship and it is exactly this relational aptitude of ours that tells us who we are’. This observation, though, raises an issue – if the human being and the world around him/her are related to each other, what are the connotations that pertain to being in relationship? Starting from Plato and Aristotle and ending with Buber, Ricoeur and Panikkar, philosophical thinking has often referred to a connection becoming a relationship, which is a category that founds and structures the real world, a category that interprets the human being, his/her thinking and relation with the real world. Relatedness constitutes, connotes and specifies the whole world’s essence and existence. If we were to investigate the semantics and etymology of the word relationship, we could identify its meanings within the relation/link it intrinsically entails and the correlated potential of being in fieri that we consider inherent within it. A historical, socio-anthropological and scientific interpretation of the real world can be developed through the concept of relatedness. By the same criteria, we can investigate the manifold relational dimensions intrinsic to human beings that constitute and develop them. If we were only to consider the origin of life on our planet, we would certainly discover that the possibility of existing has been engendered by relations, or better still, by bio-molecular interactions. The human being is relation because he/she is always in relationship with the worlds he/she interacts with, whether they are physical environments, non-physical environments, living things or other human beings. Even the psycho-physical structure of the human being is relationship-based: we find relationships between the various dimensions of our psyche, between the various parts/organs of our body, between body and psyche. The synapses in our nervous system organically and physiologically express relations belonging to our being. They also bear an analogy between man and the relationship he/she establishes with his/her own knowledge and the real world as a whole. The relatedness that the human being practices with other human beings actively participates in his/her identity-building process because the interpersonal relationships he/she entertains constantly intersect his/her intra-personal dimension, i.e. the relationships he/she entertains with himself/herself. In the light of what has been said so far, we can state that Relatedness, i.e. ‘being which is inside a relationship’ is that state of being which belongs, connotes and defines a dual, plural and dialogical relationship in its essence, existence, actualization and manifestation.

Situation and situatedness Situatedness is being in situation, i.e. the connotation, the specificity, the condition of a context, of a natural/physical and non-natural/physical setting, of living and non-living things. A being is always situated as it is precisely through a situation, by means of a situation, because of a situation that it is and becomes. The whole world is situation in relationship and/or relationship in situation, including our being and existing, our being there. Relatedness and Situatedness structure and connote the real world by predicating and substantiating it at an 16

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ontological level. They are the coordinates that enable us to read and interpret ourselves and the world around us, because they indicate the closest and deepest connections binding the various parts together into the whole. They inform the being that becomes an inter-being which is situated and in fieri. The human being states, expresses and communicates his/her own situated relatedness and his/her own related situatedness within the thinking, languages and praxis he/she has been immersed in since the early stages of his/her development. The most recent authoritative psycho-pedagogical and anthropological theories argue in favour of teaching/learning formative processes which are situated. Therefore, we can talk of a situatedness which would stand for contextuality / referability / connection / referentiality / possibility / inhabitability of thinking, languages, life experiences and teaching/learning processes. That said, one question wants answering: in what manner and to what extent do these dimensions of being influence the growth and development of an individual and a CoPI?

The central character of the relationship and the situation in Lipman’s thinking Philosophy – Thinking – Educational Process Lipman’s theories and suggestions for educators have often referred to relatedness and situatedness. Even his idea of philosophy identifies with practicing relationships in situation. The same can be said of his idea of Complex Thinking, which is a sort of multi-dimensional thinking whereby every dimension is able to relate with the others, within a thinking process which becomes a kind of inquiry that fosters a dialogue between networks of relations. As Lipman has often maintained, the very definition of thinking and the idea of educational process and philosophical practice evince the central character of the relationship and the situation. When Lipman says philosophy is ‘the core of the educational process’ (Lipman, Sharp 1988: Introduction), he thinks of philosophy as activity, i.e. a potential for practicing thinking and its processes. When Lipman states: ‘philosophy uses thought ‘to’ think and at the same time, thinks ‘about’ philosophy. This way it reflects on its method while investigating its content’ (Lipman, 2012: 507), the philosophy he has in mind ‘acquires thinking both as content and as method’ (Striano, 1999: 3-4), i.e. he refers to practicing the relationship between content and method. This form of thinking recognizes its own nature, content and procedures and consciously uses both what is thought and who is thinking it, as well as how it is being thought, in a process of shared, co-participated and situated inquiry. And the relationship between thinking as content and thinking as method, or inquiry, leads to the meta-relational and situated dimensions of thinking which a) are implicit in Lipman’s assumption (as it is precisely these dimensions that enable this relationship to take place) and, b) within a context of further formative and situated practice, are to be recognized, developed and evolved. Higher Order Thinking is described as ‘a complex form of thinking, one which is an articulated unit of logical, analytic, creative and caring thinking (ethical and affective involvement), a type of thinking which finds its fulfilment in meta-cognition, insomuch as it is conscious of which procedures are being adopted and it is capable of controlling which processes are being activated.’ (Lipman, Sharp 1982: Introduction). It is a form of thinking ‘that (...) puts forward thought that thinks about its own way of thinking while, at the same time, it thinks about other things.’ (Lipman, 2012:524) 17

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The definition of the ‘meta’ dimension of thinking stresses both the facilitator’s and the CoPI members’ awareness of the procedures and their ability to develop and control them. In other words, what Lipman has in mind here is a way of teaching/learning thinking whereby the ‘thinking matter’ is internalized, and the ‘thinker’ becomes aware of its content and procedures and develops the ability to control them. Thus, Lipman stresses our need to actualize a conscious relationship between acquiring learning procedures and developing the ability to control them. The meta-relational aspect of thinking is intrinsically ever-present and potentially formative, insomuch as thinking content, procedures and control are closely related to each other. As regards the most appropriate way of thinking to be developed in children and teenagers, Lipman clearly stated this during a conversation with Marina Santi some years ago: ‘What interests us is that when children philosophize, they learn to think ‘in networks’, systematically, through areas organized into relationships and not in a fragmented, disjointed manner. If this idea of ‘thinking’ sits at the centre of Philosophy for Children, then through it we can help students to develop the disposition to think ‘by relationships’. This way, it is the thought process itself that can be conceived as a relational dynamic.’ (Lipman, 2012: 516). This quotation definitely evinces Lipman’s concern with the relational dimension of thinking, where the thinking process is identified with relational dynamics. Thinking in networks, through organized relational areas, i.e. thinking through relationships, is precisely the building of a dynamic-relational process and the development of an inquiry process whereby thinking recognizes itself in a dialogical structure which is present and/or takes shape through an interconnected network of relationships. Thinking in networks also means considering thinking as some sort of activity aimed at entering into relationships and interacting with the relationships that this process activates. And the relationships evinced/recognized/built during the educational process will decisively contribute to the CoPI member’s internalization of the relational dynamics which will later become a dialogical process between relationship and meaning. In Thinking in Education, Lipman clearly states the above when he defines thinking as being ‘a process of finding or making connections and disjunctions (…) The generic term for connections and disjunctions is relationships (…) each relationship, when discovered or invented, is a meaning, and great orders or systems of relationships constitute great bodies of meaning’ (Lipman, 2003: 23). The importance of relationships (multi-structural worlds coordinated and situated in formative inquiry processes), together with the corresponding thinking dimensions to identify, stress, nurture and educate, is present even in Lipman’s statements on an educational process which, according to the model proposed, is aimed at producing sound educational reform. In his advice to educators concerning a reflection- and inquiry-oriented restructuring of educational practices, Lipman stresses the comprehension and knowledge of relations within and among the various disciplines and stresses their intrinsically problematic nature: ‘The disciplines in which inquiry occurs are assumed to be neither non-overlapping nor exhaustive; hence their relationships to their subject matters are quite problematic’ (Lipman, 2003: 18). By connoting the educational process as inquiry-driven, he adds: ‘The focus of the educational process is not on the acquisition of information but on the grasp of relationships within and among the subject matters under investigation (…) It should now be clear that the reflective paradigm assumes education to be inquiry, whereas the standard paradigm does not.’ (Lipman, 2003: 19). Then, by stressing the indispensability of educating pupils to think in the various school subjects, Lipman shows how the pupils’ internalization of the languages inherent in the various subjects is a consequence of their ability to recognize, comprehend and interpret the structural relationships within and among the various disciplines. Likewise, making mental operations 18

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means consciously going into the meaningful dynamic relational and situated processes which stimulate the pupils’ internalization of laws and principles, as well as concepts and categories, through their recognition, comprehension and practice of internal and mutual relations. This practice should enable the individual and/or the group to acknowledge, recognize, identify and build relationships in situated formative contexts. To corroborate what has so far been reported, Lipman says: ‘To judge is to judge relationships, either by discovering relationships, or by inventing them’. (Lipman, 2003: 22) (...) He then goes on to stress the need to adopt comparison-and-contrast-operating criteria, by adding that: ‘Obviously, the criteria in such cases are similarity and difference, but similarities and differences are kinds of relationships, just as are part-whole, means-end, cause-effect, and countless others. Every classification scheme establishes formal relationships for empirical entities. Every law, every principle, bears a relationship, or more precisely a set of relationships, to the events to which it applies. Disciplines are only trivially the information they contain; more important, they are the structures of relationships into which such information is organized. They are our understandings’ (Lipman, 2003: 22). Hence, discovering, recognizing, evincing and creating relationships in situated educational contexts is part of a formative process which primarily aims at shaping and developing a specific dimension of thinking, as well as the individual’s and the CoPI members’ awareness of it, through a shared co-participated educational practice. As regards the 3-dimensional connotation of Complex Thinking, Lipman stresses that this distinction is merely functional to an analysis of the spheres of thinking. He suggests that educators should never lose sight of the relational and situated connotation of thinking. His poignant remarks of 2002 can be summarized as follows: ‘Talking about the 3-dimensional connotation of thinking (as well as of judgment, for that matter) in saying, making and doing, i.e. the corresponding logical, creative and caring spheres of thinking, I do not mean to make a hard-and-fast separation between them (…) The tripartition only serves analytical purposes: there is no presumption to regard thinking as being actually divided into these 3 regions (…) Rather, I am postulating that thinking is always situated within a context: those who think historically think differently from those who think mathematically. These are disciplinary differences. The same can be said of formal differences: those who think rationally think differently from those who think ethically and affectivelyʼ. (Lipman, 2002: 29).

Situated relationship and situated relatedness By Relatedness we mean ‘being which is inside a relationship’, namely, that state of being which belongs, connotes and defines a dual, plural and dialogical relationship in its essence, existence, actualization and manifestation. By Situated Relatedness we mean that specific expression and that particular development inherent in and intrinsic to being in a relationship when and only when it inhabits a given context of space and time, cognition, language and logic, emotions and values, within an inter- and intra-personal dimension. When we consider Situated Relatedness in its articulate development through a philosophical practice within a P4C-based CoPi, we mean a situated process whereby articulated formative strategies intersect the structural and dynamic dimension of the individual and the group being in relationship. Starting from a theoretical investigation and following on from our laboratorylike experience, we arrive at defining P4C-based CoPi relationships as Situated Relationships. We call Situated Relationships the Relationships that start, develop, evolve and turn into a typical holistic CoPI context. Situated stands for inhabited, i.e. addressing specific psychophysical [logical-cognitive, linguistic, affective (emotional), space/time / social (situational)] contexts; Relationship stands for a structure (a model and a criterion of a 19

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procedure/development) for any functional practice/reference both in terms of thinking and knowledge and in terms of personal, inter-personal and intra-personal experience.

The P4C-Based curriculum novel as model and cradle Situated Relatedness within a P4C-based CoPi becomes (turns into) Situated Relationship praxis, i.e., a philosophical practice which is made of, stimulated and guided by, procedural and developmental models and criteria that refer to interactions between thinking, languages and life experiences. As regards the semantically specific orientation we want to ascribe to the term Situated Relatedness, what we have in mind is a movement characterizing the Situated Relatedness and portending towards change and transformation, because it engenders a mode of being that becomes a specific mutual nexus/bond. This mutual nexus/bond stimulates an interaction which is subject to becoming dialogue of and between thinking, speaking and acting. Situated Relationships can be found in P4C curriculum novels, namely texts becoming pretexts, contexts and instruments for ‘doing philosophy’. The novel is the most functional instrument for activating situated relational philosophical practice because it has a plot that becomes a texture of specific coordinated elements and develops an articulated process which achieves its objectives through the words that are narrated. The Situated Relatedness intrinsic to it produces an in fieri process which generates a CoPI within the context of the story. Moreover, it is in and of itself a movement which enhances and orients the CoPI of the children or teenagers that use the story. The specific coordinated elements can be seen in those universally extendable topics and issues pertaining to the characters and protagonists of the novels who have personal, familiar and social experiences. These experiences can be identified, adapted and transferred to the socio-cultural contexts the CoPI members belong to. It is precisely these specific elements, once inserted into the novels and correlated with experiences which children and teenagers find familiar, that guarantee their motivation and involvement. The narrative frame of the novel is the texture that aims to be a leading model/pattern. This is achieved through procedural, logical-cognitive and linguistic criteria and steps, still with reference to contexts that have been experienced and practiced, and which are practicable and bound to stimulate some sort of educational and formative transfer within contextual situations that the CoPI members have actually experienced. This transfer will induce a stimulating thinking process that will have an impact on the education and development of the CoPI, insomuch as it has had an impact on the inter- and intra- personal dynamics of its members. A novel becomes a cradle, i.e. a place and time where situated relationships can start, grow and develop safely and securely, along with their practice, both through the characters and the protagonists and through the logical-cognitive, linguistic, emotional, ethical, interpersonal, intra-personal and situated contexts of the story. Finally, as the novel enables situated relationships to establish and evolve themselves, its educational context is going to stimulate a form of philosophical practice which will most likely enable the CoPI members consciously to recognize, utilize and co-build other situated relationships. Thus, P4C-based CoPI members are involved in some sort of inquiry which consciously interacts with thinking (content and process), languages and meanings, life experiences and situated contexts. This situated and relational philosophical practice contributes to raising the levels of ethical and epistemological consistency in the individual as well as in the community.

Philosophical Novel – Narrative Thinking – Languages Languages are channels/codes which have multiple expressive, communicative and interpretive potential. More specifically, the communicative options of verbal language are 20

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greater and more substantial. Verbal language is a more direct channel – it allows for greater coherence and definite interpretation. The thinking that grows and develops within a CoPI is one that is linked to a life experience, as well as a novel which is subject to being linked to past, present and future life experiences, in any way closely connected with the lives of children, teenagers and/or other members of the community. When it activates processes and reflects on itself, when it thinks and it is thought, this form of thinking uses narration. By sharing different perspectives that integrate within the participated inquiry, the interpretation of the world around and the shared construction of senses and meanings to assign to one’s own life experiences occur thanks to the narrative dimension of thinking, which is always there and is stimulated and enhanced by curriculum novels in the philosophical practice routes. All languages can be used as stimuli, aids and conversions, and improve, foster and enhance expressive and communicative potential, the internalization of notions, concepts, topics and objectives. Practicing other languages and converting expressions and communicative acts into different languages means acquiring translation/exemplification skills that guide and orient the comprehension and production of messages. To acquire translation and conversion skills from one code to another is extremely important in order to make logical clarifications or adopt interpretive strategies. It is necessary, however, to make some things clear: even if codes like icons, music or gestures became text/pre-text for philosophical inquiry, they could cause ambiguity or perplexity or raise various other issues, pose questions, etc. but, at least in our opinion, they could not serve the purposes or perform the functions typical of a narrative text like the P4C novel, which is not only a pre-text, but also a context that guides the inquiry-building process; they would not leave so much room for imagination and creation as the narration of novels normally does. The use of other codes would certainly require some sort of conversion into verbal language, into words, in order to facilitate doing philosophy or practicing discussion. There is a great difference between the use of other codes as stimuli for imagination, creation or reflection purposes and the verbal language used in P4C curriculum novels. The words and events engaging the characters and protagonists of the novels lead the individual and the group to build their own thinking and their own self within contextual inter- and intra-personal dynamics. The verbal language that Lipman refers to is a language that connotes itself into a set of relationships connected in significant logical, cognitive and linguistic connections that interact with life experiences. This language becomes social production and an action tool and the CoPI dialogue becomes a set of relationships which are connected in their connections and meanings. In Thinking in Education, when introducing the fundamental nature of awareness and self-awareness, the awareness of our mental acts, Lipman maintains the educational importance of fiction by saying: This is the value of literature: It provides a surrogate context that helps us figure out what the term in question is doing in that context. We can’t see a surmise or a gathering the way that we can see a cassowary, but we can be conscious of performing the mental act of surmising or gathering. We can confront a cassowary in the zoo, but we can confront a surmise only by thinking about our own thinking, by being conscious of our own consciousness. Thus to think about our own thinking is to objectify a mental performance we have just engaged in, whereupon we can name it, describe it, correct it, substitute a synonym for it, and so on. (Lipman, 2003: 143)

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Situated relatedness and praxis Therefore, Situated Relatedness is that process which generates, enacts and modifies thinking, language and life experience. In so doing, it connotes itself both in its original essence at the outset and in its development as becoming, with a substantiality that is basically movement. It comes back onto itself and, at the same time, can evolve in a spiralling manner. This form of thinking that originates from life experience embodies a language that is, in its turn, an action tool in a continuous and continual becoming which allows for changes and transformations. Situated Relatedness is the constant source and power of the inquiry process. It stimulates, generates, induces, guides and orients mental and linguistic acts/states, emotional and relational states and their consequent mental operations, which are enhanced by the problematic ambiguity of life experience that can be found in a novel and transferred to the holistic and situated context of inquiry typical of a CoPI. Situated Relatedness produces a generative transformational movement that guides and orients the individual and the group through some routes rather than through others, through some operations rather than through others. Although it leaves a lot of room for choice, it creates growth and development routes that are specific and detailed. If we take ‘Sassi d’artista’ (‘Artist Stones’), (Nardone, 2011: 65-83), a story written according to P4C-based formative indications, as an example, we can see that the protagonists of the story are inserted in a very motivating context. The teacher decides to put on an art show with works his/her students have created with stones gathered on the beach. While gathering these stones, students talk and quarrel with each other as to which stones to gather and which not. They provide many reasons which bear various and heterogeneous ideas of beauty. The protagonists of the story discover and inform each other of issues and problems they often leave unanswered, such as, for example, the relationship between criteria and beauty. In their mutual ‘confrontation’ for editing the Agenda and during their discussion, the pupils of the ‘Liceo Anco Marzio’ CoPI were induced to undertake a thinking and talking movement which guided and oriented them towards specific mental operations, such as ‘discovering implicit assumptions’ or ‘making a comparison’. The issues they constructed show a consistent correlation between the dynamics interacting in the context of the story and those developing from among the laboratory students. They evince a movement that goes beyond the movement/action present in the story: e.g., a question like ‘Does the beauty of a whole set depend on the beauty of its single parts or on the beauty of the whole set itself?’ indicates an articulated form of cognitive curiosity. The discussion still features various positions and in-depth observations, such as putting the concept of beauty in relation with the beauty of a civilization or culture, or the observation that ‘the individual parts might not be beautiful, but it is the whole they take part in which becomes beautiful.’ We can therefore assert that the Situated Relatedness which is practiced within a CoPI is that movement of individual and/or group thinking, language and life experience which is stimulated by a story and by the life experiences of the members and guided and oriented by the facilitator’s interventions. It describes an in-network process which is: a) situated in an educational and formative context whereby network means all those connections, links and relations originating from contextual experience and generated within the context of CoPI praxis and b) guided and oriented by a procedure which becomes a holistic process of inquiry aimed at creating shared co-participated knowledge and philosophical dialogue.

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Situated learning – Situated cognition – Distributed thinking – Situated relatedness When we talk of Situated Relatedness, not only do we acknowledge the educational value of formative interpersonal interactions in the teaching/learning process, but we also have other aspects in mind. The philosophical practice undertaken in P4C-based CoPIs is certainly in line with the principles and guidelines that connote situated learning. Situated learning is a teaching/learning process which develops in a significant formative space that greatly contributes to the nurturing of internal relations between the community and the relevant cultural context. This is a holistic learning context where situations are highly motivating, characterized by a form of activity-oriented situation-integrated knowledge which becomes the result of a shared discursive/dialogical process. Intra- and inter-personal relationships are oriented towards inclusive interacting relational ethics. The skills to be attained are cognitive and affective – learning to learn in order to learn to be is the main aim of the educational process. Particularly significant is the term situated cognition, which indicates a type of knowledge that is the result of a cultural situation which the subjects internalize by practicing distributed thinking. Distributed thinking is a form of thinking whereby, thanks to social interaction, the subjects actually build their own knowledge, which they will use in order to shape their own persona and develop their own personality. All these principles and aims do exist and are pursued through the philosophical practice that connotes P4C-based CoPIs. One difference could be found in the specificity of their relevant context, which is not only a physical space, but also a symbolic environment that includes the whole corpus of the experiences narrated and practiced by community members. This environment might be thought of as an open space fostering the construction of meaningful experiences with various types of contexts (physical, institutional, etc.). The main distinction between a situated-learning-practice community and a Lipman-modelbased-practice community is to be found in the kind of activity practiced. P4C-based CoPIs foster a form of doing philosophy which becomes situated-relatedness-oriented philosophical inquiry. P4C-based CoPI members are involved in some sort of inquiry which consciously interacts with thinking (content and process), languages and meanings, life experiences and situational contexts. The inquiry is carried out according to intra- and interpersonal circular dynamics criteria whereby philosophy is used for the growth and development of conscious multi-dimensional thinking in the individual and within the group. Thus, the transverse aspects of philosophical practice enhance individual- and group-based skills. All these activities are carried out on an inter-disciplinary basis, which favours the individual’s and the group’s internalization of the structural relations within and among the various disciplines. Practicing the trans-disciplinary dimension of philosophy helps both the individual and the CoPI to focus on, and interact with, logical, metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic and epistemological topics and issues in their learning process. Distributed thinking is an educational dimension whereby every participant in a group engages in the same thinking procedure: some mental/language acts interact with others, and some mental operations interact with others. This type of interaction is knowledge-buildingoriented. Situated Relatedness is not to be confused with distributed thinking. Situated Relatedness implies interactions between thinking, language and life experiences among CoPI members in order to produce sharing and co-participation in dialogue. It is some sort of movement which is the source and power of, as well as the criterion and model for, the growth and development of CoPI relational dynamics. It can become interactive, it is an in 24

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fieri relational process that can later create distributed thinking. The dialogical-relational process between mental acts/states, speech acts and mental operations, which is present in the P4C curriculum novel is oriented to the construction and development of thinking skills in a holistic inquiry context of educational learning, through some sort of discussion which is subject to becoming philosophical dialogue based on the educational dynamics of the interactions between concepts, emotions, reasoning and judgments. This process will be created because it derives from the characters and the protagonists’ dialogue in the story and it will be suggested by the situational and relational context of the novels. By evincing the role, functions and interactions of mental acts in the educational process, Lipman maintains: A mental act may play an important part in a dialogue by serving to move the inquiry along. It can be related to a speech act having a tactical role in discourse. The speech act is not something independent of the mental act yet somehow corresponding to it. Rather, it is that portion of the single discursive entity that has developed to the point of utterance. In this sense, speech acts have their roots in ongoing mental performances, while at the same time they interact with other speech acts that are parts of the communal dialogue, and they produce the phenomenon of ‘distributed thinking’ in which each participant contributes to the single thinking process. Without the activity of tiny molecules of thought -interacting mental acts- that process would be fairly unintelligible. (Lipman, 2003: 139)

Besides indicating that mental performances and speech acts are formatively interdependent, which contributes to generating dialogue-making distributed thinking, the above quotation stresses the great value of relationships situated within and among acts, states, operations, words and meanings. This type of Situated Relatedness should always be recognized and practiced in a formative perspective that includes a facilitator and CoPI members, because it is exactly this founding structure which makes the formative process feasible and enables the participants to become aware of the educational value of what they have practiced and internalized. In light of what has been maintained so far, Situated Relatedness can be defined as being: 1) a continuous and continual source and power of the philosophical inquiry and 2) a movement that generates, enacts and modifies a constant interaction and complementarity between and among thinking, language and life experience, inasmuch as it provides criteria and models which stimulate, engender, induce, direct, guide and orient specific mental and linguistic acts/states, emotional and relational states and mental operations. Situated Relatedness is an in-network process of links and connections, i.e. of relationships identified and generated in formative situational contexts.

Situated relatedness, Meta-relational situated thinking, Complex thinking The results of our research and consequent observations enable us to talk about a form of thinking which, in the aforesaid settings, starts, grows and develops and which is not only Relational and Meta-Relational, but also Situated. Can we talk of relations between Complex Thinking and Meta-Relational Situated Thinking(MRST)? MRST, which P4C cultivates and nurtures in and with its philosophical praxis, is a form of thinking based on the structural and formative value of the situated relationship. It is a type of thinking which forms and develops within the individual’s and the group’s awareness and through the acknowledgment, recognition, formation and development of Situated 25

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Relatedness. Situated Relatedness is nothing other than an interactive network of situated relationships. P4C-based CoPi praxis implies the formative interaction of individual and group thinking, language and life experience and the awareness that thinking, language and life experience are linked to one another in an educational perspective which is both interpersonal and intra-personal. Here we mean to establish and develop a form of Complex Thinking in which both the individual and the group are aware of the importance of educating / developing / corroborating formative interdependent relationships within each thinking sphere (as is the case with self-correction and context sensitivity in critical thinking), as well as in the interaction between the various thinking spheres (critical, creative and caring). As the tree image shows, we can regard Caring Thinking as that dimension of thinking which represents a carrying structure that could become the support or incentive necessary to corroborate the growth of other dimensions of thinking. In the image, it corresponds to the roots which are that part of the tree which feeds on the soil to nurture the whole plant and make it grow. Critical Thinking corresponds to the trunk of the plant, that which supports it by letting the nourishment through and connecting the various parts, features and functions of the plant. Creative Thinking corresponds to the frond of the tree, which consists of branches, leaves, flowers and fruits, i.e. it stands for that dimension of thinking with a generative and developmental nature. MRST corresponds to the lymph, whose canals run through the tree and enable it to live and grow. The lymph runs all the way through the tree: its crude part, the sap, is that light-coloured fluid consisting of water and mineral salts which the roots absorb from the soil; the rest, the processed part of the lymph, is a solution of nutrients created by the leaves (by photosynthesis) which spreads all the way through the plant. In our view, Complex Thinking and Meta-Relational Situated Thinking grow in a direct proportion to each other. Together, they represent some sort of Complementary Thinking - a highly articulated type of thinking in which every dimension performs specific functions that constantly interact with those of the other spheres of thinking. A CoPI can successfully pursue P4C formative objectives insofar as its educational model helps activate and nurture a philosophical practice oriented towards a conscious growth and development of MRST.

Situated relatedness as an educational choice Will an educator who becomes aware and practices Situated Relatedness really make a difference in facilitating the growth of a CoPI ? Does being and becoming MRST (i.e., its Situatedness and Relatedness) acquire valuable meaning and significance in co-building philosophical dialogue? Situated Relatedness is a valuable educational choice provided it is recognized and nurtured as an educational platform and formative tool. In order for us to make this choice, Situated Relatedness must be consciously acknowledged per se and promoted in terms of its becoming a long-term educational strategy and methodological approach throughout the process of philosophical inquiry. By educational platform we mean a structure which acts as a multi-functional launchpad and constant safe reference in the growth and development of the individual and the group. By formative tool we mean a channel that aids and guides the community throughout the educational process by accurately intervening in the activities so as to constructively and fruitfully stimulate a meaningful practice of interactions between thinking, language and life experience. From our own point of view, mastering, practicing and activating Situated Relatedness in a conscious manner obviously does make a difference for an educator: it improves his/her competence and facilitation style and makes him/her feel 26

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more suitable for fulfilling the requirements of being and becoming an educator. The P4C curriculum, which is structured on the significant formative potential of relationships, can act as a valuable guide also on account of its trans-disciplinary character. Although formative projects often imply great educational perspectives, at the end of the day they feature activities and pieces of knowledge that shape and develop deeply non-related thinking processes and completely ignore the formative influence of relatedness and situatedness. As regards the influence of conscious Situated Relatedness practices oriented towards shared coparticipated dialogue-building processes, it is worth noting that thinking, language and life experience are not only mutually connected; they also merge together and, albeit keeping their own specificities, become dynamically complementary. The meeting relationship that results from the aforesaid multi-stage process makes the elements connote themselves in such a way as to dynamically complement each other. Moreover, this process generates dialogue because it creates deep conscious relationships of thinking, languages and behaviors through interactive practices of mutual situatedness and relatedness. Situated Relatedness creates some sort of osmosis between and among the various dimensions of thinking. As a source, it continuously and continually gives strength, energy and life to the movement of thinking, thus vivifying relationships in the shared co-participated knowledge-building process.

Conclusion The present paper has stressed the importance of the role, functions and growth of Situated Relatedness and the meta-relational and situated structure of thinking connected to it. To this end, the formative route suggested by P4C-based curriculum novels is shown and interpreted through a philosophical practice which is meta-relational and situated. The educational relationship to consider here is one featuring not only interactive emotionalaffective-social-ethical dynamics, but also linguistic-cognitive-conceptual dynamics which intersect each other and concern both the individual and the group in an interpersonal and intrapersonal perspective. P4C-based curriculum novels generate a model of meta-relational and situated philosophical practice which can become a fruitful instrument of growth and development if its inherent aims and procedures are recognized and familiarized with. By building conscious situated relationships, P4C curriculum novels guide the individual and the group to practice and develop relational attitudes and aptitudes within their real-life experience. Finally, educators can really guide and orient others and themselves toward the growth and development of multi-dimensional thinking especially when they have internalized the importance of practicing Situated Relatedness. It is precisely its being situated and related that makes a real difference. In these respects, acknowledging the situated and related being-andbecoming nature of thinking enables all of us to better comprehend and appreciate the concept, function and value of the formative relationship in thinking, both in ordinary educational processes and in the whole world we are situated in and interact with.

REFERENCES Lipman, M. and Sharp, A.M. (1982). Looking for Meaning. Upper Montclair, N. J: IAPC. Lipman, M. and Sharp, A.M. (1988). Getting Our Thoughts Together. Upper Montclair, NJ, IAPC. Lipman, M. (2002). Orientamento al valore (caring) come pensiero in Filosofia e formazione, Napoli, It: Liguori. 27

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Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in Education. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press. Lipman, M. (2012). A conversation with Matthew Lipman. In Santi M. Educating for Complex Thinking through Philosophical Inquiry. Napoli, It: Liguori, p. 501-518. Nardone, S. (2011). Sassi d’artista. In Lupia, E., Miraglia, M., Nardone, S. and Sorbo, R. Il risentimento della mula. Napoli, It: Liguori, p.65-83. Striano, M. (1999). La filosofia come educazione del pensiero – Una conversazione pedagogica con M. Lipman, CRIF, Bollettino 13/14/15, p.3-4.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AA.VV. (2012). Thinking Education Through Philosophy, 15th ICPIC Conference. Jinju, Korea: KATPIS. AA.VV. (2012). Moral and Multicultural Education Through Philosophy, 15th ICPIC Conference. Jinju, Korea: KATPIS. Carpentieri, A. M. (2009). Giocare con le parole. Childhood & Philosophy. 5(10). Carpentieri,A.M. (2015). Situated relationship and Philosophical praxis - Childhood &Philosophy. 11(21). Cosentino, A. (2002). Costruttivismo e formazione. Napoli, IT: Liguori. Cosentino, A. (Ed.) (2005). Filosofia e Formazione. Napoli, IT: Liguori. Cosentino, A. (Ed.) (2005). Pratica Filosofica e Professionalità Riflessiva. Napoli, IT: Liguori. De Marzio, D.M. (2011). What Happens in Philosophical Texts: M. Lipman’s Theory And Practice of the Philosophhical Text as Model - Childhood & Philosophy. 7(13). Greenspan, Stanley I. (2007). L’Intelligenza del Cuore. Milano, IT: Oscar Mondadori. Kohan, O.W. (2014). Philosophy and Childhood. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Lipman, M., Sharp, A.M. and Oscanyan, F.S. (1980). Philosophy in the classroom. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Lipman, M. (1988). Philosophy goes to school. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in Education. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press. Lipman, M. (2008). A Life Teaching Thinking. Upper Montclair, N.J.: I.A.P.C. Lupia, E., Miraglia, M., Nardone, S. and Corbo, R. (2011). Il risentimento della mula. Napoli, IT: Liguori. Matthews, G.B. (1980). Philosophy & the young child. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Mohr, L.J. and Israeloff, R. (2012). Philosophy and Education. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Naji, S. (2004). Interview with Ann-Margaret Sharp, P4C Conference, Mexico. P4C Curriculum: Children’s Novels and Teachers’ Manuals. 28

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Ruffaldi, E. (1999). Insegnare filosofia. Firenze, IT: La Nuova Italia. Ruffaldi, E., Carelli, P.and Nicola, U. (2012). Il Nuovo Pensiero Plurale. Torino, IT: Loescher. Santi, M. (1985). Ragionare con il discorso. Firenze, IT: La Nuova Italia. Santi, M, (Ed.) (2005). Philosophy for Children: un curricolo per imparare a pensare. Napoli, IT: Liguori. Santi, M.and Oliverio, S. (Eds.) (2012). Educating for Complex Thinking through Philosophical Inquiry. Napoli, IT: Liguori. Sharp, M. (1978). A Novel Approach to Philosophy for Children. Momentum 9(2). Striano, M. (1995). La filosofia come educazione del pensiero – Una conversazione pedagogica con M.Lipman. Roma, IT: C.R.I.F. Bollettino 13/14/15. Striano, M. (1999). Quando il pensiero si racconta. Roma, IT: Meltemi. Striano, M. Pensare insieme in P4C: alcune riflessioni. The information can be found at www.filosofare.org Waksman, V.and Kohan, O. W. (2013). Fare filosofia con i bambini. Marina Santi (Ed.), Napoli, IT: Liguori.

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Philosophy for Children (P4C) as Philosophical Practice of Community Antonio Cosentino CRIF (Centro di Ricerca sull’Indagine Filosofica) [email protected] CV Antonio Cosentino is a high school teacher of Philosophy and worked as a teacher trainer at SSIS (Scuola di Specializzazione per l'Insegnamento Secondario) of Calabria University from 1999 to 2009, where he also was Adjunct Professor. He holds a Ph.D. in Science of Education and Psychology from the University of Naples ‘Federico II’. He is currently President of the scientific committee of CRIF, Co-director of the series “Impariamo a pensare” of Liguori, publisher and Director of the Acuto Summer School, which offers P4C teacher training programs. He is author of several articles and essays on educational research (specifically P4C), the editor of two books and the author of three books on topics such as philosophy as social practice and philosophical community of inquiry and education. ABSTRACT While the number of proposals for practising philosophy with children is on the rise, I realize that, often, P4C is not in fact ‘Philosophy for Children’, not in the first instance and not in the manner of ‘Filosofia per/con i bambini’ – that is, something like a ‘toy-philosophy’. My contention is that the P4C curriculum is rather a corollary of Lipman’s conception of philosophy as a ‘social practice’. Consequently, the background of the P4C curriculum I call ‘Philosophical Practice of Community’ (PPC), and it is this which I would like to bring to the foreground. When the purely pedagogical aspects of P4C are set aside, we can throw light on the three main pillars of PPC: (a) community, (b) dialogical inquiry and (c) philosophy. a) The quest for community appears to be a widespread and at the same time dangerous reaction against globalization. PPC insists on the challenge of cultivating open communities everywhere, engaged in creative and democratic communication and inquiry. b) Although we might consider Socrates an unattainable model for PPC, nonetheless we want to overcome the agonistic spirit characterizing the Greek dialegesthai. Only a constructive vision of dialogue can broaden the communicative space to include more voices and turn them into a harmonious choir. c) I believe that PPC cannot accept the diagnosis of the death of philosophy pronounced by postmodern philosophers. Perhaps, we need to go back to Plato’s key allegory of the cave and invent a different outcome, a different figure of the philosopher capable, in the end, of dwelling inside the polis. KEYWORDS 4C, Philosophical practice, Philosophical novels. 30

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RESUMEN Si bien el número de propuestas para hacer Filosofía con niños va aumentando, me doy cuenta de que, a menudo, FpN, después de todo, parece no ser en realidad “Filosofía para niños”, no en principio y no en la línea de “Filosofia per / con i bambini” como una filosofía de juguete. Mi propuesta es que el currículum de FpN es más bien una especie de corolario de la concepción filosófica de Lipman como una “práctica social”. En consecuencia, los antecedentes del plan de estudios FpN es lo que denomino “Práctica filosófica de la comunidad” (PFC) y es lo que me gustaría destacar. Cuando los aspectos puramente escolásticos de FpN se dejan de lado, podemos arrojar luz sobre los tres pilares principales de PFC: comunidad, investigación dialógica y filosofía. La búsqueda de la comunidad parece ser una reacción generalizada y peligrosa contra la globalización. PFC insiste en el desafío de cultivar en todas partes comunidades abiertas, involucradas en la comunicación y la investigación creativas y democráticas. Aunque podríamos considerar que Sócrates es un modelo incomparable para PPC, sin embargo, lo que queremos superar es el espíritu agonístico que caracteriza a la dialegesthai griega. Solo una visión constructiva del diálogo puede ampliar el espacio comunicativo para incluir más voces y hacer que se conviertan en un coro. Creo que PFC no puede aceptar la declaración de la muerte de la filosofía pronunciada por los filósofos posmodernos. Tal vez, tenemos que volver a la alegoría de Platón de la caverna e inventar un resultado diferente, una figura diferente de filósofo capaz, al final, de vivir en la polis. PALABRAS CLAVE FpN, Práctica filosófica, Cuentos filosóficos.

INTRODUCTION Reflecting upon the theme of the XVIII ICPIC Conference, the phrase ‘family resemblances’ appropriately represents the current situation of P4C around the world: P4C no longer exists as a whole, a unique class, no longer as a space defined by inclusion and exclusion, but as a family in which relationships are settled on the basis of resemblances. Still, the question remains open concerning the criteria to be chosen to recognize these resemblances, that is, how to know where family membership starts and where it ends. In Italy there are many projects available today for practising philosophy with children, some derived from Lipman (more or less transparently), others with different sources and with various approaches, so that ‘filosofia con i bambini’ has become almost a fashion, a fashion which obsessively includes a critical attitude towards Lipman’s traditional curriculum. Each approach has its own formula (sometimes presented as ‘magical’), but I have the distinct impression that in some cases what is happening is that P4C is interpreted as ‘Filosofia per i bambini’, which in Italian sounds like a reduction of philosophy to a toy format or, worse, an empty pretence. This host of initiatives is certainly a sign of how much the idea of doing philosophy with children has gained credibility over the years and how much prospects are more promising at present than in the early nineties. Pluralism is a value and not a problem, but 31

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one wonders to what extent some of these proposals are different to Lipman’s curriculum; to what extent the differences are only in vocabulary, justifiable more in terms of sociology of knowledge then in logical, pedagogical and philosophical terms. With regard to Lipman’s curriculum, it is worth noting that a lot of attention has been paid everywhere to the novels and, in general, to the materials used to prompt philosophical dialogue. Important as they may be, focusing on starting stimuli can risk forgetting the overall event of philosophical practice and, especially, its proper core, which is the dialogue. Some Italian people say: ‘Why should we prefer these nasty American stories when we have Pinocchio and several other wonderful fairy tales?’. Of course, this kind of criticism is based on a category misunderstanding concerning the difference between a classic fairy tale and a ‘philosophical’ novel. We are dealing here with a topic that can make a family difference. Those who rightly denounce the limitations of Lipman’s curriculum, pointing out its ethnocentric characterization, have – it seems to me – at least two possibilities. The first one consists in replacing the American ethnocentrism with some different ethnocentrism, emphasizing the preference for contextualization. The second possibility is to develop the creation of new novels increasingly free from ethnocentric characterizations. In this case, however, the risk is an excess of decontextualization, of falling into the world of pure forms. In other words, the challenge is how to create a balance between contextualization and decontextualization. In any case, it must be clear that a text to be shaped as an instrument for inspiring dialogue should be different from other kind of writings. It needs to be conceived of as a specific tool for specific ends. It is also true that reflection and dialogue in a philosophical manner may arise from any event, situation or story. Nonetheless, if we engage in criticizing old tools, we are expected to show attempts to improve them or replace them with those that are more useful. Appealing to literature, folklore or mythology is to abandon the field of research: it sounds like a statement of defeat. Returning to contextualization and decontextualization within philosophical practice, I think that Lipman’s model of story is a prototypical draft to the extent that it materializes a fortunate weaving between storytelling and reflection as the central pillar of a philosophical novel. While the narrative dimension contextualizes, the reflective decontextualizes and – this is important – both are offered inside the novel. You can also do philosophy after reading Pinocchio, but, however, you have to add further elements that are not actually inside the story. Ultimately, I read Lipman’s stories as a great challenge to write new stories which inspire thought; this has been a recent work objective of mine, and I include an example of an invented dialogue below: Dialogue between Right and Left [Inspired by the Kantian text, What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? (Kant, 1996)] Right- I’m Right and I stand in front of you. So, I stand on your left… Left- Here I am. I’m Left and I stand in front of you. So, I stand on your right… (Turning to face Right) Tell me, where does your sense of orientation come from? Right- I’ll let you into a little secret. Here's how I do it. I look at the direction you take and then I go to the opposite side. What about you? How do you find your way? Left- I’ll let you into a little secret. Here's how I do it. I look at the direction you take and then I go to the opposite side. Right- This is a rather vexing surprise… I was following you believing you were following a rule. Left- And I was assuming the same of you. So, does this mean that there is no rule? Right- If that were the case, nobody could know, once and for all, where the right lies and where the left lies. What do you think?

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Left- I don’t know exactly, but I have a story to tell you. Listen… David has just arrived in Zoe’s town, which is completely new to him. Just off the station he asked a native the way to Nowhere street. “Easy! - was the answer. Just turn right after that pub over there and you’ll be there”. In the pub, drinking a beer, a doubt suddenly struck David. The image of the man who gave him directions had returned to his mind with his left hand raised, while clearly telling him to go to the right. Might someone confuse his own right with his own left? Better ask again – David thought. “Excuse me, could you please tell me the way to Nowhere street?” “Easy! - was the answer. Just turn left here. Look, I'll show you on the map of the city. (Standing in front of him) Look, it's on the left”. “To say the truth, it appears to me to be on the right!”. “Of course, it is on your right! We just have to turn the map around. Done! Now it’s the right way round! This way, you have your right exactly on your left”. What? Is this a joke? Oh. You are right. Yes, on the map! But I have to move in the real city and to be sure, I cannot turn it to my liking”. “Maybe you can turn around yourself…” “Oh, sure… But, which way, for God's sake?”

Far away from a Platonic perspective, this philosophical novel provides a clear connection with everyday experience and with commonsense certainties, putting them in doubt and puzzling daily frameworks. Moreover, it produces a sufficient deal of wonder to set up seldom asked questions and to promote philosophical inquiry. At the same time, the surreal scenario helps avoid detailed contextualization, preventing, during the building of the agenda, questions like ‘What is the job of Pixie’s father?’1. The narrative code asks for contextualization, but a philosopher is never content with the single context; he’s not comfortable with commonsense; he always moves toward the edges, the boundaries between one context and another. In any case, what in my view is really at stake is not the way or the tools you use to prompt dialogue. Rather, the main concern is the quality of the dialogue itself, its philosophical style and its educational effects. Someone can do philosophy with children, for example, using Plato’s cave allegory. He/she rewrites the Platonic text as a wonderful fairy tale, reads it in the classroom, asks children what they think of this story and, if this philosopher is lucky enough, an enjoyable conversation may develop. Not bad, we might say. Unfortunately, what is lost here is the philosophical practice and, with it, the transformation of the classroom into a community of inquiry. In a case such as this, what happens is that a piece of philosophical tradition is wearing a childish dress and plays with children; Plato – I’m sure –would be quite annoyed by this. But this is not the sort of practice Lipman’s curriculum suggests. There is no need for gifted philosophers to meet children in order to show them how to do philosophy, rather, what we really need is as large as possible a number of teachers capable of rethinking their professionalism and combining it with a reflective style, while, at the same time, philosophers capable of performing an epoché with their knowledge, suspending it in order to listen to a community of non-philosophers and to participate in dialogue. In this regard, P4C took seriously the lesson from Dewey, who in The Sources of a Science of Education (Dewey, 1929) warns about the risks involved in the figure of the brilliant teacher, especially with regard to his/her inability to extend to other colleagues his unique skills and, in addition, with 1

Pixie is one of the characters of Lipman’s novels.

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regard to the seductive effects on students which, in contact with this kind of teacher, tend to adopt attitudes of imitation and dependence. In this sense, the main character of the P4C settings is not the figure of a leading philosopher, nor is it an alleged ‘philosophical child’ (Mohr Lone, 2015; Gopnik, 2010). The whole community is always the real performer. This is because I prefer to read P4C as ‘Philosophy for community’ or ‘Philosophical practice of community’. What I’m suggesting, in addition, is that the P4C curriculum is rather a corollary of a more general background which has to do with the conception of philosophy as a ‘social practice’. This is more like an ‘ante-philosophy for children’ and goes sharply against the inconsistent idea of a postphilosophy for children, as suggestive as the latter may be. The P4C curriculum emerges from this background when the philosophical practice is implemented in educational environments. To be clear, I think that the inner nature of the P4C curriculum is well stated by the expression ‘philosophical practice of community’, which summarizes a premise we can conceive of as a more general framework that is thinkable before the curriculum, and beyond its specific tools and procedures. Now, if we assume the philosophical practice of community (PPC) as a starting point, a wider social horizon opens up for philosophy. During the first decade of this century PPC has been explored as a field of research and experimentation in Italy and it has been tested in several contexts: prisons, drug addict communities, hospitals, companies, and, last but not least, in public squares like, for example, the Campo de’ Fiori in Rome, and so on. Meanwhile, books have been published on this topic (Cosentino, 2006; Cosentino, 2008; Volpone, 2014) and I believe it may be particularly significant that the first essay by Lipman published in Italy in 1988 was titled Pratica filosofica e riforma dell’educazione (Lipman, 1988). This extension of the field of action marks the social and political value of philosophy when it is interpreted as the practice of shared inquiry and contributes to binding more closely together reasonableness and democracy (Lipman, 1991). Finally, when the purely pedagogical aspects of P4C are set aside, we can throw light on the three main pillars of PPC: community, dialogical inquiry and philosophy. As far as the topic of community is concerned, I would like to point out that seeking community is ‘seeking safety in an insecure world’, (Bauman, 2000, p. 25). So, it is not enough to transform some classrooms into CoI. The quest for community appears as a widespread and, at the same time, dangerous answer to globalization. It is dangerous because community, in order to warrant security, tends to raise barriers and borders and to nourish the tribal spirit. PPC, on the contrary, insists on the challenge of cultivating open communities, engaged in creative and democratic relationships and inquiry. If community is the primary pillar of PPC, the second very important pillar is dialogue. In this regard, many questions arise. One is that of comparing and contrasting PPC dialogue with the Platonic tradition. How could there be an epistemology of dialogue which could overcome the Socratic dual and negative scheme? How can dialogue become really choral? And how may dialogue be ‘not a conversation but an existential ‘form’, a way of existingwith’? (Biesta, 2017). Although we might consider Socrates an unattainable model for PPC, what we want to overcome is the agonistic spirit which characterizes the Greek dialegesthai. Can we modify the Greek sense of dialegesthai, its essence as a fight in which the ultimate purpose is to put the interlocutor in difficulty, the index of a competitive and deconstructive vision of dialogue, destined, for these reasons, not to produce new immediate knowledge? Only a constructive vision of dialogue can broaden the communicative space to include more voices and turn them into a choir, even though they will continue to speak one at a time. 34

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With regard to philosophy, there is a primary question to be asked: What kind of philosophy can there be after Postmodernism pronounced it dead? I believe that from the point of view of a ‘philosophical practice of community’ the death of philosophy is to be understood only as the end of the metaphysical tradition and by no means of philosophy as a style of thinking. Perhaps, we must go back to the platonic cave allegory and invent a different conclusion, a different image of the philosopher capable, in the end, of dwelling inside the polis; a figure who would be recognizable, in any case, as a philosopher in the light of our tradition. All philosophies pass away, but we hope that philosophy will continue to live as an unmistakable style of thinking and acting, the same as was used to announce its death.

REFERENCES Bauman, Z. (2000). Missing Community, Cambridge: Polity Press. Biesta, G. (2017). ‘Touching the soul? Exploring an alternative outlook for philosophical work with children and young people’, Childhood & Philosophy, 13 (28), 420. Cosentino, A. (ed.) (2006), Pratica filosofica e professionalità riflessiva. Un’esperienza di formazione con operatori psico-socio-sanitari, Napoli: Liguori. Cosentino, A. (2008), La filosofia come pratica sociale, Milano: Apogeo. Kant, I. (1996), What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dewey, J. (1929) The sources of a science of education, LW, vol. 5, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Gopnik, A. (2010), The philosophical baby, New York: Picador. Lipman, M. (1988). Pratica filosofica e riforma dell'educazione, Bollettino SFI, 135. Lipman, M. (1991), Thinking in Education, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mohr Lone, J. (2015). The Philosophical Child, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Volpone, A. (ed.) (2014). Pratica filosofica di comunità, Napoli: Liguori.

