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MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

THE GREEK AND PERSIAN WARS

EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW

THE GREEK AND PERSIAN WARS Text and colour plates by

JACKCASSIN-SCOT

ISRN o 83045 27 I f6

Thc preparation of 111istrxt wnulrl havr bccn impnnsihlr wi tho11t thr nssiatancc o F Charlcs Wonrill, who gavr of' h i s time rnml cr~lrrouslv,ancl savrtl ~ h c Iwmk ham manv rsron of'I;i(.~. IlI~~~rr;~tions 2:3 to 30 art. taken firm Cn.~l~/rn~ o f t l ~ r&rek.r and Kornnni hy 'l'hrnnas Hopr (1)rlvr.r P~~hlicationsl.

Filmsrt by HAS Printrrs Limited, Ovrr Wallop. Hamphir~ I'nnlcFirwlln wrrt. rlrtcrnrinrd to ~~~~~~~~y \rnt~ldhc inc.lli.c.tivc. mainr;~iti thr intlrprr~clr-nrc ol' :\thc.ns; rhr '171~invasion flrcr 11r;lc-hc.tlon ill(. s;tnrly short-, cr,t~~m;inder-in-r:hirf' was (.:i~llim;lchus nl' :lpliiclna ha~rlrclu p 111(. ships xtlrl ct\\-.rt.~~ tllr. rn;~rsht.snntl i r k r l ~ t .protvrrion 01' t h t tli\.isional ct)rnmanrlt.rs,. prnmontory, .r.;~llcvl (I~I-tosura,on t h r latltlw;~rtl E l a r i n ~1w;nc-ons \r;lrtlc-ct t hc :\thr=tli;inx that thr sidr. 'l'llr c ; ~ n ~ pw : ~rit~~;l!c.daicar ~ h rX1;~karia 13c.rsi;~ninv:ision t r m p s 1l;td landtul. ' 1 1 ~icrvs ~ was spring tc~l~ich pmvi(ltul ~ C K K I graxinr: Tor IIIV hrmcs tirkrmn a h s t runllt-r 10 Sp:trt;\ ; rhc Spa~.tat~r;, aucl a plrntihrl s~rpplyol'z*~atrr. i ~ l t t ~ ~St ~ ~ c T !I ~ hI ~ ~t i ~c .;~nnouncrd ~ t l ~ a ttheir rc111 :\tlit*ns the sittl;ilinn r u m vcrv di tlimr.etltrrom li~fouscotlsr-ic-nrrlosl,;ldr rhcir [ m o p firm cmtrr111;11wl.tic.11had prt.zliiilv

. and thc lcfi flank was Iicld 1 ~ ) - the Platacans. ' 1 ' 1 1 ~ 'I'hr Athenians took up thcir position at thr centre, which was to takc thr l ~ r u t ~otf thc first sonthern end of thc plain with Mount A~riclikicJn anstaught, was under t l ~ r+joint cornrnenci ol' thcir l e l i flank and the sea to the right ; the Rrvxisa Themistoclm and Rristrides. 'l'ht. Athenian tartic. marsh lay slightlv to thc war. 'I'hr ccjastal road to was to wcakcn the ccntrc hy widen in^ thc space Athrns was tiow efictivclv scalrd. J'rrm rverc cut 'bctwcen cacli man ancl to rcrlucr rhe ranks t o tibur down and man-hauled into drfrnsivc p s i tions with instcad of thr usual r i ~ h a .'Tltc chance r ~ l thc branrlles licing the Pcrsian linrs, a prccal~tion 131.eakthrough was a caltula~cd risk. Thc rnairt atpinst thr Prrsiat~cavalry!..From 7 to I r .August strcngth wi~gmassed on thc flanks which i l was thc front lincs rrrnained static, five kilomctrcs apart, ncithrr side willing to rnakr thr first mnvc. Thc .4thvni;trus wcrv loath to commit thrir tmops to hat tlc, as thc advantap lay wi tk thc Pcrsians in an open -plain con flirt. A q i n s t thr superior Pcrsian force of cavalry and arrhcrs, thr Athrnians had only inrantrymen. The Pcrsians remained irnmobilc hccause r hrv had II(F wish to engage tthcir own weak and i n h i o r infantry agains~thc Grcck hoplitrs in thcir prcp a r d position ; thcy wcrc also hoping for ;t s i ~ n a l from Hippias' ii-iends within Athens itscll: Rut thr stalemate could not last indefinitely and Datis finally put Iiis own battlc plans into action. Under mver of darkncss on thr nigIlt of I I 112 August h r reem barked most oft hc cavalry as well as his task force and, slipping out, sai1r.d Tor Phalrran nay leaving behind Artaphernm with a holdinq force facing thc Athenians. Thc departure of' D a ~ i sdid not ga z~nnoticecl and Milliadcs' scouts wrsc quick to iniirrn him of thc h r t . ?he r l ~ h c n i a n commanders were surnnlonccl and Miltiadcs outIind the only posible chancc of a Greek victory : the Persians could not passi1)ly react1 Phalcron by sea in less than tw hours; 1,eashing and d iscmharking would take a frw more hours, by which timr it would be late aFtrrnoon or early eveninq; in thc immediate vicinity, on the plain of Marathon, Artaphernm had lost a large part of the cavaliy and tmp, but would still have his archrrs. Thr quesrion waq whcther thc Aihenians shnulcl risk an engagemcnt with the Pcrsian forces; if they did, ant1 clefeated thcm, there was still timr to doubIt back Tor the defence of Athens. It was 5.30 a.m., so

11q~d U'C)IIICI complctc at1 rnrirrlinfi movement. "I'hr Pcrsian li>rrcs were drploycd as Miltiadcs anticipatrd : thc crntrr was stalIi.cl with the rriitk troops ar~tl thc flanks wrrr helcl 11y interior hartalions drawn fmnl thc conscripts oft hc clnpirr. 'IBc risks Ihr thc Athenians wcre great, howcvrr; 5. D c d I from a p i mof d f i g t u t Attic bowl (fithcmtury kc), showing m~ Athenian boplite w n m o r mttncking n Fersipp stmdard-befrrr. (LOIMP, P u r i ~ J

rhrir strcngth was a littlr orrcr half' that of thv Persian cen trc, and tIlr opcn qround to hc covcrrd put thr Greeks at the mprcy of thc rlitr Pcrsinrr arrhcrs. At almut 6 a.m. otl 12 August the distance l>ctweetlt11etwo armics was apprclxirnately nnr anrl a halr kilornetres; t11r lrtrrnpet wunded thr conmand and thr Alhcnian ranks movcrl forward. T h e acivance start cd briskly, drveloperl into a trot, thcn

thr. clnublc as thcy rushrtl thc last 140 rnctrcs to avnirl thc hail arrows. T h e Persian royal coneinqc'ents put up a stronq resistance, the centre standinq its ground, forcing t h r Athcnian hoplitrs t ~ ~ c kMranwhilc, . on cither flank the Athenians wit11 thrir slronE concentration uf troops carried all ihcforc ~ h c mant1 ptlt the P&rsi;~n flanks tn fliqht, man?) ~ ~ r t r r a t to i n ~thc Great M;irsh whew they drtmned. Ot hcrs retrratcd along ~ h sllorr c tr, thcwaiting ships in thc I~eof'tbcpronlontow. Zlr'ilh thc Pcrsian flanks in cornplcte disarray, tl~r rlthcnian ancl l'latacan flar~ krrs dimgaged thc pursuit accol-ding to plan. Regroupi nx, thry rclturnrd to thr sccnc of thc batrlc whcrc thc remain in^ Prrsiarls wcrc out flanked in r douhir pincer rnovcmcnt. Thc rctn8at in^ Persians rouxht their way back in the dirrction ol'thcir s h i p along the narrow gap Ir~twcon thc marsl~csand thr beach. Thrv werr closrly pursrlcd l)y t l ~ Athrnr ians, who were drtr*rrninc.clto dcs~rovt hc enemy forces and fleet. 'I'hc I'ailurc at' t h e Persians to envisaqc surh a contingcncv was qui tc astonish in^, especially 21s t h r d>vious Athenian preparations can hartlly h a w mrapcd rhcit notice. c Pcrsian Ry a.m. on r l r \ ~ p ; r l ~ t~ h surviving roval trmps ancl the ships of khr Mararhon task forcc wrrr out at sra and heading for PhaErron. In the final count ol'c;~-ualtiwthr Pcrsians had lost 6400 nlrn and an unrt.c.orclcd num hcr 01' prisoners and ~vounrl~*d ;*long with scvrn ships. "I'hc ?t~Ficnians suni~mrtsurprisin~lyfew castmities with on iy 192 dead, inclucl ing: t hcir commander-in-chief Callirnachus. In orcler to cornplvtc his ovcrall stl-aregic plan, l\liltiadcs had to clernand fmm his mcn ionr more H e ~ u l c a ncndravour, tht- march l ~ a c kto Athens, 'as bst as thrir feet could carry them'. Commander Aristeidrs and one division wcrc left lwhind to guard thr prisoners of war and raptured cquipmrnt. 7'hr rcttrrn ol'the Athenian army, quick in comparison with thc slower naval squadrnns of D;itis, had to take fill1 advantage of surprise iT h'liltiades' plan was to take elrecl, GIfhen thc Persian invasion task iorce arrived, the Athenians were alrcacly in thrir delinaivc posirions at C y n o s a r g ~ , muth or thr. citv ancl fiicin~tlw st:;t. And, whcn Dalis arrived in Phalcron Bay, hc founcl the citv wrll drfended. Attcrnpis t o I;~ndwoultl have h e n tlscl~ssso hc allcharmi and awairtd Arrapllcrnrs' hrokc into

L Pi-orl-d

sbot which w e r t t t n d am rnimdtun

with the d d or n leather s l i a ~ .T h e sling m n a w u q ~mund, d niter aomc turn8 n wider nwep m a r ucctrrnplirhd and one cad of the lrmthrr sling w a n r r l r n u t d , b u r l k ~the 1cmd shot vwuy with qrtat momrrrtum. 'IXe *hot warn o f t e n i n s c r i h r l with mrk.iaEts. (Rritinh Museum, Lnndon)

drtachmcnt. Thcir arrival: i l l a dvplrtrtl and 1)atrrrecI condition Idi only orw rollrsc Ibr thc

