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The Cynic Conception of Aytapkeia Author(s): Audrey N. M. Rich Source: Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, Vol. 9, Fasc. 1 (1956), pp. 23-29 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4427776 . Accessed: 04/08/2011 22:53 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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THE CYNIC CONCEPTION OF AYTAPKEIA - BY

AUDREY N. M. RICH AusapxLapis a term with associations that are fundamentally Cynic. To Diogenes the arch-Cynicit meant, broadly speaking, two things; on the physical plane, contentment with the bare necessities of life 1); and on the spiritual level, complete detachment from the world and worldly values. The Musa'pxr was the man who

had dispensed with the superfluous in every department of life and reduced his needs to a minimum. All that he required for his material well-being was food, shelter and clothing of the meanest sort 2); his spiritual needs could be satisfied by Virtue alone, the possession of which was sufficient to ensure happiness 3). The Cynic then, had no desire for wealth, knowledge, pleasure or friendship. In his mind all these would be classed together as unnecessary luxuries. Nothing, in fact, that was to be derived from any source external to himself had any value for him or could affect him in any way. This, of course, is xusapzvxc in its most uncom-

promising form, the form in which it was advocated by Diogenes and the Cynic of the Lucianic dialogue. In some of the later adherents of Cynicism the concept is less harsh. In Bion 4), for instance, atuocapxma.becomes not so much a stern renunciation of

the world as an attempt to adapt oneself to the world and changing circumstances just as an actor adapts himself to, the varied roles he has to play. But this is clearly not the orthodox Cynic view though it does not verge so far towards heresy as that of Peregrinus who is said to have denied the possibility of complete Self-SufDiogenes Laertius, VI. 104. His attitude could well be summed up in the words of St. Paul (I Tim. 6.6) gxov?eq8i 8&ocpmpqc& xoclax ka?octrcX,To&rou0&pxeaO-a6FiOm. 3) D. L. VI. i i. (referring to Antisthenes, the traditional founder of i)

2)

Cynicism).

4) See Dudley, History of Cynicism, Stobaeus, Ecl. III. I. pp. 37-49.

p. 66. For the views of Bion see

THE

24

CYNIC

CONCEPTION

OF AYTARKEIA

ficiency even for the Cynic, since even the follower of Diogenes depends upon the services of the leather cutter, the woodcutter and the weaver in order to equip himself with the wallet, staff and cloak which are the visible signs of his calling 1). Bion and Peregrinus are not, however, "typical" Cynics, and it is with the norm rather than its variations that we are here concerned. The true Cynic aimed at o',rpxze as it was exemplified in the conduct of Diogenes, and his motive in so doing was obvious. Self-Sufficiency alone, in the Cynic's view, can give security and immunise a man against the ills inflicted by Fortune. If he has little, he has little to lose; if he desires nothing, he cannot be disappointed 2). His ocvTapxserxis, in fact, in the jargon of modern psychology, a "defence mechanism" which can be put into operation by two methods. In the first place he must revert to a "state of nature" and live as far as possible like the animals whose needs are strictly limited. As Epictetus puts it, he must emulate the irrational beasts, 6v e'xoa-rov avTo auTZ &pxo4vov ou'm 7pOpiJ; &7sopex 't-f~

-r Tr

Q OLXELCX ou)Y oL

xo

od

xOrc

Gv6Lv3).

Secondly, he must strive to imitate the Self-Sufficiency of divinity, since "It is characteristic of the gods to need nothing, of those like the gods to need but little" 4). So then, the practice of aapxemoc gives rise to a curious paradox. The ocaT&pxisis sub-human in so far as he descends to the animal level, super-human in so far as he approximates to the divine. Thus, if he is reproached for living like a beast, he is in a position to reply with all the assurance of Lucian's Cynic: xLvave?oUaLV O6 Oeo'0 oL &tv ONPExV eVL zapoveq toc yer tIV av

X6yoV -u

saVc, yIp aIOVTaL5).

Such then, is

avt&pxr4a according to the genuine Cynic tradition. The question now to be considered is whether the concept owes anything to outside influences. It is perhaps significant, for in-

stance, i)

that the Atomist

See Dudley,

~~

uses

x&rapXoc

to denote

~

Cohibenda Ira,

46I C. oL yap &y.Lyc,v8?0evO

~ ~ ~ ~~~~,

Aro?v

3) I. IX. 9. See Julian, Or. VI. 193 D; Dio Chrysostom, Or. VI. 26. 4) D. L. VI. I04. Cp. Xen. Mem. I. VI. io, where a similar sentiment ascribed to Socrates.

