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HowChiefs Come to Power The Political Economy in Prehistory Timothy Earle

Stanford UniversityPress Stanford, California

[997

Stanford Universiry Press, Stanford, California © 1997 by the Board ofTrustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University Printed in the United States of America CIP

To my research collaborators: The Hawaiian Social Morphology and Economy Project, 1971-72 (Marshall Sahlins, director; Eliza Earle)

data appear at the cnd of the book

Stanford University Press publieations are distributed cxclusively by Stanford University Press within the United States, Canada, Mexieo, and Central America; theyare distributcd exdusívely by Cambridge University Press throughout the rest of the world,

The Upper Mantaro Archaeological Research Project, '977-89 (Terence D'Altroy, Christine Hastorf, and Catherine Scott, codirec1:ors; Cathy Cosún, Melissa Hagstrum, Terry LeVine, Glenn Russell, Elsie Sandefur) Proyecto Arqueológico Calchaquí, 1990- (Terence D'Altroy, Ana María Lorandi, and Veronica Williarns, directors; Elizabeth DeMarrais) The Thy Archaeological Project, 1990- (Jens-Henrik Bech, Krisúan Krisúansen, Mike Rowlands, and Nick Thorpe, directors; Joyce and Bob Daniels, Kristina Kelertas, John Steinberg)

PREFACE

Writing a book is a product of much labor and thought. At the University of Michigan in the early 1970's, my professors Kent Flannery, Richard Ford, Roy Rappaport, Marshall Sahlins, Eric Wolf, and Henry Wright taught me to understand the complex interactions arnong ecology, economy, society, and politics. Archaeology graduate smdents of that time focused on what was to be labeled "social archaeology" - how to describe the organization of prehistoric human groups and how to explain their social evolution. Prime-mover theories of societal adaptation were attacked, as we grappled with the variety, complexity, and speciticity of historical sequences trom Oaxaca and the Valley of Mexico to Iran, Madagascar, and the Pacitic. M y tirst academic job was as an assistant professor of anthropology at the University of California, Los Angeles, where 1 stayed for 22 years. 1 was hired to provide an intellecmal bridge between archaeology and sociocultural anthropology. With my training at Michigan, this breadth carne to me namrally, but my colleagues and graduate smdents continued my education. M y closest intellecmal alIies were Alien Johnson and Jim Hill, strong culrural ecologists interested in understanding how humans make a living successfully in diverse environments. Colleagues in social anthropology included the senior academies Hilda Kuper and SalIy Falle MODre and the younger scholars Francesca Bray, N ancy Levine, and Anna Simons; each in rurn helped me understand how social instimtions were established. A new assembly of colleagues at Northwestem University now continnes to educate mc.

But my real education was not in academe. It was in the tields of archaeology. Here a confusing chaos of human debris documented

viii

Preface

histories of people and their societies. Archaeological projects are hard to describe to those who have not been on one. The collaborative enterprise spans a wide range of activities: mundane duties, from providing breakfast to handling automobile breakdowns; data collection, including logistical planning, excavation, and laboratory analysis; and extraordinary intellectual constructions, as ideas are put forward, debated, discarded, and e!aborated. Coworkers on an archaeological project develop an intimacy and anticipation that is both rewarding and demanding. These people's Iives and goals are shared, and their ideas me!d and mix so that individual contributions cease to have meaning. And then we return to our academic worlds and try to sort out what is each of ours, who should publish what, and how the products of our work together can be divided to build our separate careers. I dedicate this book to my colleagues and graduate students on these projects; it is theirs and mine together. The actual process of writing is long. The effort to think through the complexity ofhuman societies allows the writer to regard complex re!ationships sequentially, work out ideas, reflect on their merit, and then Iaboriously tic them together. Special thanks go to Elizabeth Bnunfie!, Terence D'A1troy, Elizabeth DeMarrais, Eliza Howe Earle, Christine Hastorf, Antonio Gilman, and Patrick Kirch, who he!ped me develop the book's arguments. They read (sometimes repeatedly) earlier versions of this manuscript and pointed out inconsistencies, gaps, and errors that I, from the inside, could not see. Perhaps the book is really theirs, but I own the lurking errors. There must a1ways be the beast, the author. He steals away from the dinner table, rude!y shuts out the family, and thinks about style when others need love. My gratitude showers on my family - my wife, Eliza; my daughters, Caroline and Hester; and my AFS (American Field Service) daughter, Ina Iffandhi. They shared in the fieldwork, discussed the results, argued with me about significance, and then stepped back and allowed the selfishness that writing demands. Finally 1 thought the manuscript was done, and it was submitred to the watchful eyes of Stanford University Press. There senior editor Murie! Bell and associate editor Ellen F. Smith oversaw its review and production. Lynn Stewart, as copy editor, provided careful reading