Prrsiati inval;icln rot-cv, il stra~eqicwirhdrawal. l,;lck to Asia. Marathon had provcul that the hpavy troops of the hoplirr inrantry cottld cornprrc succrssli~lly ag;Jnst supcrioritv of numbem, particularly whcn tlicir opponrnts wcrr only liqhtly arrnccl, hut [hc Circck victory should not bc o\~rrcstirnattd.Thc Pet-siitn losse~;wrrc c;lsiIv I W ~ ~ R Cl ~ SO y l i ~ ;1r~ W~C T ~ and scnrct only to emphasize thr nccd Ibr a prnprrly pwparcd rxywdition il'Gwrcr was za br suhjigarrcl. 'I'h;~trite Pt-rsians woriltl rrtllrn was incvitahIt*, ancl it was clcartv t-ssrntial h r thr Grcrks to rralizc thar, dmpitr t h e glov of Marathon. they had done Iittlr- morc than I~uvlimr in wliich to prcparr t Iicmsrlvcs for t h r rrsurnption or the con flick. In 4W.9 w:. Miltiad-, rotnmanrling tthv A1hr.niarl flvrr, attrmptcd to regain cnt~~rt)l of rhostAegean islands which had capitz~latcd to thc. Persians, hut his naval forcc insufTicirnt to accomplih this task and his hlockadc of Parm bitcrl ;I dcl'cat which let1 tn his imprisonment ar Athcns, whew h c d i d smn after ol' a wound rcceivcd ar Paros. Thc Ath~niansncxt tried LO obtain mastpry of thc Saronic CuIi'by ovcrpoww-

7-.

C r o m r u t p f d r q a h o w k ~ a nA l h t n i a n horseman, 475 m.c. The h m m i s without *ndrElc or stirrups hut with full head hmeuzrs. 'Fht horwman wrar.c a lonq, hiahly-patlrrnrtl, rtiArlnak and r a m r n the -hart j ~ v e i i n s (Villa . Ciiulira, Hornr)

in^ rhc pro-l'rrsian island oT:\r.@qina whusc raiders By this tirne Gr~rccbhad rcrcivrd alarming relxlns mntinually ravagrd rhc shorm ot'tittica. This too ol' cxtrnsivc I'rrsian inv;~sirln pl.c.parnlit)ns, rumw;rs n f;lilurt, ant1 i t llccamc ob\pious that rhc o t ~ r spry D ~ I - ~ Ison. I s ' S v t * x v s ~[hr new Arl~rnianflrr~raulrl o&r little pmtrction ;qainst a I'crsian kin^, who apprrriatrd t hc psychalqical 11mlil~S V ; ~powrr. v[Ti.cl o f w~chstorirs, prrhaps haping thcrrhy to 'l'llevacancy crrnlcd 1)y thc fall of h4iltiadr.swas Entlucc selmc areas o ~ G r r ~ 10 r t c. i l l ~ iul;itc l without a frllrd '1'hc.rnislr~:lr-s,who rully apprrciatrd nht fish t . nclvl fir a stronq naval ti~rcc; thc discovr~yof nrw To facilitarr thr rnclvrrncnt ~f his army into silvrr d r p ~ i t it) s chc Lauricln mining district placed Grcecc. Serscs had orrlerrd thr I)rid~ingof the surplus capital (hr dispjsal of' thr A~semblyand Hellcspcmt, a maqnificcnt achivvvrnrnt on thr part enal>lr(l thc Athtbt~ians, ~rcrsuaclcd by 'I'hrrnis- a l his rnqinccrr; who t~seclavtSrsix hunclrcrl ships to toclrs, ~ r stommcncr a shiphuildinq programrnt. construct two huge pontoon brirlqcs. I n order to inrrnrlrcl t o prodrice [wnhuntlrrcl new triremes filr avnLI risking his fleet arountl thc d;ingcrous cape of thc Athrniat~fleet. Moutrt rlthrrs hc tlihrl acannl (lug r:at.rtnsthc isthmus. t 3 idrntificd. ~ Set-xcsdrrnantluu!rcln t ir~grt~ls lkom vvrysatrapy of the Persian Empire ant1 the rmponse enabled him to amam an imposing lbrrc. Ry 48 I KC. he had

and rracm ol'this canal can still

set up his I~eacEquancrs, at

Sardcs in 1,ydia ancl sent out toall t11eGrrpk stat(%rxccpl Athens ancI Sparta for thc carth and wa'tcr of submission. Tlrc sizt. (IT the Persian arm?;has htcn a clurstion ofrlispn~rand conjccturr cvcr since Horoclot us' c~rifinal figusc. gros4y exaggrratccl, of ovrr two millicin comtxttants. More realistic latter-day commrntators estimatr Xrrxm' forcr at some r jo.ooocomhatants, approximately half OF which arc thought to havc h e n Prrsian troops, and i t i n c l u d ~ d thc hcst cavalry available li-orn t h r Mditrrranean arca. His fleet, said by Hrrodot~rsto nurnl~crabout I ,200 vessels, many of which werc snlall t ranslxlrts. hasted a contingent o f skilled Phoenician svilrnrn and forces from E4ypt,Carin and Ionia. Sinrr :in army of such a size coulcl nor hope to live off so arid a land as Gmrcr it nepdpd to be provisionrd rrrlrn the sca as i t prncccclcd around thc shows of thr Thracian scil ancl into ccntral Gwccr. T h r Hvvt would also ~>mvidra mili rer? bar-k-1111w1icnt.w.r necessan. Serxrs clrarly intrndecl the subju~atinnn f tlic whalcofGrrcce ifpossible Tor he harl to~nmittrrfan rnnrrnous numbrr of troops and had mad(. rxtcmnsire ~~rcl)arations, inr:ludinq an aLwr.rntLntwith 11rc

tn pin clown thc wt=qtcmrn Grrrks ol' Sirily whilst S c r x r s attack(.cl from the.

C;~rlhaginianswho wrrc vast.

Hy tlie spring of 480 R.C. [he huge itmy I ~ a d crossvd ~ h Mrllrsl~lr~t r w h ~ r ri t was-joinecl by the flcrt, and was making its way. in 111rce separate columns, rc~warclsThrssaly, prt-c*r.rl(*dby alarrning rumnurs that i t was drinking [hv ri\.ecs dry. Mranwhilc, thr I;rtr.h, in the autumn of 481 R.c., rrummnntd to thr Isthmus of' Crlrirlth 1rpt.rsrnta1ivt-s c~l'allthtsc statrs which hacl nnt at ready subniittcd t o Pcrsia. and an alliancr, lrrl hv Alllens ancl Spart;i, was Srwrnt-c!. I-lowtvrr. a s~~clclcr~ blow was rlc-alt to Crrvk rrcolution 11y ~ h voicr r of thr Tlrlphic. orarlt., which prr~lictc.rl rlisast~rfor ~thc Grccks and arlviscd thr Athrnilins in particular ta flcr For thrir livtx. 'Thv oraclr rlairn~tlthat the only hopr lay in a wtrdr-n wall, and although (his prtw~rnahll;indica~c.rithc wrmclen rlcfcnces oi' t hc :Ir.rt~polis, ir wiu i n ~ ~ r p r e t ~hy r l 'I'hernistoclm to mran tllr Grt-ck f1t.t-t. On the qucstion nf strate,:, opinion ar thc Isthmi;tii cc~nfi*rc.nc-cwas dividrtl. 'I'he Spartans and rhrir l'(-lr~~~r~ri~ic.siiirinrighhours hclcl tcn;~ciouslyt o ~hr:view [hat tlie main d~renccsbould

GEPIERAL S U R V E Y

-----

Road

Trsci Goat r r x k

4.*k h:am

contours

thu Eutxlean Channel, a posirion favourable to the Grcrks bccause i t compris~d narrow, easily detensilrle passm for thr armv ancl hccausc any outflankinq rnovrrncnt hy the Persian flcst would t a k ~i~ into the Euhoean Channcl whrw its sizc would hc a disadvantage. It' tha land hrcc could hold out against Xerxcs' army lonq cnough to induenidaschow 10 occupy the. Midrllr clwcrlrssagainst Sencs' I~ITCCF., c v a c u a ~ ~ dthr non-combatant popula~ion to r l e ~ i n a , T'rt~czcn and Salamis whilst t h r ablrlwciird mcn wcnt ahoard ~ h ships c tcr await thc ncxz conflict. A few p u tl~rir ~ faith in a drfmcr or Athcns and rcrnained in tht- stockaded. Acrr~polis. Thc Spartans, rn~anwhilr. harl built a Ihstiliuation acmss thc Istl~musof C~rinthand thc Grrck army now concrntrarvd an thr drfmct. which had, all alonq, most appcalcd to the Pelopo~~nt.sians.