5) Cyn.

I2.

a

op. cit. p. I78.

2) Cp. Plutarch, De OOX 0tJCOTLeVO G6V 00X OC7CO0rUYO1)XVOUaLV.

~

Democritus

is

THE CYNIC CONCEPTION OF AYTARKEIA

25

frugal way of life 1) and like the Cynics, opposes 'vocUpxito 2). Furthermore, when he says that Fortune though bountiful, is uncertain, while Nature is ocuTapxicw3), we cannot help feeling that here is something very similar to the Cynic notion is the man who lives a "natural"life. The Sophist that the au-ocpx% Hippias who lived at roughly the same period seems also to have made ociurpxeaohis aim 4), but in his case there can be no suggestion 7OXUT?k

of possible influence upon the Cynics. His

bears no ocut&pmcLC

resemblance at all to that of Diogenes. For judging from the anecdote recordedof him by Plato in the Hippias Minor5), it is obvious that he did not aim, like the Cynic, at reducing his needs to a minimum, but rather at developing his capacities to the utmost in order that he might himself, without external assistance, satisfy any and every desire that presented itself. There is nothing ascetic about the ov&apxma of Hippias, nor does his brand of Self-Suffi-

ciency, like that of the Cynics, demand the total abolition of luxuries. For, as we know from Plato, Hippias, besides providing himself with essential clothing and footwear, all, of course, of his own manufacture, also adorned his person with such superfluous articles as a ring and an intricately wrought girdle made after the Persian fashion. We also know from Plato 6) that he was in the habit of boasting about his ability to make money, a clear indication, surely, that he is not likely to have had much influence upon the Cynics who plumed themselves rather on their mendicant state and were frequently to be heard extolling the merits of Hevtocas an indispensable condition of Self-Sufficiency. Undoubtedly one of the main inspirations of the Cynic conception of act"r&pxeLoc was the conduct of the philosopherSocrates. Xenophon, who, to some extent, sees Socrates through the eyes of Antisthenes, i)

Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, II. 246.

VeT?Le

'LouoU'r-pXetov

M&a&xeL. 2)

ibid.

2I0.

Tp7reXV

TO\U-?X?O

pev

T6Z-x

XapOCO7aLv,

OUTapx'o

cPpoa6'v72.

3 ) ibid. 4) ibid. 5) 368B,

I176. ru'Z- ?tyao68wpoq 326 (Suidas). In7rto

....

C.

6) Hipp. Mai.

282 D; 284 C.

&aBVa5?a6Poq, pU'aLq8?e oUTaropX-n. . r0Xo4 1? Apt(?o T0Tv owUNtpxxv.

8E aX -

26

THE CYNIC CONCEPTION OF AYTARKEIA

continually stresses his abstemious way of life 1), while Plato too bears witness to his frugal habits, his ability to endure hardship and his indifference to material prosperity. But whereas Xenophon emphasises the austere side of Socrates' character, Plato gives us a less one-sided view and shows us that the cxU&tCpxsLoc of Socrates is based

on motives which differ radically from those underlying the Cynic conception. Socrates, it is true, neglects his material concerns, but his reason for so doing is not that he feels, like the Cynic, that such concerns are a necessary bar to the good life, but simply that his mission as a philosopherleaves him no time to attend to his worldly affairs 2). Again, his attitude to pleasureis obviously quite different from that of the Cynic. In moments of relaxation, as Plato's Symposium indicates, he can enjoy the pleasures of drinking and social intercourse with considerable zest - and yet without detriment to his Self-Sufficiency. For his conduct illustrates a truth to which the eyes of the Cynics were apparently blinded, namely, that the ability to maintain a temperate attitude in the enjoyment of material blessings, is really a far more convincing proof of spiritual independence than the outright rejection of all pleasure as an obstacle to be avoided by those who would attain xcxU'tpx?e&c. In some ways Plato's attitude is much more "cynic" in tone than that of Socrates. Admittedly he realises that in the material sphere the au-&cpxeLoc of the individual is a physical impossibility, and actually attributes the genesis of the community to the fact that tuyZXv t pvxiatov v oux acurocpxs&?a& t&oc B 3), but on the moral level, however, o'crcXpxexc is, he thinks, attainable by the virtuous man. The Good at which men aim is, so Plato thinks, of necessity perfect, and as such, lacks nothing (0tv?v 0t8eV0' tC7poa8eaOocL)4). It follows then, that he who is in possession of the i) AMem.I. III. 5. o0rc y&p zT 5 iv &a-T otx o18' kpydcOLTo, ?rCSa 4n xOC,43&VzLVO'T EC)xp&TrL &pxo(5v-tOx.

av E'

TLL o5tcZ5 oXLyOC

Cp. I. II. I4. It is interesting to notice that Xenophon puts into the mouth of Socrates a remark similar to that elsewhere (D. L. VI. I04) ascribed to Diogenes: -o6 pdv V68eV 8aCLeoat eov lVcLL, T0 8? @c zXM artCv &yyu'r&cxa -ro5 OeLou ..... 2) Apol. 23 B 7. 3) Rep. II. 369 B. 4) Phil.