Preface

ix

and many changes that improved the book greatly. The final forms for many of the iIlustrations were prepared by Mike Gabriel; the first drafrs of these were done by Deborah Erdman. From many sources, 1 received financial support for the ficldwork and writing. The drafr manuscript was written during the academic year '994-95 when 1 was on sabbaticalleave from UCLA. The ficldwork was supported by five National Science Foundation grants: the Hawaiian Social Morphology and Economy Project (GS72871 8XI ) ; the Upper Mantaro Archaeological Research Project (BNS 820 3723); the Proyecto Arqueol6gico Calchaquí (BNS8805471); and the Thy Archaeological Project (DBS9207082 and DBS9II6921). Support for the fieldwork a1so came from multiple smaller grants and assistance from the Wenner-Gren Foundation, the Fulbright Commission, the Social Science Research Council, the Bernice P. Bishop Museum, the Museum for Thy and Westem Hanherred, the Narional Forest and N ature Agency of Denmark, the Danish Research Council, UCLA (Academic Senate, ISOP [Intérnational Studies and Overseas Programs], Department of Anthropology, Friends of Archaeology, and Archaeology Program), Northwestern University, Columbia University, and the University of Minnesota. I acknowledge their generous and continuing support. T.E.

CONTENTS

ONE

IntroducPion: The Nature ofPolitica! Puwer

I

TWO

The ÚJng-Term DeveÚJptncnts ofThree Chiefdoms: Denmark, Hawai'i, and theAndes 17 THREE

Sources ofEconomic Power

67

FOUR

Military Puwer: The Strategic Use ofNaked Force

lOS

FIVE

IdeoÚJgy as a Source ofPower

l43

SIX

Chiejly Puwer Strategies and the Emergence of Complex Política! Institutions 193 Bibliography Index

241

2IS

TABLES

AND

FIGURES

TABLES

Archaeological Sequence for the Mantaro Valley 2.2. Estimates of Population Change in the Upper Mantaro Valley 4.1. Distribution of Flint Daggers from the Excavations of the Thy Archaeological Project 2.1.

52 53 127

FIGURES

1. 1. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2,4. 2.5. 2.6. 2.7.

Decreasing Number of Independent World Polities TheThy Region, Demnark Pollen Diagrarn, Thy, Demnark Paríshes ofThy House 1 at Thy 2758 The Chiefly House 1 (Thy 2999) at the Early Bronze Age Settlement of Bjerre . Distribution of Barrows (Maiuly Early Bronze Age) in Sonderha Parish, Thy TheIslandofKaua'i

2.8. Waimea, Kaua'i, at Time ofFirst Contact

Estimated Population Growth Curve for the Hawaíian Islands 2. !O. Cross-section of the Andes, Showing rlle Vegetation Zones and Elevations 2.11. The Upper Mantaro Valley, Pero

II

19 23 24 28

30 32 35 37

2.9.

42 47 48

¡

Tables and Figures

xiv 2.12.

2·13· 2.14.

2.15· 2.16. 2.17· 3·1. 3·2. 3+

3·4· 4.1.

4.2. 4·3· 4.4.