'Thcmis~oclcswas strnrlgly in fitvour of an carly rngaEctnetl1, prrfrrahly on Grt:rk terms. E~ut. as IISLI~I,Greek learlrwhip was dividr~l,sqtrnc sfill prcfi-rring a consolidated dcfcnce oS t h e Isthmus. Howcvcr. the size of'tilr Athrnian rnntribt~tionIn the Llert cnablecl cl'hcmistocles to Tclrcc ;I drcision hv ~hrc':ut~ning a withdrawal of thr .Athenians il' hattlr was not olli:rrrl in thc. Stl-aitsorsalarnis. 'I'ltis position was favc~urahlrto the Grrrks hcc:~uscor t hr ~ a r t i r a disadvanragr l

which thr l'rmian nutn-

I~crsw o ~ ~ l~xprrirrlrt. d tl~rrr,At rlrtm~isionthe Persian flcet had I~rrnablc ro drploy itscjf' with rclativr vasc. hut thew would I,r cattlc,and, bc-r-dwith the his flret into thc Saronic Gulf t o a ~nooringat wavering mnralr of his mrn. hr i s said to I-~avc Phalcron. jyhilst thc Grcrk llcrt rrmainecl tin.tlr- rntirrrl rhc Pprsjan corn~t~andvrwith a rnEsr frat&, ~ h c r rwas no possil,ility of Pmian maslr? message. suggestinq i h a ~tl~cGre~ks,dyicrtcd ancl dGrrcce; wonrr or later a navaI engaiyrnpnt was irrrsolulc, woulcl oKir l i t t l r or no rcsistnnct~. inrvitablr. C3n thv r v r ofthr hat~lc,22 Scptcrn1,rr 480 KC.,

MT AEGALEUS

SALAMIS CHANNEL

~LIPSOKOUTALII

t TAlANTONESIk

11.. h n i l from Crrtk lrrbtr n t z i n f i n ~M u bow.

vase

p i n t b g q50 ns, shmving an

the Greck flcct lay krtwern rhr nt~rthcoast of the island or Salamis and thr coast nf Altica north-west of Piraeus. The Pcrsians had drawn up facing north in a line, thrikc d-cp, from thr Cynosura promontory on Salamis to Pirarus. The channel bctwcrn Salamis and Megara, t h r o u ~ hwhich the Grerk pmi tion could be reached r r t m the west, was Irft un~t~artlc-d by Thrmistocles, pssihl l; to tempt Xerxes to rmptov thc same tac~icas had initially been adnprcd at Artemision-la divide his force and trap thr. Crcck fleet in 111rhapr orcapturing it intact. 'I'his Xrrxcs did, senditig his Kpptian ct~ntingmtarouncl t h e south coast ofsalamis to seal t hrw western channcl. The Greeks were apparently still arguing whcn r hcv received ncws of t hc Pcrsian movrs, and thry rra1ir.d that ~ h c r rwas no other course opvn to thcm but to fight. Accordingly, the Grcck fleer rlrrw up in batlie formation facing Hcracleion on the show ofnttica. T h e y had at thcir disposal about y o vessels, the Athenians caking the Icft wing and the Aeginetans the right. Ry the mornin# nf F ~ ha(tl(* C t hr Prrsi ans hail dc-plt)ycd, with thcir right wing held by rhe skilrul Phoenicians and thc Ioniaii ships (once more under. Persian rutc) on the left. Whilst still rnanwuvring into position, the Persians wcrc rowed upon 11). the Gr~ekswho began to rorcc the Icatling Persian ships hack upon rhcir FcIlows, causing disorder in zhc overcmowdcd Persian forma tion, This was ~ollowed hy an Athenian flank attack on the Phoenician ships, which wfrc pushcd hack into their own

rs. Milthdes, the G m k com-drr the C;mk victery at Mmrnchon.

who m s r c ~ i b ~ t

rr*lrr*atiny.Prrsiatl f1cc.t !jut cvenruallv h l l o w d it as h r a s t h r islnntl ol':inrlrt~swherr tlrt=!' llc.ltl ;I council , 01' wral-. I hrrnistnclcs ~ a ~ w u r r sail t l in^ ;kt nncc for t h c Hdlrspnnt ant1 rlrstso~ing;Xrrsrs' Mvny hack suilirt-tl hc.;~vyIrsscs - ;iccorrlirlg tr r 1-irrtdotus. .roo ;~uross thr l~~-itfgr.s, thus trappi~lg liiiri without ship ;irid 1w;rrlvrl hack r o l'halrron wlit.ilc-4. it supplirs: hut ot hcrs k i t 1hal lliis tvottld rnch;in r h r rrturnrtl c.vrnrualty to l l ~ rMrllcxlwn~t.Facccl now pil1;tgin.q nf C:~.cccr1,y a lxrqr and star\-ing army, will1 ilrt. iinpowi I ~ l rtask rh' ~,ro\.ixioningil huge and rllr pl;in w;u dropp~rl. army from st1c1-1a rleplr~trtlflrrl, Srrsr.; had nn h grt-;it tic-ill of prrstiqr harl hc-rt~Inst Ily Xtmcs option h u ~10 withcll-alw the' I,ulk or h i s forces. at Salarnis ancl hc hacl ro consirl~.~. carrfi~llythc 'Fhr Prrsians had hrrtl rleti-ated 1)y ;I cnm- i n ~ p l i r i ~ t i t xrd' ~ s witl~clraw;~l.I,oss or Tact= 1ni~l11 rrvolt on ~ h wtbstt.rn r ln~rdrrorltis ernpire as lin;riion or supcrior Grerk tactics ant1 their own ins~irr+ inrptittwlr in fail in^ lo npprcriatt- that shrc-rwrbight i t had ;~Irr;trlydotle in 'lhracr anrl M;~c.rclonia,and maintain the till-rat t o C:rt*ccc by ol'numtlrm 7it-as insuficirnt to c-arn tltt- clay arainst hr rlt.cidt-rf ly, and forces which. although stmallc-r. wrrc: or h i ~ h r - s lravinq \)art o f his army in ' ~ ' l ~ r s ~ a'I'hrarr - arclnniiis x ~ ~ r; l\ ~ ~ i ~ l f i ~ z ~ qualit?.. I'hr fight for inclepct~.rlcncc was a powerSul !tl;acc-c!r~ni;~.~ ~ n d c lhf ~nolivation for thc Greeks, ;trlcE t 11c. u ~ ~ c l i strd ~ > u whilr taking thr rmt hack wit11 him over thc thr c.;istc-rn victor!: at Salamis hoostet.1 the-it. moritlr ;~nrE Hrllrspor~~10 rtBasscrt cont 1-01 rrpmation at thr rsprnst. ol' Xrrsrs' n ~ i q h\i W i i r Argean coasl. wlrirhcr he srnt his flwt Tctr thi. samv purposr. Mardonius was lcii in 'I'hrssal y with rnachint.. Unawart. (1 "t Xrrxcs' i n t ~ nions, t tlu* Grrrks 13.Dttnil Sa -lid the hcrd aCa G& -0s h a SPrcopham, Pstnnbul drlayecl hcfilrc sctltin~ out in pursuit or thr a Bwotian-qpehelmet. (TheAl-dcr

rcntrr anrl rmlo thc

[.(last

of :\tticn.

:\ti

rvt.rltu;il

.

Museum)

Athens ant1 rctircd to Bocoliir whrrc the ~vrrainw;rs

admiral)ly w~itcd to his cavalry, assrml~linghis filrcca n p p i t r Mount Cir hrrac nn the :%wpua plain hrt w r r n Thcl~csand I'1atar.a. Ry f'rlIin2 a nurnbcr oE' trrrs in thcr area 11rcrtbatccl stitl lilrthrr ad\antage ror his cavalry, and w;u waitinq at tllr rc;rdy when thr 3.5,ooo-strnng Clrcrk huplirc hrcr, mrnrnal~dedFy rhc Spartan Pausimius, nlo\-cld ovrr Mount Cithrrat. and camprd nciw l'lataca na tlic

q. Pi- -f

a relid sbowhg a amggk ktwtcn Marc-

dapinn d Persian warrior* Thtrrc f i p r r r wtr. mmd an the rarnaus AJcxudcr Smrropbnpn by o d e o f &c k i u ~ or Sidon, AWlonymus, who w c c u d hin t h r o w rhrou~hthe innuof M-drt. (TheAlr-ader Srrcopbp~h, Israubul Museum)

suficicnt rorccs to rcnrw tlic olrrnsivc at his cliscrrtir,n. His armv uonsistrtl of 12,non cavalry sncl ahnut .~O,OOO infanlr)l or whom mmt: wrrr run tingen ts from central and northern Grrcr~. Included in this torce, which was a continual threat to Grevk indcprnclencc, wcrc thc Immortals and the Guard C:avalry.

A n attcmpl to won the Athenians and t h ~ i r valuable H i r t into a trenly wirh thc P ~ n i a n smrt with failure, and Mardonius, hoping lo thn:atcn thcm inko sul)mission, rnarchrcl on Athsns, 'l'his provokcd t h r Athenians into an aqrcernrnt with Spasta to mount a n imnldiatc offcnsivr upnn thc irrv;lrlcr. M~si(lt's,Srrxm t l i iq1rl ;12 anv limp srnrl a rrfirrhishcd flrrt to asqist Mardonius; the Grrcks cnuld not affhrd to hrsi tatr Ihr loo long. As thc Spartans rnovccl up through the Corinrhii~n isrhlnus in 479 P.C.. ldardotii~~sfirrd

slnprs ovrrlookiny the plain. Matrlonius cornmcncccE hatilit iw IIV scndinq his cavillry nqainsl 111vGrccks. who wrrt. pmqirianed on ground zrnsuitahJr for a cavalry action. Predictably, t h Prtrsians ~ wrre forcrtl to rctrrat, hut ia has hcrn proposed that the loss nnf is rav;tly was a pricc Mardnnius was prcparccl to pay in orcler to lurr tlw Creeks into il more oprn position on the plain. 'l'liis is indrcd what happrntd, f i r Pausanius Icd his men onlo the plain and statinned them l>ctwrcn Plataea and rhc ~Isopus,a littlr ~ 1 1 t or h ~ h zrivrr. . T h e Spartan hoplites took ~lrrright flank, tlw rlthcnians the Irfi, with the rernaintlcr of the ;~llicsoccup~ingthr tcntrr. On srring this, M a r donills drew u p his f i ) r ~ c lacing s them, can thc other sirlc of the river, and in this position thc two armia wait(-d, sn Herodottrs says, Tor c i ~ h tclays. Earh

commander may h a w bcrn wailillx lfbr Ihr othvr to makr t h t first mow, Imth appreciatin~thr slrrngrh nTa mawd hoplizr drrcncc. Howrvrr, Pvtxian raids ilz thr mnllntainc behind thc Grrck lines seriously threa~rnrdPausanius' supplirs, a situation which the skarionary Grrek rorcr:s on t hc plain could in 110 wa?.allcwintr, Aftrr il pvriotl o r s ~ x ~ r ; ~ skirrnishn rlic betwren rhc two rorces, Maxdonius dccidrrl to commit hirnscl f and at ~ackvdwit 11 his cavaly, whosc missilrs pinned dowtl t hr lucklcs Grceks. Cbntinurd prcssure Tmm thc Prmian cavalr! succcrtled in prcvcnring nhc Grrrk lcfi and crntrr from using thc watrrs aT the Asnpr~s,mmpcllig thrm to rclv on thc Gargaphia spring which lay hchind ~ h Spartans r and Irotn wtrirh thrse latter had heen drawing thcir supplies. PJn fortunate1y I i r Pausanizrs the I'rrsians managrd sonichnw tn ctut flank or push hack the Spartans ;uld rcndcr the spring untlsahlr, thus leavine ~ h Grrcks r withoa wiltcr. Furt trcmorc, t h ~CirrcL supply mum thnmgh hillorrnt Cit hrrac had been l>~sirgr:rd. I t war now ~ l p a rha^ Marclonius was control to pursue a policy of attrition whirh might wrll sw:~.rcdf