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The Community of Philosophical Inquiry as a Regulative Ideal Dina Mendonça IFILNOVA-FCSH-UNL [email protected] Magda Costa-Carvalho NICA-UAc/IFIL-NOVA-FCSH-UNL [email protected] CV Dina Mendonça is a research fellow at IFILNOVA, FCSH NOVA, New University of Lisbon, Portugal. She took the Master’s degree at Montclair State University with Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp, and holds a Ph.D on John Dewey’s Concept of Experience from the University of South Carolina, USA. Her research focuses on Philosophy of Emotions and Philosophy for Children. She is an invited collaborator of the Master Course in Philosophy for Children at University of the Azores and offers Philosophy for Children sessions in a variety of settings (schools, museums, in preparation of creative projects, and pedagogical projects meetings, etc.). Magda Costa-Carvalho teaches at the University of the Azores, Portugal, and is a research member of IFILNOVA, New University of Lisbon, Portugal. She holds a Ph.D. on Henri Bergson’s Concept of Nature. Her research focuses on the ethical dimension of P4C, as well as on Environmental Philosophy. She holds Levels 1 and 2 of SAPERE’s P4C training (UK). She coordinates a Master Course in Philosophy for Children at University of the Azores and offers Philosophy for Children sessions in a public school. ABSTRACT The paper proposes that understanding the notion of ‘community of inquiry’ as a regulative ideal is a valuable working move for the refinement and improvement of the practice of Philosophy for Children (P4C). Reed (1996) and Sprod (1997) have already drawn attention to this, stating that the community of inquiry is more a regulative idea than a typical occurrence. Building on these claims, we will show that taking the notion of community of inquiry as such gives new light to many of the items and aspects of the description of what constitutes a community of inquiry. Consequently, it provides ways to identify important moments in the philosophical practice that consolidate the community of inquiry, and a working tool to grasp and handle some of the crucial moves that the facilitator makes, as well as other participants, to install and strengthen the community in the sessions. KEYWORDS Regulative ideal; Utopia; Community of Inquiry; Methodology; Reasonableness. RESUMEN Este artículo propone que entender la noción de “comunidad de investigación” como un ideal regulativo es una iniciativa de trabajo valiosa para el refinamiento y la mejora de la práctica de la Filosofía para Niños (FpN). Reed (1996) y Sprod (1997) ya han llamado la atención 36

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sobre esto, afirmando que la comunidad de investigación es más una idea regulativa que un caso concreto. Sobre esta base, demostraremos que tomar la noción de comunidad de investigación como tal aporta nueva luz a muchos de los ítems y aspectos descriptivos de lo que constituye una comunidad de investigación. En consecuencia, proporciona formas de identificar momentos importantes en la práctica filosófica que consolidan la comunidad de investigación, y una herramienta de trabajo para captar y manejar algunos de los movimientos cruciales que hacen tanto el facilitador como los otros participantes, para instalar y fortalecer la comunidad en las sesiones. PALABRAS CLAVE Ideal regulativo, utopía, comunidad de investigación, metodología, razonabilidad.

The Community of Philosophical Inquiry as a Regulative Ideal The concept of a ‘community of inquiry’ can be usefully considered an ideal such that it becomes valuable for the refinement and improvement of the practice of Philosophy for Children (P4C). Reed (1996) and Sprod (1997) have already argued that the community of inquiry is more a regulative idea than a typical occurrence. Building on their work, we show that taking the notion of a community of inquiry under the guise of the notion of an ideal gives new light to many of the descriptions of its own structure and nature. In addition to highlighting the notion of a community of inquiry in the relevant manner, it provides ways to identify important moments in the philosophical practice that consolidate the group as a community. Thus, the paper shows how the notion of a community of inquiry is a working tool to grasp and handle some of the crucial moves that the facilitator, as well as other participants, can make in order to install and strengthen the community itself. The paper will start by focusing on the nature of the community of inquiry, engaging with Lipman’s and Sharp’s definition. Taking it as an epistemological infrastructure and a pedagogical tool, we refer to the community of inquiry as an ideal, through the work of two major philosophers from the Western tradition, Thomas More and Immanuel Kant. This second part of the paper will show that the concept of ideal is only complete if we take up these two dimensions of the ideal – as a regulative ideal and as a utopia. Using More and Kant’s uses of the notion of the ideal will make even more visible two dimensions of the ideal that stand as two axes of analysis that pertinently intersect. This will allow us to explain that the ideal nature of the community of inquiry must be understood through its perception as a concept, a methodology and an attitude, leading to the conclusion that if we miss one of the dimensions, the community of inquiry will end up being a fragmentary notion. However, if practitioners acknowledge all these dimensions and see how they interact creatively, they will do justice to the notion of community of inquiry as claimed by P4C, and growth and development will inevitably occur in the philosophical sessions. 1. What is a community of inquiry? We assume Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp’s notion of a community of inquiry, based on the pragmatist tradition: a group of persons (that may be of different ages) similarly dedicated to the use of like procedures in pursuit of identical goals (Lipman, 2003, p.20). The community uses philosophical procedures (such as raising questions, examples, assumptions, reasons, hypothesis, etc.), and it also draws on philosophical contents (such as specific perspectives and concepts of the philosophical tradition), installing a communication based on a reasoned attitude, so that the practitioners are willing 37

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to reconstruct what they say and what they hear and submit it to the self-correction process of further inquiry (Sharp, 1987). A community of philosophical inquiry is an intentional speech community who dialogues regularly about philosophical concepts (Kennedy, N. & Kennedy, D, 2012, p.97). The community of inquiry also envisions communal action, such that it seeks to build consensus or compromises beyond a merely theoretical level (Weber, 2008) because participants adopt concepts and perspectives under discussion while they experience the community of inquiry, and acquire a general posture towards knowledge and reality. This means that the community of inquiry amounts to much more than a set of classroom learning activities, and both Lipman and Sharp already pointed out that it carries normative (ethical as well as political) commitments to the world, facing questions about how we want to live and the kind of persons that we want to become (Lipman, 2003). 2. The community of inquiry as an ideal: More and Kant The normative role of the community of inquiry may be explained by two different philosophical uses of the concept of ‘ideal’ – as a utopia and as a regulative ideal. When we look at the community of inquiry through the glass of the philosophical concept of utopia of Thomas More (More, 1975), and through Kant’s use of the notion of regulative ideal (Kant, 1998, B222-223), we acknowledge that, despite the complexity of the community of inquiry, it is not an unrealizable enterprise; and that those two ways of conceiving the concept of an ideal must be necessarily present in the way that P4C practice is structured such that they become pertinently intertwined. 2.1. Immanuel Kant: the ideal as regulative Kant’s notion of a regulative ideal is a core concept of his Critique of Pure Reason, being essential for the author’s understanding of the faculty of reason, in its theoretical as well as in its practical use (Kant, 1998, B222-223). The regulative ideal functions as an orientation for praxis, being a focus imaginarius (Emmet, 1994, p.11) that, as a transcendental idea, stays outside the bounds of possible experience (Kant, 1998, A644/B672). Taking Kant’s use of the notion of regulative ideal highlights the practical function of the community of inquiry because it becomes, in the mind of all its participants, an imaginary point. That is, it becomes a precious element to stand as criteria for cognitive and metacognitive judgment during the dialogue. Thus, the regulative dimension of the community enables facilitator and participants to be guided by certain patterns of questioning and discussion (Lipman, 2003, p.156). These epistemological patterns have been previously settled by its members, and stand in a continuous test for the refinement of the practice with subsequent and continual sessions. When the community of inquiry stands as an end in view, it illuminates the concrete practice of the group and reinforces the need for the establishment of rules, and sharing responsibility for the ongoing process of thinking with others. It is also important to highlight that the need to adapt and accommodate the rules to make the community of inquiry a solid and comfortable environment for insightful thinking practices is also recognized within the ideal nature of the community. The continuous adaptation of the rules, respecting the sensitiveness to contexts claimed by Lipman (2003, p.219), does not jeopardize the integrity of the community of inquiry’s structure and purpose, and is an integral part of the establishment of the rules. 38

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The use of the concept of the community of inquiry as a regulative ideal is already clear in Lipman’s work when he writes in Thinking in Education (2003) that democracy and reasonableness are regulative ideals for an inquiry-driven society (Lipman, 2003, p.204). Even though we build the notion of a regulative ideal upon Kant’s work, it is important to state that Lipman and Sharp’s notion of a community of inquiry has its base on the pragmatist philosophical tradition and thus the use of Kant’s regulative ideal is in line with Peirce’s statement that the choice of the name pragmatism is made under Kantian terms, ‘expressing a relation to some definite human purpose’ (Peirce, 1955a, p.252). Thus, it should be interpreted in view of Peirce’s claim that the problem of fixation of belief is not to be considered simply within the individual’s perspective but within a community (Peirce, 1955b, p.13) because ultimately ‘the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of definite increase of knowledge’ (Peirce, 1955c, p.247). And this notion of a community as an ideal is not only ‘within the bounds of human experience’ (Splitter & Sharp, 1995, p.18) but also, as Splitter and Sharp point out, ‘prominent in the writings of the Pragmatists’ (Splitter & Sharp, 1995, p.18). When Dewey writes in Art as Experience that, ‘in the degree in which art exercises its office, it is also a remaking of the experience of the community in the direction of greater order and unity’ (Dewey, 1989, LW 10: 87) he is describing the very dynamics of the notion of the ideal. One of the important consequences of this perspective is to recognize that ‘if the community of inquiry is a regulative ideal, it is one that is non-static.’ (Reed, 1996, p.93) Thus, when there is a community of inquiry it continually and increasingly gets transformed into a community of inquiry in the full sense of the concept. First, because time and a well-oriented experience of P4C practice necessarily reinforces itself, and second because P4C embodies the idea that reasonableness is acquired in several degrees (Pritchard, 1996, p.53) to the point of creating the conditions for a reasonable community of inquiry in itself. This is why previous work showed how P4C does not aim to teach members of a community of inquiry to merely think for themselves individually, but it understands that an individual thinker can only become fully reasonable by thinking and acting as a participant of a community. Consequently, to think with others constitutes a necessary part of being reasonable. Ultimately this means that, ‘what begins with the ability to reason in a community has to grow into the practice of reasoning as a community.’ (Costa-Carvalho & Mendonça, 2017, p.128). Thus, Kant’s notion of regulative ideal allows us to highlight two important features about the ideal nature of the community of inquiry, the first having a heuristic value, and the second asserting itself as a guiding role. On the one hand, just like a regulative ideal guides reason and action, the notion of a community of inquiry unfolds the features that practitioners ought to recognize as marks of quality within the sessions (in terms of dialogues and attitudes). On the other hand, just like a regulative ideal stands as a guiding role, it postulates what should be accomplished and refers to a concept that is ‘not realizable in particular instances but which has a role in setting standards for practical reason.’ (Emmet, 1994, p.2) The community of inquiry as a regulative ideal is not just present in the methodology but is also implicit in Lipman’s novels. Lipman claims that his stories reveal an infrastructure correspondent to the paradigm of inquiry (Lipman, 2008, p.150), meaning that the way the fictional characters think and act is meant to model philosophical practice for the real P4C participants. This is also an important feature of the community of inquiry as an ideal and has a significant impact on the second way of conceiving an ideal: through the glass of the concept of utopia. 39

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2.2. Thomas More: the ideal as Utopia Concerning the normative role of the community of inquiry, and in addition to looking at the concept as a regulative ideal, the notion’s semantic richness can be made explicit when also considered through the philosophical concept of utopia of Thomas More. Thomas More’s Utopia (1975) held an image of a better society and encapsulated hopes for the future, including a revision of educational practices (Halpin, 2001, p.307). The notion of a Utopia does not ‘negate the present in the name of some inconceivably alternative future’ (Eagleton, 2000, pp.25-26); it aims to ‘bridge between present and future in those forces within the present which are potentially able to transform it’ (Eagleton, 2000, pp.25-26). And More thinks that if one does not have a clear and lively experiential take on the utopian state it is impossible to think according to it. Thus, he writes, ‘I’m not surprised that you think of it this way’ he said ‘since you have no image, if only a false one, of such a commonwealth. But you should have been with me in Utopia and seen with your own eyes their manner and customs, as I did – for I lived there more than five years, and would never have left, it if had not been to make that new world known to others’. (More, 1975, p.39). Given that the P4C program can be seen as an educational practice that aims to contribute to a better society, it is easy to establish a similarity with utopian projects inspired by Thomas More’s work. The community of inquiry is also a ‘master educational paradigm’ (Lipman, 2003, p.83) because, just like a utopia, its main goal is not about going from where we stand to a different place, but rather about using those different places as reflexes of our present location (Eagleton, 2000, p.33). This could be the etymological meaning of a outopos, for the community of inquiry is a ‘no place’ that the children can bring to every (philosophical) dialogue. Similarly, the community of inquiry projects an ideal to aim for, so as to refine and correct present practices, and it does not look at the real contexts as something that should necessarily be overcome. The context of a community of inquiry mirrors what practitioners can reasonably look at, in a cognitive and in a metacognitive way, helping participants to ground the foundations for their actual as well as for their future choices as individuals, and as a community. The similarity in the projected revision of educational practices brings to the surface other similarities between Lipman and Sharp’s notion of a community of inquiry and that of Thomas More’s utopia. First, both make use of the fictional space as a way of opening possibilities. That is, they both present literary playfulness as a way to create a space in which people can question ideas, as well as ways of thinking that have been fixed for a long time. This would be equivalent to creating a space of freedom that enables deeper thinking beyond the usual boundaries set for thought and action. In addition, the free playfulness of the fictional space not only opens up possibilities for future thinking but also explores these possibilities effectively. This can be seen in the way that the characters (mainly children, in the case of Lipman’s novels) speak and think, for they probe, discover and explore desirable ways of thinking and speaking. The fictional space becomes, then, an illustration and a model for the possibilities it suggests. And, just as Lipman states, what is modeled by the fictional characters in the novels is ‘subsequently continued by internalization and appropriation, by the live children in the classroom, as they talk about what they have learned.’ (2003, p.156). Third, the fictional space is also used to experiment with ideas because it explores in dialogue the philosophical concepts at stake, and enables participants to freely develop the consequences of the positions put forward in practice. This experimentation with ideas also 40

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allows participants to assimilate habits of empathy for people who argue such stances (D’Olimpio & Teschers, 2017, p.147). In sum, by giving such a crucial place to fiction to bring forth, illustrate and explore the ideal of a community of inquiry, Lipman and Sharp use the same procedures that Thomas More used to make the utopia real. Therefore, we think that the notion of a community of inquiry as utopia is complementary to the notion of a community of inquiry as a regulative ideal, and the overall concept of an ideal can only be fully understood when considered within the intersection of these two axes. When the community of inquiry is presented as an ideal, just like Kant’s regulative ideal, it has both a heuristic role, enabling interpretation of events within the practice, and a guiding role, helping the community of inquiry to continuously grow into a solid group. At the same time, just like More’s fictional utopia, the notion of a community of inquiry opens possibilities and illustrates them, enabling an experimental space in which to test and explore ideas. Consequently, we think that when we miss one of these axes, the notion of a community of inquiry ends up being a fragmentary one, not doing full justice to its total impact within the practice of P4C. If considered only in a utopian perspective, the community of inquiry might appear as an impossible-to-reach state of affairs, unleashing frustration and disbelief in its members. However, if only the regulative ideal side of the notion is considered, it might easily slip into a closed and fixed concept and its meaning and potential scope will be established only by the adults that prepare the practice pedagogically and philosophically. Without Kant’s inspiration, the community of inquiry will turn ineffective; without More’s insight it may become an educational resource with a second order agenda. The dialogue that a community of inquiry, in the full sense of the word, aims to empower is a practice that helps to develop ideas in thoughtful communication that is a crucial and necessary tool for joint action. It does so by combining these two aspects of the ideal: its regulative role and its utopian impact. Likewise, the facilitator necessarily embodies an understanding of the community of inquiry not as an end in view which when accomplished provides a closure, but as a guiding principle for an open future that goes beyond the school walls, adopting a posture which makes use of the concept both as a regulative ideal and as a utopia. 3. The community of inquiry as a concept, a methodology, an attitude In addition to the varied dimensions of P4C recognized in the literature, the added awareness that there are different roles for the notion of community of inquiry as an ideal, as we have specified, can help participants (including the facilitator) to maintain a continuing care for the integrity of its practice. Despite the unattainable character of an ideal, it is possible for practitioners to recognize a community of inquiry while experiencing it whenever they experience P4C sessions. This is why, as Phillip Cam states, ‘the Community of Inquiry is as near a philosophically neutral way of engaging in philosophical inquiry as any other cannot easily be gainsaid.’ (Cam, 2011, p.119). One important consequence of recognizing the regulative ideal and the utopian traits of the sense in which the community of inquiry is an ideal is to provide a way to better understand how previous research has clearly stated that ‘if the community of inquiry is a regulative ideal, it is one that is non-static’ (Reed, 1996, p.93). Thus, we can easily add that the non-static nature of the community of inquiry still maintains a coherent process because practice reinforces what is given, and the content can only be vivid when clearly mirrored in 41

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the practice. And it is precisely because of its dynamic and lively nature that it is of the utmost importance to better describe the interconnectedness of what it means to take the community of inquiry as an ideal. Ultimately, in order to explore the far-reaching consequences of the community of inquiry as an ideal, it is important to recognize how it is visible not only in its theoretical conception, but also in how it mirrors the general conditions for its membership. The suggestion here is that the ideal nature of the community of inquiry requires unfolding different connections between the different meanings of a community of inquiry. Similarly to the way in which Dewey interprets the sentence ‘the cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy’ as meaning that ‘the need of returning to the idea itself, of clarifying and deepening our apprehension of it, and of employing our sense of its meaning to criticize and remake it political manifestations,’ (Dewey, 1988, LW2: 325) we think that the way to grow the sense of community of inquiry is in a more conscious and critical practice of the community of inquiry. In light of the theoretical suggestion just stated, we propose that to fully understand the community of inquiry, in theory and in practice, requires understanding it as a theoretical concept, as a pedagogical and a philosophical methodology and as an inner attitude of its members. We state that it is only when the ideal as regulative and as utopia is further described under these three categories that the community of inquiry can be grasped in its full sense. 3.1. The community of inquiry as a concept The community of inquiry is a notion of a paradoxical nature, for it unites two concepts that are not ordinarily found together (Lipman, 2003, p.83). Communities can be fixated and closed entities, where rules and practices are well prescribed and settled. In the case of P4C communities of inquiry, the traditional reading is a misfit because it is rather an open and much more unconventional notion, supported by its determinant: “of inquiry”. When together, the two words create a totally different entity: the transformative notion of a community of inquiry (Lipman, 2003, p.84). This notion represents a contrast between securely belonging to a group and being permanently challenged to go further in building its own aims and structure. To probe the sense of the community of inquiry as a theoretical concept seems important to establish how it grows and develops. Framing it as an ideal might help its members to differentiate what nurtures it and identify what threatens its integrity. In this line of thought, we highlight two important tendencies that support the concept: its procedural nature and its dialogical, intersubjective and multidimensional dynamic. As such, the community of inquiry does not live from its substantive dimension, meaning that the specific philosophical concepts and perspectives that are present in the dialogues are not its main mark. To be a part of a community of inquiry is much more about experimenting with new ways of thinking and discovering its positive impacts on life, than about learning what to think, and consequently the procedural instances that build it are crucial for the nature of the community of inquiry. The second tendency that structures the community of inquiry is its dialogical practice. The linguistic dynamic is built upon an intersubjective model of reason (Daniel et al., 2002), and the dialogues produced in the pedagogical circle aim to establish a set of parameters (rational and reasonable) from which to deliberate (Lipman, 2003, p.92). It is not a derivative conversation nor is it just a logical discourse; it is rather lively communication among 42

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different people that brings together rationality, creativity and care into the multidimensionality of thinking. As we have stated, these two aspects of the concept need to be framed in the regulative use of the ideal in order to warrant the integrity of the practice and bring its members together around the same focus. However, the utopian dimension of the concept serves also as a way of opening up to different contexts, and enables a reworking of what it means to belong to a community of inquiry. In fact, in spite of having been at the heart of Lipman and Sharp’s P4C program, the community of inquiry is an autonomous framework and stands at the core of different programs and projects all around the world. 3.2. The community of inquiry as a methodology The community of inquiry can also be envisaged as a pedagogical and a philosophical methodology. In a very broad understanding of what a methodology might be, as a path through which one puts certain goals in practice, it is possible to enumerate some of its specific moments and some of its crucial traits. The methodological nature of the community of inquiry does not have to do with a sequence of strict pedagogical moments, chronologically established, but with three main aspects that should be present in the intentionality of the practice: a) the democratic circle reinforces communication because, among other things, its spatial closeness and democratic approach to everyone’s position, promotes reading people’s eyes. The dual function of gaze—collecting information from the environment (an encoding function) and communicate one’s mental states to others (a signaling function) (Risko et al, 2016, p.70) —has been identified as a factor for strengthening communication; b) the group makes things that come up in the dialogue obvious because the conclusions reached within thinking in a community reach different levels of expertise and depth than does individual thinking, as is now commonly accepted in research and scientific inquiry; c) meta-cognition & meta-emotion: stand as reflexivity of both thinking and of emotional activity which increases depth and widens scope of ideas and strengthens the impact of learning process (Brandford et al., 2000, Costa-Carvalho & Mendonça, 2017). 3.3. The community of inquiry as an attitude In his autobiography, A Life Teaching Thinking (2008), M. Lipman recalls the beginning of the work with A. Sharp at the IAPC in the terms that follows: ʽNew or modified methods of teacher education had to be devised, and new or modified relationships for the children with each other had to be worked out in the classroom. (The most successful entity in this respect has been what we called the community of inquiry.)ʼ (p.125). When it was born, the community of inquiry was much more than a pedagogical methodology, it was an entity through which children, and adults worked out a different way of connecting and communicating with each other. We might now add that the community of inquiry was born inside the P4C project as a new focus for thinking and acting, one that demands practitioners to be more than judicious individuals. The community of inquiry as an attitude of its members, that the participants take with themselves, and which allows an examination of the conditions for its membership, as well as the place of marginality and exclusion within communities. 43

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Taking the community of inquiry within means two things. First, while participants internalize what it means to be in a community of inquiry, their participation changes and develops. Some will speak more, some less, they will be more precise about knowing when and how their participations can richly contribute to the dialogue, and when to ask questions to others, which overall makes them develop a more sophisticated criteria for philosophical inquiry (Laverty & Gregory, 2007). Second, participants will take the community of inquiry within them and will participate, act, and think in other communities with the same principles (Lipman, 1997; Costa-Carvalho & Mendonça, 2017). In order not to fall into the traps of ambiguity we need to find ways to become aware of the plurality of meanings of the ideal dimension of the community of inquiry, and aim to find how these different meanings interact. For example, when we elaborate on how the community of inquiry is internalized by the participants, it becomes clear that the concept entails a sense of shared responsibility that can be taken into the methodology as part of its traits. Similarly to the way that Dewey states that, ‘democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community.’ (Dewey, 1988, LW2: 368). Lipman himself established closeness between the community of inquiry and democracy through the lens of the concept of ideal, when he writes: ‘What are the chief regulative ideas of an inquiry-driven society? There are at least two. The first has to do with the sociopolitical character of the society, or with procedures in that society, while the second has to do with the character of the individual citizen. The first is democracy and the second is reasonablenessʼ. (Lipman, 2003, p.235).

Conclusion Family resemblances Each and every community of inquiry is as unique as each individual, and no community of inquiry is equal to any other. Reinforcing its ideal nature is a way to recognize that all communities of inquiry are connected by a series of similarities that are perhaps best grasped by the notion of family resemblances. We inevitably ‘see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing in the same way: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities in detail’. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.66). The community of inquiry is a place that establishes a lively organized experience of values, which reinforces democratic values, seeking for an interconnectedness of the different values, and maintains the ongoing quest for justice in line with John Dewey’s educational paradigm (Dewey, 1985). This family resemblance must be somehow included in the practice of P4C, for no philosopher can expect to do philosophy in isolation. As Pierce claims, ‘individually [we] cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers.’ (Peirce, 1955c, p.229).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Dina Mendonça's research work is supported by the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (SFRH/BPD/102507/2014) and within the research project (PTDC/MHCFIL/0521/2014). The Authors would like to thank the useful questions and comments received at the presentation at the XVIII ICPIC Conference of a previous version of this paper, as well as to the reviewers of the manuscript. 44

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‘Do Not Block the Way of Inquiry’: Cultivating collective doubt through sustained deep reflective thinking Gilbert Burgh School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of Queensland [email protected] Simone Thornton School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of Queensland [email protected] Liz Fynes-Clinton School of Education, The University of Queensland [email protected] CV Gilbert Burgh is currently senior lecturer in the School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry at The University of Queensland. He was the founding president of the Queensland Association of Philosophy in Schools from 1994 to 1996, and president of the Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Associations from 2002 to 2003. His research interests include: civics, citizenship and democratic education; collaborative philosophical inquiry as pedagogy; the role of genuine doubt in classroom inquiry; and the history of philosophy in schools in Australia. Simone Thornton is a PhD candidate in the School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry at The University of Queensland. Her research interests include: epistemic violence; Val Plumwood and the logic of domination; and Albert Camus and the logic of the Absurd, which appears in a range of journals and edited collections. She is currently working on an edited book (with Gilbert Burgh) to be published by Routledge, entitled: Philosophical Inquiry with Children: The development of an inquiring society in Australia (2018). Liz Fynes-Clinton is a casual academic and completing her doctoral thesis in the School of Education at the University of Queensland. Previously employed at East Brisbane State School as Head of Curriculum and Philosophy Coach, Liz introduced and implemented collaborative philosophical inquiry as a whole-school pedagogical framework. Her research has been published in edited collections and she is co-author of Philosophical and Ethical Inquiry in the Middle Years and Beyond (2013) and Philosophy with Young Children: A classroom handbook (2007). ABSTRACT We provide a Camusian/Peircean notion of inquiry that emphasises an attitude of fallibilism and sustained epistemic dissonance as a conceptual framework for a theory of classroom practice founded on Deep Reflective Thinking (DRT), in which the cultivation of collective doubt, reflective evaluation and how these relate to the phenomenological aspects of inquiry are central to communities of inquiry. In a study by Fynes-Clinton, preliminary evidence demonstrates that if students engage in DRT, they more frequently experience cognitive dissonance and as a result improve their ability to engage in further and more frequent DRT. 47

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Sustained intellectual progress occurs when the inquiry reaches a point whereby students can thoughtfully move between the position of disequilibrium (doubt) and equilibrium (belief) whilst understanding the impermanency of any fixed belief, which, in turn, enables reconstruction of thinking and appropriation of learning in the context of collaborative philosophical inquiry. KEYWORDS collaborative philosophical inquiry, deep reflective thinking, Charles Peirce, John Dewey, Albert Camus, Matthew Lipman, community of inquiry. RESUMEN Proporcionamos una noción camusiana/peirceana de investigación que enfatiza una actitud de falibilismo y disonancia epistémica sostenida como marco conceptual para una teoría de la práctica en el aula fundada en el Pensamiento Reflexivo Profundo (DRT, según las iniciales en inglés), en el cual el cultivo de la duda colectiva, la evaluación reflexiva y cómo éstas se relacionan con los aspectos fenomenológicos de la investigación son centrales en las comunidades de investigación. En un estudio realizado por Fynes-Clinton, la evidencia preliminar demuestra que si los estudiantes se involucran en DRT, experimentan en más ocasiones disonancia cognitiva y como resultado mejoran su capacidad para participar más frecuentemente en DRT. El progreso intelectual sostenido ocurre cuando la investigación alcanza un punto en el cual los estudiantes pueden moverse pensativamente entre la posición de desequilibrio (duda) y equilibrio (creencia) mientras que entienden la impermanencia de cualquier creencia fija, que a su vez permite la reconstrucción del pensamiento y la apropiación del aprendizaje en el contexto de la investigación filosófica colaborativa. PALABRAS CLAVE Diálogo filosófico colaborativo, pensamiento reflexivo profundo, Charles Peirce, John Dewey, Albert Camus, Matthew Lipman, comunidad de diálogo.

INTRODUCTION Matthew Lipman (1991) provides a model of education that focuses on the development of students’ capacities to think reflectively, the aim of which is the development of an educational philosophy (defined as the use of philosophy for obtaining educational objectives) ‘redesigned and reconstructed so as to make it available and acceptable and enticing to children’ (p. 262). There is an abundance of literature on Lipman’s educational philosophy, especially regarding the idea of converting the classroom into a community of inquiry (Lipman, 1991, 2003; Seixas, 1993; Splitter & Sharp, 1995; Sprod 2001; Gregory 2002; Pardales & Girod, 2006; Burgh, 2009) and the cognitive and social benefits of CPI in schools (Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan, 1980; Burgh, Field & Freakley, 2006). In recent years, well-designed research studies have, likewise, concentrated on cognitive benefits, i.e., schooling and thinking skills, and social benefits (Millett & Tapper, 2012). An analysis of eighteen studies by García Moriyón, Rebollo and Colom (2005) concluded that ‘the implementation of P4C led to an improvement in students’ reasoning skills of more than half a standard deviation’ (p. 19). Topping and Trickey’s studies concluded that the practice of CPI produces increases in measured IQ, sustained cognitive benefits, and clear performance 48

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gains in other school studies (Trickey & Topping, 2004, 2006, 2007; Topping & Trickey, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). Recent research conducted in Australia has shown the potential for CPI to foster pedagogical transformation (Scholl, Nichols & Burgh, 2009, 2014, 2016), and more effective learning in the science classroom (Burgh & Nichols, 2012; Nichols, Burgh & Kennedy, 2017). Lipman was heavily influenced by John Dewey’s conception of reflective education – an educational tradition that has its roots in Socratic teaching – and by Charles Peirce, Lev Vygotsky, and George Herbert Mead. In this paper, we return to Lipman’s pragmatist roots in Peirce, most notably his notion of genuine doubt, which we reinvigorate by borrowing the language and concepts of Albert Camus (Burgh & Thornton, 2016a, 2016b). We argue that there is room to improve the fit between Lipman’s theoretical explorations and classroom practice. To this end, we outline a theory of practice founded on deep reflective thinking, the cultivation of collective doubt and reflective evaluation as central to inquiry (Fynes-Clinton, 2015; Nichols, Burgh & Fynes-Clinton, 2017), and how these relate to the phenomenological aspects of inquiry. Our argument has implications for teacher preparation programs and professional development, pointing to the need for greater emphasis on praxis, i.e., to be informed by the theory and the theory by practice, or as Dewey would have it, by an understanding of the interaction between habit and habitat.

Lucid Education In this section, we will draw out what we consider to be the most important principles of inquiry for classroom practice, highlighting how they connect to Peirce’s theories, to inform how they can, and have been, implemented in the classroom. In his ‘First Rule of Logic’, Peirce (1899) asserts the importance of eliminating barriers to inquiry to permit methodical investigations that advance truth: ‘Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy: Do not block the way of inquiry’. (p. 48, emphasis added). In this passage, Peirce makes the connection between learning and the desire to learn, which is necessitated by dissatisfaction with beliefs or uncertainty; a felt experience he called genuine doubt. He proposed four methods by which people move from genuine doubt to belief: tenacity, a priori, authority, and experimentation. The first three methods all resolve doubt and fixate belief by opinion, but do so by blocking inquiry. In contrast, experimentation, is an inquiry process of collecting observations and generating hypotheses to account for these observations to reach a conclusion based upon an inferential process. The feeling of uncertainty is indispensable to experimentation as it is essential for wonder from which inquiry begins and continues. Genuine Doubt is a feeling that accompanies uncertainty; that the knowledge we attribute to our experience of the world, the belief-habits that routinely and unconsciously inform our actions, can no longer be sustained. When we experience genuine doubt, our epistemic framework fails to deliver us a convincing reality. That is, we are unable at the moment of uncertainty to shape the ‘great blooming, buzzing confusion’ (James, 1890, p. 462) of the world into a familiar epistemic framework, and the result is an experience of disequilibrium, an uncomfortable feeling or irritating quality with an innate capacity to motivate us to substitute doubt with the satisfaction of belief. It is ‘the void that is felt when connections with the world and others are severed’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2016a, p. 889); a void that cannot remain unattended. Camus referred to 49

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this experience as the feeling of absurdity; ‘the phenomenological realisation that the epistemic possibility of clarity or understanding of the world always remains out of reach’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2016a, p. 887). In response to this unsettling experience, ‘it becomes either the catalyst for one to seek the absolute to overcome fear of nothingness, or the beginning of lucidity when fear is faced and awareness of the absurd is sustained’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2016a, p. 889). As Peirce points out, there are various ways to comfort the fear of doubt, namely, we can grip tenacity and refuse to consider contrary evidence, accept the authority of an institution’s dictates, or use a priori reasoning and embrace the most coherent or elegant-seeming belief-set, or we can subject ourselves to rigorous communal inquiry to correct and revise ideas. For Peirce, only scientific inquiry in the form of a community of inquirers is legitimate as a method of settling opinion and fixing belief. Inquiry lies between the states of doubt and belief, and the accompanying feelings of disequilibrium and equilibrium. To avoid moving too quickly from disequilibrium to equilibrium, inquiry needs to be sustained. In Camusian terms, such inquiry requires lucidity: ‘a sustained awareness of the absurd that allows for increased creativity’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2016a, p. 889). In sum, the uncertainty to which Peirce and Camus refer ‘is a passport to creation, an opportunity to embrace flux and shape our human nature and the nature of others in a critical and considered manner’ (Burgh & Thornton, 2016a, p. 889). Ideally, rather than succumb to the fear of doubt and seek comfort and equilibrium by any means (i.e., those that block inquiry), and subsequently embrace any belief that makes us feel good about our actions, we need to strive to ensure that our belief-habits are questioned in relation to the habitat we share with others, including their belief-habits. The ability to do so is something that needs to be fostered, for as Peirce (1899) pointed out, we cannot assume a social impulse or tendency to strive for or seek explanations that coincide with fact. This is not to create a false dualism in the form of innate versus learnt, as Dewey argued the ability to adapt is innate to all species, however, the possession of the ability does not necessitate the ways in which adaption occurs; these can be influenced by thinking. In practice, any of the inquiry blocking methods Peirce mentions can, all too quickly and easily, be employed to ‘quell the irritation of doubt through retaining our own belief or uncritically adopting someone else’s belief’ (Burgh & Thornton 2016b, p. 172). The teacher’s role, therefore, is clear; to facilitate Peircean inquiry. To do so, however, a teacher needs also to resist the impulse to uncritically adopt belief-habits themselves. To guide their students to do likewise, they must adopt the perspective afforded by fallibilism, ‘that no empirical statement is impervious to epistemological challenge’ (Powell 2001, p. 11). Fallibilism is not the same as total doubt or scepticism, which can paralyse action; we cannot begin inquiry if we doubt everything or almost everything, for any attempt at universal doubt would lead to selfdeception. Rather, it is to embrace the ‘scientific spirit’ which ‘requires a man to be at all times ready to dump his whole cartload of beliefs, the moment experience is against them’ (Peirce 1960, 1.55). To adopt an attitude of fallibilism, teachers need to assume a position of scholarly ignorance. However, they should be careful not to feign ignorance, otherwise students could become sceptical and see such ignorance as paper-doubting, or the pretence of doubt, which lacks what Peirce called the ‘heavy and noble metal’ of genuine doubt. Paper-doubt is merely self-deception, typically illustrated by Descartes’ cogito. For doubt to be genuine, it must actually interfere with my firmly fixed belief-habit and accompanying habitual action, causing me to hesitate and put my beliefs to the test in the form of inquiry. Genuine doubt,

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therefore, also acts as a gadfly, a persistent irritant that challenges our view of reality, as well as our established beliefs and values. (Burgh & Thornton 2016a, p. 892)

In other words, we cannot transmute our beliefs into doubts at will. As Peirce (1868) said: ‘Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts’ (p. 141). The teacher’s role in facilitating inquiry is multifaceted. In addition to being coinquirer, the teacher is also facilitator; this position, although not authoritative, is not strictly egalitarian. The latter [facilitator’s] role requires teachers to draw on their expertise as members of professional communities (i.e., members of the teaching profession with interests in key learning areas, such as arts, mathematics, science or history). Students come to understand that teachers have subject knowledge, but teachers need also be aware that their expertise and the expertise of their discipline or profession is limited, and they must also convey or model this limitation in their role as coinquirer. (Burgh & Thornton 2016b, p. 173)

There is a need to acknowledge that all inquiry begins with prejudices, which are ‘not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned’ (Peirce 1868 p. 140). As co-inquirers, teachers must be lucid and keep a vigilant eye on their prejudices and prompt students to do the same. In other words, teachers need to cultivate doubt in the classroom community to facilitate a lucid inquiry.

A Theory of Classroom Practice But how are teachers to cultivate doubt? The answer requires a theory of classroom practice, which can be tested in the classroom—as the study detailed in the next section will illustrate. Curiously, while the literature on philosophy for children and the community of inquiry pedagogy refers to fallibilism and genuine doubt, the literature aimed specifically at classroom practice and professional development programs is mostly lacking in these concepts and how to apply them. In response, we outline a theory of classroom practice that is congruent with the concept of lucid inquiry, outlined above. Lucid inquiry is a praxis that attempts to reinstate the centrality of genuine doubt in line with Peirce’s intent, and in doing so add[s] a missing dimension to Lipman and Sharp’s reconstruction of the community of inquiry into a model of educational practice. (Burgh & Thornton, 2016b, p. 166). Lucid inquiry, therefore, makes the cultivation of genuine doubt central to CPI. To bring lucid inquiry into a model of classroom practice we need to look at the relationship between self-correction and inquiry. Self-correcting practice is the process of reflecting critically on what is done before, during and after genuine doubt and recognising the accompanying experience of moving from disequilibrium to equilibrium. To further flesh this out we turn to the ways in which we differ from Lipman as to how self-correction appears in the classroom. Lipman’s process of inquiry has been variously described in the literature on philosophy and classroom inquiry (see Lipman, 1991; Cam, 2006; Burgh, Field & Freakley, 2006; Davey Chesters, 2012). As part of this process, students need to learn to recognise and evaluate the ways in which they think and participate with others. Self- and peer-assessment can provide a means by which ‘students can teach themselves to be independent and effective thinkers’ (Burgh, Field & Freakley, 2006, p. 131). Such means are usually limited to reflection at the end of the dialogue, the aim of which is to allow students to make judgments about the quality of the dialogue and their own participation as members of a community of inquiry. Different procedures have been recommended, including check lists, criteria, thumbs-up and thumbs down, and fishbowl discussions. These methods can ‘promote 51

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individual responsibility for the functioning of the group and so bring about the sort of educational climate required for a community of inquiry’ (Burgh, Field & Freakley, 2006, p. 130). However, as ‘self-direction and self-correction are integral components of the community of inquiry, self- and peer-assessment should eventually be part of the philosophical inquiry itself’ (Burgh, Field & Freakley, 2006, p. 130) rather than an afterthought to inquiry. Integrating self- and peer-assessment into the process of inquiry allows students to pay sustained explicit attention to metacognitive practices as an ongoing part of inquiry. In a lucid inquiry, this means maintaining inquiry through an understanding of fallibilism. Self- and peer-reflection enables students to gauge their position on the spectrum between disequilibrium and equilibrium. Once doubt is recognised, a landscape opens to the mind, and the children are invited to explore the terrain. Incorporating self- and peer-assessment and self-direction into inquiry allows students the opportunity to reflect on their own experiences of doubt, which opens the possibility of not only changing the direction of the dialogue but of changing their notions of self. Giving students the tools to engage in lucid inquiry increases their abilities to shape their own identities. ‘Deep reflective thinking’ (DRT) reconstructs the Lipman/Sharp notion of self- and peer-assessment in inquiry (Fynes-Clinton 2015; Nichols, Burgh & Fynes-Clinton, 2017) in a way that incorporates lucid inquiry. DRT is the overarching term used to define a specific way of thinking and engaging in learning that emerges from a balanced, dynamic interplay among four key elements: the first is immersion in CPI, the second the development of a repertoire of intellectual skills and processes, and the third, explicit attention to metacognitive practice, or lucid inquiry, which leads to the fourth element, the reconstruction of experience (Nichols, Burgh & Fynes-Clinton, 2017). DRT is an ongoing method of self- and peerassessment for both students and teachers to measure and propel the intellectual progress of inquiry. A further difference in the practice of DRT is the shift from books as stimulus to the stimulus being derived from the children’s individual and group reflection. Like Lipman’s purpose-written philosophical stories-as-text, in which philosophical concepts and philosophical procedures directly relate to children’s experiences through the experiences of fictional characters, so too with the community of inquiry, but children are the characters in their own narratives directly relating to their own experiences. Prior to any judgements, the ‘storytelling’ needs to be sustained … [without judgement]. This can assist the emergence of or it can cultivate genuine doubt, not only in individuals, but also as a community, which can bring on the need for inquiry, and subsequent critical analysis. (Burgh & Thornton 2016, p. 173)

To facilitate this in classroom practice teachers need to recognise when students are experiencing genuine doubt. Indicators include:  Student’s hesitation in relation to their own viewpoint or ideas  Questioning relevant to the point under discussion  Persistence with an idea that challenges the general views of the community  Counterexamples  Alternative suggestions  A change of mind in response to the ideas of others  Reconstruction of thinking habits  Internalisation and reconstruction of a theory (Fynes-Clinton, 2015) It is important to note that none of these indicators, on their own, are enough to conclude that students are experiencing genuine doubt, however, the greater the combination of indicators the greater the likelihood of this being the case. Each indicator can also be used 52

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to prompt students to further inquire, providing ways for teachers to cultivate doubt in individual students and, ideally, collective doubt in the community. It is unlikely that all students will come to a position of genuine doubt together each time they are engaged in DRT activities. However, because DRT includes an ongoing process of self- and peer-assessment as part of philosophical inquiry, it helps to develop their capacity to sustain awareness of their felt doubt that strips from the world ‘the images and designs that [they] had attributed to it beforehand’ (Camus, 1977, p. 20). When a student experiences genuine doubt, and as a result, begins to ask questions or expresses ideas that challenge their own beliefs, this has greater capacity to cultivate doubt in other students. In the same way that modelling philosophical inquiry in texts aids student acquisition of the concept of philosophical inquiry, genuine doubt modelled by one student, aids others in acquiring the concept of genuine doubt. Students who experience genuine doubt are more inclined to grapple with ideas to create meaning and to engage in inquiry with others to find ways to explore their ideas. One student’s doubt can lead to other students sharing similar doubts, which has the potential to lead to ‘collective doubt’ that could become a significant indicator of intellectual progress during CPI. For the teacher, it can be valuable as a kind of formative assessment within the students’ zone of proximal development (ZPD) (Vygotsky, 1978), and for students, it provides a way of comparing their own experiences with that of the community. Sustained intellectual progress occurs when the inquiry reaches a point whereby students can thoughtfully move between the positions of disequilibrium and equilibrium whilst understanding the impermanency of any fixed belief. This, in turn, enables reconstruction of thinking within the community of inquiry and appropriation of learning in the context of CPI and beyond.