Wanka II Settlement Pattern for the Upper Mantaro Valley The Large Wanka II Center ofTunánmarca View Across the Wanka II Center ofTlmánmarca Examples of Elite and Cornmoner Patio Groups at the Wanka II Tunánmarca Wanka III Settlement Pattern for the Upper Mantaro ValIey Tbe Wanka II and III Center of Hatunmarca A Traditional Irrigation System on an Island in the Wainiha Stream Layout of the Historical Settlement and Farming Areas in the Ahupua'a ofWaioli Three Phases of Development of the Dryland Fields and TraUs Within the N arrow Ahupua'a Land of Lapakahi, Hawai'i Drained Field Complex in the Yanamarca ValIey, Peru Early Horizon lconographic Representations in , Carved Stone, Showing Decapitated and Disemboweled Bodies Late Neolithic Fiint Dagger, Denmark, and Flint Dagger Miniature from House 1, Thy 2758 Early Bronze Age (Montelius Ir Period) Chielly Sword from Thy Weapons of Close Combat, Contact-Period Hawai'i

Tables and Figures 5·2. Illustration of a Hawaiian Wicker God; Several 57 58 59 60

Prestige Objects, Including a Kahili; and CloseContact Personal Weapons A Heiau at Waimea, Kaua'i, at First Contact with 5·3· Captain Cook 5·4· Reconstructed Plan View of a Large Luakini Heiau

62

5·5·

63 5·6. 77 5·7. 80 6.1. 88 91

II2

125 I28 136

4·5· On a Double-Hulled War Canoe, Kalani'opu'u,

Paramount Chief ofHawai'i, Comes ont to Meet Captain Cook at Kealakekua Bay 4·6. Genealogy of the Kaua'i Paramounts Described in theText 5·1. Reconstructed Cutaway of a Megalithic Danish Passage Grave

xv

137 138 161

Estimate of Total Annual Labor Required to Build the Heiau of Maui Modern Irrigation System in Hanapepe ValIey, Kaua'i, About 1920 Central Ceremonial Plazas at Tunánmarca with Two Special Rectangular Buildings Relationships Among the Different Sources of Power in Chielly Power Strategies

173 175 176 178 181 185 204

•

How Chiefs Come to Power

CHAPTER

ONE

Introduction: The N ature of Polltical Power

Elueidating the evolution of human society challenges anthropologists and other social scientists. The history of attempted explanation is long and distinguished, ranging aeross diverse social, politieal, and economic theories (see, e.g., Harris 1968). To get a sense ofthe range of explanations, I recommend reading recent syntheses by Johnson and Earle (1987), Priee andFeinman (1995), and Sanderson (1995). Theories have often emphasized the intcgrated charaetcr of hnman societies (i.e., Flannery 1972; Service 1962; Steward 1955), arguing that leaders emerge to solve problems that allow members of a gronp to prospero A reconsideration of social process, however, has focused on human agency. Brumfiel (1992, 1994) draws attention to the diverse interests and motivations of humans and the existence of many segments of society, reHecting gender, age, faction, ethnicity, and e1ass. Complex societies are not so mnch hierarchieal as thcy are "heterarchieal" (Ehrenreich, Crumley, and Levy 1995), meaning simply that segments have separate internal hierarchies that deHect overall social centrality. New thinking emphasizes how problematic is the institutionalization ofhuman society. Models focus on the anarchistic dynamics of human life, but we know that complex human societies have arisen with strong institutions. How can this happen? In ad-

2

Introduction: The N ature ofPolitical Power

dressing this question, I foeus on how Ieaders come to hold power and how that power is institutionalized. Following a politieallogic, I believe that the personal benefits of leadership are sufficient to explain thc quest for prestige and dominance. Not ali individuals may want to dominate, but individuals who wish prominence exisr within ali human populations. Why? Many would trace the quest for power to its biological roots in reproductive success. Their arguments are simple and compelling, but well beyond the scope of this book. Following Leaeh (I 9 54 ), I simply assume that sorne individuals within ali societies seek political advantage. This assumption is admitredly problematic. We must be careful to acknowledge the anthropologist's credo that cultures differ fundamentaliy and musr be understood on their own terms. But within the diversity of human existence cornmon themes and processes of social life certainly existo Here I hope ro delimit one such arena of cornmon action - the institutionalization of political domination and resistanee to it.