Pausanitla did not rnanagr tn rr-r.;t;~l~lish his linrsnf mmrnuniratiim and hrnrr t h r provisionin~01' h i s

and rhr rnanncuvrc was nrll ~ s c c u t c ~until l cl;l>break. Mardnnias' c.avalry wrrr srnt to harass thr Spartans until tht. infantry ct,ultf l,e I~rougllt lo tmgage ~ l i c m antl, , tlircrting tht. 1k)lwtians on lllr Pt-rsim right to attack 1 hc cxp)sctl i2t hc-nians. htb mohilizml ihc hulk of his ann!- a~ainrtthe Greck riqht. Rcalizinc that h i s Spartans wo~~lrl h a w to Iwar thr I3runz nf thr Persian attack, Paulrnniusst.nt ct, thr vrnhattlrd ilthmians Tor assistanrt., h111rht. Grrck ccntrc was by now pinned down and con!d not rtspnncl. IVhrti the Prrsiatl inihnwy was upon the Spartans, Pausat~iusdecided to take aclvantagr of rhr cnnges(ecl Prrsian rii~mhrrsand launch a coun tcrattack with his hopliirs. 'l'hrrr S'ollnwrd a ficrctr hattlr whirh rrmainccl undcridcd until Mardonius himsc.Ef li-ll ant1 his mcn flccl. 'l'he Athtnians rncrtnwhilt. hat! rnanagrd to mut thr Zheolians and the Grprk I'Orcrs w m t nn to capture and clestroy t hc Persian camp. I~ollnwinqrip their victnrl;, thc Grrcks hrsirqvrl 'l'hehrs, whirh capitulated a f ~ c r[went? clays and hnnrlrrl ovrr to I'ausanius, and thcrt-by to thcir

army. '2'hc Spartan cornmantler was I'aced wit11 a ha;rarrlo~~r rctreat into hlounl Ci ther;~r20 hold the main passes. a manoeuvrr hindered 11). 11ie poor 9pir.it in rvhirh snmr nl' the allirti Greeks rrrc-ivtul nrrlvrs from a crimmanrlrr who war, not ~l'thrirown citv-state. It srprns thal Pausatlius plnpsrcl lo withdrr~wthc Spartans, \vho lav on rhr G~.t*ekright winq, to M o r l n ~Ci~hrraein o~*drr to re-oprn tllc supply lines, whilst the a1lir.d li,rces in thr. Grr.r.k centre were to rplrcat south towarrl Ylataea. Last to move woulcl be I he I\ thmians, who wpre tn l>rncei=d wut h-eaxtwards across thr path recently takrn hy ihc allies and positinn ~hrmsclvrsas 111rnew Gr~t-k ccntrr. Severhal Lqctors cmnplicatrtl this manrlc.uvrtm. 'l'hr atrcmpc was scvrrelv l~andicapprd t ~ ydarknt.ss. and i t i s hclicvcd by some that the Athenians tcfi~wcl to obey Pmsanius' order to withdraw, leaving themselves cut OK tinrn the rest of r b army ~ which prcrc~ecl~das plannrd towarrls Mor~nt Cithesar. Although the allied Grrrks srrm tn lmvr rno\~ocl back suuccss~isllyto Plataca, cli~cnsionin 15. D m d from anearly bmm-retitrmhowlng A m b m m w ~ the Spartan ranks dclayccl the Grcck riqht flank n carnet hcial:atcacked by A~syrinan,p h cmtury n , (Palnnof ~ AssurbanipE, Ninwch)

~

Eitnrilitics rtid nt12 cease imrnc*rliatrly.and !i>rman!: yrars altrmtards Persian trnops i.cnlai nrd in Thracr.. Thr rnnflict c*ntErrE finally, i t is hc.licrvccl. t h ;I !rt.al! rl;ttin~f j n n ~ .t+q 48 R.c.. t l ~ rI'cxu-t. of C:alli;ts. A f e r the. virtorim at I'lalara and h4?.cale an atlierl C;rt.ok flret 1111dt.r Pausanitrs s r r ahout drivinq thr F'c.1-siann out ol' thc Carian islands. ( :yy>rus a11tI tllr Hcllesptn~~. Pnrlsanius, how~vcr, provrd 10 1w ;I ~yrannical,comrnandcl-, w l i o a ~ways w c r r unpop~r lar with tht. non-Prlnponntbsi;~ncontinct-t~ts111" thr flcct; evetltu;~ll!., aTt~ran lomian mrttiny l'nllnwing the rakina nf'Ityxantiiirii. hr was r r r n l l ~ lI,\ rhr Spartans. rvl10 pulletl out or thr irvnturc al~ogvc.rhcr. 16. D r d l from the ' G ~ t n m a c h i a Stirzr, ' sbowhg the Creek boplit* ubitld So-tion. (Siphniur Trmnnry. Delphi)

dr:lths, thtnc lcadrss who wcrr svmllathctic to the Ptmrsi;in C ; ~ I F C . Ry this tirnr rhe Pt~rsians,wrrc tnaking ttirir way hack to thr Hcllmpont, having witt~tlt.;lwua strI,stanrial pitrt of rhrir ;~rml;, uncler t\rt;~I,asus, lkom t h r tirlrl at Platac-a. 1311rinq the- si1rnmt.r of 479 R.C. a mrssagc was rrrcivrd kmn ~ h lonian r I;rvrks which st~gqwtrd that il' they I ~ ~ P T$\*~n P rhr arllqmrt 01' a IPirt thcl; wotiltl rrvot t ngilinst t hr I'rwf;~ns. Con~nanrlrctb y rhr S1~r1a11kinq. 1,cotychidas. thc Get-k I1t.c.t lrli Delns Tor Sarnor;, off the eastcmrnAegean coast, anrl rnovtd fkorn tlic.rr. to X4ycaIr in Ionia whew Xrrxcs h i d amaswcl a l;~rg(* army to maintain a sun.rillihnc~nl' thc Ionian Greeks. Lror ychidas' fhrcm landed n l c a r h,Iyci~li-and succt-s~firl ly ?~ssaultt~l thc Pcrsiarn p s i ~ i n r l thr ; Pcrsian sllipq, wlli~llhacl I)CCII 1,citclic.rl f i ~ sality, r wcrc dt.stn)yrd. Hiivinq I lins immol~ilizcdPersian wa p w e r thr G r r r k s rK flrrt wllilst l h r smallcr nnts r.ontril>utrd financial support assessrd hy ilrist idcs, thr twasurrr, Apan ii.om hindi1 1 tlnr ~ Lt-afir~c. taqr~hcrhcron a xutr rconnmic h t i n g , this practice p l ; t c ~ llave sums or rnonry undrr Athenian control. The I,crag~rt. opcra~t.rl rlTvutivrly in harassing the

I

G m k Ught Idan1ry (gymnet)

s C m h b-vy infratr). rhaplire) 3 Greek di-r

Petsiaru. l l t l t it slowly hrtame clear that thr ,Athenians rtirl not ronsirlrr i t to hr a clctnocratic alliancr o1'ti.r.r stiur-s. Sclmt. tirnc. during tthr pcriml '1 70 69 D.c., Yaxos trrrnin;~tcd its atlianuc with thp I,~aguc,1t was i tnmctliatcly l~csieqecland li~r-rrd to capitularr ; rlthrns, i t srrrned, wor~lclnot tol~t-a;?te insubordin:ltion From her 'allies'. :\I i~bnut thrsmnv timc (:aryst~anntl thr surrounding land in sor~tl~rrn I : ~ ~ l ~ was l c n fort-iMy ;innrxml hy r h h~ a g u c k~lthc sakr of consnlirlarinq i t s ~crritnrirs. 'I'hr impli calt inns wc~?cthlvious- ;\ t hcns was transforming; thc Lcaque into an crnpire. 'l'lle brcrs avai lahlc to [hc 1,ra~urwrrr mnsidcrable. 111 4fi8 rc.r:. it rlralt a rlrciperl to scm\-c.r tllr links I)ctt\*t.~-t~ Syr;~c-~~sc. ;inti t hc

I ' ~ I n ~ ~ ~ n n ~Ihr ~ s irhr ; ~ ~Syrarusnns ~s, h;nl a subwhich roulrl 1,~- n thl-[.a[ to the Xtl~rnians.Thr war provrd inrntlclusivc. Ihr lmth :\tht.ns atlrl Sp;irta, l)ur in 425 R.c:- an t.s11cditiw1ro