(Mem. I. VI. io).

20 E 6; cp. 67 A.

THE CYNIC CONCEPTION OF AYTARKEIA

27

Good needs nothing beyond the Good, and by virtue of possessing it, is Self-Sufficient: oCu o 4 yao64, xoOC' o6ov &yaoo6, xoc TOC0& 'T00V .... 0 3& ye Lx(cv0 o3evk &e0?evoq XOCt& TYv LXCoV6q&V etn x&; txoCv6tOc1)

Plato's Good Man, therefore, depends upon himself alone. No external circumstance affects his well-being. Death he can regard with the indifference of the most hardened of Cynics; the loss of a son or a brother, the loss of money, he can face without a tremor, for being [L&?aroc ocis-roceair oc-pxs tp4s lo ei54Tv he has not the smallest need of anyone or anything outside himself (&Locep6ovW rtQL) 2). He does not even need 'r&V&?XX&v-LXwm epOu 1pOu

friends, for since he is sufficient unto himself, he does not miss an absent acquaintance or feel any desire for his company when present 3). In this somewhat repellent view Plato is joined by Stilpo of the Megarian school 4), a thinker who advocates an au'rapxaL in every respect as extreme as that of Diogenes 5), and who, significantly enough, is traditionally linked with the Cynic school via Antisthenes the reputed founder. It would be dangerous to state dogmatically that the Cynic conception of waUt&pxeLa was directly influenced by the views of Democritus, Stilpo and Plato as well as by the conduct of Socrates. But the points of contact are there and it does not seem reasonable to ignore them. More important perhaps than the origin of the conception is its logical consequence. To be self-sufficient in the Cynic sense means, inevitably, to be anti-social. A man who needs nothing and nobody and who is therefore Self-Sufficient can have no possible reason for participating in the life of the community. The common good means nothing to him because there is no bond of mutual dependence between him and his fellows and the only Good that he recognizes is a private possession which he cannot Lysis, 2I5 A 6-8. Rep. III. 387 D. ii-E. i. 3) Lysis, 2I5 A. 6-2I5C. Cp. the attitude of Socrates who held that i)

2)

q6aeL.

. gXzouLv

oL aVopw)mm

TX [Liv qpLXLxK 86ov'raL, re yap

bsOmaL &)X?xcovxOC'L

xoal avvepyo5v-eq C4eXq5aL (Xen. Mem. II. VI. 2I).

4) Seneca, Ep. I. 9.3. 5) Seneca, De Constantia Sapientis V. 6; Ep. An. c. I7 p. 475; D. L. II. II5. etc.

9.I8;

Plutarch, De Tranquil.

28

THE CYNIC CONCEPTION OF AYTARKEIA

share with anyone else. The completely Self-Sufficient man is then, a creature apart. As Aristotle puts it, he is no part of the community 0OpLovn Oe6' 1)). In fact, for and so is either a beast or a god (4a'e Aristotle, the whole conception of ocxu4apxaxis open to serious question. Man, after all, is a social organism. If he is solitary and detached from his fellow men, he lacks something essential to him

qua

V6ae -noXL-L%xov2).