Deep Reflective Thinking: Collective doubt in the classroom This section outlines a longitudinal investigation by Liz Fynes-Clinton (2015) that examines the extent to which primary school students engage in episodes of DRT within and beyond the context of CPI. Commencing in 2012, the investigation was conducted in a Brisbane state primary school, which, for two years prior to this investigation, had established CPI as a whole-school pedagogic method that underpins all curriculum planning, development and implementation at the school. Evidence suggests that if students engage in DRT, they more frequently experience cognitive dissonance and as a result improve their ability to engage in further and more frequent DRT. However, the evidence also shows that for DRT to occur within class communities, a specific set of conditions needs to be set in place for the students. These conditions include sustained practice in philosophising, the explicit teaching of a repertoire of skills and practices, a deep focus on metacognitive practices and the provision of stimulus material that will elicit genuine engagement and connection to the ideas under discussion. In addition, the philosophical knowledge and skill level of the class teacher and the ways in which the philosophy curriculum is presented both impact on the students’ development of DRT and, in turn, the emergence of forms of doubt within the community. Fynes-Clinton’s investigation followed the classic design research model where the researcher frames an intervention that could be used independently by any number of teachers across a variety of learning contexts. As the investigation moved through various phases or design cycles, the intervention was modified, improved upon and redesigned so that it could effectively accommodate a variety of classroom contexts and a diverse range of student learning needs. Design methodology is based on a strong underlying epistemological and 53

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theoretical analysis of curriculum content and teaching and learning practices, with the aim to increase theoretical and pedagogical understanding (Kelly, 2003). The methodology works in harmony with the underpinning epistemological and theoretical framework of CPI and the key research focus—the students’ acquisition and reconstruction of DRT practices. McKenney, Nieveen and van den Akker (2006) maintain that design methodology brings about a synergy between research and practice that is maximised when the researchers are responsive to change. For Dewey (1916), responsiveness to change is a key factor to enabling reconstruction of experience and democracy as an associated form of life. The research was conducted over three overarching macro-cycles of intervention, consisting of a number of micro-cycles. The three macro-cycles each had a distinct focus as follows: 1. Development of DRT; 2: DRT and philosophising; and 3. DRT and doubt. During each macro-cycle students were immersed in new learning processes. During Macro-cycle 1, a considered selection of inquiry and reasoning tools based on Cam’s (2006) 20 Thinking Tools, were introduced using a range of novel approaches to gain an understanding of the students’ uptake and appropriation of the tools in the context of CPI and beyond. Each microcycle within Macro-cycle 1 was designed to build on the previous, thus increasing the complexity of the developing repertoire of skills. To enable students to understand how and why the tools could assist them to think metacognitively and make intellectual progress during the inquiry, the inquiry and reasoning tools were not only explicitly taught but the philosophical tool of reflective practice was always introduced so that students assessed their abilities to use the intellectual tools. This was accomplished through a ‘teaching COI’. This type of COI differed from the general COI process in that tools were introduced at certain points and were focused upon during the exploration of ideas. Generally, an inquiry would progress with minimal interruptions by the teacher facilitating the inquiry. Traditionally the facilitator’s role is to ask substantive and procedural questions that would assist the inquiry to remain on track, probe for depth and model or draw the student’s attention to the use of inquiry tools and processes. In a teaching COI, the researcher halted the inquiry at specific points and stepped out of the role of facilitator to introduce or build on the use of the tool that was the current focus of the design. Students were then asked to try to use the tools when they felt it appropriate during the discussion. In order to draw students’ attention to the use and impact of the intellectual tools during the inquiry, the flow of discussion was further interrupted when the focus tool had been used. The use of the tools and its impact on the discussion would immediately be reflected upon during the process. Following this, a number of general COIs were implemented to identify students’ purposeful appropriation of the newly acquired tools to further the intellectual progress of the inquiry. This method of teaching encouraged the participating students to view themselves, individually and collectively, as active inquirers within a community. Over time, a subtle ontological shift was observed among the participating students. Students’ self-perceptions moved from being participants in a process to becoming inquirers within a community of inquirers. This shift in perception prompted the students to take greater responsibility for the path of the inquiry and the collective understanding of the community. Macro-cycle 2 focused on the students’ reconstruction of the thinking and learning experiences gained from Macro-cycle 1. Whereas Macro-cycle 1 interventions had been about building inquiry procedures and intellectual inquiry tools, the key focus for Cycle 2 was to build substantive understanding and to encourage students to connect with the ideas under discussion thus facilitating reconstruction of previous experiences. Macro-cycle 3 focused on the emergence of doubt within the COI and its connection to DRT. The nature of 54

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interventions during this macro-cycle enabled further development of the students’ substantive understandings. The students’ development of their collective identity as a learning community both within and beyond the context of philosophical discussions was an additional focus of all three interventions. As the notion of the classroom as a deliberative, inquiring community is central to CPI (Burgh, Field & Freakley, 2006), for students to become effective thinkers, CPI needs to extend beyond the philosophy lesson and become a sustained practice throughout all learning areas. The aim of the interventions at each macrocycle of the research was to provide students with skills and understandings that would enable them to develop their identity as a thinker and learner and for them to understand how their reconstruction of thinking habits impacts on the progress of the class community (Burgh, Field & Freakley 2006). Through students’ reflective comments in both small group focused dialogues and the communities of inquiry, it was evident that many of the students greatly valued this aspect of their new learning. I also think the community ‘cause it’s like I’m bring up ideas and putting it into the subject and then it’s getting bigger by people building on it. (Year 4) Um, the thing that helped me most was evolving because I couldn’t have done, thought of anything without like other people starting it for me. I can’t just think of a thought that just pops out of my head, I need to, I need somebody to maybe clarify it. (Year 5) I saw that our, our community of inquiry was getting – like it’s we were in the middle of a marathon and now I know, we know that it’s like challenging to finish it because it’s like late in the year to finish it but we kept on going – the whole marathon… (Year 5)

During Macro-cycle 2, Peirce’s notions of genuine doubt and paper-doubt became the key focus of the research as further questions emerged: How is doubt cultivated within the COI? In what ways are DRT and cultivation of doubt connected? It was hypothesised that there was a significant interconnection between DRT and the concept of doubt. For students to develop the desire to learn it is necessary for them to experience doubt. However, as this desire is not always evident in primary school classrooms, something further is needed to ignite this desire in the context of learning at school. In response to this, the study proposed that a ‘metacognitive identity’ is the link that connects what may begin as cultivated doubt and evolve into genuine doubt within a community of inquirers, and that DRT provided a method for meta-reflection throughout the inquiry process by building on a solid framework of reflective practices to bring this about. This model encouraged students to think about ‘who they were’ in their own search for knowledge and understanding. During Macro-cycle 1, students were given multiple opportunities to develop DRT practices which could then be reconstructed within a new learning context. The following examples are of students’ thoughts in relation to this hypothesis: Sometimes people are sort of like lazy and they don’t really, they want to know something but they’re not that desperate to have it but if you are desperate and you really, really want it, you want the knowledge then you need to, you can try harder to get it and, because sometimes people that don’t want it don’t try hard enough and they don’t get the real answer. (Year 4) I think wisdom, well knowledge is like you have the power, wisdom is using that power um wise, well wisely um like using it correctly and not doing stupid things but things that you know, help people benefit. (Year 6)

Macro-cycles 2 & 3 took place in mixed year level classes in 2013, 2014 and 2016. The intervention process during this stage of the research did not involve the introduction of 55

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new tools or processes. Instead, the focus was on substantive understanding of philosophical concepts, thus, student groups of mixed year levels were introduced to a range of philosophical theories. The overarching inquiry question for each of these macro-cycles was: How do we acquire knowledge and understanding? This was explored through a variety of stimuli and connecting conceptual analyses. Key philosophical theories in relation to the acquisition of knowledge, including the theoretical notions underpinning the study, became the initial stimuli for discussion on commencement of each macro-cycle. Further stimuli were provided by the students themselves, from their own experiences; like Lipman’s fictional characters in his purpose-written stories-as-text, only the students were the actual characters. When planning Macro-cycles 2 and 3, it was anticipated that the students would appropriate the intellectual tools from the Macro-cycle 1 to enable them to examine the ideas and theories presented and assist them to make connections to their own thoughts and experiences. Evidence documented students’ reconstructions of their learning experiences from Macrocycle 1 to reflect metacognitively on their reasoning and reflective practices as they were taking place during the inquiry. The framework for thinking during the inquiries required students to think substantively in three key ways: through ontological, epistemological and values inquiry. Students were encouraged to audit their thinking about ideas so that they ask the following three questions:  What is the essence of…?  How do we know?  Should we care? Additionally, teachers were provided with the skills to include this approach in their repertoire of teaching practices in and beyond the context of philosophy. It became a way to plan, develop and implement rich, authentic teaching and learning experiences. The inquiry direction in the Macro-cycles 2 and 3 followed the students’ connections to key philosophical themes and their genuine interests during each inquiry process. Students explored and connected the philosophical themes and made links to key interrelated concepts. They were provided with opportunities to discuss theories and connect to philosophical concepts and ideas explored during prior sessions. In addition to this, they made substantive links to their own developing philosophical understandings and life experiences. Following students’ genuine interests was fundamental to the process as this sparked their motivation to formulate personal theories based on the ideas presented. A key focus of the investigation was the ways in which students linked their own reconstructed notions of philosophical theory, as the following example suggests: ‘I am linking to [S]. Say that there are like two circles, one bigger than the other, and the first circle is the circle you know the stuff that you don’t know and the other circle is the stuff that you don’t know that you don’t know’. (Year 3). When students actively engage in DRT and this becomes a habit of mind (a beliefhabit), then this reconstruction of thinking habits would enable them to perceive themselves as inquirers. They develop an identity as a thinker and inquirer and this in turn facilitates the inclination to examine their internal prejudices and the ways in which these prejudices impact on their understanding of the world (Burgh & Thornton 2016a, 2016b). This proposition led to further analysis of the data to determine ways in which doubt was cultivated amongst the students. Evidence from the data has highlighted an inextricable connection between DRT and Peirce’s notion of doubt. The connection could be interpreted as a reciprocal one. The 56

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recognition and examination of doubt within the community would require DRT. However, if students feel no provocation to test their beliefs in response to their own or others’ disequilibrium then doubt would not be cultivated within the community, and, in turn, students would not develop the skills to reconstruct the DRT experience. For students to reconstruct their thinking experiences they would need to internalise their thinking in relation to the doubt they experience. Students were asked to formulate their own theories in relation to the acquisition of knowledge and understanding. The following are examples of students using DRT to articulate their own theories, specifically in relation to the key theoretical notions that shape this paper. My theory on how we acquire knowledge is through doubting or testing an opinion’s legitimacy until it is proven right or wrong; this can be done through inquiry or experiencing it. (Year 6 student 1) I think you come to it [knowledge and understanding] through - like yes you need that genuine doubt to start off but then um like you can do two things to further explore that genuine doubt. You can have a discussion, see what other people think or then you can um experience it and make up a decision for yourself … and um so like yeah, ‘cause that inquiry can be just talking or it can actually be experience. (Year 6 Student 1)

Comments from this student suggest an understanding of the role of genuine doubt in inquiry akin to that proposed by Peirce. In the first comment the student suggests ‘testing an opinion’s legitimacy until it is proven right or wrong’, which echoes Peirce’s idea that inquiry forms the space between genuine doubt and fixed or settled belief. In his second comment the student makes the distinction between an inquiry that is ‘just talking’ or one that is an actual ‘experience’. Here the student appears to suggest that it is the way you ‘further explore’ the genuine doubt that provides the experience that could lead you to knowledge and that ‘just talking’, similar to Peirce’s notion of paper doubt, would not generally lead to knowledge acquisition. I would agree with that about people’s experience of things that they do or they think but also with doubt and wonder—like that’s like the trial and error to state things as facts; like a plant will grow in dirt, you wonder about that but if you try it and it works, that’s like the settled belief … So, without wonder or doubt I don’t think we would really have any facts or anything like that. The world would be much different. Because, yeah, people wouldn’t really know... (Year 6 Student 2)

Student 2 concurs with Student 1 about doubt and experience, but in addition to this, links doubt to wonder, for which doubt is a necessary condition to bring about inquiry: without both doubt and wonder ‘we wouldn’t really have any facts’ and ‘people wouldn’t really know.’ ‘Um well, I think there’s knowledge and that’s the, your settled beliefs then there’s doubts and those are your doubts and there are your opinions and those are the things that you are um always thinking about and agreeing with or even changing sometimes’. (Year 4 Student). In the above comment, the student drew a relevant distinction between knowledge, referred to as ‘your settled beliefs’, and opinion, understood as ‘things that you are always thinking about’ that may change as your thoughts change. It appears that by making this distinction the student is suggesting that doubt sits between opinion and settled knowledge. When asked by the teacher about where thinking habits fit in the student’s theory, the response was that if you see your thoughts as opinion then you can ‘bend’ but if thoughts are either settled or you always doubted then reconstruction is not possible. The distinction the student seems to be making is between certainty, absolute skepticism and fallibilism (opinion that can be doubted): ‘Um, those are the three categories of thinking habits, like so um, um if all your, 57

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if all your um, thoughts are in knowledge then you can’t bend, if all your thoughts are in doubts then you, you can’t bend but if all your thoughts are in opinion, you can bend really easily’. (Year 4 student). In the following comment, the student raised the notion that the desire to question arises from the experience of collaborative inquiry, suggesting that one desires to question to ‘find out the truth’. The comment aligns with the views expressed by Peirce in the ‘First Rule of Logic’, mentioned above, in which he makes the connection between learning and the desire to learn that is necessitated by a dissatisfaction that accompanies uncertainty over our beliefs. ‘Um I think like overtime you, you tend to just kind of naturally start questioning new ideas, um because er you have been in a lot of, lots of community of inquiries you tend to think a little bit more about things, think deeply and you kind of get, you get a bit of like a um like er (laughs) like you want to find out the truth and, get to the bottom of things’. (Year 6 Student 3). During a community of inquiry, students were asked to consider why Socrates was thought of as the wisest man in ancient Greece. The following comments demonstrate further examination of the connection between learning and the desire to learn. One student responded as follows: I think he was wise because he was ignorant because um, if you know you’re ignorant then that gives you something to um, go for um, you know and that ‘cause you know you’re ignorant you also, your mind isn’t clouded with the thought that you’re perfect, and you know things, you’re a genius, um, you’re the smartest man, when you know you’re ignorant then, you kinda just think, you know, you think of yourself as not er, you know, not as this great awesome person that’s perfect, you think oh well, you know, I, I want to pursue that knowledge and that gives you something um, to work for…. (Year 6 student 1)

The above comment suggests that if a person remains in a state of infallibility, then they are not likely to pursue knowledge. In the comment below, the student builds on this comment by attempting to make a distinction between two kinds of ignorance; having a desire to learn as being ignorant ‘in a good way’ as opposed to having no desire to learn, a form of ignorance that would not be considered ‘good’.‘Well it depends what sort of ignorance you are talking about, like literal ignorance is ignorance of wanting to learn um, um, if you’re if you don’t desire to learn then basically you’re being ignorant but if you desire to learn you are being ignorant in a good way – I guess’. (Year 5 student).

Conclusion By highlighting the role of genuine doubt in community of inquiry pedagogy using DRT, we have argued that the Peircean blocks to inquiry can be removed. Through the DRT framework, students are provided with the philosophical tools to overcome the fear of doubt through understanding their own fallibility and that of others. As I was listening to everyone it made me think a bit more, and think about having wisdom. I don’t think you can be afraid if you have no wisdom because what leads to being afraid is you think about something and that leads to fear, like you are scared of something that you think of, and I think wisdom is the key that can open any door. Like if you have wisdom you can open the door to fear; you can open the door to, like, questioning the things you think in your mind and you become a lot more wise. (Year 7 student)

Collective doubt emerges within the inquiry through a convergence of several of the abovementioned doubt indicators. This could be evident within an individual comment or collectively throughout an episode of several comments. This convergence stimulates the collaborative examination of doubt as part of CPI. Through the experience of DRT in relation to the examination

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of collective doubt, students begin to understand their own fallibility and further to this, embrace absurdity. This is evidenced by the considered way they structure their responses, punctuated with thinking pauses in the form of ‘um’, ‘like’ and the inclusion of phrases such as ‘I think’ or ‘I guess’. Students do not only begin to recognise their own fallibility, they welcome it. Consider the following example: ‘I think it’s the fact that we get to explore what life actually is so let’s say I think I’m alive but I, you know, you never normally think: How am I alive? Why am I alive? So, it’s pretty much just like life is the wardrobe and philosophy is the Narnia’. (Year 6)

REFERENCES Burgh, G. (2009). Reconstruction in philosophy education: The community of inquiry as a basis for knowledge and learning. In Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia 2008 Conference: The Ownership and Dissemination of Knowledge. 36th Annual Conference of the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia (pp. 65-1–65-12). 4–7 December 2008. Burgh, G., Field, T., & Freakley, M. (2006). Ethics and the Community of Inquiry: Education for deliberative democracy. Melbourne: Thompson Social Science Press. Burgh, G., & Nichols, K. (2012). ‘The Parallels Between Philosophical Inquiry and Scientific Inquiry: Implications for science education’. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 44(10), 1045–1059. Burgh, G., & Thornton, S. (2016a). ‘Inoculation against Wonder: Finding an antidote in Camus, pragmatism and the community of inquiry’. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 48(9), 884–898. Burgh, G. & Thornton, S. (2016b). ‘Lucid Education: Resisting resistance to inquiry’. Oxford Review of Education, 42(2), 165–177. Burgh, G., & Yorshansky, M. (2011). ‘Communities of inquiry: Politics, power and group dynamics’. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 43(5), 436–452. Cam, P. (2006). 20 Thinking Tools. Camberwell: ACER Press. Davey Chesters, S. (2012). The Socratic Classroom: Reflective thinking through collaborative inquiry. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and Education. New York: The Free Press. Dewey, J. (1933) How We Think (New York: D.C. Heath). Fynes-Clinton, L. (2015). ‘Genuine Doubt, Fallibilism and Collaborative Philosophical Inquiry’. Paper presented at Identity and Philosophical Inquiry in an Age of Diversity, XVII International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC) Conference, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. 25–27 June 2015. García Moriyón, F., Rebollo, I., & Colom, R. (2005). ‘Evaluating Philosophy for Children: A meta-analysis’. Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, 17(4), 14–22. Gregory, M.R. (2002). ‘Constructivism, Standards, and the Classroom Community of Inquiry’. Educational Theory, 52(4), 397–408. James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. New York: H. Holt and Company. 59

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Kelly, A.E. (2003). ‘Research as Design’. Educational Researcher, 32(1), 3–4. Lipman, M. (1991). Thinking in Education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in Education, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lipman, M., Sharp, A., & Oscanyan, F. (1980). Philosophy in the classroom, 2nd edition. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. McKenney, S., Nieveen, N., & van den Akker, J. (2006). ‘Design research from a curriculum perspective’. In J. van den Akker, K. Gravemeijer, S. McKenney & N. Nieveen (Eds.), Educational Design research (pp. 110–143). London: Routledge. Millett, S., & Tapper, A. (2012). ‘Benefits of collaborative philosophical inquiry in schools’. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 44(5), 546–567. Murris, K. (2015). “The Philosophy for Children Curriculum: Resisting ‘Teacher Proof’ Texts and the Formation of the Ideal Philosopher Child”. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 35(1), 63–78. Nichols, K., Burgh, G., & Fynes-Clinton, L. (2017). ‘Reconstruction of Thinking across the Curriculum through the Community of Inquiry’. In M.R. Gregory, J. Haynes & K. Murris (Eds.), The Routledge International Handbook of Philosophy for Children (pp. 245–252). Abingdon: Routledge. Nichols, K., Burgh, G., & Kennedy, C. (2017). ‘Comparing two inquiry professional development interventions in science on primary students’ questioning and inquiry behaviours’. Research in Science Education, 47(1), 1–24. Pardales, M.J., & Girod, M. (2006). ‘Community of Inquiry: Its past and present future’. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 38(3), 299–309. Peirce, C.S. (1868). ‘Some consequences of four incapacities’. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 2, 140–157. Peirce, C.S. (1899). ‘First Rule of Logic’. In Peirce Edition Project (Ed.), (1998), The Essential Peirce: Selected philosophical Writings, Vol. 2 (pp. 42–56). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Peirce, C.S. (1960). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vols 1–6, C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Eds.). Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Powell, T.C. (2001). ‘Fallibilism and Organizational Research: The third epistemology’. Journal of Management Research, 4, 201–219. Scholl, R., Nichols, K., & Burgh, G. (2009). Philosophy for children: Towards pedagogical transformation. In Teacher education crossing borders: Cultures, contexts, communities and curriculum. Annual Conference of the Australian Teacher Education Association (ATEA), Albury, Australia (pp. 1–15). 28 June–1 July 2009. Scholl, R., Nichols, K., & Burgh, G. (2014). ‘Transforming pedagogy through philosophical inquiry’. International Journal of Pedagogies and Learning, 9(3), 253–272.

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Scholl, R., Nichols, K., & Burgh, G. (2016). ‘Connecting Learning to the World Beyond the Classroom through Collaborative Philosophical Inquiry’. Asia-Pacific Journal of Teacher Education, 44(5), 436–454. Seixas, P. (1993). .The Community of Inquiry as a Basis for Knowledge and Learning: the case of history.. American Educational Research Journal, 30(2), 305–324. Sharp, A.M. (1984). Work and Education in the Thought of Simone Weil. Pedagogica Historica, 24(2), 493–515. Sharp, A.M. (1993). Peirce, Feminism, and Philosophy for Children. Analytic Teaching, 14(1), 51–62. Splitter, L.J., & Sharp, A.M. (1995). Teaching for Better Thinking. The Classroom Community of Inquiry. Melbourne: ACER Press. Sprod, T. (2001). Philosophical Discussion in Moral Education: The community of ethical inquiry. London; New York: Routledge. Topping K.J., & Trickey, S. (2007a). ‘Collaborative Philosophical Enquiry for School Children: Cognitive gains at two-year follow-up.’ British Journal of Educational Psychology, 77(4), 787–796. Topping K.J., & Trickey, S. (2007b). ‘Impact of Philosophical Enquiry on School Students’ Interactive Behaviour.’ Thinking Skills and Creativity, 2(2), 73–84. Topping K.J., & Trickey, S. (2007c). ‘Collaborative Philosophical Enquiry for School Children: Cognitive effects at 10–12 years.’ British Journal of Educational Psychology, 77(2), 271–288. Trickey, S., & Topping, K. J. (2004). ‘Philosophy for children: A systematic review.’ Research Papers in Education, 19(3), 365–380. Trickey, S., & Topping, K.J. (2006). ‘Collaborative Philosophical Enquiry for School Children: Socio-emotional effects at 10–12 Years’. School Psychology International, 27(5), 599–614. Trickey, S., & Topping, K.J. (2007). ‘Collaborative Philosophical Enquiry for School Children: Participant evaluation at 11–12 years.’ Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, 18(3), 23–34. Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). Mind in Society: The development of higher psychological processes, Trans. M. Cole. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Filosofía para Niños y Niñas en la formación del profesorado de Secundaria: un cambio irreversible en la mirada Gloria Arbonés Villaverde Directora del IREF [email protected] Sara Silvestre Anglès [email protected] CV Gloria Arbonés. Profesora de Filosofía (Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Argentina. Homologado en España al título de Licenciada en Filosofía). Formadora de formadores en Filosofía para Niños (IAPC-EE.UU.). Introductora de Filosofía para Niños en Argentina en 1989. Formadora y asesora de FpN en escuelas de Argentina. Desde 2003 trabaja como formadora e investigadora en el Proyecto Filosofía 3/18 en el GrupIREF (Barcelona), de donde es la actual directora. Desde 2012 es también profesora de Didáctica de la Filosofía en el Máster de Formación del Profesorado de la Universidad de Barcelona, así como coordinadora, junto a Carla Carreras (UdG), del Máster on line de FpN (Universidad de Girona). Participante y ponente en congresos, encuentros, jornadas, etc. en Argentina, España, Italia, Austria entre otros países. Sara Silvestre Anglés. Licenciada en Filosofía por la Universidad de Barcelona. Desde 2012 es profesora de Didáctica de la Filosofía en el Máster de Formación del Profesorado de la Universidad de Barcelona. RESUMEN Este trabajo pretende abordar diferentes aspectos relacionados con el impacto de incluir el proyecto Filosofía para Niños en los contenidos curriculares de las asignaturas del Máster de formación de futuros profesores y profesoras de Filosofía. Proponemos esta presentación a partir de nuestra experiencia como profesoras de las asignaturas de Didáctica de la Filosofía que impartimos desde el año 2012 y también de la extensa trayectoria con el Proyecto Filosofía 3/18-Filosofía para Niños/as de una de sus autoras. PALABRAS CLAVE Didáctica de la Filosofía; formación del profesorado. ABSTRACT This presentation aims to address different topics related to the impact of including the project Philosophy for Children in the curricular contents of the subjects of the Professional Master's Training of future teachers and professors of Philosophy. We start from our experience as teachers of the subjects of Didactics of Philosophy we taught since 2012 in the Faculty of Education of the University of Barcelona and also the extensive tray with the Project Philosophy 3/18-Philosophy for Children by one of the authors.

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KEYWORDS Didactics of Philosophy; teacher training.

INTRODUCCIÓN Esta presentación es en realidad una reflexión a partir de nuestra experiencia como profesoras de las asignaturas de Didáctica de la Filosofía, en las cuales hemos introducido teoría y práctica de Filosofía para Niños/as, bajo el supuesto de que la propuesta de Matthew Lipman y Ann M. Sharp da respuesta al gran problema de esta área en la formación del profesorado. Es por esto por lo que hemos articulado la presentación alrededor de tres ejes que nos parecen relevantes para nuestra reflexión: 1) El grado de aceptación o rechazo que genera el proyecto Filosofía para Niños/as en los aspirantes a profesores/as de Filosofía. 2) La necesidad de dicho proyecto para trabajar por competencias. 3) Las propuestas de evaluación que se desprenden de un trabajo con FpN.

Grado de aceptación o rechazo de Filosofía para Niños/as En primer lugar, entonces, pensaremos sobre el impacto que observamos al introducir el Proyecto de Filosofía para Niñas y Niños en la formación didáctica de los futuros profesores de Filosofía de Secundaria y Bachillerato. Podemos afirmar que, para muchos de ellos, significa un cambio irreversible en la mirada docente, pero también en su comprensión y definición de la propia disciplina filosófica. A través de un taller dentro de las asignaturas de Didáctica de la Filosofía, en el Máster de Formación de Profesorado de Secundaria de la Universidad de Barcelona, el futuro profesorado aprende de forma vivencial esta manera completamente diferente de trabajar en filosofía, y muchos de ellos definen este aprendizaje como el más significativo de su formación. Destacan como descubrimientos casi maravillosos cuestiones como la necesidad de silencio del profesor, el papel del profesor como guía, el descubrimiento de la posibilidad de que la pregunta parta del alumnado, la existencia de un currículo tan amplio de materiales ya elaborados y adaptados, la comunidad de investigación o el diálogo realmente filosófico y democrático. Cabe señalar, sin embargo, que esta propuesta didáctica no tiene valor alguno para muchos de los estudiantes hasta que no han pasado por las prácticas en el aula de Secundaria, y comprenden el desapego real e insoluble de los estudiantes actuales de Secundaria hacia las prácticas didácticas eruditas y de transmisión de información no contextualizada ni dotada de significatividad. Otro factor importante que señalar es que en cada promoción un sector menor pero significativo del estudiantado ni antes ni después de las prácticas considera digna de respeto esta propuesta didáctica. Nos atrevemos a afirmar1 que este rechazo o aceptación están íntimamente ligados con la formación inicial de grado que han recibido en las distintas facultades. Observamos que el alumnado que viene de una estructura docente en la cual la clase magistral es la metodología casi excluyente y cualquier metodología activa es despreciada o no practicada, rechazan, muchas veces a priori, cualquier propuesta innovadora, en cambio, si han tenido 1

Somos conscientes de que esta afirmación es muy poco académica y mucho menos científica, pero no hemos encarado una investigación sistemática para dar sustento a nuestra tesis. Nos basamos en la praxis, en las valoraciones formales e informales del alumnado y en nuestra percepción subjetiva. En todo caso, este trabajo podría ser un planteo inicial de algo que podría ser desarrollado a futuro.

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experiencias más activas o participativas como alumnos, son más permeables a atender y escuchar activamente. Seguimos afirmando lo que tantas veces decimos en nuestras clases de Didáctica: enseñamos como aprendimos. Sin embargo, no deja de sorprendernos que personas formadas en el espíritu crítico de la Filosofía reaccionen, muchas veces, de un modo ciertamente altivo y despectivo ante propuestas innovadoras sólidas y con una larguísima trayectoria internacional, como la de Philosophy for Children.

Filosofía para Niños y Niñas y la educación competencial Las propuestas pedagógicas actuales nos piden, a los educadores de todos los niveles, adaptarnos a los cambios sociales que han puesto la educación tradicional en cuestión y caminar hacia una educación por competencias, el “invitado sorpresa” en el mundo de la educación, como lo llaman Cázares y Cuevas (2014: 13). Si la educación tradicional ponía en el centro de la mirada educativa los contenidos conceptuales que debían transmitirse a los estudiantes, ahora debemos transformar nuestros contenidos en competencias, que implican no sólo el saber, sino también el saber hacer, el saber ser y el saber convivir (Zabala y Arnau, 2007: 45), las cuales podemos caracterizar de la siguiente manera:  SABER: datos, hechos, informaciones, conceptos, conocimientos.  SABER HACER: habilidades, destrezas, técnicas para aplicar y transferir el saber a la actuación.  SABER SER: normas, actitudes, intereses, valores, convicciones, responsabilidades.  SABER ESTAR: predisposición al entendimiento y la comunicación interpersonal y el comportamiento colaborativo. El concepto de competencia puede resultar un tanto confuso o de difícil comprensión, de modo que hay que clarificar a qué estamos haciendo referencia cuando hablamos de esta idea en el ámbito educativo. Una posible definición precisa y completa de este concepto es la siguiente: La competencia ha de identificar aquello que necesita cualquier persona para dar respuesta a los problemas a los que se enfrentará a lo largo de su vida. Por tanto, competencia consistirá en la intervención eficaz en los diferentes ámbitos de la vida mediante acciones en las que se movilizan, al mismo tiempo y de manera interrelacionada, componentes actitudinales, procedimentales y conceptuales. (Zabala y Arnau, 2007: 45)

A partir de aquí, vemos que la educación competencial da un paso más allá de la educación tradicional, ya que no sólo se contemplan los contenidos conceptuales, sino que las dimensiones se amplían con la incorporación de los contenidos procedimentales que, como ya veremos, son el centro de la acción educativa, y también de los contenidos actitudinales, los cuales hasta ahora tenían un papel meramente residual. En el nuestro ámbito específico, partimos de la experiencia que nos muestra que en el conjunto del profesorado de Filosofía existe una gran resistencia al trabajo por competencias. Esta gran resistencia tiene, en muchos casos, un contenido ideológico que podría resumirse con la expresión ya clásica de “no admitir didactismos” con la que solemos despachar frecuentemente lo que comprendemos como una intromisión de los pedagogos y didactas en nuestro trabajo. Sin embargo, la resistencia al trabajo por competencias tiene también, a nuestro entender, otra raíz mucho más sensata a la que debemos prestar atención. Profesores conocedores de la didáctica de la filosofía, innovadores, entregados a su docencia, también muestran esta resistencia, que se nos plantea como un acto casi intuitivo de resistencia a 64

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perder lo esencial de nuestro discurso, esto es, lo filosófico. Es un miedo no sólo sensato, sino que además señala al elefante rosa que tenemos en el comedor de nuestra tradición docente, y del que creemos que debemos empezar a hablar: la ausencia de una sistematización de contenidos procedimentales propiamente filosóficos. Así pues, cuando nos planteamos hacer este paso hacia unas prácticas educativas no centradas en el contenido conceptual, es decir, en las necesidades de la disciplina, sino centradas en las necesidades de aprendizaje de nuestros estudiantes, un factor clave que no debemos olvidar es la necesaria coherencia entre las metodologías docentes y las metodologías evaluativas. Cualquier didáctica, para ser efectiva, debe conseguir armonizar coherentemente estos aspectos. Como hemos señalado antes, la tradición didáctica de nuestro país en el área de filosofía está íntimamente ligada a las prácticas de trasmisión de contenido conceptual, siendo la clase magistral, ya sea dialogada o muchas veces monologada, la gran protagonista en el aula filosófica. En esta didáctica tradicional, en la que el contenido conceptual es el centro y según la cual la fidelidad a la propia disciplina se contempla como más importante que el aprendizaje del filosofar por parte del estudiantado, las formas evaluativas clásicas, especialmente el examen de exposición o desarrollo de tema, son totalmente coherentes. En este caso, efectivamente, se está evaluando lo que se ha enseñado: contenido conceptual. Por el contrario, las propuestas innovadoras en didáctica de la filosofía ya sean las nuevas prácticas francesas, el diálogo socrático o la Filosofía para Niños, tienen como componente común el hecho de haber dejado de contemplar el contenido conceptual como centro del acto educativo y pasan a centrar su mirada e interés en el aprendizaje y ejecución de la acción de pensar (filosóficamente) de nuestros estudiantes. Además, en todas ellas, el componente social del diálogo deviene un elemento esencial, de modo que contribuye a poder trabajar los cuatro elementos característicos de la educación competencial. Sin esta visibilización y sistematización de contenidos procedimentales propiamente filosóficos, el paso a una educación competencial en el área de filosofía no puede producirse, ni es deseable. Nuestra propuesta se basa en recoger el legado de la tradición didáctica que más ha trabajado este aspecto, la Filosofía para Niños, para dar así contenido a las competencias específicas de nuestra área, pero también a las competencias básicas o generales cuando se trabajan desde el área de filosofía. Nos parece relevante citar el informe sobre la evaluación2 del desarrollo del Proyecto Filosofía 3/183 en diferentes centros educativos de Cataluña realizado por el Consell Superior d’Avaluació del Sistema Educatiu del Departament d’Ensenyament de la Generalitat de Catalunya en abril de 2012, que si bien estuvo realizado en base a la aplicación de dicho proyecto en escuelas de educación infantil y primaria, y a falta de un informe de evaluación similar en institutos, creemos que sus resultados pueden ser extrapolables con facilidad. Ahora bien, ¿cómo mantener la necesaria coherencia entre las metodologías docentes y las metodologías evaluativas cuando nuestras formas didácticas han virado? Debemos, análogamente, variar también las formas evaluativas; pero ¿cómo evaluar con efectividad y

2

Se puede consultar en la página en español del GrupIREF www.grupiref.org, en el botón Informe de evaluación 3 Nombre con el que se conoce Filosofía para Niñas y Niños en Cataluña.

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rigor algo tan difícilmente clasificable como es aprender a pensar de forma filosófica y que nuestra tradición didáctica ni siquiera logra definir con exactitud?

Las propuestas de evaluación que se desprenden de un trabajo con FpN. En una didáctica en la que el contenido conceptual es el centro, y la fidelidad a la propia disciplina se contempla como más importante que el aprendizaje del filosofar por parte del estudiantado, las formas evaluativas clásicas, especialmente el examen de exposición o desarrollo de tema, son totalmente coherentes. Proponemos un acercamiento de la filosofía a las nuevas formas de evaluación que propone el enfoque evaluativo competencial, y especialmente la evaluación formadora y formativa, orientada a regular las dificultades y errores que surgen a lo largo de un proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje, más que a valorar los resultados de dicho proceso. El proceso por evaluar es la acción de pensar filosóficamente, pero para que sea enseñable y evaluable, debemos poder dividirla en partes, o concretarla en acciones más específicas. Pero ¿cuáles son, estos componentes de la acción del pensar filosóficamente? ¿Qué parte de nuestra tradición didáctica los recoge? Cuando intentamos aplicar en el área de Filosofía este nuevo enfoque evaluativo, del que destacamos la potencia de la coevaluación como herramienta para desarrollar una autorregulación del aprendizaje, chocamos inmediatamente con la gran ausencia en nuestra tradición didáctica de una sistematización de contenidos procedimentales propiamente filosóficos que permitan trabajar innovadoramente y evaluar el aprendizaje de la acción de filosofar. Como adelantamos en el apartado anterior, este gran vacío puede ser llenado con la sistematización de habilidades de pensamiento de Lipman, aunque también con la propuesta en tres fases (problematizar, conceptualizar y argumentar) de Michel Tozzi4. Serán estas propuestas concretas las que nos permitan llenar la negligencia de nuestra tradición didáctica respecto de los contenidos procedimentales, y partiendo de ellas podremos establecer esa necesaria coherencia entre metodologías docentes y evaluativas que nos permitirán trabajar en filosofía de forma no solo innovadora sino también sólida pedagógicamente. Para poder entender la complejidad de este cambio, debemos, en primer lugar, tener clara la concepción de la evaluación que se asocia a la educación competencial, y en este sentido proponer la coevaluación y la autoevaluación dentro de la perspectiva de la evaluación formadora. Si para la educación tradicional la evaluación solía ser un instrumento para recoger los resultados del proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje, la educación competencial rompe totalmente con esta premisa; el objetivo ya no es medir la asimilación de los contenidos, sino identificar las dificultades y orientar al alumno en su proceso de construcción del conocimiento. Como ya hemos mencionado anteriormente, el mismo concepto de competencia muestra la necesidad de conjugar teoría y práctica, de modo que el alumno continuamente debe estar aplicando los distintos conocimientos en contextos determinados y así dotarlos de sentido. Éste es el motivo por el cual la educación competencial tiene que partir de la afirmación de que “sin evaluación de las necesidades del alumnado, no habrá tarea efectiva del profesorado. Y sin autoevaluación del significado que tienen los nuevos datos, las nuevas informaciones, las distintas maneras de entender o de hacer, no habrá progreso. Por ello, se

4

Profesor de Filosofía francés, especialista en Didáctica de la Filosofía. Profesor emérito de la Universidad Paul-Valéry de Montpellier. Su trabajo se centra en la didáctica del aprendizaje filosófico (DAP). Es también fundador de la revista Diótima.

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puede afirmar que enseñar, aprender y evaluar son en realidad tres procesos inseparables≫. (Sanmartí, 2007: 23). Proponemos, pues, un acercamiento de la didáctica de la filosofía a las nuevas formas de evaluación que presenta el enfoque competencial, especialmente a la evaluación formativa y formadora. ¿A qué nos referimos con estas dos modalidades? Por un lado, en la evaluación formativa las decisiones son tomadas fundamentalmente por el profesor, mientras que en la evaluación formadora es el estudiante quien tiene un papel activo. La primera, pues, tendría un carácter heterónomo, el cual contrastaría con el carácter autónomo de la segunda. A pesar de que puedan parecer procesos muy similares, los matices entre una forma y otra residen en las funciones y objetivos que persiguen. Por un lado, la evaluación formativa significa comprender por qué el alumno no entiende un concepto o no sabe hacer una tarea; es decir, con este tipo de evaluación, no sólo debemos identificar dificultades y errores, sino comprender sus causas. Así pues, se contempla no como una acción puntual, sino como un recorrido a lo largo de todo el proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje. Por otro lado, la evaluación formadora implica que el alumno autorregule su propio proceso de aprendizaje. En estas dos formas de evaluación caben muchos instrumentos de evaluación diferentes, como portafolios, carpetas de aprendizaje, proyectos, ensayos, disertaciones, trabajos interdisciplinares, etc. A pesar de los matices entre cada uno de ellos, hay una cuestión clave común a todos ellos: saber elaborar los criterios de evaluación para que atiendan a las cuatro áreas de las competencias trabajadas. Esta tarea es bastante más compleja de lo que se tiende a pensar, de modo que se han establecido algunos elementos como guía. El más característico del enfoque evaluativo competencial es elaborar los criterios en cuestión en forma de rúbrica y compartirlos siempre con los estudiantes, ya que así podrán saber en qué momento de su proceso de aprendizaje se encuentran. A partir de estas nociones básicas, si volvemos a nuestra área nos encontramos con que el proceso a evaluar es la acción de pensar filosóficamente. El problema surge, pues, en que para que este proceso sea enseñable y evaluable debemos poder dividir esta acción en partes, o, al menos, concretarla en acciones más específicas. Sin embargo, ¿cuáles son los componentes de la acción de pensar filosóficamente? ¿Qué parte de nuestra tradición didáctica los recoge? Siguiendo en la misma dirección que Lipman, podemos afirmar que una propuesta de evaluación formativo-formadora necesariamente debe tener como ejes principales la autoevaluación y la coevaluación. Según la educación competencial el proceso evaluativo es indisociable del proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje, de modo que, si en este último son los alumnos los que asumen el rol de protagonistas y deben construir su propio conocimiento, también deberán ser activos en todo lo referente a la evaluación. A partir de aquí, debemos asumir que “el proceso de enseñar-aprender-evaluar se convierte en un acto de comunicación social con todas sus exigencias y posibilidades, y la evaluación se revela como un elemento primordial en el proceso de auto-socio-construcción del conocimiento.” (Sanmartí, 2007: 61) En este contexto, las evaluaciones formativa y formadora nos permiten tener en cuenta estos dos elementos de autoconstrucción y socioconstrucción del conocimiento, ya que a pesar de que el proceso y los objetivos de éste sean comunes a todos los alumnos, debemos tener en cuenta las diferencias entre cada uno de ellos. En primer lugar, la autoevaluación es necesaria para que los alumnos se impliquen en el proceso evaluativo y perciban los errores y dificultades en su aprendizaje, pero, por otro 67

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lado, la coevaluación permite percibir la tarea de valoración como una ayuda mutua entre los propios alumnos. Dado que la autoevaluación es más comuna y debería ser inherente a cualquier proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje, queremos destacar el potencial de la coevaluación. La finalidad de una propuesta evaluativa formativo-formadora nunca puede ser la de constatar un nivel previamente establecido, de modo que las diferencias deben ser tomadas como un elemento enriquecedor y no discriminativo. En este sentido, la coevaluación es la mejor herramienta para poder fomentar el intercambio de ideas y la cohesión del aula y dejar de lado cualquier idea de competición. La coevaluación se entiende como la evaluación recíproca de los estudiantes teniendo en cuenta unos parámetros prefijados previamente entre el docente y ellos. Así pues, a pesar de que el profesor tiene un papel importante en la elaboración de estos criterios, su figura ya no es la de juez, sino la de guía y mediador. Este hecho contribuye a que los alumnos olviden la visión de la evaluación como la de un peaje y la perciban como un desafío constante, como una oportunidad de conseguir los distintos objetivos a lo largo del proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje. Como ya hemos apuntado, en la evaluación formativo-formadora los criterios se suelen elaborar en forma de rúbrica y, además, son compartidos con los alumnos en todo momento. Este instrumento, aunque incluye valores numéricos, no es hermético, es decir, los parámetros a los que hacen referencia permiten identificar y recoger problemas muy distintos. Precisamente, la coevaluación tiene la función de utilizar esta diversidad y confrontación de puntos de vista como un motor de construcción de significados y, además, implica que el alumno se esté autoevaluando constantemente en función de las réplicas que recibe. No obstante, es importante poder complementar el proceso evaluativo con múltiples instrumentos que permitan trazar una continuidad. El abanico de posibilidades que nos ofrece la evaluación formadora-formativa es muy amplio, ya que combina herramientas orales, como las mesas redondas y los debates; escritas, como por ejemplo el diario de clase, los portafolios, dossiers, etc.; y, finalmente, prácticos, como pueden ser los role-playings o la práctica supervisada. Y en este sentido, animamos a explorar la evaluación figuroanalógica5, una propuesta de evaluación creada por Angélica Sátiro6 en 1993 y que ha abierto una línea de desarrollo de la autoevaluación que aún sigue siendo novedosa.

Conclusiones Conjugar todas las ideas expuestas hasta ahora y llevarlas a la práctica como docentes en un instituto, pero también como docentes de Didáctica de la Filosofía en la formación del futuro profesorado en la Universidad es una tarea muy ardua y que requiere dejar de lado muchos prejuicios y maneras de proceder arraigadas a nuestra tradición didáctica. Intentar ser coherentes en las aulas con lo que predicamos en la teoría y al mismo tiempo ser lo suficientemente sólidas desde la teoría como para que la invitación a intentarlo sea aceptada, es el desafío al que nos enfrentamos cada año ante el nuevo grupo de alumnos y alumnas que quieren dedicarse a trabajar como profesores y profesoras de Filosofía. Nuestro objetivo es 5

Es una propuesta para repensar la evaluación como un instrumento de autoconocimiento, autonomía y emancipación de los sujetos en lugar de un mecanismo de control y poder, utilizando símbolos que se hallan presentes en la cultura visual de niñas, niños y jóvenes a modo de analogía para evaluar aspectos diferentes de las prácticas de aula. 6 Angélica Sátiro (Brasil) es pedagoga, maestra, escritora y experta en creatividad. Es autora de más de 400 publicaciones.

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que por lo menos nos escuchen con atención y se atrevan a probar esta propuesta que seguimos llamando innovadora, aunque tiene casi cincuenta años de existencia y desarrollo en todo el mundo. Hasta el momento, los resultados son optimistas. Nuestra experiencia en Didáctica de la Filosofía dentro del Máster de Formación del Profesorado nos indica que éste puede ser un camino muy exitoso. Nuestros estudiantes reportan que ha sido especialmente a través de tareas de coevaluación cuando más han aprendido y más implicados se han sentido con su propio aprendizaje y el de su grupo de pares. También nos agradecen los conocimientos y las prácticas con Filosofía para Niños realizadas durante el Máster después de haber pasado por su período de prácticas. Nuevamente y recuperando las ideas de Lipman, debido a que el conocimiento se autosocio-construye, no podemos concebir el aula de Filosofía, y en este caso, el aula de Didáctica de la Filosofía, sin el diálogo. Por esta razón es muy importante crear un sentimiento de comunidad que fomente el intercambio de ideas entre el alumnado —y futuro profesorado — que permita una mirada crítica a esta propuesta.

REFERENCIAS Andrés, I; de Castro, F; et alt. (2007). Reevaluar. La educación reflexiva en la escuela. Barcelona: Octaedro. Cázares Aponte, Leslie y Cuevas de la Garza, Fernando (2014). Planeación y evaluación basada en competencias. México: Trillas. Consell Superior d’Avaluació del Sistema Educatiu del Departament d’Ensenyament de la Generalitat de Catalunya (2012). Avaluació del desenvolupament del projecte Filosofia 3/18. Barcelona. Lipman, Matthew (1997). Pensamiento complejo y educación. Madrid: Ediciones de la Torre. Sanmartí, Neus (2007). 10 ideas clave: evaluar para aprender. Barcelona: Graó. Zabala, Antoni y Arnau, Laia (2007). 11 ideas clave: Cómo aprender y enseñar competencias.. Barcelona: Graó.

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Philosophy for Children and Dewey’s Aesthetics: A Teacher Educator’s Self-Study Through Narrative Inquiry Jessica Ching-Sze, Wang National Chiayi University, Taiwan [email protected] CV Jessica Ching-Sze, Wang is a full professor at the School of Education, National Chiayi University (Taiwan). She is the author of John Dewey in China: To Teach and to Learn (2007). Her major work is to prepare pre-service teachers for inquiry-based learning, to work with in-service teachers to implement philosophy for children Hawaii (p4cHI) in elementary schooling, and to innovate new ways to make P4C more attuned to societal challenges and cultural needs, which includes using Chinese philosophy, such as The Analects, to do P4C. ABSTRACT This paper uses self-study through narrative inquiry to examine a teacher facilitator’s aesthetic experience in Philosophy for Children. This analysis blends theoretical discourse and narrative explications. It draws from Dewey’s aesthetics in developing the concept of ʽphilosophical mindfulnessʼ as the defining feature of such pedagogical aesthetics. Philosophical mindfulness means attention to the present; it requires a special type of listening; it serves to stimulate and enrich imagination; and it helps to dig beneath the surface. It is a process that integrates thinking, feeling and being and that unites the body, heart, and mind. A teacher facilitator’s sense of ʽmindingʼ the world is readily exposed in the here and now of P4C and has a modeling effect for the community. The paper argues that the cultivation of philosophical mindfulness will contribute to Deweyan democracy as full and moving communication. KEYWORDS Philosophy for Children, Dewey, Aesthetics, Teacher Facilitator, Philosophical Mindfulness, Self-Study, Democracy. RESUMEN Este artículo utiliza el autoaprendizaje a través de la investigación narrativa para examinar la experiencia estética de un facilitador docente en Filosofía para Niños. Este análisis combina el discurso teórico y las explicaciones narrativas. Se basa en la estética de Dewey al desarrollar el concepto de “atención filosófica” como característica definitoria de dicha estética pedagógica. La atención filosófica significa atención al presente; requiere un tipo especial de escucha; sirve para estimular y enriquecer la imaginación; y ayuda a cavar bajo la superficie. Es un proceso que integra pensamiento, sentimiento y ser y que unifica el cuerpo, el corazón y la mente. Aquí se expone un sentido del profesor-facilitador al que le importa el mundo en el aquí y ahora de FpN y tiene un efecto ejemplificador para la comunidad. El artículo argumenta que el cultivo de la 70

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atención filosófica contribuirá a la democracia deweyiana como una comunicación plena y conmovedora. PALABRAS CLAVE Filosofía para Niños, Dewey, Estética, Profesor facilitador, Atención filosófica plena, Auto análisis, Democracia.

P4C and Dewey’s Aesthetics Philosophy for Children (P4C) is now an umbrella term for a variety of educational programs and initiatives that attempt to ʽmergeʼ philosophy with education, as its founder Matthew Lipman (2008) envisioned it. To ameliorate the pitfalls of traditional schooling, P4C aims to help children learn how to think for themselves (Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1980, p. 53). It cultivates a deep sense of wonder, an attitude of genuine questioning, and a habit of thoughtful deliberation through inquiry and dialogue. Since Lipman and Ann Sharp established the P4C program in the 1970s, the idea of philosophizing with children in a classroom community of inquiry has spread worldwide. With its unique set of epistemological, methodological, and educational presuppositions, P4C is ʽindebtedʼ to John Dewey (Lipman, 2004) for his vision of pragmatic social inquiry and reflective education (Cam, 2008; Ladd, 2008; Golding, 2011). However, the connection between Dewey and the aesthetic dimension of P4C has often been overlooked (Leckey, 2017). Recently, the relationship between P4C and Dewey’s aesthetics has received scholarly attention (see Oral, 2013; Leckey, 2017). In my view, the reasons are manifold. The first reason is the rich scholarship on Dewey’s aesthetics (see Alexander, 2013; Stroud, 2011); the second is the awareness of the potential danger of instrumentalism associated with the rhetoric of P4C (see Biesta, 2011); and the third concerns the caution against rationalistic logical reasoning in representing the model of thinking in P4C (Vansieleghem, 2005; Steel, 2014; Wang, 2015/2016). In light of these studies, this paper proposes that a renewed engagement with Dewey, especially his aesthetics, offers fresh perspectives for P4C theory and practice. Lipman’s humanistic ideals and aesthetic orientation were actually the driving forces shaping his original thinking about P4C (see Lipman, 2008). As a fervent reader and admirer of Dewey, Lipman fleshed out Dewey’s philosophy of experience in his invention of ʽthe pedagogy of a community of inquiry,ʼ which is now the standard pedagogical practice of P4C. Although Lipman took inspiration from Charles Sanders Pierce for this term, Dewey’s views of democracy as experience, morality, and the art of living, were the centerpieces of his new educational vision. It is ripe time that we explore the nuanced connections between P4C and Dewey’s aesthetics. A review of relevant literature shows that some practitioners have already used P4C as an alternative form of aesthetics education. They engage students with philosophical texts about the arts or with art works (see William Hamrick, 1989; Leckey, 2017); or they employ creative, deliberative pedagogy with aesthetic intent, such as through drama or improvisation (D’Olimpio & Teschers, 2017). In this paper, I aim to elaborate on the pedagogical aesthetics in P4C, attuning to Dewey’s emphasis on experience and everyday aesthetics. By ʽpedagogical aesthetics,ʼ I mean to demonstrate how a teacher facilitator experiences P4C aesthetically. Here, aesthetics is not construed as a form of content, but as a way of experiencing that potentially opens ʽeducational possibilitiesʼ (Wang, 2015/2016).

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Savoring Aesthetic Experiences in P4C: Perspectives of a Taiwanese Teacher Educator Since 2013, I have taught P4C-related courses at the teachers’ college at my university in Taiwan; done P4C with children in elementary schools; integrated P4C into Chinese classics education in my local community, where parents and their children participated together; and worked with pre-service and in-service school teachers to experiment with P4C in schools. As my passion drives me toward more ideas for new projects, I think that the time for reflection upon the meaning and value of these experiences is here. Building on my prior works on Dewey and democratic education, I assert that his aesthetics is interrelated with his educational, social-political, and moral philosophy. Dewey’s aesthetics is not a theory of art (works), but a philosophy of experience, or ʽan aesthetics of human existenceʼ (Alexander, 2013, p. 1). It satisfies ʽthe human eros,ʼ ʽto seek to live with a concrete, embodied experience of meaning and value in the worldʼ (Alexander, 2013, p. 6). As Dewey himself states, ʽThe characteristic human needʼ is ʽfor possession and appreciation of the meaning of thingsʼ (LW 1: 272). In this paper, I use Dewey’s aesthetics as an interpretive framework to discover meaning and value through my pedagogical reflections. Dewey takes aesthetic experiences to be ʽexperiences at their best and at their fullestʼ (LW 13: 368) and ʽexperience in its integrityʼ (LW 10: 278). He sees the culmination of experience in the embodied, lived experience of the everyday world, constituted not by propositional statements, but by people as embodied thinkers; by events in ordinary affairs, in stories, in bodily gestures, in facial expressions, in silences, emotions, and imagined meanings—all of these ʽhappeningsʼ in human interaction and communication. That is why Dewey exclaims, ʽof all affairs, communication is the most wonderfulʼ (LW 1: 132). Anyone familiar with a P4C community circle will know that much is ʽhappeningʼ— so much more than just ʽwords” or ʽclaims. ʼ A fuller picture can be better grasped through what Dewey refers to as ʽaffective thoughtʼ or ʽqualitative thought. ʼ As Lipman interprets, it is ʽthought in sounds and in colors, not just in words, concepts, or logical relationshipsʼ (2008, p. 105). In my view, this qualitatively rich world of P4C deserves slow savoring through narrative inquiry.

Using Self-Study Through Narrative Inquiry In this paper, I use self-study and narrative inquiry to make sense of my aesthetic experiences as a teacher facilitator in P4C classrooms. Self-study is a methodology often used by teacher educators to understand teaching and learning (Beck, Freese, & Kosnik, 2004), and it can be traced back to teacher inquiry and action research. Self-study requires in-depth reflection and moves teaching beyond the technicality of practice toward a deeper understanding of self and the other in pedagogical contexts. Narrative inquiry is the study of how people make meaning from experiences through immersing themselves in experience as lived and told in stories. It is ʽa multidimensional exploration of experience involving temporality (past, present, and future), interaction (personal and social), and location (place)ʼ (Clandinin & Connelly, 2004, p. 576). In my paper, I use classroom transcripts, my own teaching journals, and classroom observations as potential data sources. I present my analysis by blending theoretical discourse with narrative explications.

Significance of the Study As P4C spreads globally, it is no longer a product or construct of the Western philosophical–educational experience. A balance between universality (the idea of P4C writ 72

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large) and locality (P4C as a culturally responsive practice) is crucial for present and future P4C practitioners. This paper presents a local rendering of P4C; the objective is not to be replicated or normalized but simply to beautify human existence. A teacher educator’s experience in P4C deserves attention because there is a great need to promote P4C at teachers’ colleges and in schools. However, P4C teacher education has been described by Lipman as ʽthe Achilles’ heel’ (Lipman, 1980, p. 151), the most vulnerable aspect in the field. Lipman and his colleagues endeavored to provide what Murris (2016) regards as a ʽteacher proof’ P4C curriculum, which aims to model ʽphilosophy’ and ʽphilosophical thinking’ for the classroom teacher and the would-be ʽphilosopher child’ in the classroom. However, I agree with Murris (2016) that the success of P4C praxis in schools largely hinges on the role of the teacher facilitator, not just on the philosophical novels or texts. Regarding the requirements for P4C teacher education, some suggest basic philosophy courses; others stress the cultivation of philosophical sensitivity. Furthermore, others recommend a broader base of philosophical knowledge and knowledge of children. This is still a highly contentious field in P4C research. I do not intend to enter into this debate. However, P4C teaching is perhaps inseparable from where all effective teaching comes from; that is, ʽfrom the identity and integrity of the teacher,’ as Parker Palmer (1998) suggests. In light of the mounting difficulties associated with P4C facilitation (Gardner, 1998) and teacher preparation, this study reveals the internal landscape of a P4C teacher facilitator and is meant to encourage teachers to have greater courage to teach P4C.