stantial flrc-r

Sicily t11rnt.d thc sralrs in favour nr thr -4thrnians. Forty ships undcr Eurymctlion ;tnd Stq)h(-)clrswrgrt8 e r r i t t o rcinbrctr tmops all-cady in Sicily. T't;vcclling with thrm was Dcmosthrnt.~who, i ~ l i h c ~ ~hold~gh ing no cotnmanri, was t-mpowt.rt.d to rlst. t ht. iIc.r't as h e saw GL. Wlwn Iat*rult o track tllr garrison at clrlct- nrorr. 'l'hr c*?rpc=c-rirt inn was r l i i l t the garristrn 13!mlus, prrli.r.it11ly hclkrr 11ic. rcttll-ll ol'111c.:tlhrnian o n Spl~;ic-trrinwoultl I)c s t a r ~ r r into l surrender. Ijut llt-ct, l ~ i tliit~n{I 1 h a ~thi. i1111y l~rat-~i(+itl~liap- S ~ ; I I ' Lp lAt r~i f Ii t ~ n l a n ; l ~ ~loE run rtn;dl S I I ~ P s~ h) i j ~ prcr;~chrsw r r r ;I! rliose ~ x l i n i sirlrriltl) limi fit-rl by ;islirrre rln ~ l i cseawartl sicle ol' Spl~uc.tc-ria.w11r.n Dr*n~osthrt~es. Hrqlinq to prriprnt:2tl1r1iiail ~ t s rr d stt-onewincl.; k v p ~ttlr A ~ I i ~ n i a t ~ ~the i t ilmy. ~ i ~and I~~ ~ h rirlancl . nl'Sph;wrrria, ~llr.Sparlans Ia~~rlrtl t h ~ r ;~~ f t c srvrs;~l r wccks ic W;IS rvIc1~11tll~attlw zarrisnn ;\ garrison (11' 420 11r;lviiv ar~nc-rlnlrn, of'\ \ , I w m ;I U.~AIICI l i o t st;In.e. D~rnosthc.11c.r was tuakillq plans filr arr assault nn litili. 11ndr.r a 11ii3r wcre rl-uc6 'Spartialvq', t'l'i~vk Sp;u-tan trrwps. 'I'ltr attack rlri l'!,lte was pnrti- Spliac t r r i ; ~whvn C:Ert)~iirjipc.i~rcd.h a v i r ~I~oi~stcd ~ czilal.ly rlilljcul~ 1 w . c . a ~ti!' ~ ~ 11s strctiqth as ;r Ir, tl~rh ~ ~ ~ - r ninl ~:\lllrns ly thal Ile coultl 1;1kc the fior~ific-i~tion. ;\a(! ~ h Spart;~"' r \wrc coi~iitrti;~ll\ i.;l;rnd in twc-nt y clays. :In initial a s ~ ~ u Ewiis r niatl~ ;Iwanhof T he possil iiit y o I ' a ~ t a c krrtlni t h r :ltl~t.rii;in with 8on Iurplizcs a1 rhc. sclr~~hcrn eml ol*thc idand I1rt.t t hrnugh thr. sot~tht-rrl t.litr;tncc to 111t. I)ay, i ~ n r la S p a r l ; ~ n o u t p s r ht.lrl I>? tllit.2~ 1 ~ 1 c . n rsaq which it was i ~ i ~ ~ ~ c hto~ I~loc-k;itlc iblr succ*qf'irlly. r)\*r-rlmwt-i=vrI; rt>,t)uo rl~ol-rmrn ii~llowrd.tntnrly 1:or thc clcl'rl~rt-ol' hi5 posilicln D r r n n s ~ l ~ r r i t r P i ~ h rtroops itlrlrwling; ahnlil 80n a r c h r ~ WIIO s h i ~ dil ~ m ~ Icl . 1d~qrratcr ~>;irt "This Eirst-r. a t tE?r Iandwalr3 c.onridrr:iI)l~.ittlvan t R ~ tP1 ~ ~ 111'a~ily 1 ' a1-mvC1 hopf o r ~!it-a~ions i wliilq~111m l i i ~ ~ ~ s ~ l l a' l5tmall ~ ~ ~11r)cIv ~ ~ ~ l litc.; r c ~in tht. nrr.kl; tcrrai~l.Ut.rncathcnrs' tacticbwas ot'hoplitrs to fight tJr:~ssnu!~ 1)). sim;l. Thc lat~rlrt-w to await tltt- i~rl.ivnlol at lilt-k. tl~nsc.Sliartans who ha(I not fillell I-rtrr;rtrd m i t i c r i ~ lilr l ~ ~llc.buildin!: ofsieqe rt~ginvs. ill lhcir tratlititmally t l i ~ c i p l j t ~ iil'iliiol~ r~l to thr rot-! Soon alirr rhr lull irt t l ~ vliqh tir~g,chr. i\theninri at thc norllrt-1.n cnd nPtElr islanil. t v h c r ~t h r y r;tngrd ship$, no\\- n ~ ~ n t l ~ rfirfry, i n ~nr.ri\-r.d itnd ir~sprc.rt.d t hcrn.wli-t-s in ;I semi-cil+clr to f i t ~ cthe ent-my. :It t31iasituation. Scrillq no nl)pi~rtut~it> ritht*rto ctltrt' t11c. s~rmntit01' a hill, rh~irflitnks prot~ctril.the thi* bay, \vllic.li W ~ oS~ c i ~ ~ ) i r c ltlic S ~ ) ; ~ r f illrtat, ln tlrli-nrlcrs 11c.ltl ~ h c i rown urliil :t group of' liqhtlr or to ~tlakc,a I;inrlitiq at Pylrls i t h ~ wo111~1 ~v 11;tt-1' armc.rl tnc.11, rommat~clrtlhy n h~lc-ssrniancaptain. ht.rtl rln room l'nr sr, w;my \.c.sst.Ixl t!~c.yI . P ~ ~ F C * ~ !cntnt. 111) o1.t-r thc hill and 1i.H u p o t~h~r ~ nT~nm~ h r rlrwtl~tcl ~ h isl;~tlrl r nl' Protv. rear. Yo.rr.I ha1 virton- tvas assu~=rd, t hc !tt henianr Early ncxt morriin~the Sl>art;inswcrr pu(ting to l~rid off. p l ' ~ t \ ~ ) ~ i ftol g rhe Spartans that tbcy sra, i t t i c a r h a v i n ; ~I,c-auhcd iht-ir ships Tor lhr. ~iight. sut.rr.rrdcr. Rlivr m u c h cliscussicm rhc remaining W I I P I ~ t111- r\tllrtliilrls ~IISIIPCI in I I ~ H I I I 111r111: 111~' 2 9 2 mrn. I st) al' t E i r ~ rSpnrtiat~s. ~ g;~\~c* t hrmst*l\.n S p a r t a n ships urr~+r p u s h ~ dhark 10i h r shnrc am!. 1" iitw'I wcrr takrw to ;lthet~s. rx,r~~tuall?+, t hr ;!rheni;~n~ mrccrerlc+riin c;~ptusit~,q U r p i t c tilr I>rilliancco6l3emnsrl~c:ncs'tactics in fivr \,ca~t-Is ancl cornplt-tc. mnlmaricl; I)T tlir Ila?., t r l i ~ s i n qtt, clllploy liis h o p l i t ~ rin ii s i t ~ ~ a t i owllrw n

-

liqht troops coi~ldbe u m I so much morc cKec lively, it was C:l~onwho. o n returninq to Athens, took [lie praiu- fi~rso prrsrigious a victory. ancl it seclmcd that the roriuncs or (he warmongers in Athcnian politics werP irr thc. ascrnciant. RUL,two years laicr, Cleon tlird in thc rout of thc Athcnian army at :\mphiupolis. and a fi rty-yeat peace treaty was t~ccntiatcdwhich called for Athcns to hand hack thosc cities shc had annexed durinq the war, along: with t h c prisoners from Sphacteria. In return, she rtqaincd nearly all the territories she had possessed a t the commrncrment ofhcrstilities. And so the war, which had heen so acutely cxp-nsivc in h t h human and ctonomic tcrms, led only to a rcsumption of thc sratus quo, as far as Athens and Sparta wcrc cancerned. Rut Carinth, Boeotia and Mcgara were so djssatisfiecl that the reopening of hnstflitirx was incvitablrr. Scvcr;tI firmrr Spartan allics, Argra, Cot-inth, Mantinca ant1 Elis, formrd an alliancc Indcpt'wlrnlly orthc Laccclacrnonians and nrgotiatd a trr-atv with thc Athenians in 420 B.C. under the acgis of a ncw ancl influential ilthcnian st rate go^, Altil,iadrs. This state of afiii',lirswas shortlivecl for, aftrr a Spartan victory at hIantinca in 418 n.c,, the I'rloponnmian statcs rcjoinrvl thc Spartan camp and I,acdacmonian supremacy ovcr t hc Pcloponncse was once morc cstahlishcd. Under hlcibiadr~thc Athcnian qumt for mastery of the Grwk worlrl found ncw inspiration ancl the :\ssernhly, despite the opposition oi'Rlcihiadrsl fellow slrnt~gosNicinq, r a t i f ~d an amhitious scheme toconquer Sicilv, in particular t h port ~ orSyracuse. An impressive rorcr was rnustcrcd comprising 5 , m hopIitcs, 1,300 lighrly a m e d troop and a fleet of t34 triremes with a complement of a b u t 20,000 men. In addition (0 this ~hcrttwere large numbers o f supply ships and attendant vessels. Although the land force was rclativcly small, the supremacy of her fleet ovcr any Syracusan opposition gave Athens hope For victory in SiciIv. 'l'he expedition was led by Nicias, AIcihiadcs and Lamachus; but not lone: i t f i c r i~rrival in Sicily, Alcihiadcs was recallod ro face political charges, and chose instead to cr;c.apeto the Peloponnesc. 1,arnachus ~avoureda swift attack on Syracuse, hut Nicias wasted time in ft~tilc cxcrcises and the Svracusans took the opp~rtunityto orgianizc thcir drfcnccs and srnd for help to Corinth and Sparta.

TR t h r s p r i n ~nf 414 B.C. an Athenian assault gained po~qrssinno f t hr plntcau nrl.:pipoiat., which commanded the city from the wmt, ancl thcv hcgan huilclinq ;L wall running nnrth lo south ovpr the pla~rauin an attcrnpt t o cut Syracuse o r rmm the rPst or Sicily. Tlie Sywcusan op1msiltion was unallle to prcvent this ancl the siruarion was hecornins despcraw, when [he Corinthian fleet arrived, hackrd u p hv a hastily raiscd army of n,ono hop1itc.s and light troops Icd bv Cylippus. This iirmv manaarcl toseizr the nor1hern part orEpipolac and to construct a counter wall wetwarcls across the plateau, frustrating the Arhrnians and cutting;their land communications. This forced t hr: Athcnians to scnd for reinforcerncn ts, which wrrr dispalchtrl unrtrr thr mmmand nf Drrnasthcnrs and Euryrncdon. Upon his arrival, Desrnosthcnes dccidcd that an irnmecliatc. attack offvrcd thc best chancc of surrws. Hc midc a night attack o n Epipolac hut was t~ns~rcccssii~l and ~hvt-rfi,rc.dutidcd that withd r a w i ~ lwas t hc wisest c o r ~ w Drlayrcl . by Nicias' intlrcisinn, tht. hthrnian flrrt was aucldrnl y blockaclrd bv thc Syracl~sansin rhc Grrat Harbnur and, despit~a valiant attrmpr to smash thhr way through tn rrrrdorn, the armv was hrcetl t o makr a lanclwarcl retreat towtlrrls C a ~ a n i a nnrth , ot'Syracuse. 'I'hey mart-hetF in it hallow wltlarth, prnrrctrd around the outside by heavy infantry. Falrltv communications Ird to thr separation ofthr lrading division, undrr Nicias, Tram thc r w r , I d bv Demoslhenrs, and thr. fi~rcvw m sonn overtaken and massacred hy [he Syracusan army. Nicias and Demmthrnm werr cxrcutcul and rhc 7,000 survivom were imprisonrd in ~ h cstone cluarries of Svracusr, where thry sulI'errd rrrril>lleprivations in thc merciless dimate. 'Thc Symrt~sandis:1stc.s was an irnmcnsr srthack to Athenian imperinlism and her enemies were quick to lake aclvantag~of the situation. Several stales revdled, ancl Sparta kegan refurbishing her fleet with too ncw ships. Besides these developments within Greece itsell; thc Persians, on the othcr side of the Aeqean, renewed their interest in thc Ionian Grcek states. Alcibiarlm, who had tcft just bcfbrc thc fateful events at Syrarusc, was at thk timc busying himself with political machinations involving Athcns, Sparta and the satrap nS Lydia, Tissapht.rncs. Puttinq hirnselrat thc tlisposal of the Athcnians,