Therefore, even in a state of Cynic detach-

ment he is not really Self-Sufficient, for to be Self-Sufficient is to lack nothing. Only the community, according to Aristotle, is for only in the community where justified in aiming at au'apoc4pxe, all are "members of one body" to borrow a Pauline phrase, can the mutual needs of individuals find any degree of satisfaction. Even moral virtue cannot guarantee Self-Sufficiency as the Cynics think, for even the good man, in Aristotle' opinion, needs friends in order to widen his knowledge of human nature and thus to extend his own self-knowledge 3). Besides, the good man must have an object for his virtue if his Justice or Temperance or Courage are to be put into practice. Furthermore, he cannot be just or temperate or courageous in a vacuum, and so, 4 ?v &xtoq 83to.at 7tpo4 Ou 8&xocLos7payYnsTcxL xoa ,O' &v, 46woG 8y xocLo 69ppv Xt 4 ovapezo; xod xxv &?A&v 'xoe0a-ro4 4). Only on the level of pure contemplation will Aristotle admit the possibility of Self-Sufficiency 5). For, in order to contemplate, a man needs no object external to himself on which to focus his activity. But even the contemplative can never be Self-Sufficient in the physical sense, for even he needs food, clothing, and bodily health if his contemplative activity is not to be hindered by material 6). p T4 O is, T 7&pv Au-0pXSa cares, ou yap au ocpxz n cp6uC I) Pol. I253 A 29. Possibly Aristotle has the Cynics actually in mind wheP he says this, for of course, the gods and the animals are, in the eyes of the Cynic, the very types of the oc&rapxeLoc to which he aspires. 2) Nic. Eth. 1097 B II. cp. II69 B 8. itoMnXOV yap o ocvOpW7Oq xOl GUonv 7recpux6q. 3) See Nic. Eth. II69 B 3 ff. 4) ibid. II77 A 30. 5) Nic. Eth. II77 A 27. iT Tr tyOL6VW OcutpX?L 7epL T7V O?p?y-Lx7V [LOcMa'r, )ibV e I7B 6) ibid. 1178 B 34.

THE CYNIC CONCEPTION OF AYTARKEIA

29

therefore, only attainable, accordingto Aristotle, in a limited sense, as a product of the contemplative life. On the practical level it is not possible at all. Thus, as far as Aristotle is concerned, there is in the Cynic sense. For the Cynic absolutely no case for ocU'rpxeLoc an adherent of the r'to4 7rp0Cx'nx0q,repudiates

being essentially

in all its forms, and ipso facto, on Aristotelian premises at Oep(pLa least, his claim to Self-Sufficiency must be disallowed. CARDIFF,

University College. AD VERGILII

CULICIS

vss. 35-38

Culicem Vergilii carmen esse teneo sed nunc fusius demonstrare praetermitto. Versus 35 sqq. hi sunt: 35 mollia sed tenui pede currere carmina versu viribus apta suis Phoebo duce ludere gaudet. Hoc tibi, sancte puer; memorabilis et tibi certet gloria perpetuum lucens mansura per aevum. Pro apta nonnulli codices praebent acta, quod immerito Giomini (Appendix Vergiliana, 1953) in textum recepit. Deinde pro gaudet codd. AU habent gaudent, faciliorem sane lectionem, quam Plesent et Giomini alteri praetulerunt; Leo singularem numerum defenderat, ita ut pagina (vs. 26) eius verbi subiectum sit, qua in re ei assentior. Contra astipulari ei nequeo asseveranti: 'Constructio ita variata est, ut in priore membro pagina gaudeat quod carmina currant, in altero ipsa ludere gaudeat'. Scilicet non offendit constructionis variatio minime insolita, sed offendit asyndeton vel iuveni poetae

nimis

durum.

Vix

dubito

equidem,

quin

infinitivus

q. e. currere

pendeat ab adiectivo q.e. mollia: 'mollia tenui pede currere' significat 'mollia ad currendum tenui pede'; cfr. e.g. Georg. I, 284 '(dies) felix ponere vitem'; Ecl. 5, i '(pastores) boni calamos inflare et dicere versus' (vide Kiihner-Stegmann II ? I25 A 3). Ergo carmina non est subiectum verbi quod sit gaudent (ut volunt Pl6sent et Giomini) sed obiectum verbi q.e. ludere: pagina versu ludere (cfr. Ecl. 6,I) gaudet carmina, mollia tenui pede currere, quaeque (aliter atque res versibus praecedentibus indicatae) viribus suis sint apta. Quod attinet ad lectionem traditam certet, Leo eam defendere conatus est sed locutionem curiosius quaesitam exemplo comprobare se non posse confitetur. Alii alia excogitaverunt: restet Ellis; crescet Sillig; sibi perstet sit tibi Heinsius; certast (certa est) Baehrens; tibi perstet Pl6sent; memorYabile; certe Buecheler. Nisi omnia me fallunt, praestat legere constet (cstet pro ctet). Cfr. e.g. Colum. 9, 9, 7 'si constat principibus gratia'; Val. Max. 4, 4, 7 'ei .... dignitas patris familiae constitit'; Sen. Dial. 9, 7, 6 'constet illi licet fides et benevolentia', sed imprimis Gratt. 206: 'quae Petroniis bene gloria constat'. H. WAGENVOORT Traiecti ad Rhenum, Prins Hendriklaan 68.