Although a political motivation to dominate may be widespread, the individnalleader's quest for dominance varies dramaticaliy from one society to another. In sorne cultures, values discourage political striving and serve as strong cultural (ideological) tools opposing the politicaliy motivated persono And in most cultures, the struggle for power is complicated and multidimensíonal. It involves competition arnong different emergent leaders, and it involves resistance (restrictions) to that leadership. The point is not that leaders will emerge in ali social contexts. Individuals who desire prominence are often unsuccessful for a plethora of reasons, not the Ieast of which are cultural. I will not atrempt to resolve questions of motivational theory - why people do what they do; such a goal seems remote to my archaeologist's viewpoint. Rather~ 1 concentrate Oil organizational thearies in an attempt to understand how the regional organizations of chiefdoms are created anddominated byan emergent elite (cf. Mann 1986: 7). From this point, my investigation is simplified: Mat allows aspiring leaders to he successful in One situation hutfail utterly in another? This book attempts ro answer this straightforward question, which, as I

Introduction: The N ature o/Political Power

3

hope to show, offers an elementary view of the political process and its place in the evolution of human society.

Some Definitions Before outlining the dynarnics of the political process, several closely intersecting concepts need to be defined and brief!y discussed. Authority is the right and responsibility to lead; such leadership is sanctioned by a group to recognize capabilities or social position. Accordlng to Weber, authority is a sociological concept whereby obedienee to commands does not require physical coercion. People follow a leader willingly because it is the right thing to do, and leaders are often thought to sustain the smooth operation of a society. In a stateless society, authority is charaeteristically based on social statuses that mark rights and responsibilities in specific arenas of actionritual, social, military, and the like (e.g., Mair 1977). It is "natural" for sorne individuals to aet as leaders, because they hold social positions by genealogieal determination or demonstrated ability. Emphasis has shífted in recent literature to concerns with indeterminacies.

Although a genealogical structure might specity that a person would be appropriate as a group's leader, social realities are worked out in a complicated political process (Moore 1978). Authority then becomes a souree of powcr, contested like ali others, that derives ftom traditional values and instiultional strucrure. 1 view authority as part of ideology. Power is measurcd by the mastery that a leader exercises over others (Mann 1986: 6). Unlike authority, power has at least an implied threat behind it; complianee by cornmon people is unwilling. Considerations of power are extensive in the social sciences (see Adams I966; Barnes I988; Bloeh I989; Foucault I970, I980; Giddens I979; Lenski I966; Mann 1986). As I see it, social power is not a resource; it is an unequal relationship arnong people (Giddens I979: 91). Unequal relationships are organized through various media to create power networks. Mann, for example, characterizes societies as '~con­

stituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial net-

4

Introduction: TheNature ofPoliticalPIJW&r

works of power" (1986: 1). Theoretidans have enumerated different sources of power, including social organization, econorny, military might, ideology, and information (Friedman and Rowlands 1977; Mann 1986; Earle 1987, 1994a; Haas, Powrski, and Pozorski 1987). These are the media from which power is constituted. The signiJicant sources of power vary from one society to the next, but multiple sources exist in all societies. The political process involves an interplay between these different sources, and, as I will argue, the specific rustorical circumstances stnlcturing access to these saurces determine the long-term success or failure of attempts to centtalize and institutionallze political hierarchies. Control is the ability to restrain access to the resources that are the media from which power can be fashioned. These media have fundamental propetties that make them more or less easy to manipulate. UltimateJy the networks of power within a society are useful both to compeJ compliance and to resist compliance to a centtal authority. As an example, military might, in the form of the warrior and his sword, exerts sttong coercive force. But can that power itseJf be controlled, restricted by a few for their exclusive use? To the degree that it cannot, it is also a force of dissolution and anarchy. To understand how the sources of power can be used to fashion institutions of governance, it is essential to know how access to the media through which power is instituted can be restrkted. The ultimate nature and effectiveness of power within a society derive from the ease with which the multiple sources of power can be monopolized.