Alcil~iaclrsIlvlprrl thr.rn ro rrqain tt~rHrlles~~orlr :~nrl I hc Ikq)l~orus1)ul. aftrr the clrii'at cr3' an :ltIirnian flc.c.t i l t Intiurn i r ~ ,l.oI; R.c., hr. was repl;~cvd1); Chlnot~.Hritsinq 1hn1lhc. Sl);~~-t;in llr-ct unclpr L ~ ~ i l t l (W:IP I t ' ~; ~ t r ~ n ~ p l i10l l disrupt g .\11tct1inn Ponlic. tr;itlr nnrl hat1 l~c~~nonrclok I Ho ships anrl nIlit+ed hat r lc a[ :~cgosptharni. 'Thr t l ; y :ilirr he arsivvd C;c>r~c)rrlwvd n up rowal-rls thc. Sp;trt;in flret at t,ntnpsacus only to find ~ h a lLys;mndt.r rt.fuscd t n engage. ;lncF so 111c ;\I lirnians r c t u r n ~ r lro .2r.%osy,or;1mi, ~)rtrsuculby Sp;lrt;m rccounai~ssnccships. For ;I Khrthcr tour clays this escrcisr was rrpr-a1rrl ; r hr nrst dav. I lie t i t hvnians, relturnit~~ li-om ?;(.I anotlrrr u n n ~ c c c ~ ~ f ~

challengr, put ashnrr in the hay oi'Aegcspotarni to rallcc~supplies. Apprisrrt or this ;)1 his srnurs, Lysander launchrcl a wrprise attack and captured all but nine of thr: Athcnian ships, massacring ovcr 3.000 men. Connn escaped with cighl s h i p to Cyprus, and a solitary dispatch tmar m a d r its way hack to Athrns with news of thr rlisastcr. 'I'he Spartans followcd up this virtual annihilation of the Athenian Ilect by hc*sir,qin~: Athens with thc Pcloponnesian army, and, blockaded from thr sea hy the victorious Lysandrr, Athpns was obliged to negotiate a wttlerncnt. The Spartans, in a position to demand almost any terms, i n s i s t ~ l that the Long Walls and brtifications be pulled down, a11 foreign possrssions ,@vcn up, ancl Athenian control confincd to Atrira ancl Salamis. Sparta. hitherto thr champion ofindividual state autonomy in Greece ancl thc vnrrny o f Athenian imperialism, now revealed thr vrry attitudes against which she had nstensibly f c n ~ ~ h The t. oligarchic governments SIIP at~crnptcdlo impose upon sul!jcct states proved unpopular, and Sparta had considcrahle trouble maintaining her leader-

ship in Grrrk politic?, 11r the rnd at' thc Peloponnesian war thc city militias which, during the years of mnff ict, had been almost permanently mohilizrd, wcrc disbanded. Largt* numhcrs of experjencccl wlclicrs were thus seeking employmenr of some kind, and, capitalizing on their capacity as fightinx mmcn, thcy hired thcmselvcs out to anyone who would pay we11 for their services. In 401 s.c. an opportunity arose for many mercenaries to take up arms a ~ a i nin the pay of Cyrus, yorrngcr brother of the Pcrsinn king Artaxerxes. Intending to overthrow his hruthcr, Cyrus induced the cities of lonia to revolt against

the satrap Tjsaaphcmes, and rnustcrccl an infantry force aT 40,000 ( 1 o,ooo of whom wcm rnrrrcenary hoplites) together with about 3,000 cavalry. Included in this force were joo hoplitrs sent hv Sparta, well aware that she was in debt to Cvrus for aid he had supplied during the Peloponnvsian war. After marching 2,400 kiIomctrrs, Cvrus conrronted Artaxcrxta' armv at Cunaxa, north of Babylon. Artaxerxes' a m y was prnhably half ns stmng again as Cyrus' army and was rquippecl with the scytlird chariots upon which the Persians relied to break up the cncm y's formation. Cyrus' trnops allowed thr I'rrsian chariots and cavalry to p:us

t h m u ~ hthrir ~=anks rrlativcl y harn~lrsslyand thvn i~rf\vinced on the. Prrsians, many nl- whom Ilrd immcdiatcl y. Cvrus' ~ i ~ v a l rthen y charged. but in an attrmpt to rcach h i s hruthvr in ordrr to kill him ~wrsnna11yCyrtis was separa ted lkom t ht*suppnrt r ~ f his army and lost his lifi-. T h e conclusion nl'thc hattlr left both Greeks and Persians unsure oiwhat to rln next. Despite ~ h r i r victory, thc Grccks wrrc faccd with attemptins a withdrawal with many hmtile Bmians still in thv arm. The Persians, for thrir part, wcre Inath ro rngagc the Greeks but krcn to be rid or them. 'l'l~cy offrrrd tn escort them out of the country and hack m Grcccc, hut soon after the march srartrd thc Grcck gcncrals were l u r ~ daway fmm the army ancl put t o dcath and the rctrcatine soldiers were thrn atkackrd. Quick to dercnd thrrnsrlvcs, tl~cygmuperl in *2 hox fnrmatinn with hop1irt.s munr1 t l ~ r outside and, keeping the Persian cavalry and liqhr tronps at hay with slingers, ~ h rGrccks. who had maintained good order and quickly clcctrd new strate~oi,managed to reach Trapezos on thc Rlack Sra. This extraordinary rrlrtmatwrll illustratecl thr in~cnuityof Grrrk soldirrs in maximizing thcir strrn~thin the race or Tar suprrior nurnl)rss. With Cyrus dead, Tissaphcrncs attcmprrd to remtahlixh his rule in Iania, and thr Grrck cities there appraIcd to Sparta Sir pro~rction.A flcct commanded by Pisander was sent to thrir aid hut at thr battle of Cnidus in 394 R.C-it clashrd with a Patilt-orclrr nl':\lrxi~nclvr's army was clr;lwn oveslorcl ur t hz. Prrniiu~F,mp>in.. 1113 1 1 ~ clay ~ ~ in 1 rnuc.11 t h r snttw way ;ts it l ~ n d11ct.11 at r\lrxandrr prtsl~rclon clowr~ rhr Syriars romt. C;r;uiicns ant1 Issus, IJLII with i h t w i n p strt-ngtaking all tllc E'rrsian naval hmra arlrl rlicrt*l>y tilt-nrcl ant1 ; ~ ~ g l rllnrk d li-om the mait1 litrt-c. ollti~iningcomj)Irtr rtll~lroli r rhv ~ r*nstchr-tlhlrtli rcr- 13~*Iiind;I c.;~v;tlry srrckc-11 ( ~ nthr r i ~ l l twine, hc rantLan,rldvtour was made i r l l r ~T,.qpl, hi11 I,? the ~>l:lrrda ~ ) i ~ w c r f imrrrrnar): ~l force, whils~ the sumrncr or 331 R.C. Alcaantlrr hat1 Icrl l ~ i satmy rvrnaind~r01' rl~crl~c.l.r-t.n;lrics and t t ~ c1,raglrc back notthw;trrls 11trt>ughSyria 10 Thapsactw t)n it~lkr~ry ~srr~tcctrtl t h r . rr*nrh.'1'11~1c.t-t winq WRF. its thr Kttphratcs, r n rrltltc' for Ral~ylon,thr rconomic crntrc r)rt hr Empirt.. Mcanwhilt.. Ihrius, 2 hinkinq that hlrxandt=r wt~uldhead clown t l ~ l r f3upl1r;ltcs. preparvtl f i r 1 rrprat of Rrta~c~~~xcms' dvl'ral ; i t tn makc ,a dvcisivt* r l ~ a r g cinto t11r )?c*rsi;tncetllse Cutlaxa which tay a little rrorth or H;lhylori. Thr whc-rr Dsrius Itimscl I' w;w positionccl. i\s t h r two astlltr Mact.rloninn Ir-itdekr was not, l~owtlvrr.I r k I,r ;irmius apprnachrrl rach athvr, r\lrxanrl~t~'srrlrn rlrawt~intr) t h i ~trap. ;rnrl having lc monsoon climate and they rcfuscd to 30 flurt her. Alcxancl~rhad no option l ~ tut o make the journcy homeward. He consrruc~~d a f l c r t on thc Jhrlum and fbllowcd thc river to rhe mouth of the Indus, where, having established a naval station a t Pattala (Hydc.rahad), hr dividcrl his army intcr two sections and made his way hack to Susa, which h c rcached in thc sprinp, of 324 B.C. A yrar later hc moved to Babylon, his chosen capital, and began tn plan various explorations or his empire. Alexander himself ncvcr implemen tcd thrsr projects, Sir be fell ill with malaria, and on lo Junc 323 B-c., he died leaving his empire to bc fought ovcr by the strongest of his gcnrrals. In the years after his death rhe memory or Alexander merger! with romantic talcs of sup~rhumanvalorir giving rise to the myth which represents him as a demi-gd, parsuing a vision of world unity. A closer look at Alcxandet's hiatoty may suggc-qt a rather d i K ~ r t~story, n blr t even today his military prowess and indirrputablv brilliant generalship rcmain his most endllring rnonumrnt.

e8, G

d w a d q drawn f -

-

t

Sicilkan v a ~ .