Experimenting with a ʽCurriculumless’ P4C in Taiwan Experimenting with P4C without a set curriculum I first encountered P4C through my exposure to P4C Hawaii, which is Thomas Jackson’s (2001) adaptation of Lipman’s original P4C movement. It aims to ʽcreate intellectually safe communities that nurture the ability to think for oneself in responsible, respectful ways’ (Jackson, 2012, p. 5). It engages students in the activity of doing ʽlittle p philosophy.’ As Jackson states, its content is ʽthe set of beliefs that we all possess to make sense of the world’; and its activity is ʽthe process of reflecting on these beliefs as part of our larger interactions with the world.’ This content is ʽunique to each of us,’ resulting from the particularities of ʽour situatedness’ in the world and ʽour responses to them’ (Jackson, 2012, p.5). Hence, the classroom philosophical activity can ʽbegin with any content or topic, whether personal or public, academic or practical’ (Jackson, 2012, p. 6). Jackson’s notion of ʽlittle p philosophy’ was emancipating for me. It took away the pressure to confine myself with prescribed curriculum through registering the proper domain of the philosophical. It afforded me the freedom to experiment with P4C through prioritizing children’s own wonderment and puzzlement in life as potentially rich philosophical sources worth digging. Hence, I usually begin my P4C classes without providing any predesigned textual or visual stimuli; I simply elicit the children’s questions that they have been wondering about and have the class vote on them. Their questions range from personal, practical quandaries to contemplative, philosophical wonderment. The following are examples:  Why don’t adults answer children’s questions?  Why do human beings have emotions?  Why is there “time”? Are there aliens? 73

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 Are there ghosts?  What is the meaning of life?  Why do people die?  Why do we have to go to school?  Do you support same-sex marriage?  Why do we compare ourselves with others?  Can students be teachers? In the actual unfolding of our classroom inquiry, the boundaries between the personal, the practical, and the philosophical are often blurred. Sometimes, we spend one class hour discussing a single question; at other times, we pursue follow-up questions under the same theme for a couple of weeks. Occasionally, if I find a strong text or video clip relevant to our theme, I use it as a new stimulus to deepen the inquiry. Generally, the source of our inquiry comes from the community (students, the classroom teacher, and myself) and our own wonderment or bewilderment about things that matter to us. This free curriculum puts everyone at a special vantage point to encounter each other as unique individual beings. For example, one third-grade boy asked whether God exists (classroom transcript, 2015/12/16). I later learned from the classroom teacher that his parents often fought over religion, one being a Buddhist, and the other a newly converted Christian. On that day’s discussion, the usually outspoken boy was relatively quiet but attentive, because he was thinking intently and trying to make sense of the ʽrole’ of God in his ʽsituated’ world. A free or ʽcurriculumless’ P4C is exciting, adventurous, and fun, but also challenging and risky. It challenges teachers and students to confront themselves and reflect upon their experiences, values, and beliefs about the world. Combating the side effects of Taiwan’s educational achievement Taiwan is known for high test scores in math and sciences. However, such an achievement has a price. Our students are afraid of speaking in class, of giving the wrong answers, and of losing face (Wang, 2015/2016). This fear is a real classroom challenge. I remember my first P4C class with elementary school children: a ten-year-old boy was so nervous when invited to speak that he burst out crying. I wrote in my journal:ʽI had huge sympathy for his crying. And I had a deep sense of realization about children’s pressures in school... When I asked everyone in the class to put up a question, one student even approached me and asked, ʽWhat if I got it wrong?’ I sensed once again their fear of making mistakes. I hope that through P4C, they will overcome this psychological barrierʼ. (journal, 2015/3/15). On the other hand, I have also seen high-achieving girls reluctant to speak in P4C class because they found it more interesting, as one girl wrote, to ʽguess what the teacher wants’ (journal, 2015/3/15). Related to this is the prevailing tendency to copy each other’s answers or to produce what we call ʽofficially correct’ answers. We were introducing ourselves by sharing our hobbies. My teaching assistant first said that he liked bicycling, and then quite a few students seemed to copy this answer afterwards. When it came to one particular boy, who initially murmured the same answer, ʽbicycling,’ his classmates seemed startled and prompted him to say ʽfishing.’ We later learned he was sort of a fishing expert. When he shared why he loved fishing, he had a shinier look on his face. I really loved this. This answer

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revealed his individuality and his uniqueness. I firmly believe that each of us is very different because of our family backgrounds and experiences. Diversity itself is not only a given, but a treasure, and a potential resource of enrichment for all. But making room for such diversity to reveal itself and to honor it has always been a luxury in today’s schools. (journal, 2015/3/15) I also wonder if the children felt obliged to give officially correct answers, that is, answers they think adults want to hear. For example, one child says that he liked to play basketball, and the reason he gave was, ʽfor health.’ I couldn’t help but think to myself: Is this the true reason for him? What if he was given more time to think for himself, what would he actually say? I am really interested in hearing what he truly thinks. (journal, 2015/3/15).

In my context, utmost patience is required to probe into children’s authentic worlds. In one class, we were discussing whether one would choose to ʽstay sick but remain alive’ or ʽdie and have no more suffering.’ One girl said that she would prefer to live, because she could ʽexperience wonderful things in life.’ When I asked her to provide an example, she thought slowly and took a long time to respond. Finally, she murmured her answer so that it was difficult to hear. My teaching assistant, sitting next to the girl, tried to repeat her words. With her murmured speech, she meant to describe an experience she had when she was sick and hospitalized, and how her parents took care of her during those days. I thought to myself: if an adult person was trying to explain this, he or she would simply say, ʽparents’ love.’ But ʽparents’ love — is just an abstract word. The picture this girl was struggling to paint with words was concrete and real, full of colors, and warmth, and mixed with fresh memories and sincere feelings—too hard to articulate for a ten-year-old girl—and not to mention, in public. Indeed, ʽthe word is not the thing.’ I was very much moved by the thing she was describing with limited words. I think that adults tend to take the word for the thing, whereas children are still very much alive with their perceptions of the thing itself. (journal, 2016/5/4)

As a P4C facilitator, I knew that I had to prioritize my goals based on where the students were. Encouraging them to ask genuine questions, to truly speak their hearts and minds (as opposed to what they think adults expect them to say), to listen attentively to one another, to value and respect multiple perspectives, and to build a loving community where high achievers and low achievers all have a chance to grow—these are my priorities. This means that I must be ʽgently Socratic’ (Jackson, 2001).

What it Means to Experience P4C Aesthetically: A Theoretical Construct and a Narrative Account On philosophical mindfulness Dewey’s aesthetics inspired me to characterize my P4C experience as being philosophically mindful. Such philosophical mindfulness is not a mere cognitive process of information processing, but a process that integrates thinking, feeling, and being, and a process that unites the body, heart, and mind. I believe my sense of ʽminding’ the world is readily exposed in the here and now of P4C and has a modeling effect for the community. Let me elaborate on its features. The first is attention to the present. As Stroud claims, ʽA hallmark of what Dewey calls aesthetic experience’ is ʽminding the present communicative situation in an intense, absorbed, and engaged sense’ (2010/2011, p. 68). The implication I draw here is that the P4C facilitator ʽwill not only sense the demands of the situation,’ ʽbut will also value all phases of her communicative activity . . . at an equal level, thus rendering her experience absorbed and aesthetic’ (Stroud, 2010/2011, p. 68, emphasis mine). This attentiveness to the rich 75

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communicative present in all its depth and complexities requires one to forgo thinking egocentrically. In the often uncertain circumstances of P4C inquiry, such mindfulness implies yielding ʽnon-judgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment’ (Kabat-Zinn, qtd. in Makaiau et al., 2016). Here ʽnon-judgment’ does not mean being emptyminded or having to relinquish one’s prior knowledge. It means being non-reactive to beliefs and values contrary to our own; and it means avoiding pre-value judgment that blocks the way of genuine listening and intensive comprehension. Second, philosophical mindfulness entails a special type of listening, which is not just ʽhearing speech’ as if ʽlistening to a babel of tongues,’ but to have ʽmeaning and value come home to us’ (Dewey, LW 10: 338). Jackson (2001) explains this clearly: ʽThis quality of listening requires setting aside one’s own thoughts in order to be truly open to what the other is saying. This is especially critical because the other in this case will most often be a child, and gentleness must be foremost in one’s mind if one hopes to be privileged with an authentic response from a child’ (Jackson, 2001, p. 459). The following quote by Luce Irigaray further captures the nuanced meanings of listening: To listen in a dimension in which I do not assume that I already know you or whatever your future is. It is to listen with an encouragement toward the unexpected, toward your initiative and your becoming. It is to listen without presupposition and without explicit demands, with a silence that is a space–time offered to you with no prior, pre-established truth or trial. (quoted in Haynes and Murris, 2012, p. 224)

Haynes and Murris (2012) refer to this as ʽphilosophical listening.’ Such subtleness of attitude marks a dramatic difference between a teacher’s listening during P4C inquiry and that during regular classroom instruction. Third, ʽphilosophical mindfulness’ serves to stimulate and enrich imagination. On Dewey’s account, imagination plays an essential role in artful communicative processes, because it leads to ʽpenetration into the hidden meaning of things—meaning not visible to perception or memory, nor reflectively attained by the processes of thinking’ (Dewey, EW 2: 171). As Dewey also reminds us: ʽAnything that hardens an experience in certain lines as if they were the proper lines in which it should run becomes a burial to genuine esthetic experience’ (LW 13: 362). Imagination runs counter to our mechanical, scripted responses in communicative situations and helps us to engage with the world and the other anew. However, according to Dewey, this –ʽnewness’– does not appear out of nowhere, but from keen sensitivity toward existing elements in tension—another crucial feature of philosophical mindfulness. This is what happens ʽwhen varied materials of sense, quality, emotion, and meaning come together in a union that marks a new birth in the world’ (Dewey, LW 10: 272). A philosophically minded P4C facilitator dwells on tensions, either conceptual or interpersonal, and most importantly will work with these tensions to create ʽnew births.’ Dewey claims, ʽSince the artist cares in a peculiar way for the phase of experience in which union is achieved, he does not shun moments of resistance and tension. He rather cultivates them, not for their own sake but because of their potentialities, bringing to living consciousness as an experience that is unified and total’ (LW 10: 21). If one is truly artful, one integrates tensions harmoniously—tensions between ʽobjective material and personal response, the individual, and the universal, surface and depth, sense, and meaning’ (LW 10: 301, emphasis mine). However, the integration of tensions requires not only analytical reasoning, but also ʽaffective thought’ or ʽqualitative thought,’ a unique manner of thinking often associated with 76

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aesthetic experience. As Dewey states, it is ʽthe logic of artistic construction and aesthetic appreciation,’ exemplifying ʽthe control of selection of detail and mode of relation, or integration, by a qualitative whole.’ Dewey also associates this manner of thinking with intuition by saying that ʽthe penetrating quality… can be emotionally intuited’ (quoted in Quay, 2013, p. 63). Here intuition is grounded in experience and is meant to oppose ʽabstract logical reflection’ (quoted in Quay, 2013, p. 64). Finally, with philosophical mindfulness, one can hope to ʽdig beneath the surface,’ a vital goal Jackson (2001) stipulates for a P4C inquiry. Dewey’s comments are significant and are worth quoting at length: Only occasionally in the lives of many are the senses fraught with the sentiment that comes from deep realization of intrinsic meanings. We undergo sensations as mechanical stimuli or as irritated stimulations, without having a sense of the reality that is in them and behind them: in much of our experience our different senses do not unite and tell a common and enlarged story. We see without feeling, we hear, but only a second-handed report, second handed because not reinforced by vision. We touch, but the contact remains tangential because it does not fuse with qualities of sense that go below the surface. (LW 10: 27)

In P4C, philosophical mindfulness provides a glimpse into underlying realities, ʽbreathes life’ into inquiry, and enhances the art of democratic communication. The highest and most difficult kind of inquiry and a subtle, dedicate, vivid and responsive art of communication must take possession of the physical machinery of transmission and circulation and breathe life into it… Democracy will come into its own, for democracy is a name for a life of enriching communion… It will have its consummation when free social inquiry is dissoluably wedded to the art of full and moving communication. (Dewey, LW 2: 350, emphasis mine).

The cultivation of philosophical mindfulness through P4C inquiry contributes to the realization of Deweyan democracy as ʽfull and moving communication.’ Let me end this section with selected lines from a poem by the English poet William Wordsworth: The world is too much with us. We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon! And are up-gathered like sleeping flowers, For this, for everything, we are out of tune; It moves us not.

A moving story: ʽWhy I am named Zeng Zi-Rui?’ The relationship between identity and name is an attractive topic in Western philosophy. People commonly question whether their name represents who they are, or whether they would be the same person if they were called a different name. In a thirdgrade P4C class, one boy wrote as his ʽwonder’ question, ʽWhy am I named Zeng Zi-Rui?’ ʽCould you say a bit more about why you asked the question?’ I asked. He shrugged his shoulders and said, ʽI don’t know’ (classroom transcript 2015/12/2). As the rest of us in the community proceeded with the discussion, we learned that the boy did not like his given name, Zi-Rui. Zi literally means child or offspring, and Rui means smart or wise. I asked him why he didn’t like his name. Again, he responded with ʽI don’t know.’ However, he then tried to produce an answer. ʽI don’t like its sound,’ he said. In response, the other children as well as the classroom teacher tried to comfort him: ʽI actually like the sound of your name’; ʽI like the meaning of your name’; ʽYour name expresses your parents’ hope and expectations for you’; and ʽYour parents hoped that you 77

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would grow up to be smart.’ The classroom teacher asked, ʽNow that you know the meaning of your name, do you like it?’ The boy still shook his head and said, ʽNo.’ While I was sitting in the circle, listening to all the comments intending to make him feel better about his name, I was still feeling puzzled about why the boy disliked his name. I sensed some tension between his firm stance and the others’ persuasive comments. From his facial expression, I knew that he was sincere. I suspected more to this than what we heard on the surface. Thus, I attempted to clarify through asking: ʽDo you not like the sound of your name or do you not like its meaning?’ He answered, ʽIts meaning.’ Stretching my imagination, I asked, ʽDo you not like it because you don’t want to be smart? Or because you don’t think that you are smart?’ He responded with a clear statement: ʽI don’t think I am smart.’ This was an ʽA-ha’ moment for me. The boy was feeling uncomfortable about the apparent disparity between who he thought he was and how he was named. This tension is philosophically rich as it is concerned with the gap between appearance and reality. To create a sense of shared experience in the community, I asked if anyone in the class also did not like their names and why. A couple of students responded, and I said, ʽWell then, if we don’t like our names, what should we do with this?’ One girl quickly said, ʽYou can change it.’ Another said, ʽYou just don’t need to think so seriously about it.’ Subsequently, the class digressed as they turned to talk about the meaning of my name, Ching-Sze. Some said, ʽChing-Sze,’ means ʽinnocence’; another said, ʽIt means clear water.’ Looking puzzled, I said, ʽWell, I think it means clear thinking.’ ʽWow, you know what? This made me realize that we can actually give different meanings to our names,’ I exclaimed. ʽSo, what new meanings could we give to Zi-Rui’s name if he doesn’t want it to mean academic smartness?’ One boy raised his hand excitedly and said, ʽIt depends on what you like. If you like Lego, you could tell yourself that Rui means being good at Lego, and that you want your offspring to be good at Lego.’ ʽOr, if you like jogging, you can think of Rui as being good at jogging.’ Their responses made many in the class laugh. And Zi-Rui looked interested in this new discovery. With support from his peers, he could redefine the meaning of ʽRui’ according to what he liked. Next, we shifted the topic and inquired into why we all need to have a name (rather than just a number), and we reached the conclusion that our names display our specialness. On that day, I wrote abundantly in my journal. This class experience reminded me how lucky I was to be given a name that means ʽclear thinking.’ Also, I thought of other things: It also reminded me of a next-door neighbor I had when I was young—an auntie, whose name was Chou, meaning ʽUgly.’ It never occurred to me how she might have felt being called ʽugly.’ What were her parents thinking when they named their baby girl ʽugly’? What kind of social or cultural conditions legitimize such indifference to naming a girl? . (journal, 2015/12/3)

Also, I felt apathetic about the educational system in Taiwan. If you are not academically smart, you suffer a lower self-esteem. The pressure children felt about schooling is far greater than we thought, and it manifests in such innocuous things as naming. (journal, 2015/12/3)

My philosophical inquiry with these children allowed me to reflect upon my experiences and to regain a heightened sense of meaning. Finally, this teaching event was an aesthetically rich experience for me because I was being philosophically mindful in many ways. I attended to the situation as a living present; 78

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listened attentively and observed carefully; did not have a prejudgment about what the boy had in mind; sensed a type of tension (a conceptual and emotional disparity in the situation); to clarify what the boy meant by reading between the lines; stretched my imagination to penetrate the hidden meanings; scratched beneath the surface and discovered the underlying reality; and with the help of the community, we were able to co-create something new in the form of new meanings for the boy’s name. I did not anticipate or foresee such an ending. I followed the inquiry where it led—but I made a judgment about what was educationally worth pursuing in the particular context. The boy’s genuine problem required a practical resolution, and as a community, we were required to think together.

My Method of P4C: Finding the Ground Where Confucius and Dewey Meet In her book Metaphor and Metaphilosophy, Sara Mattice (2014) conceptualizes different metaphors for philosophical activity: 1) combat, 2) play, and 3) aesthetic experience. Her discussion of the third metaphor draws largely from Chinese intellectual sources. Her work made me realize that my Chinese cultural sensibility and philosophical outlook inclined me to practice philosophy ʽas aesthetic experience,’ stressing understanding and appreciation (Mattice, 2014). This made me particularly attuned to ʽsomething new, something not previously understood, or not what we expected it to be beforehand’ (Mattice, 2014, p. 86). Moreover, my story about the boy’s name resembled the sort of real life questions that Confucius’ disciples raised in the Analects. For example, one disciple asked why everyone has brothers except for him (Analects 12:5); another asked whether one should jump to save a drowning person at the bottom of a well (Analects 6:26); and another asked whether one should immediately act upon something one learns (Analects 11:22). As a teacher, Confucius embraced any questions from his disciples as they struggled to make sense of life and to cultivate themselves. The same question from different disciples would lead to different answers, even contrary ones, as in the example of taking immediate action or avoiding imprudent action. It depends on who was asking the question and what answer might contribute to his or her wellbeing. Confucius did not provide any set answers that fit everyone and every situation, only his own thinking based on the complexities of each context and his practical, pedagogical judgment. This fundamentally pragmatic sensibility and human ethos of growth permeated the teachings of Confucius. His teachings provide me with a sense of validation to practice what is called life philosophy with my Taiwanese children. Like Confucius, Dewey also embraces the art of living itself. Dewey’s aesthetics and his vision of philosophy also provide strong support for my method of P4C. I know clearly that I do not want to commit ʽthe Philosophic Fallacy’ and treat philosophy as if ʽall experiences are instances of knowing’ (Alexander, 2013, p. 9). I also do not want to approach philosophy as a set of questions and skills without any ʽconcept of a human life or lifetime entering it’ (Alexander, 2013, p. 11). I want to practice philosophy, in Dewey’s words, ʽas a method,’ not for dealing with ʽproblems of philosophy,’ but with ʽproblems of men’ (Dewey, MW 10: 46), which specifically in this case are the concrete, actual questions from the children. In conclusion, I strive to practice P4C aesthetically through finding the ground where Confucius and Dewey meet.

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REFERENCES Alexander, T. (2013). The human eros: Eco-ontology and the aesthetics of existence. New York: Fordham University Press. Beck, C., Freese, A. & Kosnik, C. (2004). The preservice practicum: Learning through Selfstudy in A Professional Setting. In J. J. Loughran, M. L. Hamilton, V. K. LaBoskey, and T. Russell (Eds.), International handbook of self-study of teaching and teacher education practices (pp.1259-1293). Kluwer, Netherlands: Dordrecht. Biesta, G. (2011). Philosophy, exposure, and children: How to resist the instrumentalization of Philosophy in Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 45 (2), 305-319. Cam, P. (2008). Dewey, Lipman, and tradition of reflective education. In M. S. Taylor, H. Schreier, & J. P. Ghiraldelli (Eds.), Pragmatism, Education, and Children: International Philosophical Perspectives (pp. 163-181). New York, NY: Rodopi. Clandinin, D. J., & Connelly, F. M. (2004). Knowledge, narrative and self-study. In J. J. Loughran, M. L. Hamilton, V. K. LaBoskey, & T. Russell (Eds.), International handbook of self-study of teaching and teacher education practices (pp. 575–600). Dordrecht: Kluwer. Dewey, J. (1996). The collected works of John Dewey, 1882-1953: The electronic edition. Edited by Larry A. Hickman. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Gardner, S. (1998). Inquiry is no mere conversation (or discussion or dialogue): Facilitation of inquiry is hard work! Analytical Teaching, 16 (2), 102-111. Golding, C. (2011). Educating philosophically: The educational theory for Philosophy for Children. Educational theory and philosophy, 43 (5), 413-14. Hamrick, William (1989). Philosophy for Children and aesthetic education. Journal of aesthetic education, 23 (2), 55-67. Jackson, T. E. (2001). The art and craft of “gently Socratic” inquiry. In A. L. Costa, (Ed.), Developing minds: A resource book for teaching thinking (pp. 459-465). Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. Jackson, T. E. (2004). Philosophy with children Hawaii style—”On not being in a rush.” Thinking: The journal of philosophy for children, 17(1&2), 4-8. Jackson, T. E. (2012). Home grown. Educational Perspectives, 44 (1&2), 3-7. Ladd, R. E. (2008). Dewey and Lipman. In Taylor, M. S., Schreier, H., &Ghiraldelli, J. P (Eds.), Pragmatism, Education, and Children: International Philosophical Perspectives (pp. 153-161). New York, NY: Rodopi. Leckey, M. (2017). Guernica comes to school: art, philosophy and life. In Maughn R. G., J. Haynes. & K. Murris (Eds), Routledge international handbook of Philosophy for Children (pp. 137-144). London: Routledge. Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in education (2nd edition). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

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Lipman, M. (2004). Philosophy for children’s debt to Dewey. Critical and creative thinking, 12, 1-8. Lipman, M. (1980). Philosophy goes to school. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M., & Oscanyan, F. S. (1980). Philosophy in the classroom. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Lipman, M. (2008). A life teaching thinking. Montclair, NJ: The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children. D’Olimpio, L. & Teschers, C. (2017). Drama, gestures and philosophy in the classroom: Playing with philosophy to support an education for life. In M. R. Gregory, J. Haynes & K. Murris (Eds), Routledge international handbook of Philosophy for Children (pp. 145152). London: Routledge. Maikaiau, A. Wang, J., Ragoonaden, K., & Leng, L., (2016). Empowering P4C research and practice through self-study: The philosophy for children Hawaii international journaling project. In M. R. Gregory, J. Haynes, & K. Murris (Eds.), International handbook for Philosophy for Children (pp. 227-235). London: Routledge. Mattice, S. (2014). Metaphor and Metaphilosophy. Lanham: Lexington Books: Murris, K. (2016). The Philosophy for Children curriculum: Resisting “teacher proof” texts and the formation of the ideal philosopher child. Studies in philosophy and education, 35 (1), 63-78. Oral, S. B. (2013). Can Deweyan pragmatist aesthetics provide a robust framework for the Philosophy for Children Program? Studies in philosophy and education, 32, 362-377. Palmer, P. (1998). The courage to teach. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Quay, J. (2013). Education, experience and existence. London: Routledge. Steel, S. (2014). The Pursuit of wisdom and happiness in Education: Historical sources and contemplative practices. Albany, NY: SUNNY Press. Vansieleghem, N. (2005). Philosophy for children as the wind of thinking. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 39, 21-35. Wang, J. C. (2016). From critical thinking to artful Communication: Inspirations from Dewey’s theory of communication. Philosophy Study 6 (2), 103-113. Stroud, S (2011). John Dewey and the artful life: Pragmatism, Aesthetics and Morality. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Stroud, S. (2010/2011). Toward a Deweyan theory of communicative mindfulness. Imagination, cognition and personality 30 (1), 57-75. Wang, J. C. (2015/2016). From learning outcomes to educational possibilities: What happens when philosophical community inquiry works wonder with university students in Taiwan. Analytical teaching and philosophical praxis, 36, 26-43.

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The Philosophical Conversation as a Method of Examining Children’s Perceptions, Mindsets, and Interpretations of the World Kerstin Michalik Professor of Educational Science at the Faculty of Education, University of Hamburg (Germany), Von-Melle-Park 8, 20146 Hamburg. [email protected] CV Kerstin Michalik is Professor of Educational Science at the Faculty of Education, University of Hamburg. She holds a PhD in History and a Master’s Degree in Philosophy. She was a Philosophy teacher in secondary schools and is now teaching pre-service teachers at the University of Hamburg. She is Chairwomen of the “Society for the Promotion of Philosophising with Children in Germany”. She has published several articles about philosophising with children as an integrative part of teaching and learning in primary schools. Her research interests include education, philosophising with children in inclusive learning settings and philosophy as a subject in teacher-training. ABSTRACT Philosophising with children holds great potential for childhood studies. One important field is the investigation of the content of children’s thoughts. Children’s perceptions and interpretations of the world can be reconstructed on the basis of philosophical conversations; these perceptions and interpretations can be compared with the results of other research approaches and thus contribute to a more complex image of the child. At the heart of this article is the act of philosophising with children as a research approach. The following work also contains reflections on the relevance of this explorative approach to children for the professionalisation of teachers in the context of higher education. KEYWORDS Philosophising as a research method; childhood studies; professionalisation of teachers; higher education, rights of animals, death and dying. RESUMEN Filosofar con los niños entraña un gran potencial para los estudios de la infancia. Un campo importante es la investigación del contenido de los pensamientos de los niños. Las percepciones e interpretaciones de los niños sobre el mundo se pueden reconstruir sobre la base de conversaciones filosóficas; estas percepciones e interpretaciones se pueden comparar con los resultados de otros enfoques de investigación y así contribuir a una imagen más compleja del niño. En el corazón de este artículo está el acto de filosofar con los niños como un enfoque de investigación. Este trabajo también contiene reflexiones sobre la relevancia de este enfoque exploratorio de los niños para la profesionalización de los docentes en el contexto de la educación superior. 82

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PALABRAS CLAVE Filosofar como método de investigación, estudios de la infancia, profesionalización del profesorado, educación universitaria, derechos de los animales, muerte y morir.

The philosophical conversation as a method of examining children’s perceptions, mindsets, and interpretations of the world Philosophising with children holds great potential for childhood studies. One important field is the investigation of the content of children’s thoughts. Children’s perceptions and interpretations of the world can be reconstructed on the basis of philosophical conversations; these perceptions and interpretations can be compared with the results of other research approaches and thus contribute to a more complex image of the child. At the heart of this article is the act of philosophising with children as a research approach. The following work contains also reflections on the relevance of this explorative approach to children for the professionalisation of teachers in the context of higher education. 1. Philosophising with children and childhood studies For a long time, the traditional methods of studying childhood – such as in the context of Kohlberg’s research into the development of moral judgement in children – consisted of clinical one-on-one interviews or experimental-testing, hypothesis-verifying processes oriented towards theories of cognitive psychological development (Piaget). Questionnaires – the evaluation of which takes place based on predefined category systems – were and are also implemented. These research approaches have obvious limits and, at times, produce questionable results because they are too far removed from the contexts of children’s lives and fail to sufficiently take children into account as reflexive subjects. Even Gareth B. Matthews, one of the originators of the practice of philosophising with children, made a critical appraisal in the early 1980s of Piaget’s research methods and results in developmental psychology in light of his own experience with children who philosophise; he reproached Piaget for giving insufficient consideration to the special aspects of children’s thought processes (cf. Matthews, 1991, p. 55 et seq.). Since then, there has been a host of studies from various disciplines in which the philosophical conversation has been implemented as a method of data collection. They reveal a research approach well suited to providing access to children’s perceptions and interpretations which remain inaccessible through other methods of studying childhood. Important studies to mention include those on children’s understanding and ethics of nature (Gebhard et al., 1997; Billmann-Mahecha et al., 1998; Billmann-Mahecha & Gebhard, 2014), as well as investigations, following similar methods, of children and young people’s ethical perceptions in the context of the formation of the everyday imagination (Born, 2007; Born & Gebhard, 2005). Group discussions following the model of philosophising with children have also proven particularly fruitful during investigations of children’s awareness of history (Pape, 2006), the reception of ethical and moral issues in children’s literature (Gillebeert, 2007) or as an examination of children’s metaphorical thinking (Gansen, 2005). To date, philosophical conversations – and this also applies to group discussions in general – have found little application in childhood studies (cf. Brüning, 2000; Heinzel, 2000). The particular advantages of the philosophical conversation as a qualitative method in childhood studies can be neatly summed up in comparison with one-on-one interviews as follows (Billmann-Mahecha & Gebhard, 2014): 83

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 Suitability of the object of research and proximity to everyday life  The conversation’s openness to children’s positing of relevance and social processes of negotiation and communication  Less restriction of responses based on social acceptability Group discussions constitute a method by which externally initiated communication processes are launched in an actual – hence previously existing – group which approximates a ‘normal conversation’ in terms of its progression and structure, at least intermittently. They therefore demonstrate a closer proximity to everyday life than one-on-one interviews. Children’s everyday forms of behaviour and expression are observed and recorded in a familiar context (the conversation within the group); the children are able to express and develop their thoughts and perceptions without content input or closed questions. Opinions, attitudes and value judgements result not only from individual cognitive development, but also from social processes of communication and understanding through which children cultivate and mediate their opinions, attitudes and value judgements. Group discussions reproduce these social processes of understanding ‘in miniature’, more or less, and are thus particularly well suited to examining the process of social mediation of value judgements and opinions. Moreover, the method of philosophical inquiry – which relies on the person guiding the conversation refraining as much as possible from intervening with regard to content – is especially appropriate for ensuring the necessary openness for children’s positing of relevance regarding the research question and/or the object of the conversation. Due to the fact that children also prompt one another regardless of the questions and conversational stimuli from the person guiding the conversation and develop topics further in unpredictable ways, a restriction of responses based on social acceptability is also less likely to occur here than in other methods, such as one-on-one interviews. The philosophical conversation as a research method lends itself to different key areas of research.  Focusing on the content of children’s thought processes. In terms of content, children’s thoughts and worlds of perception, perspectives and interpretations can be reconstructed on the basis of philosophical conversations in terms of a systematic engagement with children’s points of view regarding fundamental questions about the meaning of human existence. What perceptions do children have, for example, of friendship, justice or time? What do nature and natural things mean to them? Which aspects are developed into a topic? What assumptions, opinions, convictions are expressed and developed? What positions become apparent? What arguments are asserted? By focusing on content, children’s rational abilities can also become the object of investigation, i.e. the ways in which children approach abstract terms or comprehend these terms verbally (cf. Gansen, 2005).  Focusing on structure – children’s interactions in conversation. Processes of participation and interaction over the course of the conversation can be examined alongside – or in a reciprocal relationship with – content. What forms do children use to make arguments? Are they able to assess arguments or differentiate between better and worse reasoning? How do children’s ways of arguing develop in a mutual exchange with others? How do children deal with different opinions and arguments from other children; how do they attempt to convince one another or reach a consensus? How do shared thoughts arise in conversation, in exchange and in interactions with other children? How do collective thought processes develop? (cf. De Boer, 2015; Helzel & Michalik, 2015). 84

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The focus of this article is on content; it concerns philosophical inquiry as a method of data collection and reconstruction of children’s object-related perceptions, thought processes and conceptions. Through the use of two examples – philosophical conversations on ‘humans and animals’ and ‘death and dying’ – the intention is to demonstrate how these can be identified and analysed. The following contains a rough sketch of the attributes of data collection, evaluation and analysis that will then be substantiated with two examples. 1. Data collection Data collection takes place, in an actual group or school class, in the form of a philosophical conversation with an open prompt, i.e. a story. The person guiding the conversation orients themselves towards criteria which apply to philosophical conversations – refraining in particular from making content-related interventions (cf. Michalik & Schreier, 2006, p. 104 et seq.). Data are recorded by audiotape or video and transcribed word for word. 2. Data evaluation Various methods of qualitative social research are possible for data evaluation, including qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2015), the documentary method (Bohnsack, 2010), grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1996) and other methods of analysing discourse and communication. In the following examples, content analysis as defined by Mayring and grounded theory will be utilised in analysing philosophical conversations. 3. Data analysis and interpretation The collection and coding of data material in the context of the content-analysis method is already an act of interpretation. The detailed interpretive analysis and classification of data takes place within its own procedural stage on the basis of theory and with the backdrop of research results from various disciplines. To interpret the data, reference is made to research findings from fields such as philosophy, sociology, developmental psychology, pedagogy and, of course, especially from available research into childhood. 2. Substantiation – research results based on philosophical conversations The following examples regarding the themes – humans and animals, and death and dying – are intended to substantiate the research process. 1. Is it wrong to kill hornets? The first example comes from a project on primary school children’s value retention in the ethics of nature (Billmann-Mahecha & Gebhard, 2014). The basis for the conversation in a third-grade class (children age 8-9) was a story in which two children argue over whether it is wrong to kill hornets. Open coding was used in the conversation record, in line with grounded theory. A thematic overview was created, listing all of the aspects discussed by the children, grouped thematically. The lists of themes and/or thematic overviews and an extract from the conversation are reproduced below. The headings group linked individual statements into thematic categories. In this example, the statements are still expressed using everyday language; it is only on later evaluation that they are summarised and condensed on a more abstract level. Extract from list of themes (Billmann-Mahecha & Gebhard, 2014) 85

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1. Hornets/natural gardens  Hornets belong in a natural garden, as all animals are useful in some way (1823), as bees are useful, and hornets are related to bees (35-40)  Weeds also belong in a natural garden (213-14/22-227) […] 2. Rights of animals/zoo animals  Hornets are living things and living things have a right to life, as they have some ability (65-66)  Bringing animals to the zoo is unnatural/animal cruelty (291-300)  Zoo animals have problems with offspring due to the strange feed (339-346) […] 3. Comparison with humans/change in perspective  Animals are living things, just like people (29-31)  Stinging to a hornet is like walking, drinking or hitting to a human (144-147)  Animals belong to themselves just like humans belong to themselves (420-443) [...] A passage was selected from the thematic overview for detailed analysis and in-depth interpretation: ‘Animals belong to themselves just like humans belong to themselves’ (420443). Rebecca: My neighbours who have chickens kill them too, because when people have their own animals, and they want to kill and sell them, then it’s up to them. [...] Julia: No, no, the animals belong to themselves. […] Lena: They belong to themselves. The same way that I don’t belong to my parents, I belong to me. […] Julia: So, my parents must look after me, but I can decide my own life anyway, and say I want to become a teacher, for example. But my parents say: you should be a nursery teacher. It’s my life and I can make the decision for myself, so I belong to myself too.

The content was summarised and paraphrased first of all for the purposes of further interpretation: ‘Rebecca takes the view that people can certainly kill and sell chickens belonging to them. […] Julia and Lena do not accept that: Animals don’t belong to people, but to themselves. To reinforce this view, they confer the right to self-determination they ascribe to themselves to animals’. (ibid., p. 155)

In the following interpretation of the conversation passage, the researcher(s) focus on what is remarkable or special about the children’s arguments: What is remarkable [...] on the one hand is the level of self-awareness with which these eight-tonine year old children are already formulating and employing modern, cultural concepts of the autonomous subject and, on the other hand, how they naturally include animals in this worldview. Even ‘animals belong to themselves’. For them, in terms of belonging to oneself, humans and animals are the same. This thought is expanded later on in the conversation for other examples. Proceeding from their own conception of self in our modern society, based on which their autonomy could not be restricted by their parents, they justify their right to self-determination based solely upon biologically autonomous existence and also extend this to animals. (ibid, p. 155)

If the children’s explanations were not investigated and interpreted with the purpose of theory-building, but instead as theory-led, e.g. from the perspective of Piaget’s developmental theory, this passage would be classed as an example of anthropomorphisation of animals. A known phenomenon would be explicitly confirmed by the material once again. 86

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This would not necessarily be false. However, the content analysis procedure goes further, as additional new and important aspects can be identified – for example, the motives underpinning this anthropomorphisation in particular. According to Billmann-Mahecha and Gebhard (2014), the children’s perceptions are not a form of misunderstanding reality, but are rather a symbolic interpretation. In this instance, anthropomorphism should not (merely) be interpreted in the context of general anthropological conditions or constants. Instead, what becomes apparent is the fact and the extent to which this argument is shaped by cultural conditions and our modern society – the idea of the rights of the autonomous subject. The result makes it clear that the philosophical conversation as a method for surveying children’s ideas and interpretations allows, through the particular openness of the research process, new theory-related findings to be determined. This should be demonstrated based on a further example. 2. Death and dying The second example comes from an investigation into children’s ideas on death and dying (Ahmling, 2015). This conversation in a second-grade class (children age 7-8) was based on a thought experiment: What would it be like if we were immortal? The conversation was evaluated based on Mayring’s summarising qualitative content analysis model (Mayring, 2015). This process involved paraphrasing the children’s statements first of all, before generalising these and condensing them in the analysis categories listed here. 1. Consequences for human co-existence  Immortality would lead to a lack of space on Earth  A lack of space on Earth would lead to people leaving Earth  Immortality would be associated with dangers and defencelessness  At some stage, no new life would be able to emerge  Death is a necessary prerequisite for new life […] 2. Human existence outside the Earth  Survival on other planets appears impossible  Alien life is likely [...] 3. Consequences for animals and nature on Earth  Human immortality would lead to destruction of nature  Plant immortality would have an impact on animal life  Animal immortality would lead to food shortages [...] 4. Personal assessment of immortality  Death may be considered desirable in certain situations (illness, weariness with life)  Immortality would have negative consequences, boredom and reckless behaviour  Immortality would lead to less happiness  Immortality would have positive consequences, as it would allow you to try out life-threatening and painful things  Immortality would be a positive thing, as you could celebrate more birthdays  Immortality would be a positive thing, as then you would not have to mourn the dead As is clear from the overview, the children think about the consequences of immortality from both global and individual perspectives. In doing so, the children’s assessment of 87

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immortality is thoroughly ambivalent. They can find arguments in favour and arguments against. In-depth consideration of individual passages is interesting (Ahmling 2015, p. 68). Lisa:

Maria: John:

I would never want that […], because thenyou can never die and at some point that would get boring. There’s no more adventure, nothing new, because you’ve already done everything, I don’t know, millions of times. Some people would become totally reckless too, because they think “Cool, I’m immortal” Maybe you wouldn’t be so happy then. Yes, because everything repeats itself, and that seems boring to me. Even at Christmas and Easter and things like that.

In this conversation, the second-graders are one the one hand dealing with practical consequences of human immortality on a very concrete level and developing their imaginations with regard to life on other planets. On the other hand, they are questioning the meaning of dying and death for human life. Things that seem important to the children in life would lose significance without death. This is a very in-depth and highly abstract line of thought. Another example concerns the question: What happens after we die? I will not go into details of the entire content of the conversation here but will focus instead on a selected passage (ibid., p. 75). Elsa:

Tom:

For example, if you knew now what happens after we die and it’s not something very nice, then you might be afraid of death the whole time, and you might not be so happy any more, and then you can’t enjoy your life as much. Or if you knew that it was totally wonderful, then you might end up killing yourself before your time, and your family would be sad, and then the whole world would be empty because everyone would want to die if they knew it would be so nice afterwards.

In the conversation, the children are not only dealing with various ideas of a potential ‘hereafter’ (life in heaven, life on other planets, reincarnation as a human or animal, life ending definitively with death). They are also considering the potential meaning or significance of uncertainty regarding what happens after death in the context of their current lives. This example is also remarkable in the context of existing research findings on children’s ideas of death and their development. In general, it is assumed that questions about death and the meaning of life and potential life after death are first linked with philosophical, ethical and religious aspects during adolescence and/or puberty (cf. Gesell & Illg, 1962; Orbach, 1990). That being said, thanatological findings regarding the point at which children develop a realistic understanding of death and dying and/or a realistic concept of death are not definitive (cf. research overview in Gebhard 2013, 211 et seq.). A realistic concept of death means that the finality and irreversibility of death, its inevitability and universality are understood and associated with its corresponding biological characteristics (shutdown of all bodily functions). In thanatology, there have been various attempts to develop a phase sequence based on Piaget’s model of cognitive psychology (cf. Geuss, 1984). According to this phase model, children do not acquire a realistic, biologically correct view of death as a natural phenomenon, which ultimately and unavoidably affects everyone and may occur as a result of natural or unnatural causes, until they are around nine years old. Some older studies assume this happens at an even later stage, and very few have found that it happens early on. The positions are controversial. However, it is agreed that the development of the concept of 88

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death is somehow connected with cognitive development and stage of life. Personal experiences with death, socialisation conditions and the general cultural environment also play a key role (cf. Wittkowski, 1990). The evaluation and interpretation of philosophical conversations demonstrate that children in the conversation group aged seven to eight not only already possess a thoroughly realistic concept of death, but are also developing thoughts on the potential significance of human mortality and our uncertainty about what comes after death. Philosophical conversations as a research method, it is therefore clear, can make a significant contribution to the discussion surrounding research into the concept of death, as from that it can be assumed that it is the specific form of the philosophical conversation, the research setting in proximity to children and everyday life, that permits the development and collection of children’s thoughts on this subject. The results of the two example conversations – on the subjects of hornets’ right to live and issues around death and dying – suggest that as early as primary school, children may be capable of considering natural phenomena in terms of moral criteria and that they also, with regard to existential and metaphysical topics, may arrive at reflections which previous research results have determined ‘not yet appropriate’, so to speak, for their respective age groups. The work at hand concerns insights that supplement or even call into question previous studies; at any rate, these insights reveal hitherto existing images of the child to be capable of expansion. As a research method in childhood studies, philosophising with children can itself contribute to a kind of self-reflection; to a grappling with one’s own perceptions and images, constructs of the child and childhood; and to a scrutiny of the normative implications in childhood studies. To conclude, the application of this method in university-level teacher training will be presented and discussed in this regard. 3. Philosophical conversations with children as part of research-based learning in teacher training. Perspectives on teaching in higher education. The results of this type of ‘basic research’ into children’s ideas, concepts and capacity for thought are particularly significant for philosophising as a teaching principle and integral part of professional learning. This is because the teaching can be influenced by whether and how the children’s individual approaches to the subject matter of the lesson come into their own in the learning process. From the perspective of teaching methodology, there are connecting factors for teaching decisions, and from a pedagogical perspective, the research process provides new experiences. Reflection on these experiences may be relevant to behaviour around children and in particular to scholastic interaction processes. When philosophising is used as a lesson principle, philosophical conversations are integrated into the specific lesson in order to take into account the philosophical dimensions of the lesson’s subject matter (e.g. epistemological and ethical aspects), with the aim of inspiring and opening up the children’s own ideas and interpretations and encouraging complex and joined-up thinking. I see philosophising with children as a lesson principle also as an element of subject-oriented teaching, as this involves bringing the children’s own experiences, thoughts, associations, questions, ideas, fantasies and interpretations into a practical and scientific context with the world and for the purposes of a deeper understanding of the world, and for children’s education processes in general (cf. Michalik, 2013). Philosophical conversations in lessons, in which the children are invited to express their thoughts, ideas and interpretations on a subject, without being judged or marked, with the aim of sounding out the range of possibilities for interpretation, contribute on the one hand 89

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to a deeper understanding of the lesson’s subject matter, and on the other hand, offer important insights into the children’s ideas, mindsets and capacity for thought. Philosophical conversations in lessons may provide a basis for conveying specialist subject matter from a child’s perspective. They may demonstrate the importance of interaction processes between children in the evolution of thought and may reveal the social structure of understanding and interpretation in conversation and exchange with others. Teachers’ knowledge of pupils’ ideas and the specific possibilities which lie in the common development of ideas, opinions and interpretations has an impact on teaching and on children’s successful learning. However, in practice, they still play a minimal role in lesson planning and delivery. The idea is therefore to also incorporate philosophical conversation as a research method in teacher training. Philosophical conversations as a research method are also of interest from the perspective of teaching in higher education, and particularly in the context of research-based learning, i.e. students’ research-based access to the children. The experiences that students gain as part of their active participation in research processes, in their own research approaches to the children and to themselves, may provide the basis for a variety of learning and reflection processes. As a research method for childhood studies, philosophising is therefore another important practical application for the purposes of university teaching and learning. What does ‘learning processes’ mean in practice here? As part of their Bachelor and Master’s degree dissertations, and to a lesser extent during tutorials, students conduct philosophical conversations with children and then evaluate these based on the content analysis procedures already presented. They also analyse their role as a facilitator as regards the method of philosophical inquiry. Student feedback on this form of research-based learning is encouraging and informative. Students report that the research process is exciting, interesting, and indeed inspiring, as they developed a new insight into children’s thoughts, also established the limits of their own understanding, and identified differences, but also many similarities, with their own way of thinking. Some report that they have developed respect for children’s thoughts, for the sincerity with which they deal with the subject matter, and for the originality of thinking which comes to light. The depth of content which the children managed to produce when exchanging their thoughts and during group reflection is also noted as being particularly impressive. Ideally, these experiences and reflection processes will impact students’ subsequent working lives, provided that they result in the development, on one hand, of something of a habit of research among future teachers whereby they are curious about children’s thoughts, and on the other, of an essentially appreciative attitude to the child whereby the latter is perceived not merely as a subject to be educated, taught skills and otherwise instructed, but also as an interesting conversation partner. Philosophical conversations as a research approach to children’s ideas and interpretations of the world do not only offer new insights into children’s ideas and ways of thinking. The results of this specific approach to research may also create an important foundation for learning and comprehension in lessons and for the professionalisation of teachers.

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REFERENCES Ahmling, B. (2015): Über den Tod nachdenken. Philosophische Gespräche mit Grundschülerinnen und Grundschülern. Masterarbeit im Studiengang Lehramt für Primarstufe und Sekundarstufe I. (Hamburg, unpublished). Billmann-Mahecha, E. (1994). Argumente für eine verstehende Kinderpsychologie aus kulturpsychologischer Perspektive. In Ekkehard Martens/Helmut Schreier (Ed.), Philosophieren mit Schulkindern (pp. 150-158). Heinsberg: Agentur Dieck. Billmann-Mahecha, E. (1998). Empirisch-psychologische Zugänge zum Geschichtsbewusstsein von Kindern. In Jürgen Straub (Ed.), Erzählung, Identität und historisches Bewusstsein (pp. 166-197). Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Billmann-Mahecha, E./Gebhard, U. (2014). Die Methode der Gruppendiskussion zur Erfassung von Schülerperspektiven. In Dirk Krüger/Ilka Parchman/Horst Schecker (Ed.), Methoden in der Naturwissenschaftsdidaktischen Forschung (pp. 147-158). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. Billmann-Mahecha, E. et al. (1998). Anthropomorphe und mechanistische Naturdeutungen von Kindern und Jugendlichen. In Werner Theobald (Ed.), Integrative Umweltbewertung. Theorie und Beispiele aus der Praxis (pp. 271-293). Berlin u.a.: Springer. Bohnsack, R. (2007). Rekonstruktive Sozialforschung. Einführung in qualitative Methoden. 7. Ed. (Opladen & Farmington Hills: Budrich). Born, B. (2007). Lernen mit Alltagsphantasien. Studien zur Schul- und Bildungsforschung (Wiesbaden: Springer). Born, B./Gebhard, U. (2005). Intuitive Vorstellungen und explizite Reflexion: Zur Bedeutung von Alltagsphantasien bei Lernprozessen zur Bioethik. In Barbara Schenk (Ed.), Bausteine einer Bildungsgangtheorie (pp. 255-271). Wiesbaden: Springer. Brüning, B. (2000). Philosophieren mit Kindern. In Friederike Heinzel (Ed.), Methoden der Kindheitsforschung (pp. 131-143). Weinheim und München: Juventa. de Boer, H. (2015). Partizipation und Bildung im Gespräch – Studierende philosophieren mit Kindern. In Hans-Joachim Fischer, Hans-Joachim/Hartmut Giest/Kerstin Michalik (Ed.), Bildung im und durch Sachunterricht (pp. 159-166). Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt. Gansen, P. (2005). Kindliches Denken in symbolischen Kontexten. Kinderphilosophie als Methode der pädagogischen Kinderforschung. In Ludwig Duncker/Andreas Nießeler (Ed.), Philosophieren im Sachunterricht. Imagination und Denken im Grundschulalter (pp. 167-206). Münster: Lit Verlag. Gebhard, U. (2013). Kind und Natur. Die Bedeutung der Natur für die psychische Entwicklung. 4. Ed. (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag). Gebhard, U. et al. (1997). Naturphilosophische Gespräche mit Kindern. Ein qualitativer Forschungsansatz. In Helmut Schreier (Ed.), Mit Kindern über Natur philosophieren (pp. 130-153). Heinsberg: Agentur Dieck. Gesell, A./Ilg, F.I. (1962): Das Kind von fünf bis zehn. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

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Geuss, H. (1984). Zur Entstehung von Kognitionen über Tod und Sterben. Versuch einer Entwicklungsanalyse. In Jürgen Howe/Randolph Ochsmann (Ed.), Tod – Sterben – Trauer. (pp. 294-300). Frankfurt: Fachbuchhandlung für Psychologie. Gillebeert, D. (2007). Philosophieren mit Kindern als Forschungsmethode. Erste Erfahrungen und Reflexion des Verfahrens. In Daniela Camhy (Ed.), Philosophische Grundlagen innovativen Lernens (pp. 238-264). Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. Heinzel, F. (2000). Kinder in Gruppendiskussionen und Kreisgesprächen. In Friderike Heinzel (Ed.), Methoden der Kindheitsforschung. Ein Überblick über Forschungszugänge zur kindlichen Perspektive (pp. 117-130). Weinheim u. München: Juventa. Helzel, G./Michalik, K. (2015). Kindliche Entwicklungsprozesse beim Philosophieren mit Kindern – Eine empirische Untersuchung zu Mehr-Perspektivität und Ungewissheitstoleranz. In Hans-Joachim Fischer/Hartmut Giest/Kerstin Michalik (Ed.), Bildung im und durch Sachunterricht (pp. 189-196). Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt. Matthews, Gareth B (1991). Denkproben. Philosophische Ideen jüngerer Kinder (Berlin: Freese). Mayring, P. (2015). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken. 11. Ed. (Weinheim: Beltz). Michalik, K. (2013). Philosophieren mit Kindern als Unterrichtsprinzip. Bildungstheoretische Begründung und empirische Fundierung. In Pädagogische Rundschau, 6, 635-650. Michalik, K. (2015). Philosophieren mit Kindern. Sinnkonstitution im Gespräch. In Ulrich Gebhard (Ed.), Sinn im Dialog. Zur Möglichkeit sinnkonstituierender Lernprozesse im Fachunterricht (pp. 179-198). Wiesbaden: Springer. Michalik, K./Schreier, H. (2006). Wie wäre es, einen Frosch zu küssen? Philosophieren mit Kindern im Grundschulunterricht (Braunschweig: Westermann). Orbach, I. (1990): Kinder, die nicht leben wollen. Göttingen: Springer. Pape, M. (2006). Methodische Zugangsweisen zur Erfassung von Geschichtsbewusstsein im Kindesalter: Gruppendiskussionen und Kinderzeichnungen. In Hilke Günther-Arndt/ Michael Sauer (Ed.), Geschichtsdidaktik empirisch (pp. 85-109) (Berlin: Lit-Verlag). Strauss, A./Corbin, J. (1996). Grounded Theory. Grundlagen qualitativer Sozialforschung. (Weinheim: Beltz). Wittkowski, J. (1990). Buchgesellschaft).