Sources ofP01Ver Of primary concern to emerging chiefs seeking to conttol social power is the nature of the power sources that are available. Whether chiefly power derives from social relationships, the economy, military might, or ideology determines in large measure the scope and stability of a cbief's political position. Social relationships are one potential source of power. Humans are social aulmals, building and breaking relationships through their con-

Introduction: The N ature ofPolitical Power

5

srant personal dealings. We can imagine that daily interactions between people have certain roots in our biological heritage; bonds of nurturing, cooperation, and domination are constantly esrablíshed and contested between couples, parents and children, and siblings. In the everyday intimades of family life are rdations of power, and these rdationsrups are maintained and extended through time to fashion larger lmits of clan and liueage (Malinowski 1944; Johnson and Earie 1987). Polítical arenas are built in whicb kin relationships, ttansformed by cultural rules and values, are centtal props. In traditional societies, since one's position in a social hierarchy determines in large measure one's authority, striving for social position is critical to the political process. Cultural relationships of kinship determine rights and obligations that represent power over people, and political individuals maulpulate these relationsrups (by sttategic marriages, adoptions, godfathering, and the like) to centralize and extend power. For example, among the Trobriand Islanders, a husband receives an urigubu payrnent of yams fram his brother-inlaw (Malinowski 1922). On the surface this would appear to be a simple case of reciprocal excbange as men give to their sisters' husbands and receive from their wives' brothers. However, by securing multiple wives, chiefs manipulate the exchanges to amass stoekpiles of yams. Malinowski (1935) describes one powerful chiefwith 80 wives. Cruefdoms are normally characterized as kin-basedsocieties, meaning that a person's place in a kinsrup system determines his or her social status and political position. The textbook case is eastern Polynesia (Salllins 1958). An individual's rank is measured by the genealogical disrance from a senior line of descent (first son to first son to first son). This ranking (from high to low sratus) determines sanc'tity and rights to polirical office. The rughest-status male (first son by the first wife) should succeed his father to the office of paramount. In this position, he holds both authority and special access to economic, military, and ideological power. Others, ofiesser rank, derive privilege from their positions in the cruefly ruerarcby. In Hawai'i, genealogical specialists were attached to the paramount, and an individual seeking political office would come to the genealogists, redte rus kin line, and have determined his suitability to receive an office such as ali'i 'ai

6

IntroductWn: The Nature ofPolítical Power

ahupuaJa, "chief who eats from the cornmunity:' In another example, Friedman and Rowlands (1977) describe how cruefs in a stateless society (the tribal organization of prerustoric Europe) built th.eir prestige by controlling the kinsrup system through acquiring womeu in marriage. A local cruef rose to a position of political authority by manipulating the fiow of prestige goods, feasts, and marriages. The system of kinsrup with its political relationships and related rights to labor and personal support was thus seen as the fundamental basis of cruefiy power strategies. But kinshipjtself.i§.ªw,ªlUQIJ.I:f~º.tPº~er, By definition, eaeh person is the center of a kindred network, and eaeh can attempt to build his or her relationsrups byextending claims of kinsrup. IGnsrup is thus critieal in less ruerarchical societies partiy because it offers a strategy available to ali by which to ask for aid; it is a great equalizer. Cruefs are seen as the providers of assistance, moraliy obligated to help out those in need (Sahlins I 972 ). If we were looking at the origins of cruefdoms, we might focus on how kinship is manipulated by ali to negotiate from emergent leaders a moral right to tire necessities of life. 1 do not stress kinship as a major medium for social power, altirough it is part of a society's tradition of appropriate relationsrups and the medium through whieh ali, including ehiefs, seek support. Part of tire ehanging ideology tirat accompanies social sttatificarion involves tire rupture of kinship between ruler and followers. Ultimately tire equalizing bonds ofkinship are subjugated to other, more controllable sources of power. The existing social system locates peopie in positions of differential advantage. But how are tirose systems created, perpetuated, and maintained? Kinship can be coneeived as part of tire ruling ideology; individuals will strive to manipulate it to reap political advantage. We must understand how inequality, evident as inheritance of position and property, is institutionalized, and this leads us to a consideration of tire tirree primary sources of powereconomic, military, and ideological. Economic power derives from being able to buy compliance. IE.i" based on dre simple principie oflIlaterial re",arclsandclepri:lmtion~ The human organizations of production and exchange determine ac-