- -

was a bow

and quiver darrows. Traditionally the Persians and the Meclrs scrved mainly as archers.

A 2 Pmsinn Imrnortol s p ~ n m a n 12rotn information shown in colourrtil glazed -hick rrliers in the ruins or PcncpoIis the Immortal spearman is depicted hcrr in the dress ol*thr kinx's A I Pminn stundard-h ~ m ~ r This s(anda1-d-hearer, taken rrom a paintitl~:or] a bodycuard; thry wcrr thc clite corps of the kinq's Grcck vase, wcars [he traditional woli'-skin tic-ad- bodyguard and army, and they wcrv callcd d r m 0ovr.r thr head and shoulrlrrs as a clistinction or *TmmartaIs' hcc.a~isc thcir numhrrx were never rank. Thc colnurfi~I, pat t~rncd,tir nic and trousers allowed to fall helow ro,ono, with the possjhlc madr thc standarcl-bearcr easy to recognize in addition of somc infantry and cavalry. 'l'hey ware battle. The 'uniTom* followed thc Mrdian style the Pessian style 0~1ong-skirtcd,loose-fitting tunic with close-fitting tunic and narrow slcrvcs, tight at with thc wide flowing slccvcs. The skirt was hitchcd thc wrist; under the plain short skirt, thc close- up in front with a f r i n g ~ waist l sash. I t is possihlc fitting truscm also fitt~l-tightly at the ankk. No that a claw-fit tin^ under-tunic was worn with shield was carried as both hands were required to narrow slrcves fitting rightly at the wrist (these can raise the standard, hut slung from the leu shoulder be seen crmcr~ngfrom the wide slcrve). The tunic,

lg. G m k a -r, showing pn early shield from *be inside, helm&, g m v c q swoxd, bow, quiver m d herald stpffs.

colourrt~llyd r c o r a ~ dwith floral or grornet ric '111~hair and hvard were plaited in thc Persian fashion, and rncircling thc head was a broad twisted cord lillrt. He carried the main Persian weapons, a spear and how with quivcr. h r h the bowand thcvrnatcquivrrwere hung !+om ~ h Irfi r shoulrlrr and the long, 24-mrtrc spear wizh thr pomegranate hrrt t spike was carrird in thc right hand. Far rhc officers, the hurt spikr was gil E and for the m m i t was in silver. On active svrvfce rhr Median stytc clrms wolild probably havc been

was

drsigns.

B Arnh cnmd cfit~nlry 'I'hr has-relief work in thr ruins ol' thc Palacr or Assl~rbanipalat Ninrveh shows details t~ftht.ratnclriding Arabs. The Assyrians had almost des~rnyed thc clesert nomads to which thest. camel riders belonged and had thrrehy oprned thc way Lbr rhc Persian attack and invasion r)T thcir countrv. 'The Prrsians further clrvrlopcd thc camel cavalry corps far lhoir own r~scand thc firsk-known successful operation was ;t~ainst thc RalrvIonian,

547 K C . anrl Iatrr sqainst khc clrsert nomads or Syria and Arabia. The carncI carps was oftcn a two-man unit ol' cavalry, kuing us(:y both Grceks and Pcrsisns wrrt: wrll-brcd horses of about fiurtccn to fiftccn hands and were typical o f the countries surrounding the Mediterranean at this period. The Persian cavalry used bridles that were very much the same as m d e r n onm. 'Sherc was no saddle and no stirrups; the cavalryman's only cumfbrt was a s a d d l ~dorh which was secured l,y a girth to the horse.

E r G r d ho/dir~ Thc appearanrr of' thesr hcavil y-armourcd hoplites varied from city state to city statc only by the various emblems and blazons painted on thc shicld racesand armour. Althou~hconstantly at war with each other, theyjoined forc.esto combat thc Pcmian

invasions in qge and 480 E.C. 'I'hc basic dress was the corsclet with the two shoulder piecm. the lower part ofthc body bring covcrcrl by I he Irathcr strips $ t ~ m x ~ ~Thr r ) . shield was rotind and measurtd a hour one mctre or rnclre in diametcr ; rrlirkn this had largc I ~ ~ S S P Son t l ~ vlitl)n~ in the ti~rmrjrnnirnal hrads ancl werc usvcl i11 close-quarter fiqhting 10 push against the cncrmy and crush him. Thc Clorinthian-

typc helmet was made in onc picrr with ;t larae colourcd horsehair crest. Painted hron7x grcavcs wen= warn as Icx protcrctors. Thc short thrusting: sword was carried hanj$nq from a leather strap over the right shoulder. A long spear was often used which had a hcad at ei thcr cnrl ; whrn thc shaft w a s 't>rokenthc w c a p n could br rr.vcrscd and the fight continued.

E2 Gr~tkard~rn Thc Greeks werr: not renowned Tot thrir prowcss as archers, compared with thr Persians, although same sourccs stair that thr Athenians did maintain a rqirncnt ofarchers during thc Pcmian wars. This rcconstruction is from a statue datcd r . 480 R.C. and shows an archcr in action. Hc wosc a Iion-skin head-covering-. anrl a lrathcr c o m ~ l c twith shnuldrr picc~sovcr the t radi t ianal chilnn tunic. From I hc waist hung the leather p t e r t ~ t e , ~Over . his shoulder hung the quiver which was usually very ornarcly decorated. He squatted so as to be in the best firing position. They were used in the phalanx among the hoplites and, in the p ~ i i o i ,as tight infantry.

These archen were mercenaries and, apart from rhc Scythian archers, were the only troops to be hired by the Athenians as regular light infantry. They were employed in the same capacity as slinqers and othrr l i ~ h ttmclps, c-ithcr a%p.G/ni or positioned among the hoplite heavy infantry. Their di~ltinctivc:characteristic was thc rcd chiton tunic. They worc no body arrnour and rhcir only protection was the small round bronze shicld (Jeltn), As wrll as IHIW i ~ n dquivrr of arrows i t i~

possihlc that r hey i

~ carried l ~

javelins.

m.

Greek noldiet.9 returnlnp; from battle. cmfY;n~: from the mmrnrmnratiun mnrl~lrof Salnmim. (Pirnww M u s e u m )

atrnour was made from leather with metal reinrorcemenw. Under the leather arrnour the arms and lrp wrrt: cnvcrcd with a highly-coloured thick, woven material. which was close-fitting and wa% tight at thr wrisrs and ankles. 'I'he: head wascovrrrd hv a metal helmet which came in various forms; thc one hcrr has movable chrrk-pircrs, which arc shown turned up. Weapns consisted or spear, sword or axe (bipennes). A specia! feature was the crescent-sl~apedshirld which cna bled thc soldirt t o g c t v r r y rlosc to thr cavalryman.

F I PJ~?yginnh~ary-in fnn@ mPrcPnary Thew tough mercenaries came from the north of Asia Minnr and scrvrd h t h Grcrk and Persian FP I'ursintr s / ~ c ~ r n n n maskrs. Their tunics wcrc colourful and thcir body This i s in a11 probability a Pcrsian spearman, hut as

53. Crown Prince Xcnes, detail From the Treasury Frieze Pcrsepolis. ( N a d m l M u ~ r u r n Achcns) ,

at

34. A Creek hoplite without

8

#Meld, dttpfl from a *lief.

( N a t i o p a l Muacum, Athens)

all troop or the Persian army wore the Median- aficn concealing thr lowcr jaw. The, high crown style dathes on campaign it may be a littlr di ficuit was usuaIly a sign of'rank. Equipment was the to distinguish thc regular troops from the d i t c standard shicld, quiver and h w and thc long spcar. 'Immorralq'. T h e ca1ourfi1l tunic came to midthiqh or slightly lower; trousers were worn unclcr F3 PPI.rinn oJictr the tunic and fitted very closely to thc leg and Persian officers ware a quilted type amormr over (he ankle. Various snurms stale that armour was worn rlathing, as the Persians and ,Metlrs wcre used as lightly-armed mounted archers. OfTicerx wore the Irut, as thcre is no evidence of this, i t must IH: assumed rhar it was worn tlndct the runic, a Mcdian-type campaign dress with the knee-length common p r a c t i c ~in warmer climates. Thr head tunic, and trousers. 'l'hr quiltcd armnur camc to was covcrrd by a lnosc cloth which framed the face, waist and a sash encircled the waist. A short broad-

38

sword, similar to the Creek one w m used, mainly lror thrusting, this was supported in a scallbard which hung froni a leathcr sling from ttlc left shoulcler. A turban covered the head and a cloak, which was v c y usrful an c a m p a i p , was olien worn.

G I Gwrk cnvalrynim With all the trappings or thc hoplite, the heavy cavalryman was ablr to fulfil the roles of infan tryman and horseman. Often these elite cavalrymcn cum hoplitcs woulrl ride to the site of thc battic then dismount and fight on Smt. The rtluipmrnt and arms wrrr thr samc as those oi"a 11oplitc with the exception of thc shicld; a cavalryman never carried onc. Thc typc of ht=[m~t worn IJV this cavalryman was known as 'Attic', alier the Coddcss Athene. As a11 thc q u i p m m r was purchased hy thc solcli~rs~hernsrlvcs,therc was very little uniformity. C2 ir-/t~s.~a/inn ra7vlyntan Onc of the most p o p l a r fi~urpsznkrn from Grerk vast: painting is the unualal figure o1'1hi.ThessaIiatl horseman. Thme cavalrymen carnr from thc plains of Thmsaly in the north o f Greecr, and wcre rnercenarics. This tyllical Thesalian wrars the chiton tumcd dawn to he waisl and, over his shouldrrs, a s t i f f brightly-coloured cloak. His clistincrivr Thcssalian hat was aften called a sunhat Sccause of its w r y wide brim and small crown. As all h o w m c n of that period did, h e rndc without saddle or stirrups, only a small rphippion or saddlecloth was sometimes placed on thr home's hack. 'l'he h o w was tbr usual small Mditrrranran type, extensively lrsed by thc cavalry at this time. Spears nr javelins were carricd. G3 Amnured i v f i n ! ~ Rofilif~ TIIOU~IF the appearance of the hoplites varied with

the pcrsonal taste or the individual the basic equipmmt prevailed, the metal or lrathrr Irasrrl torselel over the clrr'ton, shown here, with thr addition o f a cloak. T h c large round shicld jaspir) had a blazon painted on, with a small canopy attached to guard thc Icgs from sword or spear thrusts. Bronze grcavcs werc worn. On the h a d was the Ionic helrnrt which had a fixed nose-piece and two hinged check-picces: the fixed crest was a tnlourcrl horsvtail.