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La filosofía con niños como jazz: un camino de improvisación para una nueva pedagogía1 Marina Santi Università di Padova. Italia. E-mail: [email protected] CV71, 94, 103, 104, 209 Marina Santi (PhD in Scienze psicologiche e pedagogiche) è Professore Ordinario c/o il Dipartimento FiSSPA – Filosofia, Sociologia, Pedagogia e Psicologia Applicata dell’Università di Padova per il SSD PED/03 Didattica e Pedagogia Speciale. Si occupa di teoria dell’argomentazione e processi di costruzione di conoscenza; interazione sociale e apprendimento di abilità di pensiero; discussione in classe; “Philosophy for Children” e sviluppo di pensiero critico/creativo/valoriale, educazione alla cittadinanza, didattica della filosofia, formazione dell’insegnante/facilitatore nella “comunità di ricerca”, educazione inclusiva, didattica per l’integrazione, improvvisazione e didattica. Dirige il Corso di Specializzazione per le Attività di Sostegno agli Alunni con Disabilità e il Corso in “Philosophy for Children: Costruire Comunità di Ricerca in Classe e in altri Contesti Educativi”. E’ membro della Commissione di Ateneo Disabilità e Handicap, della Commissione di Ateneo TFA e Formazione degli Insegnanti, del Centro Ateneo Servizi e Ricerca per la Disabilità, la Riabilitazione e l’Integrazione. E’ Coordinatore del Dottorato di Ricerca in “Scienze Pedagogiche dell’Educazione e della Formazione”. RESUMEN Este artículo está basado en el contenido de una ponencia presentada en la XVIII Conferencia Internacional del ICPIC en Madrid, titulada “La improvisación como forma de indagar e inventar”, en la que se introdujo la metáfora del jazz para la educación y la filosofía. Los argumentos propuestos están también adaptados para responder a algunas cuestiones críticas planteadas por Gert Biesta en su conferencia sobre el trabajo filosófico con niños y la consiguiente experiencia en las escuelas a través de programas de filosofía para / con niños (Biesta 2017b). Mi aportación a la discusión se centra en dos focos principales. El primero es teórico, y considera la improvisación como expresión del constructivismo cognitivo humano y como una forma de adaptación / “exaptación” de la agencia humana en el medio ambiente. La improvisación es interpretada como una forma privilegiada de “pensamiento complejo”, donde los tres componentes identificados por Lipman —pensamiento crítico, creativo y cuidadoso— se integran y se implementan mutuamente. El segundo enfoque es pragmático y propone ocho características “jazzísticas” que encarnan la educación en la dimensión de la improvisación, abriendo la enseñanza a la auténtica experiencia de cambio implícita en el proceso de crecimiento/hacerse mayor y en la que la estabilidad de las identidades está siempre en riesgo. Se propone una forma jazzística de hacer con los niños como antídoto para el riesgo de la aprendificación de la educación y de la capitalización de las habilidades humanas —a los que, según Biesta, la filosofía para / con niños parece estar 1

Este artículo fue publicado primero en inglés en childhood & philosophy, Rio de Janeiro, v. 13, n. 28, septiembre-diciembre. 2017, pp. 631-647. Por acuerdo entre la revista del ICPIC y los organizadores de la XVIII conferencia, lo publicamos en español en el libro. La traducción es de Ellen Duthie.

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expuesta en su aplicación escolar— a la vez que proponemos un marco jazzístico para una nueva “pedagogía pobre”. PALABRAS CLAVE Improvisación, pensamiento complejo, jazz. ABSTRACT This paper is based on the content of a talk held at the ICPIC Conference in Madrid, titled “Improvising as a way of inquiring and inventing” in which a jazz metaphor for education and philosophy is introduced. The arguments proposed are also adapted to respond to some critical issues put forward by Gert Biesta in his paper about philosophical work with children and the related experience in schools through philosophy for/with children programs (BIESTA 2017b). My contribution to the discussion deals with two main foci. The first one is theoretical, and considers improvisation as expression of human cognitive constructivism and a form of adaptive/exaptive human agency in the environment. Improvisation is interpreted as a privileged form of “complex thinking,” in which the three components identified by Lipman —-critical, creative and caring thinking— are integrated and mutually implemented. The second focus is pragmatic and proposes eight “jazz” features that embody education in the dimension of improvisation, opening teaching to the authentic experience of changing implied in growing/aging, and in which the stability of identities is always at risk. A jazzing way for doing with children is proposed as an antidote to the risk of learnification of education and capitalization of human skills —to which, according to Biesta, philosophy for/with children seems to be exposed in its school application— while proposing a jazz framework for a new “poor pedagogy”. KEYWORDS Improvisation, complex thinking, jazz. En la XVIII Conferencia del ICPIC en Madrid (junio de 2017), Gert Biesta presentó la ponencia “Tocando el alma: educación, filosofía y niños en una época de instrumentalización”. La programación de mi ponencia “La improvisación como forma de indagar e inventar”, justo a continuación de la suya resultó especialmente oportuna, ya que mi ponencia contenía en esencia mi respuesta a las notas de Biesta sobre los riesgos a los que está expuesta la Filosofía para/con niños. Así, pude transformar mi conferencia en una oportunidad para dialogar con él, un diálogo que continuó en la revista childhood & philosophy (v. 13, n. 28, sept.-dic. 2017), con las respuestas de otros muchos colegas interesados en este tema, a modo de polifonía. En aquella ponencia, presenté una visión jazzística de la práctica filosófica con niños, a partir de la metáfora de “la educación como jazz”, que ya había propuesto en un reciente libro (Santi & Zorzi, 2016). En dicho libro propongo ocho formas “jazzísticas” de escapar a la tradición monológica de enseñar y aprender en educación (Santi, 2016), que pueden ofrecerse como posible respuesta a los riesgos a los que está expuesta la Filosofía para/con niños. La primera es visible en la crítica de Biesta a la instrumentalización de la filosofía para/con niños cuando se transforma en un currículo con resultados de aprendizaje mediante una mentalización del pensamiento (Biesta 2017b, p. 418). El segundo riesgo es el de reducir el trabajo filosófico con niños a un ejercicio de fomento de destrezas para el pensamiento 94

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crítico (Biesta, 2017b, p. 418). Este reduccionismo se encuentra también en la base de un tercer riesgo destacado por Biesta, concretamente, la aprendificación de la educación contemporánea (Biesta, 2017, p. 422), que corresponde a una especie de “reduccionismo invertido” por el que la filosofía para/con niños se reduciría a una estrategia para “enseñar destrezas de pensamiento”. De hecho, todos estos reduccionismos emergen como riesgos acordes con muchas aplicaciones del Currículo de Lipman —y de otras propuestas similares— que acaban transformando la práctica filosófica con niños en la escuela en un dispositivo de capital humano. Más recientemente, el marco del “capital humano” y sus dispositivos parece menos inobjetable, estando inmerso en una crisis de competencia y legitimidad (Biggeri & Santi, 2012). Como bien se sabe, en tiempos de crisis, las preguntas sobre educación se vuelven cada vez más urgentes y cruciales, surgen llamadas a crear nuevos paradigmas y se demandan soluciones. Los marcos que llevan a diversos modelos pedagógicos podrían, en palabras de Biesta, orientar la educación hacia una praxis más “adulta” (Biesta, 2017b, p.430), en lugar de una práctica basada en el desarrollo; es decir, hacia un aprendizaje transformativo en lugar de un aprendizaje basado en la instrucción; hacia la individualización personal frente a la socialización de la comunidad; y hacia la determinación subjetiva frente a la evolución ambiental. Las diversas teorías del conocimiento que subyacen a estos distintos marcos son también responsables de la reducción de la educación a la mera instrucción, y de los diversos métodos de enseñanza y aprendizaje aplicados en la escuela, que se conciben y se proponen como procesos monológicos, dialógicos o polifónicos (Pasgaard, 2009; Wegerif, 2011). En el núcleo del argumento de Biesta encontramos la afirmación de que la implantación de programas de pensamiento crítico (incluida la filosofía para/con niños) en las escuelas se basa principalmente en el reduccionismo de la educación a resultados de aprendizaje (y enseñanza), que implica un conjunto lineal y secuencial de aproximaciones al desarrollo curricular. Estos enfoques son coherentes dentro del marco de la actual carrera por la capitalización del conocimiento y del know-how, y siguen siendo los objetivos dominantes de las políticas educativas/de instrucción. La convulsión que afecta al actual mundo globalizado exige nuevos paradigmas que ofrezcan formas frescas de explicar y orientar el “desarrollo” humano (o incluso mejor, la historia humana) de acuerdo con una visión estocástica, compleja y emergente de la evolución, donde la creatividad y la emoción desempeñan un papel crucial. Una respuesta a estas urgencias socioculturales exige propuestas sugerentes para el diseño de currículos, como las elaboradas recientemente, por ejemplo, por Wiggins & McTighe, (1998). La idea subyacente que guía estas propuestas educativas es el reconocimiento del hecho de que la instrucción, como la vida, no siempre puede planificarse de antemano, especialmente cuando a los estudiantes se les está enseñando “destrezas” para interactuar con situaciones y problemas de la vida real (Donmoyer, 1983; Jackson, 1977; Lortie, 1975). Desde esta perspectiva, la idea de que la instrucción deba considerarse como un sistema de “experiencia ordenada en el desorden de la vida” y/o como “una experiencia desordenadora en el orden de la vida” se vuelve interesante tanto desde un punto de vista teórico como práctico. Aunque estas propuestas mantienen la enseñanza de destrezas como objetivos fundamentales del currículo de instrucción, tienen la ventaja de introducir la idea de “crecimiento” en el proceso educativo, una idea que se perdió durante un tiempo en el siglo pasado, y una idea que es fundamental para la crítica de Biesta a la aprendificación, que ha llevado a la actual mercantilización del logro. 95

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De hecho, el fomento de la creatividad significa no solo promover la “innovación”; la creatividad tiene menos que ver con lo que es original (nuevo en comparación con otros productos ya disponibles en el mercado) que con lo que es originario (que emerge de una auténtica generatividad) (véase Ingold, 2014). Como expresión humana de la disposición al asombro y a la reacción ante la novedad, la creatividad implica dimensiones críticas y emocionales del pensamiento (lo que Lipman llama “pensamiento complejo”), y exige apoyo educativo, tanto para el logro de fines extraordinarios (Bailin, 1988) como para el reconocimiento de los medios extraordinarios que ofrece lo ordinario (Leddy, 2012). Este tipo de apoyo supone para los educadores un reto de diseño interesante, en el que la necesidad de planificar el mejor futuro deseable se entrecruza con la aspiración de obtener un posible pasado mejor. Esto parece especialmente acorde con la afirmación de Biesta sobre los límites del “aprendizaje adaptativo” (Biesta, 2017b, p. 433) que domina el diseño curricular y la práctica en la actualidad. Como se destaca en el citado artículo, el principal supuesto de la perspectiva evolutiva de la educación es que, posicionándose en distintos entornos de aprendizaje, los aprendedores pueden mejorar su efectividad para adaptarse a las cambiantes condiciones ambientales. Este supuesto es cuestionado por Biesta, que propone algunas preguntas pertinentes sobre el asunto: “ ¿Es ésta una concepción adecuada de los estudiantes en relaciones educativas? ¿Es ésta una visión adecuada de los seres humanos como seres-enel-mundo?” Según Biesta, no. Aunque reconoce que “aprender puede ser un concepto más rico que lo que capta la idea de adaptación inteligente”, enfatiza lo extendida que se ha vuelto esta idea en la teoría de aprendizaje contemporánea y argumenta que “en la medida en que nuestra comprensión del aprendizaje depende del paradigma de la adaptación inteligente, tiene carencias significativas, tanto en términos humanos como educativos” (Biesta, 2017b, p. 423). La respuesta de Biesta a la pregunta del aprendizaje como adaptación fue bastante crítica por dos tipos de razones, que se resumieron del siguiente modo: 1) la pregunta que el paradigma del “sistema adaptativo inteligente” no puede hacer es si el entorno realmente merece que nos adaptemos a él; 2) el acontecimiento que no puede darse en este paradigma es la reciprocidad: el sistema no se puede enseñar, no es susceptible de que nos comuniquemos con él ni de que nos dirijamos a él. La primera pregunta desafía un paradigma totalmente funcional que busca la supervivencia, no la vida (este es el algoritmo incorporado); la segunda pregunta sugiere que el mundo y otros seres humanos solo pueden aparecer como obstáculos —algo a lo que adaptarse—. Para aclarar este punto, Biesta nos refiere a las ideas de Dewey y Mead sobre la comunicación, oponiendo a la visión “adaptativa” de la educación una perspectiva en la que el mundo y otros humanos son algo/uno con lo que yo me comunico; algo/uno que me habla, que me toca, que pregunta por mí, que me interpela al uno único que hay dentro de mí, como sugirió Levinas (Biesta, 2017b, p. 426). He de reconocer que aprecio mucho este punto. Coincido con Biesta en percibir como un peligro la reducción de la educación a la adaptación al entorno, y de enseñar conforme al diseño, por parte de los profesores, de entornos adaptables. De hecho, considero que estas cuestiones —la relación con el mundo como más que un entorno, y la relación con otros en la misma medida que con pares— conforman la cuestión clave de la crisis social global con la que se ha inaugurado el tercer milenio, y que corresponde, según considero, con lo que Gould y Vrba (1982) denominaron “la dimensión perdida de la evolución”—es decir, la “exaptación”. 96

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La “exaptación” puede considerarse como una especie de adaptación creativa que no es demandada ni suscitada por el entorno; consiste en una variación dentro de una función normalizada y regular, y en un viraje hacia usos inexplorados e “innecesarios”; se correspondería con lo que yo llamaría “serendipia funcional”. De hecho, para Gould y Vrba, no tener en cuenta la dimensión de la “exaptación” supone perder la dinámica creativa e inesperada de la evolución, reduciendo su desarrollo a la adaptación y a la selección. La metáfora de “la educación como jazz” podría resumirse como un modo de escapar del marco funcional, monológico y selectivo de la enseñanza y el aprendizaje. Según este enfoque, una filosofía para/con niños jazzística podría ser una oportunidad para experimentar la infancia como una forma de temporalidad caracterizada como tiempo exaptativo. Las ocho características (o “puertas”, o incluso “puentes”) que propongo para desgranar la metáfora del jazz en términos educativos están reconocidas en la tradición musical del jazz, pero en un sentido más básico, se corresponden con una forma jazzística de vivir la vida en sus distintas dimensiones temporales. De hecho, la relación del jazz con el tiempo es muy interesante desde un punto de vista educativo, particularmente en referencia al diseño curricular (Dick & Carey, 2004). La naturaleza improvisadora del jazz nos empuja a vivir el presente, donde la tensión hacia el futuro y el recuerdo pasado parece colapsarse en una forma de temporalidad generativa –un tiempo donde la creatividad tiene lugar como algo que disuelve el peso de la edad de un sujeto (adulto o niño) y emerge como una humanidad que se hace mayor. Como expuso el fenomenólogo Bernhard Waldenfels (2004, p. 242), “somos más mayores que nosotros mismos”, es decir, – como explicó Ingold –: detrás de los individuos que estamos a punto de llegar a ser, pero aún no somos, están los individuos que ya somos sin siquiera saberlo. En este proceso continuo e itinerante de devenir quien fuimos y de haber sido la persona que llegaremos a ser, no hay límite, no hay ningún punto en el que podamos descubrir alguna naturaleza humana básica que ya estaba ahí antes de que empezara todo. (Ingold, 2014, p. 137)

Esta dialéctica entre pasado y futuro que inunda el presente, transformándolo en “existencia”, con su significado dinámico, también lo expresa maravillosamente F. Scott Fitzgerald (autor de Cuentos de la era del jazz) en la frase final de El Gran Gatsby: “Y así seguimos navegando, barcos a contracorriente devueltos sin cesar al pasado”. Las ocho características que propongo como puertas o puentes a “la filosofía jazzística” podrían interpretarse como posibles respuestas a la crítica de Biesta a la aprendificación de la filosofía en la educación. La primera puerta la llamaría el jazzing (hacer jazz) y tiene que ver con la experiencia jazzística de filosofar que tienen los niños. Decir que “el jazz es hacer jazz” puede parecer una tautología pero, entendido de forma más profunda, no lo es. El oxímoron es fructífero para generar la multiplicidad de significados que se atribuye a la palabra, que, en su etimología y significado en argot, está relacionada con una colorida metáfora de copulación y fluido seminal. El jazzing no estaba relacionado solamente con la acción mecánica del coito, sino con el disfrute y el placer de un orgasmo compartido (en Latín co-ire quiere decir literalmente “irse juntos”) y la promesa implicada en la eyaculación. Por eso el jazz y el jazzing (hacer jazz) se refieren tanto a la intimidad de un espectáculo en solitario como a la sintonía mutua en una sesión de jazz. El erotismo del jazz también es reconocible en la encarnación musical que es evidente en las interpretaciones de jazz, que se ven claramente enriquecidas con las tensiones psicofísicas de los músicos hacia oposiciones dialécticas: momento versus duración; diferencia versus igualdad; gratificación versus frustración; estabilidad versus estimulación; cercanía versus distancia (Gustavsen, 2010). 97

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Cuando estas oposiciones se “congelan”, el arte del jazz está en peligro; cuando un dilema crea flujos, el pleno potencial del arte del jazz emerge. No es ninguna coincidencia que el jazz siempre dispare un proceso creativo o, mejor dicho, una dimensión generativa de la creación musical compartida, que da lugar a nuevas melodías y experiencias sonoras, dando forma a algo original que da forma a los formadores para siempre. La misma encarnación puede reconocerse en un buen diálogo filosófico dentro de una comunidad de niños: el erotismo de la indagación emerge también en la implicación física, donde todos los sentidos están abiertos a captar sentido en la memoria, en la imaginación y en el encuentro y desencuentro con otras mentes. La filosofía jazzística señala en mayor medida al potencial humano para el pensamiento creativo, predominante en la infancia, que al poder demiúrgico del conocimiento fabricado por humanos que domina la edad adulta. La generatividad de la filosofía jazzística aparece más como una manera de ser y de hacer que como la producción de hacedores individuales. Jazzing quiere decir animar, llenar de vida, y llevar el jazz a la filosofía con niños significa rodear la experiencia de pensar de la vitalidad y la animación propias de la infancia y siempre con un disfrute compartido entusiastamente. La palabra jazzing también aparece en el argot con el significado de hacer el tonto de forma creativa, ordenar de forma caótica o desordenar de forma armónica (Barrett, 2012), que es exactamente lo que transforma la actividad de niños pensando en razonamiento filosófico. El jazzing (o hacer jazz) es una actitud que busca crear orden en el caos, desorden en la armonía, desviación de la melodía, pero nunca a partir de la nada: el jazz emerge cuando las oportunidades que ofrece el momento se crean a partir de la memoria de modelos, a los que se desafía intencionadamente a través de la repetición y de las infinitas alternativas de variación. La repetición y la variación –de ritmos, secuencias, cadenas, riffs o frases– es la principal “técnica” que genera novedad en el jazz, sin estropear la espontaneidad, que es lo que caracteriza el juego libre de los niños, y es su manera propia de explorar el mundo interior y exterior. La generatividad en el jazz, como en el filosofar auténtico, se encuentra justo entre la técnica y la espontaneidad (Santi, 2010), y siempre en perfecto equilibro entre el arte y el corazón (Pilc, 2012). La dimensión artística de la jazzificación de la filosofía —o del “sonido de la filosofía” como destacó Tartaglia (2017)— es reconocible en el firme compromiso con la repetición, la copia y la imitación de marcos de pensamiento, que están en el corazón del jazz, de la filosofía y de la educación. Solamente mediante la repetición de una cadena de pensamientos como notas, puede un pensador, al igual que un músico, encontrar su propio sonido en el proceso de razonamiento, como si saliera de la nada, haciendo así su aportación al diálogo de la improvisación (música, filosófica, educativa). Creo que este erotismo del jazzing como componente del acto filosófico, sería el mejor antídoto que la filosofía para/con niños podría ofrecer contra los riesgos implicados en la capitalización del aprendizaje (y de los aprendices) denunciada por Biesta. La segunda característica/puerta a la filosofía jazzística es la fusión. La filosofía con niños fusional es una característica evidente, considerando la disposición natural que tienen para fundir las diferencias y crear algo sorprendente. En el jazz, la fusión se refiere a la mezcla de estilos, géneros y temperamentos interculturales; técnicas y entornos educativos múltiples; teorías y prácticas alternativas. Pero principalmente implica el abandono de la “pureza” y la apertura a la contaminación y a la promiscuidad, dejando la “zona de confort” para vivir en el carnaval, el topos optativo de la heterodoxia en el que puede nacer el neologismo (Folch-Serra, 1990): el filosofar para/con niños propone ese abandono como la principal condición para la práctica de pensar en comunidad, como un proceso de unión 98

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donde el producto final es más que la suma de sus partes. El filosofar fusional —como el jazzing— crea nuevas identidades en las que el recuerdo de los elementos combinados se mantiene en la mezcla y cada uno puede reconocerse a sí mismo o a sí misma. El aspecto fusional en la filosofía jazzística es lo que protegería a los niños de los riesgos identificados por Biesta de perder la identidad subjetiva en la aprendificación del mundo y de perder el mundo en la aprendificación de la existencia subjetiva. Además, como observa Ben-Josef (2006), una pedagogía de la fusión sería la respuesta educativa preferente a la diversidad y la complejidad. La tercera característica de la filosofía jazzística es la libertad. El jazz y la filosofía comparten una libertad en la medida en que ambos están relacionados con la libertad interior y la heterodoxia propiamente dicha; ambos encarnan la necesidad de romper con las cadenas sonoras tradicionales de notas (pensamientos) para explorar nuevas escalas armónicas (discursos) y paisajes melódicos (marcos). La filosofía y el jazz, como prácticas libres, son fuertes antídotos a la instrucción canónica y anticuerpos potentes contra la pedagogía académica (tanto en escuelas como en conservatorios), donde la enseñanza y el aprendizaje se reducen a la reproducción “pura” de las rutas clásicas y la repetición de contenidos estandarizados. Claro que ser libres para transgredir normas establecidas no quiere decir estar completamente libres de un marco de regulaciones y normas, pero sí que libera el sistema del riesgo de volverse dogmáticos, limitados por marcos estéticos establecidos y con restricciones y criterios rígidos para juzgar resultados predecibles. La dimensión libre de la filosofía jazzística protege a los niños del riesgo de adoctrinamiento que yace detrás de todas las formas de instrucción estandarizada y de todos los currículos estandarizadores, que parece ser la principal preocupación de Biesta con respecto a las tendencias educativas actuales. Considerados desde una perspectiva del free jazz (jazz libre) los componentes de pensamiento crítico (como la lógica) dentro del currículo de la filosofía para/con niños deberían considerarse como medios para la libertad —herramientas para liberar actividad filosófica— en lugar de objetos de evaluación, que encierran la práctica en estándares y meras “destrezas”. El filosofar libre, como la fusión, requiere una experimentación fuera de la zona de confort del éxito predecible y la exploración de otros espacios en un “entorno seguro de creatividad” (Weinstein, 2016). La filosofía jazzística es siempre una “actividad al aire libre”. Si Biesta reclama la importancia de la jardinería en la educación (Biesta, 2017b, p. 419), la filosofía jazzística es una forma de hacer jardinería con mentes creativas. Como jardinero, cada miembro de la comunidad de investigación tiene un compromiso con el pensamiento y con la acción, lo que implica actitudes cuidadosas en la toma de responsabilidad por ese pensamiento y en ser libres para participar en la exploración y la experimentación. La filosofía-como-jardinería está abierta a una auténtica democracia del juego/jugar, donde todos los instrumentos tienen tiempo y espacio para expresar sus sonidos y voces (y usos), y decidir cuándo retirarse y dejar oportunidades a otros. La cuarta característica requiere swing. Uno de los significados de swing es “columpio” o, como verbo, to swing, “columpiarse”. A los niños les gusta columpiarse, actividad comprendida como una forma de juego primordial no exenta de compromiso. La dinámica del ir y venir, propia del jazz y del diálogo filosófico, es esencialmente juguetona y llena de disfrute, recordando la evidencia física del paso del tiempo, un ritmo pendular y una alternancia combinada con el movimiento intencionado de un cuerpo y su fuerza. Columpiarse como una experiencia especial de la encarnación del tiempo, donde el ritmo mecánico se transforma en un movimiento interior de emociones (placer, pero también 99

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riesgo). Columpiarse, como filosofar, es una actividad liberadora, pero requiere voluntad y deseo de liberarse de la inercia de “quedarse colgando”, transformando así el tiempo y el espacio en emoción y entusiasmo. El columpio transforma el chronos en aion (Kohan, 2014; 2015), tendiendo un puente entre la experiencia cuantitativa y cualitativa del tiempo en una temporalidad generativa, y dotando de sentido a cada momento, que se convierte en un acontecimiento en nuestra historia y biografía. Vivir la vida de esta manera es vivirla filosóficamente, lo que refleja el interés de Biesta en el sujeto y la subjetividad en la educación (Biesta, 2017, p. 420): en la filosofía jazzística el niño está columpiándose en el mundo, sin una posición fija ni una perspectiva privilegiada. La posición del pensador está siempre en movimiento…, como me dijo Lipman un frío día de 1991, en su despacho de la Montclair State University. La quinta característica es una aspiración al groove. Esta es una aspiración compartida, una prerrogativa del concepto de comunidad, y la comunidad está en el núcleo de la experiencia de la filosofía para/con niños. Literalmente, el groove es el surco espiral en un disco fonográfico para que la aguja siga su curso; es el cursus (cfr. curriculum) dentro del cual y a lo largo del cual todos los músicos, instrumentos, notas, puntos y contrapuntos se suceden y encuentran el flujo. El groove es un flujo común, y encontrar el groove supone encontrar una dirección compartida, una intención e intensión mutua y para “ser” en lugar de “hacer” y “tener”, una especie de intenc(s)ionalidad “débil” que no está orientada a la retención (de contenidos, información, destrezas y relaciones), sino que se mueve promordialmente por la atención. La atencionalidad es lo que guía la “acción subyacente” antes de convertirse o sin que se convierta en una decisión inmersa en agencia (Masschelein, 2010; Ingold, 2014). La atencionalidad hace del vulnerable ser humano, un ser revelado, expuesto a los demás y a distintas posibilidades: en una posición débil, o mejor, una noposición que genera las condiciones para moverse y dejarse atrapar en el groove. Esta atención recíproca es lo que nos inserta en un diálogo o en una polifonía, siguiendo el pensamiento adonde nos lleve y siendo atraídos por el lugar a donde nos lleva. Sería, para Lipman, el groove de la indagación en la comunidad filosófica. Encontrar el groove es un sentimiento positivo, que requiere escuchar con emoción, empatía y con una actitud cuidadosa, y que acompaña el logro de una satisfacción común sin suavizar la tensión de la dialéctica. Podría representar la mejor respuesta a la preocupación de Biesta acerca del modo de estar “ego-lógico (Biesta, 2017:9-10) que domina la educación actual; estar en el groove significa salirse de los patrones egológicos. De hecho, a mi modo de ver, la visión de Biesta de la filosofía para/con niños revela una subestimación del componente “conjunto” del pensamiento, un componente que no puede reducirse a la naturaleza comunicativa de los pensamientos ni a posiciones recíprocas entre iguales, sino que está relacionado con una actividad multitarea que tiene una génesis social: escuchar lo que se está diciendo mientras se está diciendo. Esto tiene que ver con lo que mi amigo Bjorn Alterhaug me contó durante una cena en la celebración del Día del Jazz de Padua hace dos años: “no saber lo que estamos diciendo antes de oír lo que estamos respondiendo”… Pero también es mirar lo que está pasando y decidir asegurarse de que ocurra no solo para mí, sino para todos los implicados; es tocar y degustar el evento con los sentidos en alerta, y como un objeto de los sentidos de otros. Hacer filosofía con groove está en el corazón de la indagación activa en comunidad como forma de jamming—una expresión y condición de lo que Sawyer (2007) llama “el genio del grupo,” dejándose atrás a uno mismo y convirtiéndonos en algo más grande; lo que Pilc define como “una ola musical” (Pilc, 2012). 100

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La sexta característica requiere soul (literalmente, “alma”) y esto tiene una relación directa con el núcleo y la conclusión del artículo de Biesta (2017b, p. 418), donde demanda una forma de educación capaz de “tocar el alma”, dejando a un lado la prioridad de empoderar a estudiantes en favor de una preferencia por desarmarlos. Biesta reconoce el potencial en esta dirección que ofrece la filosofía para/con niños. Yo añadiría una interpretación desde el jazz de la dimensión del soul (alma) del filosofar que podría enriquecer la oportunidad que esta práctica ofrece a los niños. La filosofía con soul expresa la naturaleza espiritual de la intimidad de jugar juntos. El soul en el acto filosófico no es un concepto ni una idea, sino un discernimiento y una intuición que guía todas las formas de sabiduría humana no fundamentada en el dogmatismo, equilibrando las dimensiones de soledad y compañía que tiene jugar con ideas con una disposición cuidadosa hacia la humanidad como comunidad. Desde esta perspectiva, la filosofía jazzística está “en contacto” con el alma —soul— al emerger en seres humanos en comunidades, entornos mundiales, la historia y la evolución. La séptima puerta es el cool. En el lenguaje de paisajes, cool es la atmósfera creada por la salida y la puesta de sol, cuando las sombras son más alargadas y los sonidos más ligeros. Esto mantiene la experiencia abierta al horizonte de posibilidades. En el cool jazz, cool no significa frío, sino reductor, minorador y atenuante del “más”. La filosofía cool busca ahorrarse el esfuerzo de satisfacer la sed de libertad. No es difícil para los niños, con su valentía interior y su esperanza en lo posible. Es más difícil para los adultos y para el pensamiento adulto. El pensamiento cool implica un compromiso con el enrarecimiento del paisaje sonoro para revelar las delicadas líneas del discurso melódico. En términos del discurso lingüístico significa dilatación, expansión, ensanchamiento y acentuación de hilos de razonamiento y teorías armónicas para crear espacio entre pensamientos y voces, dándoles tiempo para conversar y más espacio en el que pensar. Quizás un papel para el profesor en la filosofía jazzística con niños —de acuerdo con la necesidad identificada por Biesta (2017a) de redescubrir el papel de la enseñanza en la educación— sea hacer cool el proceso de pensamiento. Implicaría incorporar la atmosfera enrarecida en la propia acción de cada uno, suspendiendo el tiempo y cualquier programa establecido de programación instructiva, y permitir y complacerse en el lujo de esperar a lo que emerja de nuestra experiencia compartida. El profesor cool es una presencia ligera o “débil” que destaca no por lo que añade al conocimiento acumulativo en el intercambio educativo, sino por cómo es capaz de aliviarlo, dejando espacio para la comprensión. El cooling asume una buena dosis de silencio, igual que la enseñanza asume una buena dosis de ignorancia, el tipo de ignorancia ya atribuida a un buen profesor (Kohan, Santi, Wozniak, 2017) en la práctica filosófica con niños. Por último, la última puerta (si bien la primera característica del jazz propiamente dicho) sería la improvisación. De acuerdo con los anteriores comentarios, podemos considerar la improvisación como algo inesperado y extemporáneo; como una (re)acción creativa natural/cultural que permanece en la base de la evolución, que implica un comportamiento tanto ad-aptativo en el entorno y la acción/agencia ex-aptativa con el mundo. Por eso consideramos “la filosofía como jazz” como algo completamente coherente con la educación “deseable” en la que Biesta deposita su esperanza (2017b, p. 430). Pero la filosofía improvisada con niños tiene otras prerrogativas importantes que vale la pena desarrollar, empezando con el acto de asombrarse ante el mundo, que es el inicio de la filosofía (y el título del maravilloso manual de Kio & Gus en el currículum de “Filosofía para niños” de Lipman y Sharp). Para improvisar hay que estar abiertos al asombro. El asombro es la condición, pero también el objetivo de la improvisación: asombrarse ante lo que pasa en 101

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nuestro mundo tal y como nos viene dado; asombrarse ante lo que estamos tratando de alcanzar cuando inventamos un mundo posible. Si la ignorancia es una condición necesaria para un verdadero profesor, la invención es el principal compromiso del educador: estar abiertos a lo que empieza a existir. Estar abiertos al asombro no quiere decir sencillamente ser capaces de hacer preguntas, un punto que parece ser particularmente importante para Biesta, y que da en el corazón de su problema con la filosofía para/con niños. De hecho, lo que cuenta en el acto de filosofar —como cuando se hace jazz— no es quién propone la mejor pregunta ni quien pregunta mejor, ni siquiera quién está “en cuestión” (Biesta, 2017b, p. 434), sino quién tiene la disponibilidad (y no solo la capacidad) para implicarse e implicar a otros en el asombro. Así, la improvisación, como un componente fundamental del jazz, podría volverse un ingrediente secreto del auténtico acto de filosofar, que merece ofrecerse a la imaginación cuidadosa de los niños pensantes. De hecho, la improvisación es tan fácil de comprender como difícil de explicar, en el sentido en que es muy parecido al juego o al acto de filosofar. Podría verse como un proceso (la actividad y la dinámica de la improvisación); un procedimiento (el uso metódico de la variación); o un producto (la improvisación que emerge). Sin embargo, nosotros lo consideramos como algo caracterizado por una paradójica mezcla de actitudes, capacidades, técnicas, motivos, deseos y aspiraciones que impulsan, en lugar de dirigir, el pensamiento en una suerte de “juego infinito” más que en un juego finito, como sugiere Carse (1987). La filosofía como jazz implica improvisación, y la improvisación es casi una forma de vida en la infancia, un compromiso con lo que ocurre en el momento y una curiosidad acerca de todas las sorpresas ocultas en el futuro, como es propio de aquel que tiene poco pasado (ruinas o reliquias) ante sí. La improvisación en sí tiene algo de milagroso, que conmina al improvisador a admirar lo que emerge de su propia acción/agencia como algo que supera sus expectativas e intuiciones. Traté de entretenerme buscando un acrónimo que contiene los principales elementos de la improvisación y me encanta que (en inglés) di con CHRIST (Cristo): C de creatividad, curiosidad, coraje y cuidado; H de hope (esperanza), happiness (felicidad), honestidad y help (ayuda); R de riesgo, reglas, resiliencia y reciprocidad; I de indagación, imaginación, invención e implicación; S de eSpontaneidad, sorpresa, suspense y sensibilidad; T de técnica, trust (confianza), tensión y transgresión. Claro que este acrónimo podría enriquecerse con muchas otras palabras como componentes de la improvisación, traducidas a muchos otros idiomas o completamente cambiadas en otro idioma. De hecho, lo propongo simplemente para ejercitar la memoria de palabras y su potencial para “hacer cosas en el mundo” (Austin, 1962) y dar significado a nuestra experiencia. Pero finalmente, lo que tenemos que tener en cuenta en el intento de captar algo tan evanescente como la improvisación es que siempre tiene algo que ver con relaciones especiales con:  El tiempo / el tiempo verbal: vivir en el momento (… no a la hora);  El mundo: quedarse en el medio (… no en el centro);  Los otros: ser contemporáneo con uno mismo y con el otro (… no cualquiera);  El trabajo: renunciar a la propiedad de ideas/productos (sin autoría) y evitar citarse a uno mismo (sin repetición); 102

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La verdad: elegir la imperfección (como estética) y la incertidumbre (como ontología) para seguir inspirado y aspirar a cosas, a pesar de todo. No estoy segura de que estas notas de jazz sean útiles para provocar o enriquecer la discusión iniciada al eco de la voz de Biesta. Espero, sin embargo, que estos reflejos inspiren pensamientos en otras personas, o rompan otros hilos de razones para remarcar la oportunidad de hacer filosofía con niños como una nueva “pedagogía pobre” (Masschelein, 2010) para nuestra era rica, que sigue en busca de la infancia perdida del pensamiento humano.

REFERENCIAS Austin, J.A. (1962): How to do things with words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bailin, S. (1988): Achieving extraordinary ends: An essay on creativity. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988. Barrett, F. (2012): Yes to the mess. Surprising leadership lessons from Jazz. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2012. Ben-Josef, E. (2006): A Pedagogy of fusion. An educational response to diversity and complexity. International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations 5, 2005/2006. Consultado el 15/01/2018 en http://literacypower.com/2012/04/a-pedagogy-of-fusion/ Biesta, G.J.J. (2017a): The rediscovery of teaching. London/New York: Routledge. Biesta, G.J.J. (2017b): Touching the soul? Exploring an alternative outlook for philosophical work with children and young people. Childhood & Philosophy, 13(28), pp. 415-452. Biggeri, M.; Santi, M. (2012): The Missing Dimensions of Children's Well-being and Wellbecoming in Education Systems: Capabilities and Philosophy for Children. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 13(3), p. 373-395. Carse, J.P. (1987): Finite and Infinite Games. New York: Ballantine Books. Dick, W., Carey, L. (2004). The systematic design of instruction. 6th edition. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Donmoyer, R. (1983): Pedagogical improvisation. Educational Leadership 40 (4), January, pp. 39-43. Folch-Serra, M. (1990): Place, voice, space. Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogical landscape. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 8, p. 255-274. Gould, S. J., Vrba, E. S. (1982): Exaptation. A missing term in the science of form. Paleobiology 8 (1), p. 4-15. Gustavsen, T. (2010): The dialectical eroticism of improvisation. In Marina Santi (ed.). Improvisation. Between technique and spontaneity. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Ingold, T. (2014): The creativity of undergoing, Pragmatics & Cognition, 22(1), p. 124-139. 103

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Jackson, P. (1977): The way new teachers think. The social context of learning and development. New York: Gardner Press. Kohan, W.O. (2014): Philosophy and Childhood. Critical Perspectives and Affirmative Practices. New York: Palgrave. Kohan, W.O. (2015)): Childhood, Education and Philosophy. New ideas for an old relationship. London/New York: Routledge. Kohan, W.O., Santi, M., Wozniak, J.T. (2017). Philosophy for Teachers: Between Ignorance, Invention and Improvisation. In: Gregory, M.R., Haynes, J y Murris, K. (eds.). The Routledge International Handbook of Philosophy for Children. London/New York: Routledge, p. 255-259. Leddy, T. (2012): The extraordinary in the ordinary. The aesthetics of everyday life. Peterborough: Broadview. Lortie, D. (1975): School teacher. A sociological study. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Masschelein, J. (2010 E-ducating the gaze: The idea of a poor pedagogy. Ethics and Education. 5(1), p. 43–5. Pasgaard, N. J. (2009): Erkendelsensbetydning for skolenogsamfundet. Unpublished dissertation. https://www.academia.edu/10939546/Erkendelsens_betydning_for_skolen_og_samfun det Pilc, J. M. (2012): It’s about Music. Art and heart of improvisation. Montrose CA: Glen Lyon Books. Santi M., Illetterati, L. (2010 ): Improvisation. Between performance art and lifeworld. In Marina Santi (ed.). Improvisation. Between technique and spontaneity. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Santi, M. (ed.) (2010): Improvisation. Between technique and spontaneity. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Santi, M. (2016): Education as Jazz. A way to escape the monologue of teaching and learning. In Marina Santi, Eleonora Zorzi (eds.): Education as Jazz. Interdisciplinary sketches on a new metaphor. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016. Tartaglia, J. (2017): The sound of philosophy. Philosophy Now, 117, 26-29. Wegerif, R. (2011). Towards a dialogic theory of how children learn to think. Thinking Skills and Creativity 6, 2011, 179—190. Weinstein, J. (2016): A safe creativity environment. In Marina Santi and Eleonora Zorzi (eds.). Education as Jazz. Interdisciplinary sketches on a new metaphor. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Wiggins, G. & McTighe, J. (1998): Understanding by design. Alexandria VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.

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Taking it Slow: Enhancing Wellbeing through Philosophy for Children Rhiannon Love Senior Lecturer, University of Winchester, UK [email protected] CV Rhiannon Love. After ten years spent in secondary education, followed by eight years as a primary school teacher, Rhiannon now works as a teacher educator. She is the Route Leader for the Secondary RE PGCE and the Senior Lecturer responsible for Primary Religious Education and Philosophy for Children in the Department for Teacher Development, at the University of Winchester, UK. In addition, she teaches on the Masters in Education programme and, in her role as a SAPERE trainer, delivers courses to schools in Philosophy for Children. Rhiannon is also a doctoral student, focussing specifically on Philosophy for Children (P4C). Her research interests lie in the potentially transformational impact of P4C on pre-service teachers, the children they teach and ultimately the whole school community, with a focus on wellbeing and affective gains. Her research aims to investigate how embedding Philosophy for Children in Initial Teacher Education might prompt a fundamental shift in, not only the emerging teacher-formation of the student, but also their personal philosophy and indeed their approach to a more holistic form of education. ABSTRACT We live today in times of accelerating change, where speed is often equated with progress and success. There is a growing desire amongst educators to counter this current bias towards performativity and results/data driven education. One example of this is a growing interest in what is termed ‘Slow Schooling’ or ‘Slow Pedagogy’ – which advocates that children not only learn better at a slower pace, but also report a decrease in stress. In the current climate where there are increasing numbers of young people suffering from mental health issues, there is a concern that these needs are not adequately addressed in education. This chapter suggests that one possible approach to addressing and dealing with this current situation is to embed Philosophy for Children (P4C) into a school’s pedagogy, values and curriculum. KEYWORDS Wellbeing, Slow pedagogy, Philosophy for Children, P4C, affective gains, holistic education, Community of Enquiry/Inquiry. RESUMEN Vivimos tiempos de cambios acelerados, en los que la velocidad a menudo se identifica con el progreso y el éxito. Existe, además, un deseo creciente entre los educadores de contrarrestar esta obsesión mediante la performatividad y la educación orientada a resultados. Un ejemplo de esto es el creciente interés por lo que se denomina ‘Lenta escolaridad’ o ‘Pedagogía lenta’, que aboga por que los niños no solo aprendan mejor a un ritmo más lento, 105

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sino que también disminuyan su nivel de estrés. En el contexto actual, con un número creciente de jóvenes con problemas de salud mental, existe la preocupación de que estas necesidades se ignoren desde el sistema educativo. Este capítulo sugiere que un posible enfoque para enfrentar, desafiar y potencialmente lidiar con esta situación es integrar Filosofía para Niños (FpN) en la pedagogía, los valores y el currículo de una escuela. PALABRAS CLAVE Bienestar, pedagogía lenta, Filosofía para Niños, ganancias afectivas, educación holística, Comunidad de Investigación.

INTRODUCTION We live today in times of accelerating change, where speed is often equated with progress and success. There is a growing desire amongst educators to counter this current bias towards performativity and results/data driven education. I propose that one potential solution might be to return to, or indeed perhaps embrace for the first time, a slower pedagogical approach to education, which research shows can encourage a more holistic form of education as well as an improvement in pupil and teacher wellbeing. This approach, commonly termed ‘Slow Schooling’ or ‘Slow Pedagogy’, advocates that children not only learn better at a slower pace, but also report a decrease in stress. In the current climate where there are increasing numbers of young people suffering from mental health issues, there is a concern that these needs are not adequately addressed in education. My suggestion, which will be explored throughout this chapter, is that Philosophy for Children (P4C) might be seen as aligned with slow pedagogy, and that embedding P4C into a school’s pedagogy, values and curriculum could be one possible approach to address and deal with this current educational climate. This chapter explores current research on wellbeing and slow pedagogy in education and what P4C might have to offer this field, as well as illustrating the proposal with data gathered from some small scale qualitative research I carried out, that examined children’s reflections on the potential benefits of introducing P4C into primary education. The study’s main focus was on whether children would independently identify that P4C had had impact in more affective areas, that could be linked to wellbeing, rather than the more traditionally reported cognitive gains. Thus, through this chapter I wish to pose two questions: firstly, what does current research into wellbeing and slow pedagogy have to offer those who would engage with philosophical enquiry; secondly, from the results of the study, did the children perceive any change to their wellbeing as a result of engaging with P4C?