Introduction: The N ature ofPolitical Power

7

cess to resources and goods tirat are botir needed and desired for subsistence andsoeiallife. Private property is basic to Marxist theory of capitalist social formations. Under capitalism, common people eannot produce goods effectively because they lack tire appropriate technology; tirey must work for tire owners of capital technology, who tiren derive a profit at tire same time tirat workers toil for a subsistence wage. The Marxist solution was revolurionary-to brealc tire economic power of a few by wrencrung ownersrup from tire capitalists and having tire state hold it eentraliy for tire benefit of tire workers. In cruefdoms, control over production and exchange of subsistence and wealtir creates tire basis for political power. In Hawai'i, cornmunity eruefs alioeated to cornmoners their subsistence plots in the chief's irrigated farrnlands in return for corvée work on chiefiy lands andspecial projects. By owning tire irrigation systems, and tirus controlling aecess to tire preferred means of subsistenee, chiefs directed a commoner's labor. Where you lived was determined by whose land manager "put you to work?' In contrast, in Bronze Age Denmark and elsewhere in northern Europe, control over tire specialist manufacture and the distribution of prestige goods underwrote tire emergence of regional elites (Friedman and Rowlands I977). Economic power is based on tire ability to restrict aeeess to key productive resourccs or consumptive goods. Control ayer subsistence resources and technology is a simple, yet effective, source of power. Control over exchange permits tire extension of economic control over broader regions, but exchange networks are inherently decentralized, and tirus a reliance on exehange as a mediurn for social power is just as likely to undercut central control as to support it. The real significance of economic power may be that tire material fiows tirrough tire political economy can be channeled by chiefs to nurture and sustain tire alternative power sourees/At tire same time, economic power depends on those otirer sources of power - military might to defend resourees and ideology to institute rights of unequal access~-' _,

M,Ü;ary might derives from coereing compliance. Without tire institutionalization of social hierarehies, strong leaders are bullies, forc-

8

Introduction: The N ature ofPolitical Power

Introduction: The N ature ofPolitical Power

ing compliance by threat and intimidation. Elementary might is right. A key part of the political process is to be able to assert coercive power. In the Andean case, leaders were successful warriors (cinchekona, sing. cinche) known for personal qualities as feared fighters, ready to kili and die. Backing up the chief were his warriors, individuals bound by kinship and loyalty to the chief and willing to assert his will. Gllman (I98I) sees politicalleaders as local thugs, creating protection schemes of extortion. Political ascendancy is based on coercive advantage, gained by having special fighting skilis, training, and weaponty (Goody I97I; McNeill I982). Following on the nineteenth-century work of Spencer, Carneiro (I970, I977, I98I) has argued for the significance of warfare in the creation and extension of political systems. For him, no one would willingly submit to the authority of another; physical struggle underJies leadership, and complex political systems are fashioned through conquest. 5hlefdolIl~'",,,.s!J.arªcterized by .eodemic'Yarfar~, . and the. rise.to poweris a1ways implicitlYlIlilitaryat its ro.o.rs (Carnei~o I 98 I ). The paramounrchléfs of Hawai'i rarely died in bed; they were kilied in battles of rebellion and conquest or were assassinated by their c10se affiIiates. Military might is in fact a highly problematic source of social power. Warriors are an instrument of fear by which an emerging chief asserts politica! domination over a region. But at the same moment the chief must fear those warriors, whose power and rage can turn on him. Rebellion, betrayal, and intrigue fill the Icelandic sagas, the narratives of the Hawaiian ruling Iineages, and the accounts of Andean lords. While leaders depend on their warriors to extend political power, they must a1ways be on the lookour for treachery. Ultimately warrior might is a destabilizing and divisive power in institutions of leadership; i!J.s__()llIY. "ff".ct~ve as long as it can be reigned in and ~'1"'''''''''~'''''''''''-''"''''''

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