H I . Hz, H-7 Cret-k I I Y ~ O U T Pinfi~n!~_l ~ 'I'hese qoldiers camr rrom t h e Grcek city states 01' Athens, Sparta, Tl~ehcsor Corinr h. A1though 111err was deep enmity between them they sallied to2e:erhprwhrn th(-Prrsians invadrd. At t h e battle ol' Marathon in 490 B.c.,with thc phalanx ol' thr A1lleniar1 l~c~pliws, they dcfcawd thc. Prrsian arc11rr-s who w t w ac-claimed as the Iwst in tIlr. world. At thr l~attlrof Thcrnmopylar 300 Spartan (HP)hoplites hrlcl nul for thrrr days against a fierce t ou times greatpr in numhcr, until all werc k i 3 l d . T h e hoplitr's main squipmcnt rrrnained the cuirass or corseler which covcrrd thr rrppr pa~tof thc M y , made of metal or some flrxi1,lc maai.rial onftr which metal strips werr altachrd. The shield had a rnctal arm-loop inside, at thr ucntrc, thmuqh which the left arm was pushcd up to thc rlhow, ancl a m r h l handle near the rim. Hrlrnrts wcrc ust~alty onc of three types : Doric, cornplctrly closecl with slats For thc ryes, Corinthian, madr in cjnc pirce with Iixccl nose alicl cherk-pirctms, r,r lonir, witl-t movahlc cheek pieces. These helrncts nearly always had crmts, though later ones were worn without crcxts. Metal greaves, sandals and hoots were worn. Thc lung spcars wrrc not thrown, hut were uscd as thrusting weapons, either from almve to the neck, or from 1x10~ to the point under the cuira~q.'I'hc short .word or dagger was used as a ttlsus~ingrat h ~ r than a cutting wcapon.

:I Iln arthrr.cni~rhanruln xrc. rl'llr~ v:ur Crrrqur. .?yr I1.r:. *-a blilriarlrr. lc cornrnnndani Grrcquc r m p n n u h l c dc la vicroirc tlt Muwll~on.c3 'Ti.tr d'un wcrrirr C r m q u c pnrraeil un caquc l h t r . 14 RrlirTrl';'ll~x;lnrl45 ~ r r p h a r m

d l . l w ~ r > ~ nla a ~h~r t r c n r r r Ira p r r r i r n M a r h l a u ~ i c ~c~i t I ' m r s . 15 Bar-rrlirf r l u yrntr qiirlr. nio#ilran\ I- : b ~ ~ r m q t*~all;iquenq i I- Arahr%~ I ~ I I T +-3 IKIPT I,~III c% 'S.kriw',

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nt Uravurr N u n phalanx datant d u tfinr Jklr. p.A r r h r r p n a n t u n b n CI l'hrv.~lr.n, u;uc r,~y, n.r:.T*a x r t h r n i t ~ i r n uuliria t par Alcxx~lrlrrrn q : ~R. ~ I xrll,ullr- Iwwr ~lr*lirlgurlrrn n n c ; il rrl. tmrlr IKIX (14' ~YJII{ LIT ~.mr11 h w i n dc w?i 11rux nlirinr prr E1iv1.r tr rIr.lprau. k z tan4 irr rrrr ' I m n l r w \ ~ t ' 11:llbili r n m ~ ; ~ * du d c n g r p r i l l nli: ilr 6hictu :qllrli.u ximi car ilr ~~'avuifritIM Ic rlrrrlr rldhr l ~ t i ~ i r r t ~ r r r n ~ i r 1rrI vr I~III -FZew~$;m'1 lrml,n..14 U v h r l \,~btb.\tcx:\rulvm 1.3 t biirkoph.1~ rilit,nl Kimirlld ~ w i w h r nn ~ i ~ ~ w l o r ~ lint1 i w h p-miu-l\rr~ ~n Kriqrm dsm!rlla-ntl. t 5 lb.m-~u-!ir~ di*t~r7. Jiif>rb~u~icie.rt, Aswrirr ~ r r i l r:1mIx1 t~ ;ill( vi11v11 K.*tnrl II~~II~PI?: arb. r 6 D ~ I . ~ I dI r r 'C:~~.~t~roin.wcl~i.a'-Frirqe%' rut jirqrl~llial~l~vr It ~ q ~ I ~ t ~ * - S u ~ t ~ i l r i - F n ti tf ~tr;ar t~i r~cmt i i ~ - h Krlrqc1 rr nlrl ~II~M I1dn1 ti11d r u ~ r t a l ~ , r 5r ~~ I i i t l i .m 8 ,,.I! l'rwwrhrr t l?ltu. i!w%*,(,:l~r. I s 1 '~III Hrtn~. i z t ~ r t i ~ ~ ~ u r'.(:hr. b r r i ~,rrICmliiwhcr 1Irlm; .(, jahrl~utmla+rbv.I Ilr. .rl; I . r ~ , ~ - l r i ~ l1rl111. . l ~ r ~ IN^ jrn r.t:hr. sg 1k-tail r-irwr V i ~ wi l l 1 5 rlrm 5. j.r ttrlr~~trrlr :r..( :hr.I tnil v r t v l l i ~ . t l r n r nIV;~lla-rr1111rl. I l l ~ k l l . i r l a l m i + < ~ t ~ ( ~1:inSlir.h k ~ * . ~ ;trlrtlrrri ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ , t i ~: v111rt r l r ~I~> ~I ~ :r < I r r~ ~~ I'LI.II,WIIX ~ ! ~nmt >dIr In ~ ~ ~\~C n~I rn I '~ S :*t t~ i ~I~ t - l

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or Stirh rinrr Phalmx rros d r m t7. j r h r h u d ~ r t .pn F.in hynuhuzre mil p h v y i r h r r Mu47.r: r l a c l ~ r i n r r Vnwrr, 535 \,.Chr. Alrxandrr srlerr dim- Krirqrr qr+ut - ( :hr. cir~.Q Phrirvgiwlw ?ic.hilrlrr, Ktlrhrr unfl R ~ ~ n r liq r .l'l~~~buIIrlnrv. &rqm, I l i l r n n r . K ( r h r r , t Irnlrl, .k~tunrl WnrRpr.rr. I ' m i w h r rrispprn I~rnlbtztrnviek a L 1 a - w ~ < ~ ~ ~ c ~ ~ ~ a5 t d rl l~t lr ri . ~ l ~ i Ku,1cgthr w ~ ~ ~1 ~r ~i 1~iort*c-l~r 1 H r l ~ n ,Srhillt rrrltl kurza.rlr 3%-hwrr~. 16 l'hrl~:in~-a-ht+r4e,llilrl mlr I h q r l ~t l u l l l li~rhrr7 . I;ril.chiwk,~r F;rirprr: n ~ r eillrlll ! ~ ]'lartik rn clnrr Kunrtllsllr ln Flqnrrn~.-zR ;"~LII~\L bwr L r ~ r ~ vnitt-11 r : riwr Vxw . t r ~Si>.ilirtb. q (;riecl~~whrr Ilarrrrsrtt. 30 I:rzccl~iuchrr ~I'n,mprrrr. ,nit r i r r r r n Srlvilrl alavem hinE rillt R 1 ~ ~ Thj m l r 15~411% llutr I~rrrlh. 3F Prniu-hr Solalatrn mrh r i n r r r>n~*lrllum~r: in den Ruincn zu Pcrsrlk ~s li;rirrhivE~r % ~ l ( l . t t rit11f ~ ~ ctrtn Kiirkkctn n:trl~rrincr % hlarht. Nar I clnmm h l a r m ~ a r - I k n l ~ ~i rni S i l r l m i n . 33 Krr,llljrlnr Yrrxcx; n a r l ~ rlrlir ScllstzkanlmrI . r ~ r - r ; I'rrwtx~lis C;rlec:hi* tb.t I~O~LILIT.

CI (;ymnrI, Ii~i-rrrtibnrvrimccr lr rrurvfli~rn h a r r r l m t I'mrmi. Cn Iloplilr, i n h b r r i r itrvm u r ii n nI I i nac I I i I m ip ir n ruurliir t r n i l ~ 11111' I'kwnllnr (lr m n rhlr p r ~ r f l r I.r s Iloplitnr rl:linll rrntrnlrnk p u r rmr sol~tlr l,.I,.. .I 1;1k'1I.1 n qL. 187 : 2 I I 74 : t-m j:~.,? -li' I ;I 'bh;.,~ 1 -:I9-:I I 17 It p, i.+1 %, , 111 p1 t - $ , t< I~I~+~.O. .. ' r, i 20 r.1 -7 8 .,-,l b T:,V -,.tC, ,I 'b*v,.~:; 225 11.I i~ r , ::!.+. 70 I -:,i~r-I-, ! ''4 ..I!. 216 I!,,, lI>*,; ;117, 130 ' i , , ~,n- .#,,a* 167 t-r .lnq>*.,*. -1.i . y t6f:'J =. 96 I>,:a ii~,lpnlr, T.TK,.>, 206 I I . . ~ . ( ~ , ~ l :~l.n ~ r,~ I ?'c y IF 226 T~.~.A:T,F:~~.;.~$A),I~ A:.! 10: 96 AI:!IIP,-/ I 44 ,1rrr,vr-t, 77 I Il?..(>. ! t " T i 17'VI~ .,rk I 7& 1 1 , 9,*>: :t-.!Y! !2:f$a-:,,:l 114 1 !-m.k,r>':t.r. "IT:',.'.'.-

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4 8 Wol!r'rA-rrv hr?c.n:ai WimxIlaid Indnns I'r t rh h r w y In h A r c r 1 rcnrb ~nA n c * W.\I hncl C.rrcr?.!W;151..rror's A m y II I 1775.

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T~tle Jhr contkued an IruMe b m k c m r