Wellbeing Wellbeing resonates as a central discussion to P4C due to a growing awareness of the number of young people that suffer from mental health issues, and a concern that these needs are not being adequately addressed in education (Alexander & Armstrong, 2010; The Children’s Society, 2015). In particular, the current focus on achievement in the UK could be argued as a key driver for an ethos and curriculum that prioritises ‘speedy’ results, often at the expense of the more holistic elements; which are paramount in the development of the child (Adams, 2013; Clarke, Bunting, & Barry, 2014). The concept of ‘wellbeing’ has long been part of educational discussions. I would argue that an integration of wellbeing into primary education is not only opportune, but crucial in 106

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an era when every year; ‘up to one in five children are using mental health services’ (Hallam, 2009:133); with surveys reporting children as young as eight describing themselves as ‘stressed out by relationships and school’ (Füredi, 2004:112). Seen by Layard (2007) as Britain’s most pressing social problem, these wide-ranging concerns have placed children’s wellbeing high on both political agendas and public interest (Adams, 2013). Defining wellbeing is problematic for education, due to the ‘bewildering array of terms and labels to describe work in this field,’ with ‘emotional literacy, emotional intelligence, positive mental health, and emotional well-being’ amongst the most common (McLaughlin (2008: 353-4). Eaude (2009) adds that wellbeing is usually associated with ‘feeling good about oneself, self-esteem, being aware of one’s own and other people’s emotions’ (p187). Although an eclectic range of definitions can lead to ‘conceptual sloppiness’ (Morrison & Ecclestone, 2011:203), McLaughlin (2008) clarifies that this distinction is often to do with the context in which wellbeing is being referred to: for example the term ‘emotional literacy’ is used often by those in education and ‘positive mental health’ by psychologists. For the context of my research I seek to interpret wellbeing as the non-cognitive or affective outcomes of education, which include aspects such as; self-esteem, confidence, empathy, and meaning making, to name but a few. I appreciate in doing so, this may give the appearance of wellbeing as an affective/cognitive binary, however the intention is to proffer a useful starting point for what is known to be a complex term. This position is supported by Siddiqui, Gorard, and See (2017:9): ʽThe list of such personal qualities is long and could include social and communication skills, resilience, determination, motivation, confidence, self-esteem, and self-efficacy. Various collective terms are used in the literature such as noncognitive skills, soft skills, personal characteristics, personality traits, life skills, social and emotional skillsʼ. For consistency and clarity, we use the term non-cognitive outcomes (of education). Champions of wellbeing in education have stressed how it can permeate all aspects of school life and learning (Clarke et al., 2014; Eaude, 2008; McLaughlin, 2008). In the current educational climate, England’s preoccupation with testing has engendered a climate of stress, impacting on children’s self-esteem and feelings of being unable to cope, arguably presenting an education system where ‘the product’ (i.e. test results) is the focus rather than education of the child per se (Holt, 2002; Narayanan, 2007). Nowadays, it is being increasingly argued that the aim of education should not only be the obtainment of cognitive knowledge and skills, but also non-cognitive outcomes. Opdenakker and Van Damme (2000) question whether schools are able to have as much influence on the non-cognitive outcomes of their pupils as on their achievement, stating that ‘there is some evidence that schools [that are] effective in enhancing achievement are not necessarily effective in enhancing the well-being of their pupils’ (p.106). If the concern being offered here is that, as the current system stands, schools are not managing to influence both cognitive and affective outcomes, I would suggest that it is imperative that we look afresh at our approaches to education, to see if indeed there might not be a way to incorporate both, perhaps, as I am suggesting through embracing a slower pedagogical approach. There is criticism levelled at the concept of wellbeing as a foregrounder to education. Ecclestone and Hayes (2009b) and Füredi (2004) equate programmes which encourage wellbeing as a form of therapeutic education. Their proposal is that educators have moved from critical engagement with knowledge to an over-emphasis on emotional well-being (Ecclestone, 2011; Ecclestone & Hayes, 2009a). They argue that this has resulted in a ‘hollowed-out curriculum as an instrument for ‘delivering’ a plethora of attributes, skills, 107

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values and dispositions’ (Ecclestone & Hayes, 2009a:385), suggesting this to be a profoundly dangerous existence for education to be based upon. Füredi, in his foreword to Ecclestone and Hayes (2009b), sees the main outcome of emotional education is ‘to disempower young people’ in addition to distracting schools from providing ‘a genuine intellectual challenge’ (pvii). Critics argue that although ‘a therapeutic ethos in education appears benign and empowering’ (Ecclestone, 2004:112), they see wellbeing evolving from a perception of the child as diminished or fragile (Ecclestone, 2004; Ecclestone & Hayes, 2009a; Füredi, 2004). Whilst there are many who would argue that childhood might be seen as in decline (Adams, 2013), the image of the child as ‘broken’ and as a consequence wellbeing as therapy, is strongly refuted by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000:7) who state that ‘treatment is not just fixing what is broken; it is nurturing what is best’. At odds with wellbeing being portrayed as a purely therapeutic endeavour, The Independent Review of the Primary Curriculum (Atkinson, 1998) strongly recommended less subject teaching in lieu of a more holistic approach to education (Alexander & Armstrong, 2010). The shift in seeing wellbeing as an educational outcome challenges the discourse of education as process by which young people are to accrue a body of knowledge (Ecclestone & Hayes, 2009a). For many educators, knowledge is but one part, subscribing to a more holistic view of education, which frames the academic curriculum around the development of the social, cultural, spiritual and personal (Adams, 2013; Clarke et al., 2014; Korthagen, 2004). My advocating the benefits of a return to a more holistic view of learning, which encompasses wellbeing, is not meant to be at the detriment to knowledge, but to enhance the potential for knowledge learning. My argument is that wellbeing should be seen as learning in its own right, both as part of the curriculum, as well as integral to the principles or values of education. That is not to say that there are no concerns or potential issues with the teaching of wellbeing. One such concern is raised by Eaude (2009), who posits that there can be a danger of over-focusing; ‘for happiness and emotional well-being to be explicit ends in themselves, they would tend to promote introspection and a sense of vulnerability’ (p185). I would suggest however, that wellbeing integrated into a holistic approach to education could allay these concerns, becoming part of a strategy to help children develop in resilience and resourcefulness (Claxton, 2002; Dweck, 2010), with schools creating ‘environments that support the young person’s natural resilience in the face of the daily adversities of human existence’ (Dawkins et al., 2004:10). Eaude (2008) states the necessity of striking a balance between too much support, which could leave a child dependent and too little which could leave some vulnerable. The aim is not to encourage introspection that could leave a child wallowing in negative emotions, rather to create opportunities to enable children to become confident with dealing with their emotions. Eaude adds that the effects of wellbeing should be seen as ‘by-products of children flourishing as a result of sensitive relationships and the types of activities through which children’s resilience and sense of agency are reinforced’. (2009:185). There is a current focus in the UK around how to develop resilience in children. I would argue that P4C provides genuine opportunities for children to develop their own personal resilience. The Community of Enquiry (CoE), whilst engendering a feeling of safety and security for the children, I would argue, also encourages an atmosphere of criticality and creativity. The environment promotes an atmosphere that welcomes and actively searches for multiple and contrasting viewpoints. There is an expectation that opinions that have little or no reasoning to support them should be challenged. An understanding and acceptance that children will be challenged and disagreed with (naturally with respect as part of Caring thinking), facilitates an opportunity to explicitly encourage a development of robustness and 108

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resilience that might otherwise be lacking in children and young people in the current framework of our curriculum. When I began my journey as a practitioner of P4C, after approximately six weeks of engaging in enquiries, I asked the children in my class to reflect on their impressions of it. One pupil, who was extremely able, told me that he loved P4C, because it made his brain go “durr”. When I queried his meaning, he said that up until this point in his education (he was 10), everything had been easy. He felt that he had never been challenged by anything and, in his opinion, he had never had to think very hard to do anything. He continued, that P4C had been the first thing he had experienced that could not be done easily. Whilst this had led to periods of frustration, not being able to articulate his thoughts or opinions, he loved the challenge and continued to embrace it. The ability to be challenged in one’s thinking, and face challenge with a positive outlook, I would argue, helps to develop resilience in children and is a foundation for any distinction on what it means to be educated. Equally, I would suggest that P4C further ensures a sense of agency, as mentioned by Eaude (2009). In this learning space, children lead the direction of the enquiries from the initial question formation, thus placing the ensuing dialogue around their own interests, concerns or ‘wonderings’. This in turn also supports the notion of the children having a voice and being heard, central to the work of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (United Nations, 1989). Whilst educational policy has traditionally been driven by a focus on the economic benefit for individuals, society, and indeed the nation (Siddiqui et al., 2017), it could be argued that a more aspirational vision of education would value non-cognitive outcomes for their own sake. Brighouse (2008) advocates a vision of education and expounds on the educational and schooling implications for taking wellbeing, or ‘human happiness’, seriously (p58). He claims that education ‘should aim to improve children’s prospects for leading flourishing lives’ (Brighouse, 2008:60), and refers to Layard’s “Big Seven”: ‘Financial Situation, Family Relationships, Work, Community and Friends, Health, Personal Freedom, and Personal Values’ (2005 cited in Brighouse, 2008:61). Brighouse stresses that he does not equate happiness with flourishing, and clarifies that: ‘Flourishing is a richer property than happiness, sensitive to many more features of a person’s life than just her inner states. Flourishing involves people making meaning, making sense, of important aspects of their lives and the totality of their life’. (2008:62, emphasis mine). Brighouse’s definition and vision of ‘flourishing’ is a quality that I would argue has great affinity with what I am calling ‘wellbeing’, that is; non-cognitive or affective outcomes of education, such as; self-esteem, confidence, empathy, and meaning making. In my experience, P4C can help children to co-construct meaning, not just about themselves and their lives, but about the people around them, and even of the world at large. The link between flourishing, or wellbeing, and meaning-making, I would argue, is significant with regard to P4C and the Community of Enquiry. As Kizel (2017:91 - 92) writes: The search for and finding of meaning also allows children to uncover their full humanity by enabling them to recognize their uniqueness—i.e., their otherness from those around them and, by the same token, the otherness of others, together with their responsibility towards others ... Meaning is therefore a means of determining responsibility, philosophical communities of inquiry enabling young people not only to discover the meaning of life but also the purpose and road this bestows opens up for them.

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Kizel (2017) proposes that the CoE is relevant in this process because it ‘creates relationships within and between people and the environment’ (p.87). He suggests that the more the CoE engages with ‘social, cognitive and emotional’ relations that are relevant to the world of the children, ‘the more they enable young people to search for and find meaning’ (Kizel, 2017:87). Whilst an exploration of the definition of ‘meaning’, and how this is realised in P4C, could be the subject of a whole new chapter, in my opinion meaning-making is often central to one’s identity, relationships and sense of wellbeing. In addition, it could be argued that this is a key ingredient of a more holistic view of education. As Lipman stated: ‘Schools that consider education their mission and purpose are schools that dedicate themselves to helping children find meaning relevant to their lives’ (1980, cited in Kizel, 2017:93). One of the things I love about P4C is its potential for awakening a social consciousness or responsibility in not only the children, but also in the student teachers I work with. Kizel (2017) proposes that in the CoE, the process of meaning-making can be an ‘incentive to motivate children to be socially involved’ (Kizel, 2017:95). He refers to Lipman’s work and the underlying principle that the CoE can help to develop children’s ‘sense of self and community’ and suggests that ‘Philosophy is thus a motivating force not only for self action but also for social and environmental activism, helping to transform personal competency into social good’ (Kizel, 2017:95). How then do I see P4C as potentially contributing to pupils’ wellbeing? It is first necessary to consider the markers or indicators of wellbeing. As previously mentioned, Layard identifies the seven key factors influencing our levels of happiness, of which I would propose that four could be argued as being actively engaged regularly within P4C and the CoE – namely: ‘Family relationships, Community and Friends, Personal Freedom, and Personal Values’ (2005 cited in Brighouse, 2008:61), although it could be argued that depending on the nature of the enquiry, the remaining three: Financial Situation, Work, and Health, could easily form part of a CoE. Similarly, Opdenakker and Van Damme (2000), when specifically discussing children’s wellbeing, encapsulated eight indicators: ‘wellbeing at the school, social integration in the class, relationship with teachers, interest in learning tasks, motivation towards learning tasks, attitude to homework, attentiveness in the classroom and academic self-concept’ Opdenakker & Van Damme, 2000: 172). From these eight indicators, all bar relationships with teachers and attitude to homework were specifically mentioned by numerous children in my research, as areas they felt had been impacted upon as a result of engaging with P4C. Furthermore, Humphrey (2013) describes wellbeing as inextricably linked to Social and Emotional Learning; the process of ‘explicitly developing skills such as empathy and self-regulation in children’ Humphrey, 2013:1. In my own experience and in the views of the children as part of my research, empathy and selfregulation were frequently cited as impact of engaging with P4C.

Slow pedagogy A possible strategy to ameliorate the stresses that face children and young people might be a rethinking of how we approach education. In the current educational climate in England, where ‘slow’ often has negative connotations, this chapter will now seek to explain how embedding philosophical enquiry as part of a slower pedagogical approach might enhance wellbeing in children as a positive educational connotation. My interest in possible connections between P4C and slow pedagogy were initially sparked because of a comment that a teacher made to one of my pre-service teachers in their 110

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PGCE year. When the student asked if they could introduce the class to P4C, the teacher responded that he would only allow this if the student could explain categorically how the P4C enquiry would support student progress in that particular lesson. Whilst it might be possible to evidence progress in the very first P4C enquiry, my reflections were that P4C might sit more comfortably as part of a slower pedagogical approach, as endorsed by the Slow Movement (Hartman & Darab, 2012), where practitioners and advocates have a longer term, more holistic view of education and educational gains. The current view that seems to proliferate in society today is that the faster we do something, the more acclaimed it is. Research in schools shows that both staff and pupils identify issues concerning time as a potential threat to wellbeing (Dawkins, Boardman, & Jennifer, 2004; Ebersohn & Ferreira, 2012), with ‘the pressure to proceed from one targeted standard to another as fast as possible, to absorb and demonstrate specified knowledge with conveyor-belt precision, an irresistible fact of school life’ (Holt, 2002:265). There is a growing desire amongst educators to counter this current bias towards performativity and results/data driven education. One example of this is a growing interest in the abovementioned Slow Movement, which began in the 1980s as a reaction to the hurried pace of life (Hartman & Darab, 2012). Whilst this movement initially was concerned with advocating a better attitude towards food consumption and enjoyment in reaction to the Fast-Food industry, the Slow Movement has embraced other areas of life; leading in 2002 to a call for ‘Slow Schooling’ or ‘Slow Pedagogy’ (Hartman & Darab, 2012:58; Honoré, 2009; Payne & Wattchow, 2009:15). Honoré (2009) reports that a growing body of evidence suggests children learn better at a slower pace, resulting in children who are ‘less anxious, more eager to learn and better able to think independently’ (Honoré, 2009:252). Narayanan (2007) posits countering ‘Acceleration and Speed’ with ‘Slowness and Wholeness’ (Narayanan, 2007:1). In particular, he discusses ‘consciously embracing the core value of slowness – both as way of being and as a way of learning’ (p.6). His argument is that a slow pedagogy frees the learner from the constraints of the school day, releasing them to learn at the ‘metronome of nature, giving them time to absorb, to introspect, to contemplate, to argue and rebut and to enjoy’ (ibid, p.6). Critics of slow pedagogy are primarily those who espouse a preference for a rigorous academic education, focussed on knowledge-acquisition, rather than what they see as ‘a diminished curriculum for diminished individuals’ (Ecclestone & Hayes, 2009b:164). However, Payne and Wattchow (2009:17) discuss how this tendency towards ‘fast, takeaway, virtual, globalized, download/uptake versions of pedagogy’ potentially might restrict children to viewing education as ‘snapshots rather than the fuller picture, let alone engaging in reflection’ (Hartman & Darab, 2012:56). This ‘speedy pedagogy’ can, I would argue, result in superficial learning, focussing more on short-term memory retrieval, rather than deep and long-lasting learning that is connected to a more permanent change over time. For me, learning is more than just the ‘acquisition of knowledge or skills through study, experience, or being taught’ (Oxforddictionaries.com, 2017) and resonates more with definitions of learning as proposed by Gagné (1985), where he suggests that learning affects a change in disposition that persists long term and is not purely to do with growth, or as posited by Bingham and Conner (2010:19): ʽWe define learning as the transformative process of taking in information that –when internalized and mixed with what we have experienced– changes what we know and builds on what we do. It’s based on input, process, and reflection. It is what changes usʼ. 111

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Hartman and Darab (2012) support slow pedagogies and describe the characteristics of what they call ‘slow scholarship’ as ‘engaging with ideas through deep reflection, experiential learning, and reflexivity, ultimately resulting in critical insight, creativity, and innovation’(p58). They advocate that the ‘freedom and time to engage in thinking, to immerse oneself in experiential encounters, to synthesize information and reflect upon it— this is how new ways of knowing are formed’ (Hartman & Darab, 2012:59). At the heart of slow pedagogy, or slow learning, is the belief that the learner has agency rather than being a passive recipient of knowledge. It celebrates taking time to go deeper, to deliberate and foster genuine and sophisticated understanding. Advocates of slow pedagogy would argue that this makes the learning richer, deeper and more meaningful. Honoré (2009:14 - 15) supports this, summarising that: ʽFast is busy, controlling, aggressive, hurried, analytical, stressed, superficial, impatient, active, quantity-over-quality. Slow is the opposite: calm, careful, receptive, still, intuitive, unhurried, patient, reflective, quality-over-quantity. It is about making real and meaningful connections - with people, culture, work, food, everythingʼ. Interestingly, Bracey states that schools that are focussed on performativity often lack in developing personal characteristics related to virtue and morality, ‘these are as remote from the activity of fast schools as is gastronomic pleasure from fast food’ (2001 in Holt, 2002:268). So how then might P4C support a slow pedagogy philosophy? Sharp, Oscanyan, and Lipman in their book Philosophy in the Classroom, proposed that the aim of a thinking skills programme such as P4C was to help children become ‘more thoughtful, more reflective, more considerate and more reasonable individuals’ (1985:15). These qualities or dispositions are not achieved in a hurry. P4C gives children, students and teachers an opportunity to step off the carousel that a data driven, and test-oriented school system dictates, to engage in deeper, more meaningful encounters, that by their nature need time to develop, improve, and internalise. It is interesting that when you study what Narayanan (2007) suggests are optimal learning arrangements to ‘foster and promote slowness’ (Narayanan, 2007:7), 2007:7, there are elements that resonate with P4C. For example, using a circle as an optimal learning environment; which Narayanan suggests represents symbolically ‘the spirit of unity and equality within the learning community’ ibid, p.7, also, themes or topics for study which are not prescribed but are emergent. Narayanan advocates that these topics should be selected from student talk, through dialogue with the community –a clear resonance with the recommendation in P4C that the enquiry should stem, wherever possible, from a question created by the children, not the teacher/facilitator. A final connection is suggested by Narayanan: ʽall learning is the result of direct first person conscious experience. This method or tool focuses on the transformation of the self and the awakening of the mind rather than on the transfer of knowledge and the acquisition of skills’. (p7). I would argue that this view not only supports a more holistic view of education, but also attunes itself to the Community of Enquiry (CoE) and the aim of developing creative and critical thinking skills/ dispositions. Teachers and schools have readily offered qualitative feedback as to the potential non-cognitive/affective benefits of P4C. For example, a key conclusion of Gorard, Siddiqui, and Huat See (2015)’s research was that ‘Teachers and pupils generally reported that P4C had a positive influence on the wider outcomes such as pupils’ confidence to speak, listening skills, and self-esteem, wellbeing and happiness’ (Gorard, Siddiqui & Huat See, 2015:28). Indeed, more recently Siddiqui et al. (2017) carried 112

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out research in 16 schools (with 1099 children) specifically looking at this area. However, it can be challenging to substantiate these affective gains, thus the starting point for my own research was a desire to move from the anecdotal to the informed. Specifically, I was keen to explore how the children perceived the impact of P4C, and indeed whether they would independently identify any impact that could be said to be related to affective benefits or what might be termed wellbeing. I gathered my data from fifty-seven children (two Year Six classes, 10 – 11 years of age), in a junior school where philosophical enquiry is embedded. The research approach I used was the qualitative method of Nominal Group Technique (NGT) (see Asmus & James, 2005; Chapple & Murphy, 1996; Van de Ven & Delbecq, 1971). There were several factors that influenced my selection of NGT as my research method. At the heart of my research was ensuring that I heard the voice of the child, as my research specifically aimed to foreground the idea of democratic practice in schools – sometimes referred to as Rights Respecting Education – strongly linked to the UNCRC (UNICEF, 2012). The methodology of NGT is widely recognised to be a solidly democratic research method, which empowers participants through valuing and considering all views equally, thereby also harmonious with the aims of P4C. The children were asked to consider, discuss and rank the perceived impact they thought P4C had on them, their class and their school. As expected, cognitive areas were identified by the children. However, from the ten themes identified by Class A, only three had a clear cognitive focus, with the remaining seven areas focusing on affective impacts of P4C. In the case of Class B, eleven themes or groupings were designated, of which only four were cognitively focussed. Key headlines from my research showed children identifying that P4C had impacted significantly on their personal development and understanding of the world, with concepts such as happiness, empathy, confidence, and self-belief, recorded by the majority of the children. Children remarked that P4C had seemed to make, not only them as individuals, but the class as a whole, and even the whole school community, happier. The children attributed this to having more time to talk to others, as well as P4C having made them more passionate about learning. The children found listening to each other’s opinions enjoyable, but also being able to express their own feelings to everyone, or share their own personal moments, if they wanted to, stating that this helped them understand their own emotions better. Siddiqui et al. (2017) state that ‘enhancing the enjoyment of school for young people … should also be a part of the policy agenda for education’ (p12), and is in stark contrast to the warnings raised about the current level of stress and mental health concerns in primary schools (Füredi, 2004). This identified impact of enjoyment of learning and increased motivation towards school links to both Opdenakker and Van Damme (2000)’s indicators of wellbeing, as well as Honoré (2009) and Narayanan (2007)’s claims regarding impact from a slower pedagogical pace. A key factor for many children was that P4C had helped them to not only respect each other’s ideas, but also to understand other people better, which they felt had developed and improved their empathy. Humphrey (2013:1) describes developing social and emotional skills such as ‘empathy and self-regulation in children’ as central to wellbeing. The identification by the children that P4C had helped to develop their confidence and self-belief is encouraging, considering Holt (2002) and Narayanan’s (2007) warnings of low self-esteem and an inability to cope, that they suggest is a common experience for many children in our schools. The children in both classes described the impact as being not only 113

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in terms of having the confidence to speak out and express themselves clearly, but also having the confidence to challenge each other if they disagreed with opinions that were being expressed. This was also seen in Siddiqui et al. (2017:9)’s research, which reported that P4C could impact on areas such as ‘resilience, determination, motivation, confidence, self-esteem, and self-efficacy’. Many children in the two classes commented on the fact that P4C had helped them to understand the world better and how it works, also to understand the differences in the world, both in peoples’ thinking but also in their circumstances – leading some children to comment that it had made them reflect on how lucky they were to have a home, food and a family. I would propose that there are links here with Brighouse (2008) and his work on ‘flourishing’ as helping children to understand ‘important aspects of their lives and the totality of their life’ (pp. 61-62), as well as Kizel’s (2017:91-92) aforementioned research on P4C helping children to make sense of the world and of their own humanity and purpose.

Conclusion I have argued in this chapter that the rising tide of children’s mental health issues in the UK (Edwards, 2015; Fraser & Blishen, 2007) is affecting ever younger children, and must be of concern to anyone involved in education. Parents, teachers and schools around the country are actively engaged in looking for ways to halt this trend, and consequently interest has grown around the role of wellbeing as an educational issue. Many schools are trying out new initiatives aimed at increasing children’s emotional health. However, I would suggest that a successful approach in addressing, challenging and potentially dealing with this current situation that our children find themselves in, is to embed P4C into a school’s pedagogy, curriculum and vision. Through ongoing discussions with teachers, tutors and students, there has been an overwhelming consensus that the current environment in schools promotes and prioritises speedy results and that adopting a slower pedagogy could potentially garner positive outcomes in all areas of wellbeing. Narayanan (2007:7) suggested that the pressure felt by schools to modify and adapt in this climate of accelerating change is not sustainable, adding that it can result in: ʽa disconnect between the means and ends of education. The larger democratic ideals of social justice, of interdependence and of co-evolution through cooperation and collaboration are being increasingly marginalised in favour of greater accountability through testing, the drive towards nationalised curriculum, which suffers from a ‘one size fits all’ mindsetʼ. Brighouse (2008:71) further stresses that ‘understanding that the ultimate goal of education must be to facilitate the flourishing of the children in their care, … can help policymakers, administrators, and teachers to resist these forces to some extent, and to promote an ethos, adopt a curriculum, and manage the day-to-day pace of school life better, to serve the children under their care’. At the start of this chapter I suggested that I would attempt to address two key questions, namely; what current research into wellbeing and slow pedagogy had to offer those who would engage with philosophical enquiry; and secondly, whether the results of my research would demonstrate any links to wellbeing as identified by the children as a result of engaging with P4C. I propose that many of the characteristics of the Community of Enquiry fostered through engagement in P4C, could be argued to support the aims and ideals of slow pedagogy and could in turn lead to increased wellbeing amongst children. Furthermore it could potentially stir in them, and in the teachers that facilitate P4C, the social consciousness 114

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or responsibility referred to by Kizel (2017:95). Kizel (2017:92) claims that P4C can enable the children or young people we work with ‘not only to discover the meaning of life but also the purpose and road this […] opens up for them’. In my mind this sounds like a better purpose or goal of education, and one worth striving for, than the data-driven alternative that proliferates today. Reflecting on my own research I would suggest that the children in both classes clearly identified many areas of impact from P4C, which could be linked directly with wellbeing and slow pedagogy, significantly more than the cognitive impact. My proposal is that P4C can be seen to facilitate a particular pedagogy across the school curriculum and indeed community; to encourage deeper learning, moments of slowness, and reflection, that will enhance both pupil and teacher wellbeing. As a result, I would further argue the need to explore potential links between P4C, slow pedagogy and wellbeing and how teachers can be supported to recognise and encourage these links in their practice.

REFERENCES Adams, K. (2013). Childhood in crisis? Perceptions of 7–11-year-olds on being a child and the implications for education's well-being agenda. Education 3-13, 41(5), 523-537. Alexander, R. J., & Armstrong, M. (2010). Children, their world, their education: Final report and recommendations of the Cambridge Primary Review: Taylor & Francis US. Asmus, C. L., & James, K. (2005). Nominal group technique, social loafing, and group creative project quality. Creativity Research Journal, 17(4), 349-354. Atkinson, R. (1998). The Life Story Interview. London: Sage Publications. Bingham, T., & Conner, M. (2010). The new social learning: A guide to transforming organizations through social media: Berrett-Koehler Publishers. Brighouse, H. (2008). chapter 4: Education for a Flourishing Life1. Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, 107(1), 58-71. Chapple, M., & Murphy, R. (1996). The nominal group technique: extending the evaluation of students' teaching and learning experiences. Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education, 21(2), 147-160. Clarke, A. M., Bunting, B., & Barry, M. M. (2014). Evaluating the implementation of a school-based emotional well-being programme: a cluster randomized controlled trial of Zippy’s Friends for children in disadvantaged primary schools. Health education research, 29(5), 786-798. Claxton, G. (2002). Building learning power. Bristol: TLO Limited. Dawkins, J., Boardman, C., & Jennifer, D. (2004). Emotional health and well-being: A practical guide for schools. London: Sage. Dweck, C. S. (2010). Even geniuses work hard. Educational Leadership, 68(1), 16-20. Eaude, T. (2008). Children's spiritual, moral, social and cultural development: Primary and early years. Exeter: SAGE. Eaude, T. (2009). Happiness, emotional well‐being and mental health–what has children’s spirituality to offer? International Journal of Children's Spirituality, 14(3), 185-196. 115

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Ebersohn, L., & Ferreira, R. (2012). Rurality and resilience in education: Place-based partnerships and agency to moderate time and space constraints. Perspectives in Education, 30(1), 30-42. Ecclestone, K. (2004). Learning or therapy? The demoralisation of education. British Journal of Educational Studies, 52(2), 112-137. Ecclestone, K. (2011). Emotionally‐vulnerable subjects and new inequalities: the educational implications of an ‘epistemology of the emotions’. International Studies in Sociology of Education, 21(2), 91-113. Ecclestone, K., & Hayes, D. (2009a). Changing the subject: the educational implications of developing emotional well‐being. Oxford Review of Education, 35(3), 371-389. Ecclestone, K., & Hayes, D. (2009b). The dangerous rise of therapeutic education: Routledge. Edwards, J. (2015). The fundamental facts about mental health. London: Mental Health Foundation. Fraser, M., & Blishen, S. (2007). Supporting Young People’s Mental Health. Eight points for action: a policy briefing from the Mental Health Foundation London: Mental Health Foundation. Füredi, F. (2004). Therapy culture: Cultivating vulnerability in an uncertain age: Psychology Press. Gagné, R. M. (1985). Conditions of Learning and Theory of Instruction (4th ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Gorard, S., Siddiqui, N., & Huat See, B. (2015). Philosophy for Children: Evaluation report and executive summary. Education Endowment Foundation, Millbank, UK. Hallam, S. (2009). An evaluation of the Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning (SEAL) programme: promoting positive behaviour, effective learning and well‐being in primary school children. Oxford Review of Education, 35(3), 313-330. doi: 10.1080/03054980902934597. Hartman, Y., & Darab, S. (2012). A call for slow scholarship: A case study on the intensification of academic life and its implications for pedagogy. Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 34(1-2), 49-60. Holt, M. (2002). It's time to start the slow school movement. Phi Delta Kappan, 84(4), 264271. Honoré, C. (2009). In praise of slowness. London: Harper Collins. Humphrey, N. (2013). Social and emotional learning: A critical appraisal. London: SAGE Publications Limited. Kizel, A. (2017). Philosophic communities of inquiry: The search for and finding of meaning as the basis for developing a sense of responsibility. Childhood & Philosophy (13), 87103. Korthagen, F. A. (2004). In search of the essence of a good teacher: Towards a more holistic approach in teacher education. Teaching and teacher education, 20(1), 77-97. 116

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Layard, R. (2007). Presentation to the All-Party Group seminar. Well‐being in the classroom. McLaughlin, C. (2008). Emotional well-being and its relationship to schools and classrooms: A critical reflection. British Journal of Guidance & Counselling, 36(4), 353-366. Morrison, M., & Ecclestone, K. (2011). Getting emotional: a critical evaluation of recent trends in the development of school leaders. School Leadership & Management, 31(3), 199-214. Narayanan, G. (2007). A Dangerous but Powerful Idea-Counter Acceleration and Speed with Slowness and Wholeness. The Knowledge Tree: An e-Journal of Learning Innovation. Edition 13: From the Fringe, 11-19. Opdenakker, M.-C., & Van Damme, J. (2000). Effects of schools, teaching staff and classes on achievement and well-being in secondary education: Similarities and differences between school outcomes. School effectiveness and school improvement, 11(2), 165-196. Oxforddictionaries.com. (2017). Oxford Living Dictionaries Retrieved 07/10/2017, from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learning Payne, P. G., & Wattchow, B. (2009). Phenomenological deconstruction, slow pedagogy, and the corporeal turn in wild environmental/outdoor education. Canadian Journal of Environmental Education (CJEE), 14, 16-32. Seligman, M. E., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction (Vol. 55): American Psychological Association. Sharp, A. M., Oscanyan, F. S., & Lipman, M. (1985). Philosophy in the classroom (2nd ed.). Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Siddiqui, N., Gorard, S., & See, B. H. (2017). Non-cognitive impacts of philosophy for children. Project Report. School of Education, Durham University, Durham. The Children’s Society, P., L., Rees,G., Main, G. and Bradshaw, J. (2015). The Good Childhood Report 2015. London. United Nations. (1989). United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Geneva: United Nations. Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx [Accessed on 18 May 2016]. Van de Ven, A., & Delbecq, A. (1971). Nominal versus interacting group processes for committee decision-making effectiveness. Academy of Management Journal, 14(2), 203212.

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Becoming a Philosophical-Teacher: The Role of the Teacher and the Nature of Teaching in Philosophy for Children Riku Välitalo Oulu University [email protected] CV Riku Välitalo is a teacher trainer and a lecturer at a Teacher Training School in Oulu (FI) and has practiced P4C pedagogy for ten years. He is also a postgraduate student at the University of Oulu, where he delivers courses for teacher students on teaching ethics. His PhD thesis deals with P4C, with a special focus on the teacher’s agency in the practice. ABSTRACT Philosophy for Children (P4C) promotes a pedagogy that builds on a collective process of truth-seeking and meaning-making. In contrast to seeing teachers as sources of knowledge, they are often described as facilitators in this communal process. P4C is part of the larger movement in education that has aimed to put the child at the center of the teaching and learning process. Yet, P4C, like other child-centered pedagogies, brings new challenges to understanding the role of the teacher. This article traces the questions concerning the pedagogy of P4C by incorporating Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1984) notion of practice and the scholarship of P4C. MacIntyre’s concept of practice offers the source for unveiling the internal goods of teaching in P4C. This article locates the internal goods in the teacher and in the work or performance of the teacher. The work of the teacher is approached by examining two components that shape its role. One is orchestrating a fruitful platform for growth grounded in epistemic criteria, and the other is another level of specifically educational judgements the teacher must make. Together, they form the internal goods found in the performance. The nature of teaching and the role of the teacher in P4C provides a set of goods for the philosophical-teacher in his or her educational task. KEYWORDS Internal goods, philosophy for children, philosophy with children, Alasdair MacIntyre, community of inquiry. RESUMEN Filosofía para Niños (FpN) promueve una pedagogía que se basa en un proceso colectivo de búsqueda de la verdad y creación de significados. En lugar de verr a los docentes como fuentes de conocimiento, a menudo son descritos como pesonas que facilitan este proceso comunitario. PFCP4C es parte del movimiento más amplio en la educación que ha tenido como objetivo poner al niño en el centro del proceso de enseñanza y aprendizaje. Sin embargo, FpN, al igual que otras pedagogías centradas en el niño, plantea nuevos desafíos para comprender el papel del profesorado. Este artículo hace un seguimiento de las cuestiones relativas a la pedagogía de FpN incorporando la noción de práctica de Alasdair MacIintyre (1984) y la erudición de FpN. El concepto de práctica de MacIintyre ofrece la fuente para descubrir los bienes internos de la enseñanza en PFCP4C. Este artículo localiza esos 118

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beneficios inherentes en el profesorado y en el trabajo que desempeña. El trabajo del profesor se caracteriza por involucrar dos componentes que conforman su papel. El primero es componer una plataforma para el progreso colectivo basada en criterios epistemológicos y el segundo nivel consiste en juicios específicamente educativos que el profesor tiene que hacer individualmente; juntos forman los bienes internos encontrados en la actuación. La naturaleza de la enseñanza y el papel del maestro en FpN proporciona un conjunto de bienes para el profesorado de filosofía en su tarea educativa. PALABRAS CLAVE Bienes internos, Filosofía para Niños, Filosofía con Niños, Alasdair MacIntyre, comunidad de investigación.

INTRODUCTION Philosophy for Children (P4C) was established in the 1970s as an educational program that promotes a radical change in our understanding of growth, teaching, and the relationships that are formed in educational contexts.1 From the start, the primary mission was to emancipate the child by developing an educational practice that creates possibilities for his or her agentic action (Lipman, Oscanyan, & Sharp, 1980; Matthews, 1984). The aim of this pedagogical approach was to transform the classroom into a reflective environment where young inquiring minds have a space for the mutual exploration of ideas. By emphasizing collective reason in its pedagogy, P4C scholarship has promoted a radical change in the teacher’s role, which shifts from being an authoritative figure to being more like a co-inquirer in the classroom (Lipman, 2003; Gregory, 2004; Haynes & Murris, 2011). In recent decades, we have witnessed increasing interest in student-centered pedagogies, which can be seen, for example, in the tendency to refer to teachers as facilitators not only in P4C, but also in other fields of education (see, e.g., Biesta, 2010; 2012). Although this new shift has been a triumph for student-centered pedagogies like P4C, it has also brought about worrying developments in education, as reported by acknowledged scholars in the educational field. Most notably, Gert Biesta has termed this as the rise of the language of learning (Biesta, 2012). According to Biesta, this is an outcome of partially related developments, such as the postmodern critique of authoritarian forms of education, neo-liberal ways of thinking, the impact of the Internet, and especially, constructivism. Biesta sees that the language of learning has led to a hollow notion of the teacher as a servant, retrieving its justification from constructivism, which does not operate only as a learning theory or as an epistemology, but also as a pedagogy in which students construct their own insights and knowledge (see also Bingham, 2015). P4C is grounded in a version of social constructivist epistemology and is also attached to postmodern critics; this raises a need to address the role of the teacher and the nature of teaching in P4C pedagogy. Bingham urges proponents of P4C to re-think some of its original commitments and take a leading role as a teaching movement (Bingham, 2015). Surely this depends on what we mean by teaching in this unique practice that is located at the crossroads of education and philosophy. It is my primary task to give an account of the nature of teaching 1

This text was originally published in Childhood & Philosophy 2017. The text is revised and shortened, but otherwise it is the same as the one published earlier.

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and the role of the teacher in the pedagogy of P4C. In doing this, my hope is to articulate some central internal goods in P4C, as it is theorized and practiced. Furthermore, I will show that the teacher confronts questions about educational purposes, which are unanswerable only by leaning to the collective process of truth-seeking, and require teachers’ individual judgement. A point of departure is Alasdair MacIntyre’s conceptualization of internal goods, which will serve as a framework for considering P4C in terms of teaching. MacIntyre’s moral theory rests on the concept of social practice. According to MacIntyre, for something to be a practice, it has to create internal goods, which capture a distinctive vision of what it is worthwhile to achieve (MacIntyre, 1984). My primary mission is to articulate some central internal goods in the pedagogy of P4C, which give shape to the nature of teaching in P4C and unfold a particular commitment in the role of the teacher. My study advocates a view that teaching in P4C entails more than simply inducting students into different practices with a purely technical skill set. Moreover, I suggest that the teacher needs to take into account three broad domains of educational aims or purposes, namely, qualification, socialization, and subjectification (Biesta 2010). Together, these domains form the educational telos of the philosophical teacher. My paper is organized in the following way. I will start by briefly introducing MacIntyre’s main idea of what constitutes a practice and the vital role of internal goods in it (MacIntyre, 1984). Against this background, I flesh out the internal goods of teaching in P4C by studying the scholarship of P4C. This is done by showing that the nature of teaching shapes the internal goods located within the teacher. Other internal goods are located in the work and the performance of the teacher, through which it is possible to articulate the role of the philosophical teacher.

Defining a practice Alasdair MacIntyre’s famous work After Virtue, published in 1981, has triggered significant discourse among educational scholars, especially regarding whether or not we should see teaching as practice. It is beyond the scope of this article to go into this debate, except to suggest that there is something worthy in terms of teaching, in this case teaching in P4C. In the book, he offers an account for what can be called “a practice”: … any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 187)

MacIntyre’s account of practice stays true to Aristotle’s by stressing action guided by a telos, which is the good of an activity. A good could be most succinctly defined as that for the sake of which we act. A crucial difference to Aristotle is in the way it locates the telos. For MacIntyre, ethical authority is grounded in practices, which offers the first domain in which goods receive their meaning.2 In other words, ethical understanding does not guide practices, but is formed in them3. A good is something judged valuable to achieve or attend to in a practice, and the goods of a given practice are the purposes for action. A virtue is 2

Life narratives and moral traditions are two other moral contexts where goods receive their meaning in MacIntyre’s moral theory, but this article builds mainly on the context of practice. 3 In Aristotle, biology or human essence plays a bigger role in locating the telos.

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closely related to goods in the traditional Aristotelian way of thinking as a disposition to act for the good and also as one constituting element of the good itself (Aristotle, 1959). MacIntyre’s distinction between internal and external goods offers the starting point for deepening our understanding of goods. Roughly put, external goods are achieved when something is done for money, fame, or prestige and can be acquired in multiple ways. Internal goods give meaning to a particular kind of practice and can be had only from the inside out. MacIntyre gives an example of a boy who is learning the game of chess. As long as the boy plays chess just because he is receiving candy afterward and receiving even more if he wins, the goods are external. So the boy is motivated to win, but not by the game itself, which might provoke an interest in cheating in order to reach his goal. MacIntyre explains that ‘there might come a time when the boy will find those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons’ (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 188). Thus, his actions would not only be guided by external goods (winning) by any means necessary, but by internal goods (the practice)4. What becomes clear from this example is that internal goods are essential for the realization of any practice. Chris Higgins (Higgins, 2010b) expands the notion of internal goods by making a distinction between the telos and the literal aim of a given practice. Inside each practice, there is a shared vision of what is worthwhile to achieve, and each practice has its own way of envisioning a finally perfected work, which captures the shared telos of a given practice. According to Higgins, ‘this evaluative teleology is closely related to but not reducible to the more literal aims that structure the practice’ (ibid., p. 246). Higgins finds this distinction in MacIntyre’s own examples; one of them is about a fishing crew whose aim is to catch fish, but never simply to catch fish, rather, ‘to do so in a manner consonant with the excellences of the craft’ (ibid.). Another useful and important structural notion can be found from the typology of internal goods also originally interpreted by Higgins. First, we can locate internal goods 1) in the practitioner and 2) in the products. The goods located in the products are more specifically located in works and performances, and the goods in the practitioner can be located in what Higgins calls moral phenomenology, biographical genre, and the excellence of character (Higgins, 2010b). I will address these components as they fit with my primary mission, and they will become clearer as we move along. Next, the task is to search for the internal goods for P4C based on this typology and to see what it means in terms of teaching. If we accept the MacIntyrean characterizations of a practice, we also accept that practices are the moral sources for action. Every practice is framed by its telos, which is the good of that activity. To act virtuously is to identify the goods and act towards the goods realized in a given practice.

The nature of teaching As mentioned, the pedagogy of P4C builds on a notion of a community of inquiry, or more specifically (to emphasize the philosophical nature of such inquiry), on a community of philosophical inquiry (CPI)5. CPI works in the realm of concepts usually starting from a 4

MacIntyre’s theory as a whole is much more complex, and my brief sketch does not give credit to its overall architecture. 5 My assumption is that a philosophical dimension exists (but can remain hidden) in all inquiries, and so I will refer only to the community of philosophical inquiry.

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puzzlement or a problem and trying to find the best argument or truth of the matter that settles the case, albeit just until a new problem is found (see Splitter, 2014). The complexities originate in the fact that it is a shared experience, where the creation of dialogical relations multiply. While I address something to someone, it is also addressed to the whole group and interpreted individually by each member. Ideally, the group works towards a mutually coordinated perspective while accepting its fallibility and the possible errors and partialities in its pursuit. Still, it is striving towards a certain epistemic telos that is bounded by the Socratic notion of ‘following the argument where it leads’ (Kennedy, 2010, Ch.. 3). On the other hand, this telos is something out of reach, something impossible to predict, because the multiplicity of ways to move forward is dependent on the participants in the communal dialogue (ibid.). If we take the distinction between the literal and the actual telos demonstrated in the example of the fishing crew, it seems that the epistemic quest as a search for truth works more as a literal aim of CPI and the telos has to do with (to use Aristotelian language) the manner consistent with the excellences of CPI. The telos of CPI would then not only be a communicative, but also a disposition towards dialogical relation, a wakened desire to understand the other (see Juuso & Laine, 2005). For example, Sharp’s articulation of CPI as an activity that ‘fosters an ability to put one's ego in perspective’ illuminates this internalized ability that grows out of the dialogue towards ‘a slow realization of what it is to be human and live the human predicament’ (Sharp, 2007, p. 5). Also, Kennedy sees that by moving beyond epistemological ‘egocentrismʼ, a more radical form hinges ʽon a new experience of alterity within the self’ (Kennedy, 2014, p. 27). This distinctive aspect is related to the philosophical ‘meta’ nature of CPI. It is a practice beyond practices in the way it tackles the questions imbedded in various practices including itself. So we could say that the practice under investigation works on a metapractical level fostering a community where different voices, that is, different practices, can also be heard in a substantive dimension. CPI aims to tackle various issues in a spirit that MacIntyre also sees as crucial: ‘there is the question of whether it is good for that society that the goods of this or that particular practice should have this or that place in its common life’ (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 66; see also Higgins, 2010b, p. 243). In other words, CPI aims to offer a wider perspective to the cultural habits that cloud our thinking. Dewey talks about a possibility for cultivated naïveté that can be acquired through reflective thinking or by means of philosophical thought (Dewey, 1963; see also Gregory & Granger, 2012). It is the activity, the doing of philosophy, the way of embarking with contestable, common, central, and connected questions that shapes the nature of teaching in CPI (Splitter, 2014; also see Splitter & Sharp, 1995). The experiential landscape calls for a willingness to take the risk of preparing for the unexpected and throwing oneself into a state ignorance. This enables more authentic exploration of meanings, connections, and relationships between ideas stemming from the dialogue. The fresh and open attitude seems to be more natural for children, but for the teacher, it calls for a readiness to ‘be “killed and eaten’” by the group’ as a traditional authority figure (Kennedy, 2004, p. 753; see also Haynes & Murris, 2013). Gregory and Granger see that CPI may enable the teacher to ‘decenter from adultism’ in finding their own sense of wonder reawakening (Gregory & Granger, 2012). Both of these characteristics (the process and a certain attitude required by the substance) indicate a particular commitment to a state of being that seems worth pursuing (see also Higgins, 2010b). This experiential landscape is something Higgins refers to as the distinctive moral phenomenology that is realized as an experience (Higgins, 2010a). So, 122

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although the internal good, once realized, is located in the teacher, its source is in the nature of teaching. To be more specific, the intelligibility is derived from the ideal nature of teaching understood in the practice of P4C. If we accept this, it follows that a teacher who is entering the practice should start by experiencing CPI. This might happen by arranging inquiries with faculty members or partaking in inquiries with children facilitated by more experienced members of the practice. This way, the teacher can get a grip on the nature of teaching in P4C. Working through this process, the teacher might start to notice that he/she needs to change something within him/herself, in the way he/she encounters the students, and in the way he/she encounters the world. This would be the first step in entering the practice. The challenge is that a distinctive moral phenomenology is hardly observable; instead, it is something that is experienced. Still, an important proviso is that this experience is not something deemed to be good because it is pleasurable; although at times it surely can be, in the MacIntyrean sense, this experience is good for its own sake and also contributes to general wellbeing (see MacIntyre 1999, p. 64). Let’s look at an example. When the teacher patiently holds his/her urge to give an account related to the issue at hand, but merely feeds the dialogue with questions, he/she can occasionally feel discomfort or irritation at the course of the discussion. There may be students intentionally distorting the dialogue by playing with double meanings or having other sorts of agendas (see Michaud, 2014). On other occasions, even when the whole group is interested in working together, the teacher might feel a state of panic when the dialogue gets stuck or breaks down because of too much generality or some other reason, and a deadly silence descends on the classroom. Still, every morning when the classroom is filled with students, the teacher is dreaming of an astonishing experience of mutual exploration, and sooner or later his/her perseverance is rewarded. This is to say that he/she is not doing it merely for the pleasure, but because, for him/her, there is something valuable in the activity itself. The experience of the distinctive moral phenomenology, with all the risks and feelings, offers its practitioners a vision into how it is excellent to be. At the same time, by offering a way of being in a particular world, it offers an insight into a way of being in the world (see also Higgins, 2010a).

The role of the teacher In the ethos of P4C, there is a commitment to creating a social, political, moral, and aesthetic environment, a space where these aspects are under conscious scrutiny (see Gregory, 2012). It is the creation of the environment where a teacher’s excellence is measured and also techne comes into play. By this I do not mean purely technical reason, which would outstrip the possibility to conceive CPI as a practice and render it to technological or scientific formulations, ʽbut a techne (Greek: skill, art, craft) based on a series of philosophical judgments, and in which the descriptive and the normative are in a chiasmic relationshipʼ (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2011, p. 269). To start with, this skill-like ability can be found in the readiness for the signs of fruitful dialogue and in the momentous judgements made to discard the prepared lesson plan when a promising slot appears. On the level of an ongoing dialogue, the teacher has to make discursive moves like, for example, explicating the positions, summarizing, asking for clarification or definition, giving or asking for examples, indicating contradictions, or pointing out possible contradictions by generating alternative views (see, for example, Kennedy, 2004, p. 754; Fisher, 2003, p. 130; Gregory 2007). Interestingly, a teacher’s judgement about the epistemic progress is not concerned with how close the community has 123

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moved towards the truth or consensus, but with criteria that Clinton Golding describes as 1) reaching mutual understanding ‘by the degree to which we appreciate the views of the other participants, or the degree to which they are mutually intelligible,’ 2) through advancing a distributed inquiry in ‘the movement from a problem and through a collective process,’ 3) by reaching inquiry milestones that are the products of each stage in an inquiry, for example, a consensus about an uncovered assumption in a suggested resolution, and 4) last but not least, by ‘reaching epistemic consensus about the procedures of our inquiry’ (Golding, 2013, p. 427‒434; also see Golding, 2017). These epistemic criteria guide the community’s standards of epistemic progress in CPI, and from an educational perspective, can be viewed as an induction to collective philosophical thinking. The criteria also shift the focus from the literal aim toward the actual telos. The literal aim of truth-seeking does not articulate the manner consonant with the excellences of the craft, and there is a possibility that questioning becomes the most vicious tool of manipulation as exemplified in the movie The Paper Chase from 1973, or by Bingham’s study on the relational nature of authority (Bingham, 2008, Ch. 5; see also Michaud & Välitalo, 2017). Although there is a kind of extra-moral element in the excellence of questioning, the nature of teaching already sets some requirements for the proper spirit of CPI. So, in order to think of questioning as something pedagogically significant, we need to think of it as something more than just a technique to put to use in the classroom. A good internal to P4C, which intertwines around the concept of questioning, works in both intraand inter-subjective modes of being; it is questioning as a permanent (dis)order of collective and individual habit, or as Lipman sees it, ‘questioning, more narrowly a quest for truth, more broadly a quest for meaning’ (Lipman, 2003, p. 95). Furthermore, when the internal good of questioning is practiced in an educational context, it sets great possibilities, but also special challenges for the teacher. As an educational telos, questioning needs to be articulated accordingly.

Educational telos As discussed earlier, there is a multiplicity of ways to move forward in a dialogue, but we can also distinguish a multiplicity of aims at work in the educational task of the teacher. The teacher is confronted with institutional aims fleshed out in the curriculum, but we (especially P4C teachers) have a somewhat contrasting aim to free our students from oppressing structures in society (see Biesta, 2012; Välitalo et al., 2016). This is a complexity that comes into the picture when envisioning CPI as a structuring element of our teaching as a whole, entailing all aspects of classroom life 6, and therefore, being forced to face its institutional role. Biesta differentiates three broad domains of aims or purposes in education that he labels as qualification, socialization, and subjecti fication (Biesta, 2010). Qualification can be roughly described as the domain of knowledge and skills; socialization, as the educational encounter with cultures and traditions; and subjectification as emphasizing education’s orientation towards children and students as subjects of action, not objects of influence (Biesta, 2012; 2010). Biesta describes the work of the teacher thus:

6

This is something that is not always clear. Some seem to advocate Philosophy for Children as a separate activity from otherwise restrained curricular activities, and some construe a more holistic framework that entails a larger pedagogical vision.

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Three dimensional thinking and doing also begins to reveal the complexities of even the smallest decisions and moments of action and doing in the work of the teacher […]the specific complexity of teaching, viewed from the perspective of the three-fold character of educational purpose, is that of three-dimensional chess, where three complete chess games are played on chess board hanging above each other, and where the pieces not only interact horizontally on each of the chess boards, but also vertically – so that a move in the ‘game’ of qualification not only impacts what happens and can happen there, but at the very same time ‘does’ something in the ‘games’ of socialisation and subjectification, and vice versa. (Biesta, 2015, p. 5)

Here, Biesta is also taking the game of chess as an example. Recalling MacIntyre’s understanding of a practice, it offers the first domain of purpose for the practitioner. In terms of P4C, the crucial question is: What is the game for? One current discussion inside P4C concerns the rules of the ownership of questioning (see Turgeon, 2015), where we can see that some are advocating students’ primacy in questioning and see P4C as a pedagogy grounded in emergent epistemology where fresh and unique ways are prioritized and subjectification is seen as the most fundamental educational aim (see Murris & Verbeek, 2014; Kennedy, 2010; Kohan, 2015). On the other hand, there are some who stress the teacher’s role in the process and who are more inclined to see the historical canon of doing philosophy central in educational efforts suggesting that socialization and qualification are set as primary goals for the pedagogy of P4C (McCall, 2009; Worley, 2011). If we accept that both of these domains shape the game the teacher is facing in her task, the role of the teacher is also shaped in balancing between these purposes. Therefore, what I am suggesting here is that we can distinguish two components in the teacher’s task. One is orchestrating a fruitful platform for growth grounded in (weak) epistemic criteria, and the other is another level of specifically educational judgements the teacher must make. Educational judgements in themselves can then be divided into three dimensions. On the one hand, to use Biesta’s terms (Biesta, 2010), the teacher has to consider the knowledge and skills (qualifications) that are seen as relevant for a given practice (i.e., academic disciplines), the ways of building a nest of reasons through which it is possible to comprehend the practice as a whole and find it meaningful to pursue (see White, 2009, p. 425). In P4C literature, this domain is often referred to as ʽthinking skillsʼ (Lipman, 2003) or the ‘tools of thinking’ (Cam, 2006). The dimension of socialization is related to the previous one, and it calls for judgements based on critical reflective engagement toward the traditions and cultures of which the practices are a part. For example, Darren Chetty and Judith Suissa see that ‘the vigilance and humility required of white educators, then, means reminding ourselves of the moral and political context in which our educational efforts make sense, reflecting on our own racialized identities and those of the people in our classrooms’ (Chetty and Suissa, 2017, p. 16). Thirdly, the teacher should be occupied with the question of how her actions impact the student as a person. What possibilities could the engagement with CPI offer in terms of being and becoming a unique subject? (See Biesta, 2010).

Conclusion I started with a problem: What is the nature of teaching and the role of the teacher in P4C? To answer this, I applied MacIntyre’s concept of practice as a first context of internal goods in P4C. Based on this definition, I located part of the internal goods in the practitioner, which are characterized as a disposition towards dialogical relation and a certain willingness toward a state of ignorance shaped by the nature of CPI. Other internal goods were located in the work or performance of the teacher. Here I made a distinction between the actual telos of questioning as a philosophically and educationally meaningful activity and questioning as 125

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mere search of truth. This makes P4C a distinct practice not only as a part of philosophy, but as an educational practice. I proposed, following Biesta, that education entails a multidimensional telos, and teachers are confronted with questions about the purposes of education. Recalling Matthew Lipman’s and Ann Sharp’s proposal of multidimensional thinking (critical, creative and caring), we can notice some connections between these conceptualizations. Especially the dimension of care, when approached as an educational telos, elucidates the good of the student and the good of the culture adding a special responsibility for the teacher. The teacher’s care for the student illuminates the helping of students in their search for a good life, and the care for the culture animates the requirements and answerability for our co-existence. In answering the question ‘how to educate?’ the teacher is balancing a multidimensional purpose and is forced to take the role of a tragic protagonist in his/her daily judgements. He/she must choose what he/she sees as the most desirable end in a particular moment, and often, that comes at a cost in terms of some other end. Still, this challenge is the moving force of a philosophical teacher, and P4C pedagogy can serve as a practice in the encounter of the greatest good: the growth of the student. The way the philosophical teacher can tackle this telos is by sustaining the continuous quest for the good beyond practices, a quest MacIntyre declares as the good life for man: ‘the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man.’ (MacIntyre, 1984, p.219). The unexamined life is not worth living, nor is it worth teaching.

REFERENCES Aristotle (1959). The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Translated by David Ross. London: Oxford University Press. Biesta, G. (2015). The duty to resist: Redefining the basics for today’s schools. Research on Steiner Education 6, 1-11. Biesta, G. (2012). Giving teaching back to education. Phenomenology & Practice 6, no. 2:3549. Biesta, G. (2011). Philosophy, Exposure, and Children: How to Resist the Instrumentalisation of Philosophy in Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 45, no. 2:305-319. Biesta, G. (2010). Good education in an age of measurement. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publ. Bingham, C. (2015). Philosophy for Children as a Teaching Movement in an Era of Too Much Learning. Childhood and Philosophy 11, no. 22:223-240. Bingham, C. (2008). Authority is relational. Albany: State University of New York Press. Cam, P. (2006). Twenty Thinking Tools. Camberwell, Vic: ACER Press. Dewey, J. (1963). Experience and education. New York: Macmillan Company. Fisher, R. (2003). Teaching thinking. 2. ed. London: Continuum. Golding, C. (2017). Getting better ideas: a framework for understanding epistemic philosophical progress in Philosophy for Children. In The Routledge International Handbook of Philosophy for Children, edited by Maughn Gregory, Joanna Haynes and Karin Murris. New York: Routledge. 126

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Golding, C. (2013). We Made Progress: Collective Epistemic Progress in Dialogue without Consensus. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47, no. 3:423-440. Gregory, M. (2012). A Philosophy of Education for teaching reasoning in Pre-College Classrooms. In Philosophy and Education. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Pub. Gregory, M. (2007). A framework for facilitating classroom dialogue. Teaching Philosophy 30, no. 1:59. Gregory, M. (2004). Practicing democracy: social intelligence and philosophical practice. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 18, no. 2:161-174. Gregory, M. and David G. (2012). Introduction: John Dewey on Philosophy and Childhood. Education and Culture 28, no. 2:1-25. Hager, P. (2011). Refurbishing MacIntyre's Account of Practice. Journal of Philosophy of Education 45, no. 3:545-561. Haynes, J. and Murris, K. (2013). Child as Educator: Introduction to the Special Issue. Studies in Philosophy and Education 32, no. 3:217-227. Haynes, J. and Murris, K. (2011). The Provocation of an Epistemological Shift in Teacher Education through Philosophy with Children. Journal of Philosophy of Education 45, no. 2:285-303. Higgins, C. (2010a). Working Conditions: The Practice of Teaching and the Institution of School. Journal of Philosophy of Education 44, no. 2-3:371-397. Higgins, C. (2010b). Worlds of Practice: MacIntyre's Challenge to Applied Ethics. Journal of Philosophy of Education 44, no. 2‐3:237-273. Juuso, H. (2007). Child, Philosophy and Education: discussing the intellectual sources of Philosophy for Children. Oulu: Oulu University Press. Juuso, H., and Laine, T. (2005). Tact and Athmosphere in the Pedagogical Relationship. Analytic Teaching 25, no. 1:1-17. Kennedy, D. (2005). Neoteny, Dialogic Education and an Emergent Psychoculture: Notes on Theory and Practice. Journal of Philosophy of Education 48, no. 1:100-117. Kennedy, D. (2010). Philosophical dialogue with children: essays on theory and practice. Lewinston: Edwin Mellen Press. Kennedy, D. (2004). The Role of a Facilitator in a Community of Philosophical Inquiry. Metaphilosophy 35, no. 5:744-765. Kennedy, N. and Kennedy, D. (2011). Community of Philosophical Inquiry as a Discursive Structure, and its Role in School Curriculum Design. Journal of Philosophy of Education 45, no. 2:265-283. Kohan, W. (2015). Childhood, Education and Philosophy : New Ideas for an Old Relationship. New York: Routledge. Kohan, W. (2005). Philosophy and Childhood : critical perspectives and affirmative practices. New York: Palgrave Pivot. 127

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Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in education. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lipman, M., Oscanyan, F. S. and Sharp, A. M. (1980). Philosophy in the classroom. 2nd ed. ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. MacIntyre, A. (1999). Dependent Rational Animals. Chicago: Open Court. MacIntyre, A. (1984). After virtue. 2nd ed. Notre Dame, Indiana: Univ. of Notre Dame Pr. MacIntyre, A, and Dunne, J. (2002). Alasdair MacIntyre on Education: In Dialogue with Joseph Dunne. Journal of Philosophy of Education 36, no. 1:1-19. Matthews, G. B. 1984. Dialogues with children. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Pr. McCall, C. (2009). Transforming thinking.1. publ. ed. London: Routledge. Michaud, O. (2005). A qualitative study on educational authority, shared authority and the practice of philosophy in a kindergarten classroom: A study of the multiple dimensions and complexities of a democratic classroom. Ph.D. diss., ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. Michaud, O. and Välitalo, R. (2017). Authority, democracy and philosophy: the nature and role of authority in a community of philosophical inquiry. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy for Children. New York: Routledge. Murris, K. and Verbeek, C. (2005). A foundation for foundation phase teacher education: making wise educational judgements. South African Journal of Childhood Education 4, no. 2:1-17. Sharp, A. M (2007). The Classroom Community of Inquiry as Ritual: How we can Cultivate Wisdom. Critical and Creative Thinking 15, no. 1:3-14. Splitter, L. (2005). Preparing Teachers to 'teach' Philosophy for Children. Journal of Philosophy in Schools 1, no. 1:89-106. Splitter, L. J., and Sharp, A. M. (1995). Teaching for better thinking. 1st ed. Melbourne, Victoria: ACER. Suissa, J. and Chetty, D. (2017). 'No Go Areas' - Racism and Discomfort in the Community of Inquiry. In The Routledge International Handbook of Philosophy for Children, edited by Joanna Haynes, Maughn Gregory and Karen Murris. New York: Routledge. Turgeon, W. (2015). The Art and Danger of the Question: Its Place Within Philosophy for Children and Its Philosophical History. Mind, Culture, and Activity 22, no. 4:284-298. Välitalo, R., Juuso, H. and Sutinen, A. (2016). Philosophy for Children as an Educational Practice. Studies in Philosophy and Education 35, no. 1:79-92. White, J. (2009). Education and a meaningful life. Oxford Review of Education 35, no. 4:423435. Worley, P. (2011). The if machine. London [u.a.]: Continuum.

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2. FUNDAMENTACIÓN FILOSÓFICA / PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND Ha sido muy común usar la filosofía occidental (entendida en un sentido amplio y flexible) como la base filosófica de FPN. Sócrates, por una parte, y el pragmatismo americano (Mead, Peirce y Dewey), por otro lado, tuvo un papel relevante en el trabajo realizado por el equipo original de IAPC, pero con el tiempo otras personas han acudido como fuente de justificación a otras escuelas

filosóficas o tendencias, tales como el posmodernismo, la hermenéutica o la filosofía feminista. The Western philosophical tradition (understood in broad terms) has been commonly used as the philosophical underpinning of P4C. Socrates, along with American pragmatism (Mead, Peirce and Dewey) played an important role in the work done by the original IAPC team. Over time, however, other philosophical schools or tendencies, such as postmodernism, hermeneutics or feminist philosophy have been applied.

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18th Century Scottish Moral Philosophers and Children Elaine E. Englehardt Distinguished Professor of Ethics, Utah Valley University. [email protected] Michael S. Pritchard Professor Emeritus in Philosophy, Western Michigan University. [email protected] CV Elaine Englehardt is a Distinguished Professor of Ethics and Professor of Philosophy at Utah Valley University (UVU). Her PhD is from the University of Utah. She has written and directed seven multi-year, national grants in the area of Ethics and Ethics Across the curriculum from National Endowment for the Humanities, and from the Department of Education. One grant founded the Ethics Across the Curriculum program at UVU and another funded the Society for Ethics Across the Curriculum and their official journal Teaching Ethics. She is a SEAC board member and with Michael Pritchard was co-author of the journal Teaching Ethics. She has authored ten text books. She has written numerous peer reviewed articles and ten book chapters. She has served in various administrative positions at UVU including Vice President for Scholarship and Outreach. Michael S. Pritchard is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Western Michigan University. He received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Wisconsin. He is a founding board member for the Society for Ethics Across the Curriculum, and was a seven year editor of its journal Teaching Ethics with Elaine Englehardt. Among his publications are: On Becoming Responsible (Kansas, 1991); Reasonable Children (Kansas, 1996); Professional Integrity (Kansas, 2007); Ethical Challenges of Academic Administration (Springer, 2010), edited with Elaine Englehardt, Kerry Romesburg, and Brian Schrag; Engineering Ethics, 6th edition, (Cengage) with C.E. Harris, Elaine Englehardt, and Ray James; and Obstacles to Ethical Decision-Making (Cambridge 2013), with Patricia Werhane, Laura Hartman, Crina Archer, and Elaine Englehardt. Among his many published articles is ‘Philosophy for Children,’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. He and Elaine Englehardt are coeditors of the forthcoming (Springer, 2018), Ethics Across the Curriculum: Pedagogical Challenges. He was the PI of several National Science Foundation and National Endowment for the Humanities grants in various areas of ethics. ABSTRACT While acknowledging the pioneering work of Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp, and Gareth Matthews in making the case that the philosophical inquiry of children should be supported both in the schools and in their everyday lives, we argue that a number of 18th century Scottish philosophers were also receptive to the idea that children are capable of philosophical inquiry. We focus on Thomas Reid and Adam Smith, both of whom discuss the moral development of children at some length. We detail some of their views regarding the moral sensitivities of children, including the relationship between those sensitivities and the development of the rational abilities of children. 130

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KEYWORDS Children, moral philosophy, ICPIC, Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, Dugald Stewart, philosophical inquiry, reasonableness. RESUMEN Si bien reconocemos la labor pionera de Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp y Gareth Matthews al argumentar que la investigación filosófica de los niños debe apoyarse tanto en las escuelas como en su vida cotidiana, sostenemos que varios filósofos escoceses del siglo XVIII también se mostraron receptivos a la idea de que los niños son capaces de la investigación filosófica. Nos centramos en Thomas Reid y Adam Smith, quienes discuten el desarrollo moral de los niños con cierta profundidad. Detallamos algunas de sus opiniones sobre las sensibilidades morales de los niños, incluida la relación entre esas sensibilidades y el desarrollo de las capacidades racionales de los niños. PALABRAS CLAVE Niños, filosofía moral, ICPIC, Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, Dugald Stewart, investigación filosófica, razonabilidad.

INTRODUCTION When the International Council for the Philosophical Inquiry of Children (ICPIC) was founded in 1985, Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp, and Gareth Matthews were recognized as leaders of a worldwide effort to establish a significant place for philosophy in pre-college curricula. Especially in the USA, philosophy was largely restricted to higher education. Insofar as the question of children’s philosophical aptitude was given serious attention at all, it may have been presumed that they were not capable of serious philosophical inquiry. Led by Lipman and Sharp, Montclair State’s Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children established a K-12 educational program that undermined this presumption. Quite independently, the philosophical writings of Gareth Matthews offered powerful illustrations of children’s thinking that challenged this presumption, as well. Although all three of these pioneers have now passed away (just months apart, in 2010 and 2011), it is evident that their influence continues. This 2017 ICPIC meeting in Madrid, Spain featured many discussions of their work, both supportively and critically. This shows how their memory is being sustained even as new paths to the philosophical thinking of children are being carved. This is as it should be. However, in this essay we encourage looking back even further than these pioneering efforts. We focus on two 18th century Scottish philosophers who had much to say about the moral development of children, namely, Thomas Reid and Adam Smith. Others from this period in Scotland (such as Dugald Stewart) could also profitably be examined. One might wish that David Hume, Scotland’s most renowned philosopher of this era, could be included among those who have important things to say about the philosophical abilities of children. Unfortunately, he seems to have written little about children. Still, we can ask what he might have said, if only he had been asked. After all, the author of the Treatise on Human Nature claims that he was only a teenager when he first formulated the central ideas of what many contend is his finest philosophical work. Nevertheless, in contrast to Reid and Smith’s writings, the skeptical undertones of that early work might have stood somewhat in the way of Hume accepting a community of inquiry 131

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as the starting point of philosophical inquiry. The two philosophers we have selected for special attention here seem to be especially open to the idea that philosophical inquiry can, and should, play an important role in the lives of children.

Thomas Reid We are not the first to suggest that the approach of Thomas Reid (1710-1796) to philosophical inquiry is receptive to the notion that children, not just adults, are capable of significant philosophical reflection. This is precisely what Fiachra Long argues in his ‘Thomas Reid and Philosophy With Children’ (Long, 2005). Reid’s receptivity to children’s philosophical thinking is further supported in Jessica L. van der Shalk and Rene van Woudenberg’s, ‘Philosophy With Children and Reid’s Thoughts About Children’ (Shalk and van Woudenberg, 2011). Basically agreeing with the general tenor of these two articles, we will discuss Reid’s account of the moral development of children and the space it provides for their philosophical inquiry. Central to Reid’s view of morality is that its basic principles, rules, and requirements are accessible to philosophers and non-philosophers alike. He says ‘Moral conduct is the business of every man; and therefore the knowledge of it ought to be within the reach of all’ (Reid, 2010, 185). He rejects the idea that ‘in order to understand his duty, a man must needs be a philosopher and a metaphysician’ (Reid, 2010, 283). This does not mean that philosophical reflection is not needed. However, it is not just philosophers who engage in philosophical reflection, any more than it is only mathematicians who engage in mathematical thinking. Furthermore, even though Reid is convinced that moral knowledge should be within everyone’s reach, it is not his view that this is easily attainable. Education can play a critical role in fostering moral development. There are many obstacles that one must take care to recognize and learn to avoid, overcome, or constrain (Reid, 2007, 10) if one is to attain a solid, reliable perspective on what morality requires of us, whether we are children or adults. Reid notes that all of us, if only we had the will to do so, could do much better at taking these obstacles into account. Nevertheless, Reid holds that children are quite capable of comprehending and acting in accordance with basic moral ideas. He offers an example: One boy has a top, another a scourge; says the first to the other, If you will lend me your scourge as long as I can keep up my top with it, you shall next have the top as long as you can keep it up. Agreed, says the other. This is a contract perfectly understood by both parties, though they never heard of the definition given by Ulpian or by Titius. And each of them knows, that he is injured if the other breaks the bargain, and that he does wrong if he breaks it himself. (Reid, 2010, 329)

This knowledge is not based on an understanding of, let alone acceptance of, a comprehensive moral system. Even adults need not have such an understanding. Resisting the Socratic demand (made of Euthyphro in Plato’s early dialogue of the same name) to explain what it is that makes all right acts right, Reid holds that such a demand is unreasonable. There may be no one thing that makes all right acts right. But even if there is, it does not seem necessary to know what this is in order to have a deep understanding of what makes this or that kind of act right (or wrong). Commenting on the desire to have a system of morality that rests on a single, overarching principle, or at least a small set of overarching principles, Dugald Stewart, Reid’s student and close follower of his views, warns us against having ‘an excessive love of simplicity’ which will lead us to sidestep ʼ ‘the real complication of our active principles’. (Stewart, 1829, 17-18). 132

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A central feature of Reid’s view of morality is that, although systematic thinking can help us organize our ideas in useful ways, a system of morals is more like a system of botany or mineralogy than a system of geometry. Empirically based systems like botanical or mineralogical ones are amenable to new discoveries and changes that do not necessarily depend on, or seriously alter, other portions of the system. Similarly, Reid believes, moral learning can be piecemeal and revisable in light of further experience and reflection. This comports well with how children’s moral development takes place (and is emphasized in the writings of Matthews, Lipman, and Sharp). The two boys in Reid’s example understand their mutual responsibilities in sharing the top and scourge. Although they may lack a definition of ‘contract,’ they grasp the normative implications of their situation. They understand the bindingness of giving their word, the importance of mutual trust, the moral injury that can result from betraying that trust, and what fairness requires of them in situations of this sort. Also, without relying on a comprehensive account of morality, they can extend their understanding to related, but different situations. For example, they can realize that circumstances may require them suddenly to stop, even if one of them is deprived of his turn. ‘Next time,’ one may say to the other, ‘it will be your turn first.’ This, they can agree, is the fair way to proceed. Reid speaks metaphorically of ‘the seeds of morality’ that require a hospitable, nurturing social environment as they slowly mature (Pritchard, 2011). Also, he insists: ‘Our moral judgments are not like those we form in speculative matters, dry and unaffecting, but, from their nature, are necessarily accompanied with affections and feelings’ (Reid, 2010, 180). So, although judgment (which involves reason and cognition) is an essential aspect of moral approval and disapproval, affect is, too. In illustrating this, Reid (like his contemporaries Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart) discusses resentment in great detail —focusing on both the promise and challenges it poses for moral agents. Although it is a natural sentiment, it requires considerable refinement and constraint if it is to qualify as a moral sentiment —and this begins in early childhood, as one’s rational and affective capacities are developing together. Van der Shalk and van Woudenberg contrast Reid’s approach to philosophical undertakings with Lipman’s Thinking in Education (2nd ed., 2003). With its insistence that children be prepared to give reasons for whatever they assert, Lipman’s approach invites failure, they warn —and, in the end, skepticism. In contrast, they say, Reid’s reliance on ‘common sense’ allows some statements to stand on their own, without needing to be supported with reasons. However, it is not clear that this depiction is a good fit for either Lipman or Reid. Lipman’s starting point is what he calls a community of inquiry, not Cartesian solitude. Nor do either Reid or Lipman endorse the Cartesian quest for incorrigible certainty. Both allow ‘common sense’ appeals, but they would insist that these appeals themselves must be able to stand up to critical assessment by thoughtful inquirers. Admittedly, Reid relies on an appeal to ‘self-evidence’ in support of basic moral principles, but self-evident statements for Reid may need to be carefully examined before their selfevidence becomes obvious. He notes that without such examination, one may spend one’s entire lifetime without noticing or appreciating their self-evidence. Reid’s example of the two boys sharing a top and a scourge should stand up well to critical challenges by both adults and children. However, not all views that might initially seem plausible fare so well. Consider this example provided by Gareth Matthews: ʽIan (six years old) found to his chagrin that the three children of his parent’s friends monopolized the 133

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television; they kept him from watching his favorite program. ‘Mother,’ he asked in frustration, ‘why is it better for three children to be selfish than one?’. (Matthews, 1980, 28). Matthews invited a group of 8-10 year olds to discuss Ian’s question (Matthews, 1984). What followed was a vigorous analysis of the situation. None of the children seemed tempted to side with the mother’s utilitarian leanings in this case. This does not mean that they totally lack utilitarian leanings. Perhaps different examples could bring this out. (For example, would they support the fluoridation of water in their community in order to reduce tooth decay even if a few members opposed it?) Children’s eagerness to discuss such issues illustrates what Reid calls their ‘principle of curiosity’. Reid comments: ‘The curiosity of children is the principle that occupies most of their time while they are awake. What they can handle they examine on all sides, and often break in pieces, in order to discover what is within’ (Reid, 2010, 100). As Matthews’ example illustrates, such curiosity is not restricted to physical objects. It applies to the moral domain, as well. Throughout his Essays on the Active Powers of Man Reid discusses ‘seeds of morality’ that he regards as precursors to the child’s moral understanding and moral agency. For example, there is the principle of veracity (a natural tendency to say what one believes is true) and the principle of credulity (a natural tendency to believe what one is told). These ‘seeds of morality’ eventually help shape the child’s moral assessment of, say, lying and trust. The principles of veracity and credulity are instrumental in children’s language learning. As time passes, of course, children learn that others are not always to be believed (they may be mistaken, or even lie); and they learn that they themselves are often mistaken, and they learn how to lie. Still, as Reid points out, even adults retain dispositions to take others at their word, albeit somewhat guardedly, as they lend support to the acceptance of testimony and the norm of truthfulness. For Reid, an essential moral guide for young children is a first principle that, taken seriously, requires caring about others and not just oneself: ‘It is a first principle in morals, That we ought not to do to another, what we should think wrong to be done to us in like circumstances. If a man is not capable of perceiving this in his cool moments, when he reflects seriously, he is not a moral agent, nor is he capable of being convinced of it by reasoning’ (Reid, 2010, 177). This principle presumes that those who accept it do think that they can be wronged, and, similarly, so can others. It does not, by itself, indicate what is right or wrong, only that judgments about right or wrong in particular circumstances should be generalizable to other circumstances that are relevantly similar. A fundamental starting point is that moral agents do have ideas about right and wrong —for, Reid insists: ‘To reason about justice with a man who sees nothing to be just or unjust; or about benevolence with a man who sees nothing in benevolence preferable to malice, is like reasoning with a blind man about colour, or with a deaf man about sound’ (Reid, 2010, 178). Recognizable as a version of the Golden Rule, Reid’s first principle is not always easy to use appropriately. Resisting its use only for personal advantage, Reid holds that one ‘must consult his conscience, or moral faculty, when he is calm and dispassionate, unbiassed by interest, affection, or fashion’ (Reid, 2010, 179). Whether adult or child, we can easily fall short of attaining such a disinterested frame of mind, but we have reason to hope that, with effort, we can have some success. Reid counsels: ‘The faculties which nature hath given us, are the only engines we can use to find out the truth. We cannot indeed prove that those faculties are not fallacious, unless God should give us new faculties to sit in judgment upon the old. But we are born under a necessity of trusting them’ (Reid, 2010, 179-180). 134

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So, for Reid, the story of moral development is one of the gradual development of rational powers, of having appropriate affective responses to what one perceives, of correcting oneself, and of accepting responsibility (for both wrongdoing and for doing good). But central to this story is the social setting within which the development of moral understanding takes place. Exchanging ideas with others, examining uncritically held assumptions, and coming to appreciate both similarities and differences in circumstances and perspectives is crucial to that development for Reid. These are all central features of the views of those today who encourage the philosophical thinking of children.

Adam Smith Thomas Reid’s immediate predecessor in Glasgow University’s position as Chair of Moral Philosophy was Adam Smith (1723-1790). Although Reid took issue with some of Smith’s views in Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, there are some striking similarities in their respective accounts of the moral development of children. The highpoint of Adam Smith’s theory of the moral sentiments is its reference to an imagined ‘impartial spectator’, a critical point of view we may strive to attain, but with only imperfect results. As with Reid, what is urged is that we try to adopt a disinterested attitude toward our own particular interests and those with whom we have close association. In regard to self-assessment, what is required is that, ‘I divide myself, as it were into two persons; and that I the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of’ (Smith, 1790, 110). Thus, both Smith and Reid can be seen as trying to push moral agents, including children, in the direction of seeking full moral justification of their beliefs, motives, and actions. Insofar as we succeed in viewing our own particular interests and circumstances with such disinterest, we can ask what enables us to do this. Smith’s account of moral development is intended to help us answer this question. Before any self-assessment, moral or otherwise, is possible, says Smith, we need the help of others: ‘Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face….’ (Smith, 1790, 113). Although Smith characterizes the perspective of an impartial spectator as a voice from ‘within the breast’, it is clear that the development of this voice requires the assistance of others. Others serve as social ‘mirrors’, telling us how we are seen, and assessed, by them. Such engagement with others offer us opportunities for conversation, or dialogue. The ‘reflection’ provided by others can occasion mutual exchange and exploration. Thus, neither those confronted by this social ‘mirror’ nor the ‘mirror’ itself remains passive. Each is provided with the opportunity for acquiring new perspectives and for engaging in critical assessment of these perspectives. This aids us in moving in the direction of attaining the sort of disinterested perspective of an ideal examiner and judge. We do not need to deny totally the hold that self-interest might still have on us. This can aid us in learning to keep it more in check, by coming to regard oneself as simply ‘one among many’ in a shared moral world. Smith illustrates what he has in mind in his detailed examination of resentment. As with Reid, Smith’s account of resentment is inspired by the earlier writings of Joseph Butler, whose sermons discussed the moral importance of learning to subject our anger to reasonable constraints (Butler, 1970). Smith points out that resentment is seldom welcomed by others —either when it is directed at them or even when it is seen as directed at others. At least 135

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when initially observed, its unpleasantness often directs negative attention toward the person who is expressing his or her resentment. The resenter is perceived as an aggressor, and the person against whom it is addressed may be viewed as an unfortunate victim. This may change in favor of the resenter after the observer has acquired a fuller understanding of what has given rise to the resentment, but only after his or her anger is toned down. In cases in which the resentment seems excessive, Smith observes, ‘Society and conversation […] are the most powerful remedies for restoring the mind to its tranquility, if at any time, it has unfortunately lost it; as well as the best preservatives of that equal and happy temper which is so necessary to self-satisfaction and enjoyment’ (Smith, 1790, 23). This, Smith likely thought, is also the key, in general, to achieving and maintaining the sort of reasonableness in attitude and behavior that is morally desirable. So Smith might well have welcomed the sorts of discussions encouraged by today’s proponents of a community of inquiry approach to philosophical reflection among children. However, in a recent article, Virgil Henry Storr and Arielle John pose problems for Smith’s account, problems that would seem to challenge community of inquiry approaches in general (Storr and John, 2015). What Smith describes, they suggest, is a mirror provided by others that expresses their own enculturization, rather than disinterested assessment. Thus, the socialized individual may end up being a ‘quite parochial figure’ (Storr and John, 2015, 33). What assurance is there that the cultural values surrounding the developing child will be free from the sort of bias that seriously compromises the hoped for disinterested perspective of an impartial spectator? Smith himself expresses concern that the vast majority of adults fall well short of attaining an impartial perspective, even with the aid of others as social ‘mirrors’. Ignorance, unruly passions and widespread ‘self-deceit’ are the primary culprits. Matters become even more challenging when we consider different cultures. Here Storr and John employ the metaphor of ‘cultural spectacles’. They contend that our moral perspectives are formed by social processes that challenge our ambition to embrace substantive, universal features of morality. Instead, it is more plausible to see us as looking at the world through ‘cultural spectacles’, thereby raising the specter of moral relativism. Storr and John’s suggested way of dealing with the problems this poses is to encourage more dialogue across different cultures. However, they note that the very notion of an impartial spectator ‘evolves through a process of enculturation, and, as such, the impartial spectator is, like all of us, a cultural creature’ (Storr and John, 2015, 51). They worry that, even at its best, the perspective of an impartial spectator will be affected to some extent by the particularities of the culture within which that perspective has developed. Thus, they worry about any claims to ‘universality’ that Smith might make on behalf of the impartial spectator. Nevertheless, Storr and John conclude somewhat optimistically: ‘On a more positive note, however, we should expect that the more we encounter people different from ourselves, the more our passions are moderated, and more cultured our spectator becomes. Thus, the more cosmopolitan our lives, the more understanding, tolerant, and cosmopolitan our views become’ (Storr and John, 2015, 51-2). Why we might expect such results is not explained. However, Storr and John provide the germs of an answer that Smith himself might find suggestive. Here is how they describe the process of enculturation: ‘Wanting to receive praise and to avoid blame, we simply try to act as others around us act. However, since other people can be biased, we realize that other people’s feelings toward us are not always the best barometer of our actions. Thus, the impartial spectator within us becomes our judge as we seek to become people who are ‘objectively’ worthy of praise and innocent of blame. To judge us at all, the impartial 136

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spectator needs a lens to help it discern the right and wrong in our actions, and that lens is our culture’ (Storr and John, 2015, 51). Although Storr and John insist that ‘the spectator’s judgments are culturally specific’, it seems that room is provided for at least some of the spectator’s judgments to be critical of the judgments of others, and even one’s own. This opening is acknowledged by Storr and John’s statement that ‘we realize that other people’s feelings toward us are not always the best barometer of our actions’. That is, it is possible for a culture to encourage self-criticism rather than simply social convention. Smith himself found fault with much of the world that immediately surrounded him, as well as with such practices as slavery in faraway lands. He also credited ‘self-deceit’ with causing much of the moral mischief in our world. Did Smith believe that children were capable of entering into philosophical discussion with other children, and even with adults, about what is better, what is worse, fair, unfair, kind, cruel, insufficient, excessive, and so on? It is interesting, and important, to note that the students who heard his lectures at Glasgow were typically young teenagers (as were Reid’s). One would certainly hope that he believed they were capable of understanding, and putting into practice, the critical perspective he was advocating. Those who today advocate establishing communities of inquiry in the schools need to take Storr and John’s challenge of ‘cultural spectacles’ seriously. A note of optimism, however, is that if these communities of inquiry are started early enough, the ‘enculturization’ that concerns Storr and John will not yet have fully set in. Combined with the inclusion of serious study of other cultures in early education, establishing philosophical communities of inquiry in the schools would seem to hold some promise in addressing their concerns.

REFERENCES Butler, J. (1970), Butler’s Fifteen Sermons, edited by T.A. Roberts (London: London Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. Englehardt, E. E. and Pritchard, M. S. (2013)., Teaching Practical Ethics, International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 27:2, pp. 161-173. Gregory, M.-R-. and Laverty, M. (2017), In Community of Inquiry with Ann Margaret Sharp: Childhood, Philosophy and Education. London: Routledge. Lipman, M. (2003), Thinking in Education, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. Long, F. (2005). Thomas Reid and Philosophy With Children. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 39 pp. 599-614. Matthews, G. (1980). Philosophy and the Young Child. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Matthews, G. (1984). Dialogues With Children.(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Plato (1975). The Trial and Death of Socrates, translated by G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Pritchard, M. (2011). Thomas Reid on ‘the Seeds of Morality. Journal of Scottish Thought, Vol. 4, pp. 1-13.

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Reid, T. (2007). Thomas Reid on Practical Ethics, Knud Haakonssen, ed. University Park, PA: Penn State Press. Reid, T. (2010). Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Knud Haakonssen and James A. Harris, eds. University Park, PA: Penn State Press. Roesser, S. (ed.) (2010). Reid on Ethics. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Smith, A. [1790] (1984). The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, eds. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc. Stewart, D- [1829] The Works of Dugald Stewart, Vol. V: The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man. Cambridge, England: Hilliard and Brown. Storr, V.l and Henrietta, J.(2015). The Impersonal Spectator’s Cultural Spectacles. In Of Sympathy and Selfishness, C.S. Thomas, ed. Macon, GA. Mercer University Press. van der Shalk, J. L. and van Woudenberg, R. (2011). Philosophy With Children and Reid’s Thoughts About Children. Journal of Scottish Thought, 4, pp. 169-181.

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The Limits of Constructivism and the Possibility of Facilitating Ethical Dialogue in a Community of Inquiry: Avoiding the Temptations of the Ring of Gyges Emmanuel Skoutas Assistant Principal, Dandenong High School, Melbourne, Australia [email protected] CV Emmanuel is a secondary Philosophy and English teacher and is currently an Assistant Principal at the Dandenong High School. He is a PhD candidate in Philosophy of Education researching the connection between the disposition of care and the role of the facilitator in a Community of Inquiry. During the year he is a part time lecturer at the Melbourne Graduate School of Education in the subject of Dialogical Pedagogy for Critical Thinking with a special interest in dialogical pedagogy. He is a member of the Victorian Association for Philosophy in Schools (VAPS) and regularly runs Philosophy in the Classroom teacher professional development with teachers across Melbourne. He has delivered papers and conducted workshops at international Philosophy of Education conferences and facilitated communities of inquiry using art as a stimulus at the National Gallery of Victoria. ABSTRACT In this paper I will examine and analyse how the pedagogy of the community of inquiry (CoI) resembles and reflects constructivist epistemologies. The key model is the maieutic pedagogy in the Socratic dialogues of Plato. However, constructivism is limited by its epistemological and ontological relativism. I will argue we can still have a commitment to constructivism by focusing on an ethical heuristic. Referencing Levinas, dialogue is possible because an ethical disposition to be responsible for the other and respond to the other motivates our desire to care about and for dialogue. The way this can manifest in a CoI is in the disposition to ‘care’. As per Noddings, care is essentially relational and therefore can be seen as an ethical disposition that acts for the other and is felt by the other. One of the consequences of this conception of care for the facilitator of a CoI is that rather than rely merely on a constructivist epistemology, an ethical heuristic also becomes a source for pedagogical judgments. An example, of caring facilitators is when they avoid the temptations of Gyges, from the Platonic myth. This metaphor illustrates how facilitators ought not make an exception of themselves and to subject themselves to their ethical responsibilities. In conclusion, I suggest a procedural example from the Australian Aboriginal practice of the ‘yarning circle’ used as a scaffold for dialogical inquiry. This structural device may support the conditions for the facilitator to be passively open to the needs of interlocutors and active in their moral responsibilities toward the community. KEYWORDS Community of Inquiry, Constructivism, Care, Ethical Heuristic, Facilitator. RESUMEN En este trabajo examinaré y analizaré cómo la pedagogía de la comunidad de investigación (CoI) se asemeja y refleja las epistemologías constructivistas. El modelo clave es la 139

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pedagogía mayéutica en los diálogos socráticos de Platón. Sin embargo, el constructivismo está limitado por su relativismo epistemológico y ontológico. Argumentaré que todavía podemos tener un compromiso con el constructivismo al enfocarnos en una heurística ética. Al hacer referencia a Levinas, el diálogo es posible porque una disposición ética de ser responsable por el otro y responder al otro motiva nuestro deseo de preocuparnos por el diálogo y hacerlo dialogar. La forma en que esto puede manifestarse en un CoI está en la disposición de 'cuidar'. Según Noddings, el cuidado es esencialmente relacional y, por lo tanto, puede verse como una disposición ética que actúa por el otro y se siente por el otro. Una de las consecuencias de esta concepción del cuidado para el facilitador de una CoI es que, en lugar de basarse únicamente en una epistemología constructivista, una heurística ética también se convierte en una fuente de juicios pedagógicos. Un ejemplo de facilitadores cuidadosos es cuando evitan las tentaciones de Giges, del mito platónico. Esta metáfora ilustra cómo los facilitadores no deben hacer una excepción de sí mismos y someterse a sus responsabilidades éticas. En conclusión, propongo un ejemplo procedimiental de la práctica aborigen australiana del “círculo de la estera” utilizado como andamio para la investigación dialógica. Este dispositivo estructural puede apoyar las condiciones para que el facilitador esté pasivamente abierto a las necesidades de los interlocutores y activo en sus responsabilidades morales hacia la comunidad. PALABRAS CLAVE Comunidad de investigación, constructivismo, cuidado, ética heurística, facilitador. Listen quiet. I’m alongside here, teach people here. They used to camp here, and painted. Little bit of paint here. What the story is, they used to sit down and remember. Ah, I better go draw something. That just like school, might be. 1

Bill Neidjie

INTRODUCTION The introductory quote from Bill Neidjie, a Gagadju elder from Kakadu National Park, Australia recounting his elders teaching Dreamtime stories. In its description we can appreciate an ethical dimension to teaching that is demonstrated by his elders’ invitation to proximity and community as a condition for teaching. It is also clear that he sees this form of teaching as a model by which to fulfil his own responsibility to continue their teachings to the young today.2 It is included at the beginning of my paper to illustrate an example of teaching that is possible from an ethical heuristic. But can an ethic—and in particular collaborative dialogical inquiry in the classroom called the Community of Inquiry (CoI)— inform pedagogy? We are accustomed in the West to consider the findings from educational research to inform teacher practice from psychology, social sciences and philosophical disciplines such as epistemology and ontology. But can an attitude and disposition of responsibility towards others also encourage teachers to seek solutions to how they facilitate

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Neidjie, Bill (2015) Old Man's Story, Aboriginal Studies Press, pp.41-42. It is taken from a series of stories narrated to Mark Lang to be transcribed into text and represents a break with the oral tradition because ‘Old Man Bill’, as he was called, recognised that as one of the last speakers of his language, Gagudju, he felt a responsibility to continue his people’s legacy not only for his people but for all Australians and the written text was the best way to capture and relay his teachings. 2

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dialogical inquiry? In the spirit of Bill Neidjie’s teaching this paper is my exploration of how an ethical heuristic can be a practical guide for the facilitator of a CoI. I will explain how constructivism is an epistemological justification for facilitating dialogue and yet it can be argued to be a limited theory and therefore not a fully coherent pedagogical instruction. In the first section I examine and briefly outline the practice of the CoI and in the second section I discuss an interpretation of constructivism and how it informs and relates to the practice of facilitating a CoI. In the third section I examine how constructivism is limited and suggest whether this gap can be overcome by an ethical heuristic. In the fourth section I explore and suggest through Plato’s metaphor of the Ring of Gyges how we can overcome the limitations of constructivist theory with an ethical disposition. And finally, I discuss a current example from the oral tradition of the Australian Aborigine in the use of the 'yarning circle’3 to illustrate how an ethical heuristic can inform structured communal oral dialogues such as the CoI.

Section 1 The Community of Inquiry The practice of communal dialogical pedagogy called the Community of Inquiry (CoI) originated from the Philosophy for Children programme (P4C) initiated by Mathew Lipman in the 1970s (Lipman, 1980). The role of the teacher as the facilitator of the CoI is crucial in bringing about the conditions for a successful CoI.4 Teaching in the classroom is usually thought of as an adult acting in ways that brings about an edifying transformative experience for a child. In the P4C classroom the teacher takes the form of a facilitator who acts in a way that draws out latent meanings from the students who co-construct their learning. Much like the Socratic midwife, the facilitator of a CoI enacts the maieutic pedagogy where the classroom structure resembles the ancient Greek agora with Socrates and his interlocutors in dialogue about central and contestable concepts such as freedom, love and justice. The community of inquiry is a term co-opted by Mathew Lipman (2002) from C. S. Peirce’s ‘community of scientific inquiry’ (Cam, 2012) to describe a communal group of students who collaboratively inquire together to learn and enact critical, creative and caring thinking. In a reference to the Philosophy for Children program, Clinton Golding (2011) cites the educational and philosophical context of its curriculum and the central function of the community of inquiry as its pedagogy: The core praxis is the Community of Inquiry involving critical dialogue and reflective deliberation in a group inquiry. This praxis has a distinguished intellectual ancestry including Dewey’s reflective and inquiry learning; Peirce’s community of (scientific) inquiry; Vygotsky and Mead’s theories of social learning; and commonalities with the dialogue theories of Gadamer and Habermas. (Golding, 2011, p.413)

But before the community can mature as an autonomous collective capable of critical, creative and caring dialogical inquiry, the teacher will need to encourage and scaffold their development (Splitter and Sharp, 1995). A fundamental recurring theme in the literature of

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The yarning mat is a name given to a mat that is placed on the ground where interlocutors sit. The word ‘yarn’ as used in Australia has the general English meaning that relates to spun fibres but it also has the added meaning as is used in the ‘yarning circle’ to refer to narrated stories, or to have a conversation. 4 I have paraphrased Matthew Lipman from an interview; Sasseville, M. (2005) DVD Des Enfants Philosophent, Laval University, Quebec, Canada.

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the community of inquiry is centred on the role of the teacher as facilitator. The following are just a few examples of how the facilitator is to be understood: a provoker, a manager, a motivator, a modulator, a facilitator, a coach, a weaver of threads, a midwife and a gadfly’(Splitter & Sharp, 1995) (…) the facilitator is a coach and a catalyst for the inherent autopoeisis of group dialogue. (Kennedy, 2004) Teachers have a distinctive role within the Community of Inquiry—they guide students to make progress and to learn to make progress (rather than leading students to teacher-decided outcomes). (Golding, 2014)

What emerges from these views is that the facilitator who makes judgments will make decisions that affect the development and progress of the CoI. Matthew Lipman reinforces this when he describes the role of the facilitator. ‘Classroom philosophy teachers are conceived as facilitators of philosophical inquiry rather than as authoritative sources of philosophical knowledge. The guidance of a philosophical discussion is an art that requires great tact, skill and judgment’. (Lipman, 2014). Apart from the crucial role of the teacher as facilitator as a guide and ‘gadfly’ that is described above (notice the recurring analogy of weaving in Splitter and Sharp), the quotes also illustrate a pedagogy that encourages active participation of the students, which is the hallmark of constructivist theory. Even in these brief quotes we see a relationship between the practices of facilitating a CoI to constructivist methodologies. In the next section I discuss more fully what constructivism is and how an interpretation of it is related to the CoI.

Section 2 Constructivism and its Relation to the CoI The pedagogical options available to a teacher can be corralled in part by their epistemological and ontological commitments. If this is the case, then a teacher’s assumptions, beliefs and knowledge about what knowledge is and how knowledge is formed at the very least contributes to the range of choices they make to inform the dialogical decisions for the CoI. The dominant epistemology in education is constructivism (Powell, Farrar & Cohen, 1985). Constructivism in education today is influenced by the work of Piaget (1984) to inform cognitive constructivism and further developed as radical constructivism (von Glasersfeld, 1995) and social constructivism (Vygotsky, 1978). Its interpretations vary between exponents but below are just a few of the collated quotes that provide an overview of the scope of their position (Jones and Brader-Arajae, 2002). What is important for my purposes is to note the epistemological consensus that knowledge is co-constructed and any ontological commitment to a realist position is suspended. (K)nowledge, no matter how it be defined, is in the heads of persons, and that the thinking subject has no alternative but to construct what he or she knows on the basis of his or her own experience. (von Glasersfeld, 1995, p.1) The central principles of this approach are that learners can only make sense of new situations in terms of their existing understanding. Learning involves an active process in which learners construct meaning by linking new ideas with their existing knowledge. (Naylor & Keogh, 1999, p.93) (C)onstructivists of different persuasion (hold a) commitment to the idea that the development of understanding requires active engagement on the part of the learner. (Jenkins, 2000, p.601)

Although there are a variety of interpretations of constructivism in education as suggested above, at the core is the idea that the development of knowledge and understanding 142

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requires the learner to be an active meaning maker. In other words, the content of knowledge is not something external to the knower but something already immanent. ‘ (…) knowledge is not passively received but built up by the cognizing subject’ (Von Glasersfeld, 1995). Thus, constructivists shift the focus from knowledge as a product to knowing as a process. Within constructivist theory, knowledge isn't something that exists outside of the learner’. (Jones and Brader-Arajae, 2002). The Philosophy for Children program makes this epistemological lineage explicit (Lipman, 1980, 1995, 1996 and 2003). Maughn Gregory articulates the fundamental principle of active meaning making that is demonstrated in a CoI and how it is related to constructivist pedagogy generally. ‘In terms made famous by John Dewey, the goal is to bring children up, not as passive recipients of educational content, but as active makers of meaning, capable of exercising independent judgment and of democratic collaboration. The classroom community of inquiry is an example of constructivist pedagogy (…)’. (Gregory, 2002, p.400). He then goes on in the same article to further elaborate and explain on the role of the facilitator using a constructivist pedagogy on the need to ‘scaffold’ the learning. It is imperative in the classroom community of inquiry, as in all constructivist pedagogy, that

the guidance provided by the educator merely “scaffold” the student’s active intelligence in making and testing hypotheses, and never override that intelligence by attempting to “condition” the student toward predefined outcomes, on the behaviorist model of stimulus response. (Ibid)

Phil Cam (2011) also notes the relationship between the social constructivism of Lev Vygotsky and the cognitive development in students participating in a CoI. Cam clearly elucidates the important Vygotskian point (Vygotsky, Mind in Society, p 57) about the primary role of social relations on an individual’s thinking. ‘It is vital to note that in the Community of Inquiry this reflective process is not just an individual one. It occurs between people. It is in fact primarily inter-subjective, and only secondarily a process that goes on in the individual. Vygotsky’s doctrine that ‘all the higher mental functions originate as actual relations between human individuals’ certainly applies here’. Generally constructivism can be characterised as an epistemology, which does not subscribe to the realist and objective correlation between what we know and the world. Its epistemology seeks to overcome the stunted ancient arguments about what knowledge is and therefore is very appealing to the pragmatist approaches to education.5 This epistemological commitment traces its lineage to Plato’s Socratic dialogues. Plato’s pedagogy is based on his theory of recollection, anamnesis, but there are clearly very few if any facilitators of a CoI who would subscribe to the Platonic argument of anamnesis today. But the Socratic midwife model becomes a useful guide for facilitators who subscribe to the constructivist arguments about the immanent knowledge of students and the social methods of the co-construction of knowledge convincing.

Section 3 Limits of Constructivism Even from the brief overview of constructivism we can, I think, already point out two substantial limitations as a pedagogical theory. D.C. Philips (1995) memorably describes the Good, the Bad and the Ugly of constructivism that summarises the benefits teachers see in it 5

For an insightful elaboration of the influence of Vygotsky on Lipman, see Lipman, M. (1991), Rediscovering the Vygotsky Trail Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 7 (2), p.14 – 16.

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but also its limitations. The ‘good’ refers to the active participation of the learner and the social nature of learning; the ‘bad’ denotes its relativistic approach to truth and reality and the ‘ugly’ is the ‘quasi-religious and ideological commitment’ it inspires amongst its adherents. The ‘bad’ relativistic implications of constructivism for the pedagogy of a CoI question the validity and truth of the community’s constructed meanings. This is a dilemma if we as teachers have to ensure our students meet educational outcomes and standards. As Gregory (2002) points out, the constructed truths of the community may not meet the standards and may not be objectively verifiable. ‘Therefore, without the authority of the teacher as an external disciplinarian of the procedures and outcomes of the students’ community of inquiry, it becomes less likely that educational aims regarding the mastery of standards will be met’. (Gregory, 2002, p.400). Apart from the epistemological problem of relativism there is, however, the related ontological problem. Splitter (2009) argues in his critique of social constructivism that if learning is ‘meaning-making’ then the consequences could be that we lose any objective foundationalism about the correspondence between reality and truth. If the truth about facts, texts and even identities of the participants is socially constructed from the CoI, then the ontological status of reality is not settled. As Splitter (2009) asks, is there not a responsibility on the part of the teacher to ensure that students discover and create truths that correspond to the authoritative knowledge we have accepted in our community? For example, if students collectively rationalised to accept the legalisation of a dangerous drug, without the wider facts and consensus research from scientific community and the social sciences about its associated dangers, then teachers would be negligent in their duty of care but also in their capacity to teach to accepted standards of critical thinking. The point is the teacher is more than a facilitator of knowledge; they should also carry the authority of an expert.6 ‘With very few exceptions, no community of learners can construct knowledge of a discipline or field, unless their deliberations and findings are linked to the deliberations and findings of relevant expertsʼ. (Splitter, 2009, p.140). Splitter goes on to argue the resolution to this problem is a commitment to a process of inquiry that includes ‘warranted’ claims to truth and justified true beliefs and I agree with his argument.7 While not shying away from the relativistic problems of constructivism, Splitter still endorses it as a pedagogical approach as long as there is a commitment to deliberative, participatory and justifiable inquiry. It follows that as long as we build into our understanding of constructivism a dual sense of commitment to that which is claimed as knowledge, and to the process of inquiry that ensures a warrant or justification so to claim, then constructivism is safeguarded against accusations of relativism. This commitment, on behalf of students and their teachers, will encourage both parties to tread cautiously and watchfully in the realm of claims to know, but to do so collaboratively, by way of an inquiry into what they, as well as the relevant experts in the field, believe and why. (Splitter, 2009, p.145)

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Gert Biesta (2015) has raised the issue of how the role and standing of the teacher in the community has been eroded by the ‘learnification’ of the teaching profession. 7 For the purposes of my paper I have not done justice to convey the complex discussion and important argument Splitter has made to more fully articulate the concept of authenticity see: Splitter, L.J. (2009) Authenticity and Constructivism in Education Studies in Philosophy and Education, Vol. 28, Issue 2 pp. 135 - 151

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Although I agree with Splitter and his argument for collective, deliberative and justifiable inquiry, I seek to encourage a discourse for an ethical solution. From the discussion of the limitations of constructivism what becomes clear are two things. Firstly, there are problems with constructivism that make it untenable as a coherent pedagogy. Secondly, despite the problems of epistemological and ontological relativism for constructivism, we as teachers can still engage in the practices of constructivism in the classroom as long as we make a ‘commitment’ to how we make this pedagogy manifest in our classrooms. I agree with Splitter in particular when he describes the pedagogical issue as a normative issue. The way we get out of the dilemma of a limited constructivism is to accept a normative commitment to find how we ought to think collectively. I would argue that this kind of commitment is an argument for an ethical heuristic. But what would that look like for a classroom?

Section 4 The Ring of Gyges The ethical dimension of dialogue is important for overcoming the limitations of constructivism. To do so, I will use the myth of the Ring of Gyges to illustrate and provide a context for my argument but also to provide a model of what it might look like for a facilitator in the classroom engaged in a CoI. The Platonic myth of the Ring of Gyges is a narrative that conveys my proposition that the capacity of the facilitator to foster an ethical community is to be included along with current pedagogical theory as a necessary condition for dialogical thinking to overcome the limitations of constructivism. My interpretation of the myth and its ethical implications are informed by the philosopher and educator, Emmanuel Levinas (1906 – 1995). His analysis is pertinent because of the ethical orientation he has argued for in our relationship with the ‘Other’.8 The myth was recounted by Plato in Book 2 of the Republic as an explanation to Glaucon’s question about whether anyone could be virtuous enough to resist the temptation to do whatever they chose when they would never have to endure the consequences of doing wrong? The myth recounts a shepherd from the Kingdom of Lydia who, after an earthquake, discovers a golden ring in a crevice. He put it on and learns that if he turns the ring he becomes invisible and he can do whatever he pleases with impunity. When he turns the ring the other way he becomes visible again. With this power he is tempted and seduces the queen and kills the king and becomes the King of Lydia. According to Levinas what is fundamental to the narrative is Gyges’ willingness to abuse the power of the ring to escape from his moral responsibilities. He wants to be invisible to the communal obligations and make an exception of himself from the accepted rules. 8

The reference to include Levinas is fraught with problems and issues around the link between philosophy and in this case, phenomenology and education, but that is the subject of another paper. Laverty (2014) discusses the concern (Curren, 2010) that philosophy of education is at risk of becoming disengaged with the central issues of education when ‘. . . To write about Derrida or Dualism, Wittgenstein or Whiteness, Levinas or the Other, may be thought so obviously rich in practical implications that education need not be mentioned at all’ (Curren 2010, 3)’ from Laverty (2014 p.43). However, I accept Laverty’s argument that educational discourse benefits from the inclusion of an ethical dimension. ‘…[P]hilosophers of education seek to challenge and disrupt presumptions of educational efficiency and certainty, wishing to make explicit the ethical, aesthetic, and existential dimensions of education. If they gesture to the ineffable, it is because they are up against the limits of a certain picture of education.’ (Laverty, 2014 p. 44)

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Analogously, the teacher’s authority as a facilitator of dialogue becomes morally questionable and I would say untenable if they make themself an exception to the established communal rules for dialogue. ‘Gyges plays a double game, a presence to the others and an absence, speaking to “others” and evading speech; Gyges is the very condition of man, the possibility of injustice and radical egoism, the possibility of accepting the rules of the game, but cheating’. (Levinas, 1969 p.173). The facilitator has an obligation toward the other to scaffold and guide the shared rules of interaction and participation that becomes the foundation and possibility for reasoning. If the facilitator allows himself or herself to be an exception to the rule, then he or she like Gyges is ‘cheating’ by evading the measures they are asking of their participants to abide by while excusing themself from the same obligations. Gauthier (2012) sees the interpretation Levinas provides to apply to an ethics of hospitality but essentially the point he reinforces is the moral responsibility one person bears toward the other. ‘More specifically, what Levinas’s analysis (Plato’s myth of Gyges) suggests is that our status as moral beings stands or falls with our treatment of the strangers who present themselves on our doorstep. By way of positing an ethics of hospitality, …’. (Gauthier, 2012 p.200). In relation to the classroom, the commitment to inquire together is fostered through the ethical disposition of the facilitator. If the students recognise his or her judgments are motivated from an ethical disposition toward each of them and collectively, then there is a signal that the teacher cares. This notion of care is meant in the relational sense of care from Nel Noddings (1984) but as Lipman (2003) writes in his section on ‘Education for Caring Thinking’ there is also a link between emotions and caring thinking and its effect on decisionmaking and judgments. Here he is referring to the community of inquirers as a whole including the facilitator. I suspect we feel emotions when we have choices and decisions to make, and these choices are the leading edges of judgment. Indeed, so important is the role of emotion in the thinking that leads up to the judgment and in the thinking that leads down from and away from it that we would be hard put to tell the one from the other. In fact, they may very well be indistinguishable; they may very well be identical, in which case it would make perfect sense to say that the emotion is the choice, it is the decision, it is the judgment. And it is this kind of thinking that we may well call caring thinking when it has to do with matters of importance. (Lipman, 2003, pp. 270-271)

But firstly, I briefly examine the notion of care from Nel Noddings (1984), who makes the distinction between ‘caring – about’ and ‘caring – for’ which is relevant here as it has to do with the normative interpretation of Lipman’s phrase ‘matters of importance’. As with Slitter above, the things we make ‘commitments’ to, and the things we think are important reveal one’s normative disposition to judgment. For example, from Noddings’ distinction; the ‘caring about’ is to do with one’s concern about someone or something whereas ‘caring for’ is the feeling of being cared for that the other person senses in a relational encounter such as between a teacher and a student. The distinction is seen in the intentional goals of teaching such as learning outcomes and curriculum content as ‘caring about’ which could have to do with the material conditions that make learning possible for example. Which contrasts with the ‘relational sense of care’ that a student can experience from a teacher. ʽThe relational sense of caring forces us to look at the relation. It is not enough to hear the teacher’s claim to care. Does the student recognize that he or she is cared for? Is the teacher thought by the student to be a caring teacher?’ (Noddings, 2005). Both senses of caring disclose what it is that the teacher preferences and this distinction may inform how the teacher of dialogue in the classroom can establish relations that will make 146

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dialogue possible in the first place. ‘ʽI do not mean to suggest that the establishment of caring relations will accomplisheverything that must be done in education, but these relations provide the foundationfor successful pedagogical activity’. (Noddings, 2005, p.4).ʼ Although Lipman noted the primary role for care in thinking, the discourse so far including from his own contributions, has only given it limited attention (Lipman, 2003) that focused on the judgment. The nature and role of care in the CoI deserves greater attention particularly as it relates to the caring intentions of the facilitator which then found the subsequent judgments Lipman (2003 p. 270-271) writes about. It is the facilitator who instigates the ‘community’, it is the facilitator who mediates and models critical, creative and caring thinking. Ann Margaret Sharp (2004) pointed to the prospect of saying ‘much more’ than what has been said so far. … one cannot help but think that there is much more to be said about caring thinking and caring practice than what Lipman suggests. Maybe the same can be said with regard to critical and creative thinking— but certainly with caring thinking we seem to be in a realm of metaphysics, as well as descriptive epistemology. Caring thinking suggests a certain view of personhood and a pedagogical process. It also suggests a particular environment for the cultivation of such thinking. I am referring to the process of communal inquiry and the democratic environment of the classroom community of inquiry. It is as if you can't have one without the other, if you are interested in cultivating caring thinking among children on a large scale. (Sharp, 2004 p.9)

In taking up her suggestion here I hope I have made a contribution to the discourse on caring and explained its place in the pedagogy of the community of inquiry that can fill the void left by the limitations of constructivism. But are there examples of this type of caring pedagogy? I suggest that there are. We have each experienced a caring teacher at least once in our lives and there is abundant anecdotal evidence of teachers who chose this profession as a vocation because of their aspiration to make a difference and that they care. In the last section I examine one example of communal dialogical teaching that demonstrates the ethical heuristic of care evident in the words and actions of Bill Neidjie and his people in the opening quote.

Section 5 Yarning Circles Amongst Australians the word ‘yarn’ is used both to refer to threads used in knitting or weaving and for storytelling. The storytelling meaning for yarn originated from the nautical slang of 19th Century sailors to describe the stories they told each other while preparing and repairing ropes by twisting them with yarn.9 For Indigenous Australians10, yarning is a word that denotes the sharing of stories and knowledge and for inquiring collectively in dialogue.11 Indigenous educators have incorporated the practice of the ‘yarning circle’ into formal school settings. It is usually facilitated by Indigenous educators or at least overseen by them when used in formal classrooms or on school grounds. Below is 9

The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (2003) ed. T.F. Hoad Oxford University Press online version (Accessed, 3/10/2017). For more on the sailing etymology see: Isil, O. A. (1996). When a Loose cannon flogs a dead horse there’s the devil to pay: Seafaring words in everyday speech. Camden, Me.: International Marine. 10 The term Indigenous used refers to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people of Australia. I acknowledge that Indigenous peoples consist of many First Nations, each with their unique culture. 11 The pedagogical and philosophical significance of the analogy between weaving and dialogue has a poetic resonance in the term ‘yarn’ and could be further explored but better suited to pursue in another context.

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a description of its features and processes that are practiced in a state secondary school, Lonalea State High School. They resemble many of the practices one finds in communities of inquiries from the P4C curriculum in more than 70 countries across the globe. - Yarning takes place in a seated circle; this is either a physical space (allotted yarning space) or a reorganised classroom with participants sitting on the floor or chairs facing each other. A yarning circle does not look like a lecture theatre or traditional classroom experience. - Yarning circles, whether small or large circles have a physical presence of shared power. - A Yarning Circle looks one person talking and all others listening. Movement around the circle is clockwise. (Davis, 2013 p.6).

This description is taken from a schools’ newsletter that is shared with local primary and secondary schools in the southern region of Queensland, Australia. It is an acknowledged Indigenous practice with historical and cultural significance. ʽDespite local variations of practice, yarning is a valuable Indigenous pedagogy and process that has enriched many classrooms. Many people within our national network use yarning and the process of sitting in a circle with students, professionals and community members in their daily workʼ (Davis, 2013 p.6). The oral language tradition of the yarning circle is derived from Australian Indigenous communities where it is referred to as ‘Dadirri’ in some regions of northern Australia. The name Dadirri and also carries the connotation of ‘inner deep listening to the land’ (Ungunmerr-Baumann, 2002). Yarning circles range across a variety purposes from scaffolding reading and writing literacy (Mills, Sunderland and Davis-Warra, 2013) to the sharing and interpretation of cultural knowledge through the use of multimedia (K.A. Mills et al, 2016) or identifying ecological connection with the land (Mills, Sunderland and DavisWarra, 2013). Included below is an image about the use of yarning circles at an independent school Hymba Yumba Indigenous School in Springfield, Queensland, Australia. Yarning circles are an example of a device for building a community of inquiry that is informed not by a constructivist pedagogy. Such a pedagogy as argued above may be limited epistemologically and ontologically. However, cultural practices such as the yarning circle, build on an ethical heuristic of teachers by bringing people together to problem solve, share and build on their knowledge. For example, in my school12 the philosophy teacher used it after she reported behaviours that impeded the class from forming into a community. A variant of the yarning circle called the ‘yarning mat’ was used at Dandenong High School to scaffold rules for dialogue. It came at a stage when little progress was possible because there was a lack of interpersonal respect amongst each other. Their teacher decided to use the yarning mat as a device to foster a caring community in order to establish the conditions for inquiry. It had an immediate positive effect on the classroom dynamic and has allowed them to continue to mature as a critical, creative and caring community of inquiry. The device fostered positive emotional interactions to underpin collaboration as depicted in Figure 2 below. She and the students reported a positive emotional maturation of the class members over the course of the year. They were exhibiting indicative behaviours of a constructive community of inquiry such as: appreciative thinking, empathetic and caring relational concern for the ‘good’ of their community (Lipman, 2003, p.271).

12

Dandenong High School, a state government secondary school in one of the lowest socio-economic regions of Australia with a very high non-English speaking community and new refugee cohorts.

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I contend yarning circles are evidence of an ethical disposition in teachers to facilitate dialogue with children. Their use demonstrates the teacher’s moral motivation to find educationally significant methods by which to teach. The way teachers and elders define that moral imperative is demonstrated in their stated responsibility toward the young to pass on significant cultural knowledge, for example, and to do it in a manner and with a method that represents their ethical values. One of those values is the responsibility of the elders and the teachers to continue the learning of their traditions and knowledge. In this respect, the yarning circle is a scaffold and a model that can also be used for facilitating a CoI that can help realise the ethical responsibilities of the teacher. The quote below is another teacher’s reflection on how yarning circles help scaffold the affective dimensions of community of inquiry that can support critical and creative thinking. ‘There is a great honesty and humility that emerges in the reflections of those across our network who lead or are involved in yarning. Yarning encourages a different way of engaging with knowledge through participant’s having to relate to one another both physically and intellectually in a circle the principle of no one person being afforded the role to dominate the circle’. (Davis, 2013, p.6).

Section 6 Conclusion I began and ended this paper with examples of facilitators of dialogue who have an ethical motivation toward the young in their care. As professionals, teachers of dialogue may turn to the philosophy of education such as constructivism for a pedagogical theory to inform and guide their decisions for facilitating dialogue amongst a community of inquirers. But as I have argued there are limitations to constructivism and therefore it cannot adequately provide the framework by which teachers can reliably inform their judgments. To fill the gap, I suggest that teachers who are to be facilitators of a CoI be guided by Plato’s myth of the Ring of Gyges to not make an exception of themselves in the normative principles they hold. We also have an example from Indigenous Australians in the use of yarning circles to foster a caring community of inquiry. Ultimately, as Ann Sharp reinforced many times, we have a principal responsibility as facilitators for enabling and modelling ethical relations amongst the young that we teach through our motivation and disposition to care. For a teacher, adopting an ethical heuristic may help overcome the deficiencies of pedagogical theory. ʽIn conclusion, if we are to foster caring thinking much more is needed than logic and reason. What happens in communal inquiry is that children become aware of a meaningful structure in the relationship of their lives to each other and to the worldʼ. (Sharp, 2004, p.14).

REFERENCES Biesta, G. (2011). ‘Exposure and Children: How to Resist the Instrumentalisation of Philosophy in Education.’ Journal of the Philosophy of Education, 45(2), 305 – 321. Biesta, G. (2015). What is Education For? On Good Education, Teacher Judgement, and Educational Professionalism, European Journal of Education, Vol. 50, Issue 1 pp.75-87. Cam, P. (2012). Teaching Ethics in Schools, Camberwell, Vic.: Australian Council for Educational Research. Davis, W. (2013). Gujumba Indigenous Education Projects, Faculty of Education, Queensland University of Technology, Caboolture, Queensland. 149

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15Gauthier, D.J. (2012). Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, and the Politics of Dwelling, Lanham, Md, Lexington Books. Gregory, M. (2002). Constructivism, Standards, and the Classroom Community of Inquiry, Educational Theory, Vol 52, Issue 4 December, pp 397 - 408. Golding, C. (2011). Educating Philosophically: The educational theory of Philosophy for Children, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol.43, No. 5, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford UK and USA. Laverty, M. J. (2014). The Word of Instruction: undertaking the impossible, Ethics and Education, Vol. 9, No, 1 pp42-53, Routledge Taylor and Francis. Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and Infinity (trans. Alphonso Lingis) Duquesne University Press. Lipman, M., Sharp, A., & Oscanyan, F. S. (1980), Philosophy in the Classroom, Philadelphia: Temple. University Press. Lipman, M. (1991). Rediscovering the Vygotsky Trail Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 7 (2), p.14 – 16. Lipman, M (1996). Natasha – Vygotskian Dialogues Teachers College Press. Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in Education New York, Cambridge University Press. Mills, K.A., Sunderland, N. Davis-Warra, J. (2013). Yarning Circle in the Literacy Classroom The Reading Teacher, Vol.67 Issue 4 pp. 285-289 International Reading Association. Neidjie, B. (2015) Old Man's Story, Aboriginal Studies Press, pp.41-42. Noddings, N. (2005) 'Caring in education', the encyclopedia of informal education, www.infed.org/biblio/noddings_caring_in_education.htm (accessed, March 2017). Noddings, N. (2013) 2nd edition Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles. Phillips, D.C. (Ed). (2000). Constructivism in Education: Opinions And Second Opinions on Controversial Issues, Chicago, Illinois: National Society for the Study of Education. Piaget, J. (1970/1972). The Principles of Genetic Epistemology (W. Mays, Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Plato. Phaedrus http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/p/plato/p71phs/phaedrus.html February 2018).

(accessed

Sharp, A.M. (2014). The Other Dimension of Caring Thinking (with a new commentary by Phillip Cam) Journal of Philosophy in Schools, Vol 1 No 1. Splitter, L.J. (2009). Authenticity and Constructivism in Education Studies in Philosophy and Education, Vol 28, Issue 2 pp. 135 – 151. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978) Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, ed. Michael Cole, Vera John-Steiner, Sylvia Scribner and Ellen Souberman, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Vygotsky, L. S. (1962). Thought and Language. New York: Wiley. 150

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De los pensamientos al destino Félix García Moriyón Profesor Honorario. Dpto. de Didácticas Específicas. UAM [email protected] CV Félix García Moriyón, Dr. en Filosofía. Profesor honorario del Dpto. de Didácticas Específicas (UAM), tras 35 años como profesor de filosofía en enseñanza secundaria. Autor de 19 libro y co-autor o editor de otros 22 sobre temas de filosofía y educación, con especial atención a la filosofía práctica. Ha publicado unos 200 artículos. Miembro fundador de: la Sociedad Española de Profesores de Filosofía (1980); SOPHIA, la Fundación Europea para la difusión de filosofía para niños; y del Centro de Filosofía para Niños de España, del que fue presidente cuatro años. Es miembro del ICPIC desde 1987, vicepresidente en 2005-2007 y presidente 2009-2012. Director de Thinking. The Journal of Philosophy for Children de 2006 a 2014. RESUMEN Siguiendo el proverbio al que alude el título, explicaremos el objetivo central de FpN, prestando atención a su contribución al crecimiento personal de los alumnos. Destacamos que FpN es una propuesta holística en la que se busca un desarrollo integral de la persona, siendo muy importantes los conceptos de metacognición, hábito y carácter, entendidos de una manera específica que los aleje de propuestas como la educación del carácter de Lickona. Una premisa central en esta presentación es considerar que el aprendizaje implica un cambio de comportamiento estable: gracias al proceso de aprendizaje, una persona cambia su comportamiento de manera estable, lo que puede y debe entenderse en el sentido de que genera nuevos hábitos que guían su comportamiento cotidiano. FpN no se diferencia de otras propuestas educativas en el intento de lograr esta modificación estable del comportamiento, sino más bien en la forma en que se aborda la tarea, en el modelo pedagógico propuesto y en los objetivos fundamentales que se buscan a lo largo de un proceso educativo. PALABRAS CLAVE Metacognición, competencias, hábito, carácter. ABSTRACT Following the proverb to which the title refers we will explain FpN's central objective, paying attention to its contribution to the personal growth of students. We emphasize that FpN is a holistic proposal in which an integral development of the person is sought, being very important the concepts of metacognition, habit and character, understood in a specific way that distances them from proposals such as Lickona's education of the character. A central assumption in this presentation is to consider that learning implies a stable change in behaviour: thanks to the learning process, a person changes his or her behaviour in a stable way, which can and should be understood in the sense that it generates new habits that guide his or her daily behaviour. FpN does not differ from other educational proposals in the attempt to achieve this stable modification of behavior, but rather in the way in which the 151

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task is approached, in the proposed pedagogical model and in the fundamental objectives that are sought throughout an educational process. KEYWORDS Metacognition, competencies, habit, character.

INTRODUCCIÓN ʽWatch your thoughts. They become words. Watch your words. They become deeds. Watch your deeds. They become habits. Watch your habits. They become character. Character is everything. https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/01/10/watch-your-thoughts/ʼ

Hace tiempo hice una presentación del programa de Filosofía para Niños y consideré que este proverbio podía servir muy bien como hilo conductor. Efectivamente, partiendo de la importancia concedida al cuidado de los pensamientos como producto y del pensamiento como actividad, algo que coincide con el enfoque de FpN en el pensamiento multidimensional, se puede ir avanzando a las dimensiones más profundas y en cierto sentido más relevantes del programa: el cuidado del lenguaje y de la argumentación, el desarrollo de competencias y de hábitos, todo ello orientado al objetivo final: lograr un crecimiento integral de las niñas y los niños que les orienta hacia el logro de una vida en plenitud. Este desarrollo de la exposición permite además explorar con algo de detalle aspectos que hoy día gozan de amplia aceptación en el mundo educativo: el pensamiento crítico, la adquisición de competencias fundamentales, que aquí relacionamos con el arraigo de hábitos de conducta, y el aprender a conocer, aprender a hacer, aprender a ser y aprender a convivir. Esto es, reflexionar sobre la persona que queremos llegar a ser y el mundo en el que queremos vivir.

De los pensamientos a las palabras No hay mejor estrategia para aprender a pensar que pensar en el propio pensamiento, esa es una de las ideas centrales el novedoso planteamiento realizado por Matthew Lipman hace ya casi medio siglo (Lipman et alia, 1992). Es decir, practicar de manera constante la metacognición, pues la reflexión sobre los propios procesos de pensamiento es lo que permite detectar los aciertos y los errores y da paso a generar cambios en la manera de pensar que nos lleva a ser cuidadosos cuando pensamos. Esta introspección reflexiva se centra en los procesos cognitivos en general, desde el nivel de la percepción hasta los más complejos y abstractos procesos de argumentación y razonamiento, como pueden ser problematizar, conceptualizar con precisión, realizar analogías, argumentar las afirmaciones, refutar… Se parte del supuesto de que, aunque contamos con esa capacidad cognitiva de manera innata, el pleno funcionamiento de la misma exige un proceso de desarrollo (García Moriyón, 2010). Es más, en todo momento su uso práctico es difícil en sí mismo pues siempre puede verse alterado por posibles falacias o sesgos cognitivos que inducen a sacar conclusiones inválidas y nos llevan a tomar decisiones equivocadas. Por eso mismo, no todos los argumentos tienen la misma fuerza o valor y el desarrollo cognitivo consiste en incrementar la capacidad argumentativa y en argumentar bien. La metacognición permite, por tanto, ayudar a los seres humanos a ejercer con cuidado su capacidad de razonar, detectando argumentos falaces y sesgos cognitivos, lo que conduce a ofrecer razones que sean relevantes, pertinentes, apoyadas en evidencias, convincentes para 152

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la audiencia a la que van dirigidas y coherentes con el conjunto de conocimientos que se consideran plenamente verificados. Ahora bien, no es una actividad que pueda y deba ejercerse en general de manera solitaria. Es una variante específica de la capacidad de introspección, lo que apunta a una cierta exigencia de soledad, pero se genera y se desarrolla fundamentalmente en el diálogo constante con otras personas, a las que se reconoce como interlocutores válidos. Es precisamente la confrontación y colaboración con esos interlocutores la que permite profundizar y avanzar en la comprensión de las situaciones y en la búsqueda de respuestas y soluciones a las preguntas y los problemas que nuestra relación con otras personas y con el mundo en general nos plantea. Vigotsky señalaba con acierto que el crecimiento lingüístico y reflexivo era consecuencia de una progresiva interiorización del diálogo mantenido con otras personas e indicaba también que la interacción social que se da en el diálogo de cooperación o colaboración es crucial para el desarrollo cognitivo. Si bien existe pensamiento antes y al margen del lenguaje, es en este, y sobre todo en el diálogo con otras personas, donde el pensamiento logra desarrollarse, madurar y crecer. Iniciada la explosión lingüística en el segundo año de vida (Gopnik, 1987; Galián Conesa, 2015), lo que se inicia es un largo proceso de ampliación simultánea del lenguaje y del pensamiento. La riqueza progresiva en las dimensiones léxica, sintáctica y pragmática del lenguaje provoca y alimenta la riqueza progresiva del pensamiento, hasta el punto de que podemos encontrar una relación bicondicional entre lenguaje y pensamiento: un lenguaje pobre (deficientes construcciones lingüísticas, escasez y vaguedad de palabras, inadecuada contextualización del discurso…) provoca un pensamiento pobre, y lo mismo sucede al revés, el pensamiento pobre lleva a un lenguaje pobre. Casos extremos como el de Hellen Keller (Keller, 1905), para quien el descubrimiento del lenguaje simbólico supuso una auténtica conmoción, hasta el punto de considerarlo el inicio de su propia identidad personal, o el del niño de Aveyron (Itard, 1982) que no llegó a hablar con fluidez, muestran con cierta claridad la importancia del lenguaje para nuestra condición de seres humanos en sentido pleno. La participación en una comunidad de investigación filosófica constituye un modo potente de realizar esa metacognición centrada en los propios pensamientos. Por un lado, la tradición filosófica occidental ha cuidado mucho la mejora de la argumentación y del uso de la razón en general. Obras seminales, como la Retórica de Aristóteles, o mucho más tarde el Discurso del Método de Descartes o el Tractatus logico-philosophicus de Wittgenstein dan buena prueba de esa preocupación, como también la da la actividad filosófica de Sócrates recogida por Platón y la práctica escolástica de las Questionae Disputatae. Al mismo tiempo, la filosofía es un modo eficaz de problematización de ideas dadas por supuestas y de precisión y rigor conceptuales, sobre todo en el manejo de conceptos de alto nivel de abstracción. Las posibilidades reflexivas de la práctica filosófica vienen dadas por algunos rasgos propios de la filosofía que la diferencian de otras disciplinas. Especial importancia tienen los conceptos filosóficos porque: a) son generales; b) se usan con frecuencia en la vida cotidiana, a pesar de su alto nivel de abstracción: c) son discutibles. Por otra parte, la práctica filosófica se caracteriza por: a) potenciar las competencias analíticas y argumentativas propias de la lógica informal: b) indagar sobre ambigüedades, conceptos vagos, paradojas, incertidumbres y los límites de expresiones dotadas de sentido; c) se centra en la experiencia concreta y en la búsqueda del sentido de la vida de uno mismo y del mundo que nos rodea (Rondhuis, 2005). Todo esto lleva consigo igualmente un conjunto de competencias o habilidades exigidas por un pensamiento que debe ser cuidadoso. Por un lado, está el cumplimiento 153

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estricto de las normas de la buena argumentación: pensar cuidadosamente implica en este caso no sacar conclusiones precipitadas, ponderar serenamente los argumentos presentados, evitar falacias, no dejarse llevar por sesgos cognitivos… Pero además son necesarias otras competencias o hábitos de pensamiento de enorme importancia. Algunas ya formaban parte de las reglas de la discusión democrática en la Grecia clásica: la isegoría, o igualdad de todos en el uso de la palabra para expresar sus opiniones, y la parrexía como voluntad de verdad (Foucault, 2008), ambas vinculadas al respeto profundo al derecho de las personas a decir lo que piensan, aunque no al respeto de todas las ideas que expresan puesto que el valor de estas depende de los argumentos que las sustentan. Por otro lado está la necesidad de cuidar la presencia de los sentimientos en el proceso de argumentación. Como bien decía Aristóteles (2000, 173-240), son diversas las emociones que podemos introducir en la argumentación. Si queremos convencer, es importante mostrar sensatez, virtud (honradez) y benevolencia; pero las pasiones en general no facilitan una serena argumentación y por eso dan paso a la persuasión más que al convencimiento y son hábilmente utilizadas por quienes manipulan el discurso, de ahí que se busque con frecuencia provocar la ira, el amor, el odio, el temor, la vergüenza…, y otros sentimientos que Aristóteles llama pasiones, reforzando así el rasgo de que no están bajo nuestro control, sino que las padecemos. Es más, en algún caso constituyen el núcleo de falacias bien conocidas: ad misericordiam, ad baculum, ad hominem, ad populum, ad antiquitatem… Del mismo modo, son los sentimientos los que convierten los estereotipos, que pueden ser útiles en determinados contextos, en prejuicios, que se traducen en sesgos favorables o desfavorables que imposibilitan un pensamiento cuidadoso. Lo anterior exige diversas competencias o dimensiones de la personalidad. Para empezar, coraje y fuerza del yo, para ser capaces de expresar en público con asertividad lo que uno piensa, aunque no sea aceptado por la mayoría de los que escuchan. Debe ir acompañada de varios requisitos planteados por Albert (1973), en especial la modestia o humildad que nos lleva a admitir de entrada la posibilidad de estar equivocados. Dicho de otro modo, ponemos en juego el principio de falibilidad doxástica. Esto va unido a la exigencia de evitar la auto-indulgencia epistémica, que nos lleva a complacernos en exceso con las creencias compartidas. Una variante es la tendencia a leer sobre todo a aquellos autores que piensan como nosotros, siendo más sensibles a los argumentos que favorecen nuestra opinión previa o pre-juicio (Pariser, 2017). El pensamiento cuidadoso implica también la capacidad de escuchar atentamente, lo que no solo requiere esfuerzo personal para comprender correctamente las ideas de los interlocutores, sino también aceptar seriamente que pueden tener razón, incluso darle de partida la razón, como exige el principio de cordialidad. Todo ello reclama hablar con pasión, algo que está presente en el nombre de la filo-sofía o amor a la sabiduría, pero al mismo tiempo sin ira y sobre todo con estudio, siguiendo el antiguo precepto de Tácito; es decir, pensando bien lo que se dice y procurando afirmar solo aquello de lo que se posee evidencia contrastada.

De las palabras a las acciones Partiendo de esa profunda vinculación entre los pensamientos y las palabras, el pensamiento se convierte en acto precisamente en el momento en que es expresado en palabras. Lo interesante es que, siguiendo las reflexiones de Austin, más allá de la función puramente enunciativa o descriptiva, los enunciados tienen también una función performativa, es decir, con las palabras hacemos cosas (Austin, 1998). Austin ponía ejemplos 154

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concretos: las sentencias judiciales (inocente), las ceremonias matrimoniales (declaro marido y mujer) o las promesas (la famosa frase del Presidente del Gobierno de España: Puedo prometer y prometo”). No solo es eso, sino que el mismo acto de emitir un enunciado o de escribirlo, crea una realidad nueva que puede, incluso, independizarse de su propio autor: cuando estamos escribiendo un texto o simplemente conversando, el hilo del discurso impone sus propias reglas de desarrollo y quien escribe o habla es consciente de que no todo lo que surge desde su pensamiento responde a su propia intención. El texto nos pide decir algo que no habíamos pensado. Es más, somos conscientes de que una vez emitido o publicado, el texto pasa a ser propiedad de quienes lo leen o escuchan, quienes le otorgan una interpretación propia que puede coincidir o no con la que tenía su autor (Barthes, 1994). Hacemos cosas con palabras y la dimensión pragmática del discurso es muy importante, reforzada por recursos diversos intrínsecos, como la entonación o el ritmo, o extrínsecos, como el lenguaje corporal y los contextos en los que hablamos. Hay palabras que cuidan: en los primeros meses de nuestras vidas ya somos capaces de distinguir el lenguaje humano, sea en el idioma que sea. Y escuchar esas palabras, aunque ignoremos el significado, nos proporciona tranquilidad porque somos capaces de distinguir los ritmos y los tonos y la presencia protectora, en algún caso amenazadora, de un ser humano. Hay palabras de amor, sencillas y tiernas, como decía la canción de Serrat; palabras que generan profundos lazos de unión entre los seres humanos, como los discursos de Luther King; palabras que curan y consuelan, como bien sabía Viktor Frankl; palabras que invitan y acogen, palabras de bondad y hospitalidad (Derrida, 1997, 23; Levinas, 1971, 211.242). Pero también hay insultos, descalificaciones, lenguajes discriminatorios, lenguajes que dan paso a procesos de estigmatización y barbarización (Mosses, 2016), hay palabras como puños que preceden a guerras y matanzas (Rey, 2011). Cuidar las palabras es una propuesta que parte del reconocimiento de que lo que decimos tiene consecuencias en cómo nos comportamos y en la realidad que nos rodea. De un reconocimiento más profundo que hunde sus raíces en uno de los relatos fundacionales del mundo occidental, el evangelio de San Juan, “en el principio era la Palabra”. La identidad reflexiva propia de los habitantes de la ciudad se construye en la conversación exigente que ejemplifica Sócrates; Aristóteles señala que lo que nos identifica como seres humanos diferentes al resto de los seres vivos es que somos lo seres dotados de lenguaje. Ya en tiempos muy cercanos, Ricoeur (1990) plantea que nuestra identidad personal es una identidad narrativa y Emilio Lledó establece una continuidad entre lenguaje, memoria e identidad personal. En cierto sentido con un enfoque más radical todavía, Gadamer insiste en que el lenguaje no es una herramienta o un instrumento que utilizamos para comunicarnos, sino que estamos insertos desde el principio en el lenguaje: “Aprender a hablar no significa utilizar un instrumento ya existente para clasificar ese mundo familiar y conocido, sino que significa la adquisición de la familiaridad y conocimiento del mundo mismo tal como nos sale al encuentro” (Gadamer, 1992, 148). El ámbito para el cuidado de las palabras sigue vinculado a la metacognición, pero se da principal y prioritariamente en la comunidad de investigación. Hablar, el lenguaje, no es un acto individual, pues siempre hablamos con alguien y hablamos sobre algo. La propuesta de Lipman entronca directamente con una larga tradición para el que el diálogo es el hogar de la palabra y el lenguaje. Ese ese el núcleo de la propuesta de Filosofía para Niños (FpN): transformar el aula en una comunidad de investigación filosófica en la que todos los interlocutores participan en condiciones simétricas de igualdad y reciprocidad. Lipman (1998, 313) cita expresamente a Martin Buber: me convierto en un yo con identidad propia 155

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en el momento en el que alguien me nombra, me escucha y me dirige la palabra; no es posible un yo sin un tú y, por tanto, sin un nosotros. Es el planteamiento educativo que encontramos también en Freire y en Burbules, y que está presente en las aportaciones filosóficas de Habermas y Bajtin. Por su parte, Barthes (ibídem) revela esa característica especial de la dimensión performativa del lenguaje: las palabras producen una subjetividad, es decir, una forma concreta de ser consciente y de entender el mundo. La comunidad de investigación, que pivota sobre al diálogo entre las niñas y los niños, con la profesora o el profesor ejerciendo el rol de facilitar y dinamizar, es el ámbito en el que se da la palabra a quienes hasta ahora casi nunca la han tenido y a quienes no se les ha reconocido, entre otros y de manera especial, a las niñas y los niños, en una interpretación radical de la isegoría. Comprometidos con un diálogo exigente, fundamentado en la escucha atenta del otro con el objetivo compartido de avanzar en la búsqueda de la verdad, se potencian unas competencias cognitivas y afectivas que se transforman en genuinos pilares del empoderamiento de los estudiantes, quienes tienen una experiencia de dialogar como sujetos activos, lo que contribuirá a ser actores en la configuración de una sociedad democrática (Sharp y Splitter, 1995).

De los actos a los hábitos La educación busca provocar cambios estables de conducta. Se trata de un proceso que está presente en todo el ciclo vital del ser humano, por más que tendemos a reducirlo a los años que van del nacimiento al comienzo de la vida adulta, en el marco de un sistema educativo que, en su etapa obligatoria y universal, dura en torno a quince años, de los 3 hasta los 16 o 18. En su sentido más general, educar consiste en conseguir un cambio estable de conducta que haga posible una integración creativa y personal de cada individuo en la sociedad en la que ha nacido y crece. Si nos centramos en las aulas, la actividad que allí desarrollamos de manera sistemática busca provocar en el alumnado, y también en el profesorado, determinadas pautas de comportamientos que, en la medida en que pasan a formar parte de nuestra propia manera de actuar, reciben el nombre de hábitos. Ciertamente, destacar la formación de hábitos como objetivo de la educación tiene una fuerte influencia inicial del conductismo, lo que puede derivar en condicionamiento instrumental e incluso en adoctrinamiento. No obstante, eso es un reduccionismo no justificado puesto que pretende el la integración sea precisamente personal y creativa. En la actualidad se habla sobre todo de buscar el desarrollo e interiorización de competencias o habilidades, un enfoque que pretende que adaptar la educación a las exigencias de la sociedad actual, si bien puede también contribuir a una trivialización de la misma. Según el informe DeSeCo (2005), las competencias clave involucran la movilización de destrezas prácticas y cognitivas, habilidades creativas y otros recursos psicosociales como actitudes, motivación y valores, que se movilizan conjuntamente para lograr una acción eficaz. Esta definición permite establecer una continuidad profunda entre los hábitos y las competencias, y además, dado que las competencias ponen énfasis en el aprendizaje y, por tanto, dan protagonismo educativo a los estudiantes, pueden encajar muy bien en el enfoque de FpN. Aceptar esta continuidad no implica pasar por alto las críticas que ha merecido este enfoque auspiciado por la OCDE, bien por sus concesiones a la learnification de la que habla Biesta (Biesta, 2017) o bien por sus implicaciones y puntos de partida, excesivamente vinculadas a planteamientos economicistas (Gimeno Sacristán, 2008). Buscamos, por tanto, generar hábitos, algo que, en principio, podemos relacionar con la ética de Aristóteles, quien definía los hábitos como disposiciones que se adquieren por la 156

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práctica constante y que nos inclinan a actuar de determinada manera, facilitando de este modo nuestra conducta. Más importante es la advertencia que nos hace el filósofo griego: para ser buenos, no basta con actuar de determinada manera, como lo haría quien solo actuara por costumbre rutinaria automatizada. Cada acción concreta, facilitada por ese hábito que se posee como segunda naturaleza, solo contribuye a nuestro crecimiento personal y a alcanzar la plenitud que nos es propia, si la hacemos de manera consciente (sabemos lo que hacemos), las elegimos nosotros mismos y lo hacemos de manera firme y constante (Aristóteles, 1985, II, 1, 4-5). El hábito no inhibe la acción libre y responsable, sino que la facilita; cuando el hábito está orientado hacia un buen comportamiento, Aristóteles lo llama virtud; si, por el contrario, está orientado hacia el mal, es un vicio. Esto último es importante para entender bien la propuesta de formación de FpN. Cierto es que en el aula se practica de manera estable y constante un diálogo que exige determinadas competencias que van a ir siendo interiorizadas por los estudiantes, hasta convertir el ejercicio de un pensamiento multidimensional (crítico, creativo y cuidadoso) en un hábito o una dimensión que forma parte de nuestra personalidad. Eso sí, se hace en el marco de esa metacognición que invita al niño a pensar por sí mismo en el contexto de una comunidad de investigación. Ese es el enfoque que da Dewey al concepto de hábito; distingue tres niveles de acción: la que se produce motivada por el impulso y los instintos, atendiendo a necesidades básicas; la que está regula por costumbres o hábitos socialmente arraigados, que operan de forma inconsciente facilitando la vida de los seres humanos; por último, la que está regulada por criterios que son al mismo tiempo sociales y racionales lo que exige un proceso de reflexión consciente. Este tercer nivel es el realmente importante (Dewey, 1932, 37ss). Los hábitos se aprenden desde la primera infancia, siendo interiorizados en el proceso de socialización hasta formar parte de nuestra personalidad. No obstante, esas costumbres, instituidas por la sociedad de manera intencional para resolver los problemas de supervivencia, en un determinado momento pueden llegar a ser instintos rígidos que obstaculizan la acción por lo que es necesario modificar esos hábitos para crear otros nuevos, más adecuados. Esto exige una tarea educativa en la que el objetivo sea proporcionar hábitos flexibles e inteligentes que sepan responder a los cambios y tener en cuenta las consecuencias de nuestros actos (Anderson, 2014). Se trata de una educación que promueva hábitos de pensamiento independiente, investigación crítica, observación, experimentación, previsión de consecuencias e imaginación, y al mismo tiempo hábitos de empatía y cordialidad que favorezcan la colaboración con las otras personas (Dewey, 1922, 127s.). La propuesta educativa de FpN, como claramente decía Lipman, consiste en seguir el modelo planteado por Peirce, para quien las creencias, esto es, las opiniones que mantenemos los seres humanos, consisten en hábitos que orientan nuestra reflexión y la resolución de problemas (Peirce, 1877). La forma mejor de fijar nuevos hábitos (creencias) que sustituyan a creencias (hábitos) que chocan con nuevas experiencias o situaciones es la comunidad de investigación científica, que posteriormente Dewey convierte en comunidad de investigación filosófica y la aplica a la educación, para que por último Lipman y Sharp la conviertan en el eje del currículo de FpN (Pineda, 2006). La formación de hábitos en este contexto, en el que predomina la reflexión rigurosa, gobernada por normas democráticas de participación de todos sus miembros, alumnado y profesorado, constituye un proceso dialéctico que evoluciona para expandir el poder de los niños y las niñas, no para imponer constricciones a su capacidad de reflexión y acción (Kennedy, 2012). Como decía Dewey, “sólo a través del proceso de despojo crítico de la interiorización cultural ingenua es posible “el fomento inteligente de la cultura” (Dewey, 1981, p. 40). El progreso moral se consigue en la medida 157

Parecidos de familia Propuestas actuales en Filosofía para niños

Family Resemblances Current Trends in Philosophy for Children

en que alcanzamos hábitos de revisión reflexiva sobre nuestros juicios de valor y las acciones que se derivan de esos juicios. La infancia y la adolescencia son etapas en las que los hábitos ya adquiridos son todavía flexibles y pueden ser modificados con facilidad. La vida adulta será el periodo de permanente revisión de estos hábitos, aunque la edad va dejando el poso de hábitos petrificados y hace más difícil cambiar renunciando a respuestas que ya no sirven cuando cambian las preguntas.

De los hábitos hasta la formación del carácter Los manuales de psicología suelen distinguir entre temperamento, carácter y personalidad. El primero es la parte biológica e innata y el segundo lo que vamos construyendo según respondemos a las experiencias. La personalidad sería el conjunto de ambas cosas: lo que aporta el temperamento y lo que logra el carácter reaccionando desde ese temperamento a las circunstancias ambientales que nos toca vivir. Por eso tiene todo el sentido decir que lo importante no es lo que nos ocurre, sea esto el temperamento o el ambiente, sino lo que hacemos con lo que nos ocurre, pues siempre queda un margen para la actuación que es genuina y exclusiva responsabilidad de cada persona. El papel fundamental de la educación se centra en proporcionar un ambiente adecuado para potenciar que los educandos crezcan como personas, lo que implica cuidar su carácter. Esto es lo que, tal y como hemos venido exponiendo en los apartados anteriores, se hace en FpN, por lo que puede ser entendido como un programa de educación del carácter. Cierto es que es importante marcar distancias respecto a lo que habitualmente se entiende por educación del carácter, una propuesta desarrollada por Thomas Lickona (1991) que cuenta en estos momentos con una gran aceptación aglutinada en torno a un movimiento, Character counts!, que defiende efectivamente la creación de hábitos morales, pero sobre todo en el sentido de lograr que los estudiantes interioricen, mediante refuerzos y modelado, hábitos de conducta, virtudes, que son consideradas fundamentales, los seis pilares del carácter. Esta propuesta se presenta como respuesta a la crisis de valores morales en la sociedad y la carencia de una efectiva labor educativa. Es criticable por su enfoque más bien adoctrinador que deja poco espacio para el crecimiento autónomo de los niños (Geren, 2001), pero el objetivo final es valioso: la formación del carácter. Por otra parte, una amplia y ambiciosa investigación promovida por el Departamento de Educación de Estados Unidos llega a la conclusión de que la aplicación del programa no tiene efectos significativos en el crecimiento moral de los niños (Social and Character, 2011). Tanto Lickona como Lipman intentaron proponer un modelo de educación moral como respuesta a las insuficiencias de dos modelos muy aceptados en los años setenta y ochenta del pasado siglo, la clarificación de valores y el enfoque cognitivista de Kohlberg. Ahora bien, el programa de FpN se distancia de la educación del carácter por su enfoque, más próximo al modelo de desarrollo defendido por Vigotsky, en el que se podía encontrar una vía alternativa para resolver el problema (Tappan, 1988; Daniel, 1991). En definitiva, como ya hemos señalado, el concepto de carácter y de hábito que se maneja es muy distinto y se inspira en Dewey (1925), quien entendía el carácter como poder de actuación social, algo que incluye: a) inteligencia o visión social (buen juicio); b) poder social ejecutivo (fuerza, eficacia en la ejecución); y c) interés y responsabilidad social (hace referencia a la dimensión emotiva de la conciencia del fin). No se cuestiona la existencia de un conjunto importante de valores que son reconocidos por las sociedades actuales, pero el énfasis se pone en fomentar en los niños el dominio de hábitos y habilidades que les permitan con eficacia resolver los problemas que plantea la 158

Parecidos de familia Propuestas actuales en Filosofía para niños

Family Resemblances Current Trends in Philosophy for Children

vida. La primera diferencia radical es que FpN parte del reconocimiento de la capacidad de los niños desde muy temprana edad para razonar y tener una clara conciencia moral, lo que les convierte en agentes de su propio crecimiento personal (Lipman & Sharp, 1988, Pritchard, 1991). Hay acuerdo, por tanto, en cuanto a la importancia de las virtudes y de la formación del carácter, pero no lo hay en cuanto el modelo educativo, los procesos, que hay que propiciar para que se consigan esos objetivos. Desde la perspectiva holística que aporta FpN, el énfasis se pone en fomentar la capacidad de las personas para lograr: a) detectar le dimensión moral de los problemas; b) analizar esos problemas buscando las soluciones mejor fundamentadas y con más posibilidades de resolver el problema; y c) actuar para aplicar esas soluciones en la vida cotidiana. Son las situaciones concretas, como bien decía Aristóteles, pero también los moralistas escoceses o los pragmatistas, las que acotan la aplicación de los grandes valores morales sobre los que pivotan el desarrollo personal y comunitario. Por eso hace falta centrarse en modelos de intervención pedagógica en los que las personas vayan desarrollando las capacidades o habilidades cognitivas y afectivas que, interiorizadas como hábitos, les permiten actuar como agentes morales responsables. Esos hábitos les ayudarán a descubrir la complejidad de los problemas, la dificultad de encontrar soluciones y de aplicarlas, estando abiertos además a escuchar seriamente otras opciones y a revisar las propias, reconociendo el carácter falible de toda propuesta que exige una permanente revisión y reconstrucción de lo que pensamos (Sharp, 2009). Por otra parte, en este caso, las evidencias de que el programa de FpN sí consigue lo que propone de manera significativas son numerosas y nos animan a seguir adelante con el proyecto (Cassidy, 2014; Colom & alia, 2014).

Del carácter al destino Abordo este apartado más bien como conclusión de todo lo anterior y no como un apartado más, pues también es la conclusión del proverbio que he utilizado como hilo conductor de este trabajo. No basta con alcanzar un buen y sólido carácter, hace falta algo más, dado que el carácter es una parte de lo que llamamos personalidad. Hace falta responder con los actos a las dos preguntas básicas de la existencia personal: ¿qué clase de persona quiero llegar a ser? y ¿en qué clase de mundo quiero vivir? En primer lugar, el carácter no es algo que se pueda dar por terminado o cerrado, sino que es un proceso permanente de auto-regulación. El largo ciclo vital de los seres humanos pasa por diferentes etapas o estadios, todos ellos con límites borrosos, pero también con rasgos diferenciadores. En segundo lugar, el carácter no se mantiene para siempre, puesto que pueden darse retrocesos espectaculares o cambios de orientación radicales, motivados también por circunstancias extremas o especialmente conflictivas. Retomando una frase de dudosa atribución, lo adecuado es vivir de acuerdo con lo que uno piensa, aunque a veces es posible, si no se cuida bien lo que se piensa, que se termine pensando cómo se vive. Debemos recuperar el concepto clásico del floruit: florecer o alcanzar la plenitud, llegar a la madurez de la propia vida. Es algo más importante que lo que recoge el propio concepto de felicidad, en el sentido aristotélico que no estaba en absoluto desvinculado de la idea de plenitud de realización de las posibilidades de un ser humano. Cuando la búsqueda de la felicidad se vincula al floruit, se enriquece su definición puesto que este plantea exigencias objetivables de realización, más que volátiles y endebles sensaciones de bienestar personal. Al final, tras el largo relato biográfico que es nuestra propia vida llegamos al destino, y lo crucial es que ese destino coincida con el floruit para, de este modo, llegar a ser quienes somos. No hablamos solo de una etapa concreta de la vida plena, sino de ver el conjunto del 159

Parecidos de familia Propuestas actuales en Filosofía para niños

Family Resemblances Current Trends in Philosophy for Children

ciclo vital como un floruit global, como un acontecimiento que rompe las limitaciones del tiempo cronológico y se sitúa más bien en el tiempo kairológico (Kohan y Kennedy, 2015). Debemos aquí utilizar la metáfora de la cadena y el cable (García Moriyón, 2008) para entender bien lo que significa forjar un carácter y labrarnos un destino, una metáfora que el propio Lipman utiliza en el episodio 24 de la novela Lisa: lo importante no es lograr eslabones muy fuertes, sino trenzar un cable resistente a partir de hilos que, tomados individualmente, son muy frágiles. Este es el resultado más acabado de una vida reflexiva, una vida en la que, empoderados, asumimos las riendas de nuestro destino, reconociendo al mismo tiempo nuestra profunda dependencia de los demás, pues solo podemos vivir en el seno de una comunidad dialógica basada en el reconocimiento mutuo, y también nuestra ineludible responsabilidad individual, nuestra autonomía, porque la respuesta a esas preguntas fundamentales de la vida es siempre una respuesta personal.

REFERENCIAS Albert, H. (1973). Tratado sobre la razón crítica. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Sur. Anderson, E. (2014): “Dewey's Moral Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Consultado el 15/10/2017 en